¹ These writers arc discussed in Hinsley, F. H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 13–91Google Scholar.

² Ibid., p. 126.

³ Yalem, Ronald J., “The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965: A Survey of the Literature,” Background, 05 1966 (Vol. 10, No. 1), p. 40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Cartwright, Dorwin and Zander, Alvin, eds., Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. viiGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Easton, David, A Framework, for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 8Google Scholar.

⁷ Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (Chandler Publications in Anthropology and Sociology) (San Francisco, Calif: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 63–65Google Scholar.

⁸ For similar criticisms of another recently published work in the field of international organization see Rowe, Edward T., “The United States and International Organization,” International Organization, Summer 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 3), pp. 590–591CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Knight, Jonathan, “On the Influence of the Secretary-General: Can We Know What It Is?” International Organization, Summer 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 3), p. 594CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ The point is suggested by Berger, Peter L. and Luckmann, Thomas, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 23Google Scholar.

¹¹ These questions are raised and considered by Wolin, Sheldon S. in his discussion of “Paradigms and Political Theories,” in King, Preston and Parekh, B. C., eds., Politics and Experience: Essays Presented to Professor Michael Oakeshott on the Occasion of his Retirement (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 125–152Google Scholar.

¹² There are, however, a number of articles which examine the case for the scientific study of political science. See Wolin, , in King, and Parekh, , and his more recent essay, “Political Theory as a Vocation,” American Political Science Review, 12 1969 (Vol. 63, No. 4), pp. 1062–1082CrossRefGoogle Scholar, along with three articles by Gunnell, John G.: “Social Science and Political Reality: The Problem of Explanation,” Social Research, Spring 1968 (Vol. 35, No. 1), pp. 159–201Google Scholar; “The Idea of the Conceptual Framework: A Philosophical Critique,” Journal of Comparative Administration, 08 1969 (Vol. 1, No. 2), pp. 140–176CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry,” American Political Science Review, 12 1969 (Vol. 63, No. 4), pp. 1233–1246Google Scholar.

There are, of course, innumerable essays arguing the virtues and vices of the “behavioral revolution” in political science, but they are more monuments to confusion than epitaphs to success. Representative is the so-called debate between Hedley Bull (“International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach”) and Morton Kaplan (“The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations”), reprinted in Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 20–61. In the same volume Marion Levy (“‘Does It Matter if He's Naked?’ Bawled the Child”) has some useful things to say about this “debate.” His own view of the science game, “it has to do with a set of generalized propositions containing variables, hopefully with deductive interdependencies among the members of the set” (p. 92), is open to the objection that there is no reason why logical empiricism should be the standard for judging the infinite array of scientific explanations in both the natural and social sciences.

¹³ Dowse, Robert E., “A Functionalist's Logic,” World Politics, 07 1966 (Vol. 18, No. 4), p. 622CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Gunnell, , Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 163Google Scholar. Gunnell's comments are made in the context of describing a position which he strongly criticizes.

¹⁵ For comments on the importance of prediction see, for example: Singer, J. David, “The Incompleat Theorist: Insight without Evidence,” in Knorr, and Rosenau, , pp. 62–63Google Scholar; Allison, Graham, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science Review, 09 1969 (Vol. 64, No. 3), pp. 690–691Google Scholar; Homans, George C., The Nature of Social Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 3–31Google Scholar; Van Dyke, Vernon, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 42–51Google Scholar; Golembiewski, Robert T. et al. , A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), pp. 12–13Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Sec the works by Easton, Homans, Van Dyke, and Golembiewski et al. cited above; Dahl, Robert, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1963)Google Scholar; Eulau, Heinz, The Behaviorial Persuasion in Politics (Studies in Political Science, PS 42) (New York: Random House, 1963)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Cf., Eulau, p. 9.

¹⁸ Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 8. “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.” Planck, Max, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. Gaynor, F. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 33–34Google Scholar, quoted in ibid., p. 150.

²⁰ The structure of the general argument that follows draws on Wolin, in King and Parekh, pp. 139–147. At this point I should make it clear that by science I mean an activity that has as its purpose the explanation of phenomena within its subject-matter domain and provides explanation in a reasoned manner (cf., Rescher, Nicholas, Scientific Explanation [New York: Free Press, 1970], pp. 164–165Google Scholar). What counts for explanation, limits the subject-matter, and passes as reasoned cannot be stipulated outside the context of the particular activity, whether political science, history, physics, or astronomy (see Gunnell, , American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, p. 1239Google Scholar).

²¹ See Dunn, Frederick S., The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929)Google Scholar; Fleming, Denna Frank, The United States and World Organization, 1920–1933 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938)Google Scholar; Hudson, Manley O., The Permanent Court of International Justice, A Treatise (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934)Google Scholar; Ellis, Charles Howard, in collaboration with Zilliacus, Kodne, The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1929)Google Scholar; Potter, Pitman B., An Introduction to the Study of International Organization (Century Political Science Series) (New York: Century Co., 1922)Google Scholar; Zimmern, Alfred, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1981–1935 (London: Macmillan Co., 1936)Google Scholar; Morley, Felix, The Society of Nations, Its Organization and Constitutional Development (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1932)Google Scholar; Reinsch, Paul S., Public International Unions, Their Work, and Organization: A Study of International Administrative Law (Boston: Ginn and Co. [for the World Peace Foundation], 1911)Google Scholar.

²² Kuhn, p. 2.

²³ Ibid., p. 25.

²⁴ This list of research interests is taken from article titles in Alger's, Chadwick F. “Research on Research: A Decade of Quantitative and Field Research on International Organizations,” International Organization, Summer 1970 (Vol. 24, No. 3)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The full citations are at pp. 445–446.

²⁵ Kuhn, p. 10.

²⁶ The criteria are suggested by Kuhn, p. 10.

²⁷ Rousseau, Jean Jacques, A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and the State of War, trans. Vaughan, C. E. (London: Constable and Co., 1917), pp. 126–127Google Scholar.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 122.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 48. See also Hinsley, pp. 46–61; Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (Topical Studies in International Relations No. 2) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 172–186Google Scholar.

³¹ Rousseau, p. 72.

³² Ibid., p. 88.

³³ Ibid., p. 91.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 112.

³⁶ Hinsley, p. 40.

³⁷ Potter, p. 17.

³⁸ Zimmern, pp. 283–284, emphasis in text.

³⁹ Claude, Inis L. Jr, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (3rd rev. ed.; New York: Random House, 1964), p. 12Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Goodspeed, Stephen S., The Nature and Function of International Organization (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 9–10Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Falk, Richard A. and Hanreider, Wolfram, eds., International Law and Organization: An Introductory Reader (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1968), p. 1Google Scholar.

⁴² Charter of the United Nations, preamble, and article 2, paragraph 1.

⁴³ Scriven, Michael, “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation,” in Gardiner, Patrick, ed., Theories of History: Readings from Classical and Contemporary Sources (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1959), p. 468Google Scholar. The remainder of this paragraph follows the logic and language of Scriven.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 468.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 469.

⁴⁶ See Kaplan, p. 73; Euben, J. Peter, “Political Science and Political Science,” in Green, Philip and Levinson, Sanford, eds., Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 32–37Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ For example, on function see Dowse, , World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 607–622CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on system see Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 52–68Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Marion J. Levy, Jr., in Knorr and Rosenau, p. 99.