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Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 October 2013

Stephen G. Brooks
Stephen G. Brooks*
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. E-mail: stephen.g.brooks@dartmouth.edu
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Abstract

Political scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process. In the past few years, a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace. All of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not. I advance two contrary arguments. At least among the advanced states, I posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference. All of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization. In particular, I show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras. My second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace. I posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization—the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe—now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders.

Type
Review Essay
Information
International Organization , Volume 67 , Issue 4 , October 2013 , pp. 863 - 888
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2013 

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