¹ The Indian diplomats interviewed included: 1) officials in the United Nations division of the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi; 2) four of India's permanent representatives to the UN; 3) officials in the Indian Mission in New York; 4) Indian officials in the UN Secretariat; 5) Indian delegates participating in the 21st and 22nd sessions of the General Assembly. The term “officials” generally indicates the most senior persons except in some cases where the author was given the impression, both by Indian and other diplomats, that a less senior person had played a more prominent role during the actual discussion of a particular issue.

² Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (N.p: Publications Division, Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), p. 183Google Scholar.

³ Ibid., p. 165.

⁴ Ibid., p. 173.

⁵ Ibid., p. 174.

⁶ Constituent Assembly Debates, 1948 (Vol. 3, No. 2), p. 1767Google Scholar.

⁷ Cited in The Hindu Weekly Review (Madras), 06 13, 1952Google Scholar.

⁸ See Rana, A. P., “The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Non-Alignment,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 02 1969 (Vol. 28, No. 2), p. 302CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi, “India's Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 04 1956 (Vol. 34, No. 3), P. 435CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Cited in The Hindu Weekly Review, August 18, 1953.

¹¹ Constituent Assembly Debates, 1947 (Vol. 2, No. 5), p. 1262Google Scholar.

¹² General Assembly Official Records (15th session), 906th meeting, October 17, 1960, p. 752.

¹³ Ibid., p. 751.

¹⁴ Nehru's broadcast from London on January 12, 1951. See Nehru, p. 185.

¹⁵ Cited in Nehru, p. 79.

¹⁶ For this and other similar statements see Prasad, Bimla, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885–1947 (Calcutta: Bookland Private, 1960), pp. 281–283Google Scholar. Also see Kavic, Lorne J., India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 21–45Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Cited in The Hindu Weekly Review, February 16, 1948.

¹⁸ Cited in Amrita Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta), 06 27, 1953Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See Chawla, S., The United Nations and the Indian National Interest (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958), p. 13Google Scholar.

²⁰ Nehru, Jawaharlal, Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches, 1946–1949 (Delhi: Publications Division, 1949), pp. 268–281Google Scholar.

²¹ Cited in Poplai, S. L. (ed.), Select Documents on Asian Affairs: India, 1947–50, Vol. 2: External Affairs (London: Oxford University Press [under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs], 1959). P. 662Google Scholar.

²² Each major decision of the Conference happily refers to the United Nations and to world problems…. We believe that from Bandung our great organisation, the United Nations, has derived strength.

Lok Sabha Debates, Part 2: Proceedings Other than Questions and Answers, 04 30, 1955 (Vol. 4, No. 53), column 6973Google Scholar.

²³ Lok. Sabha Debates, Part 2: Proceedings Other than Questions and Answers, 03 3, 1955 (Vol. 2, No. 30), columns 3892–3893Google Scholar.

²⁴ Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 1770.

²⁵ See . MrsPandit, Vijaya Lakshmi, General Assembly Official Records (1st session), 37th meeting, October 24, 1946, p. 709Google Scholar.

²⁶ See Keohane, Robert Owen, International Conciliation: Political Influence in the General Assembly, 03 1966 (No. 557)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 1764.

²⁸ Resolution adopted by the Indian Constituent Assembly on December 13, 1946. Constituent Assembly Debates, 1946–1947 (Vol. 1, No. 5), pp. 57–65Google Scholar.

²⁹ The Indian delegate told the conference:

All of us who are called the smaller nations recognize, the essential features and the basis of this Conference, while we realize that the main responsibility is on the great powers, I should like humbly to suggest to the great powers themselves that they also serve who only stand and wait; that the smaller nations who have contributed a little one way or the other may also at times of stress be not altogether a negligible factor….

Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945 (hereafter cited as UNCIO), Vol. 1: General(London: United Nations Information Organizations [in cooperation with the Library of Congress], 1945), pp. 244–245Google Scholar.

³⁰ UNCIO, Vol. 3: Dumbarton Oaks, 12 2, 05 4, 1945, pp. 527–532Google Scholar.

³¹ Addressing the San Francisco conference Sir Ramaswamy Madaliar said: “Next in strength to the armies of these four great inviting powers, is the strength of the Army of India which is fighting the aggressor nations today.” UNCIO, Vol. 1, 12 22, 04 22, 1945, p. 244Google Scholar.

³² “I am not a pacifist,” said Nehru in a broadcast from London. “Unhappily, the world of today finds that it cannot do without force. We have to protect ourselves and to prepare ourselves for every contingency.” Cited in Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, p. 79.

³³ The Indian delegation wanted the following paragraph to be added to the report of the committee 111/3 on chapter XII of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals:

It should be stressed that during the debate the representatives of the sponsoring powers made it clear that they were neither prepared to accept any modification to the Yalta formula, nor to agree to a more liberal interpretation thereof than that contained in their Joint Declaration of June 7, 1945, and that any unfavorable action of the Committee on the voting formula would imperil the whole work of the Conference. It was on this understanding that many delegations voted for or abstained from voting against the Yalta formula.

UNCIO, Vol. 11: Commission III; Security Council, Document 1150, June 22, 1945, p. 174.

³⁴ Summing up India's attitude in these matters Nehru said in a foreign affairs debate in the Council of States on December 21, 1960:

The whole concept of the United Nations when it started 15 years ago was to take the world as it is, with its conflicts and its differences and help bring it together. The idea of unanimity in the Security Council in respect of the five permanent members was based on this. It was realized that the permanent members differed from each other,…that it was not possible for some of the great powers to condemn…another great power, because that meant war. But if the United Nations at the instance of one or two great powers, puts in the dock another great power, the result is likely to be conflict. Therefore, it was laid down in the Charter, something that is not democratic, that is not in a sense logical, nevertheless it was practical recognition of the world as it was and as it is.

See Rajya Sabha Debates, 1960 (Vol. 31, No. 17)Google Scholar, columns 2946–2947.

³⁵ See Indian Act 43 in the Gazette of India (New Delhi: Government of India Press), 12 20, 1947Google Scholar.

³⁶ Cited in The Hindu Weekly Review, June 25, 1957.

³⁷ In the Korean war India played a major role as an intermediary.… She was more successful in urging the ending of hostilities than in proposing a solution for the fundamental conflict of interest, and she was useful in the settlement of the prisoner of war issue. In the Formosa crisis, her appeals to the parties to use common sense and recognize reality were those of a mediator.… In the Indo-China crisis of 1954, Mr. Nehru's settlement formula… was a constructive contribution to an uneasy settlement. In the Suez crisis of 1956 and 1957 India's services, often only as a messenger, proved helpful in many ways.

Levi, Werner, “The Evolution of India's Foreign Policy,” The Year Bool of World Affairs, 1958, Vol. 12 (London: Stevens 8t Sons [under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs], 1958), pp. 119–120Google Scholar.

³⁸ An ex-colonel of the Indian troops in UN forces gave two instances of how participation in UN peacekeeping activities had added to the “profits” of the Indian government.

1) The Indian government, unlike some others who contributed direct recruits to the UN peacekeeping forces, dispatched troops from its regular army. To enable it to raise compensatory units at home it was paid by the United Nations in accordance with the international standard of army allowances which are higher than those paid to the regular Indian army.

2) On more than one occasion the government of India had sold its old “wares,” e.g., trucks and hospital equipment, at the current rates. Such deals were made possible by the fact that most of the UN peacekeeping units had been raised on short notice.

³⁹ See UN Document A/3694 and Add.1 (United Nations Emergency Force: Report by the Secretary-General).

⁴⁰ UN Document S/4029 (Report by the Secretary-General on Interpretation of Security Council's Decision to Dispatch an Observation Group to Lebanon) and UN Document S/4040 and Corr.1 and Add.1 (First Report of UNOGIL).

⁴¹ See UN Document S/4841 and Add.1–3 (Report by the Secretary-General on the Interpretation of Security Council Resolution of February 21, 1961).

⁴² UN Document S/7001 (Report by the Secretary-General on UN Operations in Cyprus).

⁴³ The delegate accustomed to more traditional forms of diplomacy may be inclined to overlook elements in United Nations diplomatic method that are necessary for the achievement of his tasks. For example, he may confine his contacts with delegations to the ambassadorial level. But within the United Nations, the interplay is as much between delegations as between leaders of delegations. Within each delegation individuals are assigned particular tasks, and to some extent they develop areas of specialty upon which their delegation leaders place considerable reliance. Depending upon the category of issue that is being considered, there are, sometimes, informal leaders within a delegation whose influence is substantial in determining the policy attitudes of a delegation.… Successful negotiation between delegations should involve contact at every level so as to provide useful intelligence on the latitude of instructions given to delegations, and therefore the areas within which an accommodation of viewpoints can be negotiated.

Hovet, Thomas Jr, “United Nations Diplomacy,” Journal of International Affairs, 1963 (Vol. 17, No. 1), P. 39Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ See “Nehru and the United Nations” (extracts of an exchange of letters between MrNehru, and SirRau, B. N., India's representative to the Security Council in 1950–1951), The Statesman Overseas Weekly (Calcutta), 12 11, 1965Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Replying B. N. Rau's letter indicating that the United States “threw out feelers to ascertain whether India would accept a permanent seat in the Security Council, ousting China” and recalling India's attitude toward the Korean crisis and China's involvement therein, Nehru wrote:

It would do us little good and it would bring a great deal of trouble in its train.… India, because of many factors is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of China.

(Ibid., p. 6.)

⁴⁶ From author's informal interview with Menon in New Delhi on August 27, 1967.

⁴⁷ Putting it rather mildly John Foster Dulles told the House of Representatives Appropriation Committee on February 10, 1956: “The domestic policy in India is not pro-Communist although their international policy tends in the other direction.” In not so mild a statement a top-ranking Department of State official closely associated with the United States Mission to the UN said in an informal discussion with the author in January 1967:

We [the United States] have to use all our persuasion to make them [the Indians] even listen to us. But they seem to run for their lives if the Russians do so much as thump the table.

He was commenting upon India's “pro-Soviet” attitude during the recent peacekeeping discussions at the United Nations but had earlier expressed the general feeling of discontent among the American diplomats about Menon's handling of the Indian delegation.

⁴⁸ Parliamentary Debates, 1953 (Vol. 8, Part 2), columns 3985–3986Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ For the texts of the correspondence see UN Documents S/4059, S/4064, S/4067, S/4071, S/4072, and S/4079.

⁵⁰ General Assembly Official Records (5th session), 286th meeting, September 27, 1950, p, 134.

⁵¹ Asked who would be victorious if. the Korean War ended, Nehru said: “It would be a resounding victory for either side. It would be a settlement between the two for the benefit of the world.” The Hindu Weekly Review, June 26, 1953.

⁵² General Assembly Official Records (8th session), 448th meeting, September 28, 1953, pp. 196–201.

⁵³ Lok Sabha Debates, 1955 (Vol. 2)Google Scholar, column 3895. Also see The Hindu Weekly Review, April 1, 1955.

⁵⁴ General Assembly Official Records (8th session), 448th meeting, p. 200.

⁵⁵ See Kashmir and the United Nations (New Delhi: Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 1964)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ See Sisir Gupta, , Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House [under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs], 1966), pp. 442–443Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Talking to the Indian journalists after his visit to the Soviet Union, India's defense minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, said on October 31, 1968:

With regard to relations between India and Pakistan, the Soviet position continues to be the same as obtained during the time of the Tashkent declaration. We in India also accept the position that all differences between India and Pakistan should be resolved bilaterally by the two countries through peaceful means.

The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 11 1, 1968Google Scholar.

⁵³ In sum the leaders and members of the Soviet delegation conducted themselves in the manner of representatives of an imperial power in their relations with a dependency. They did not observe even elementary diplomatic courtesies as they brushed aside one Indian query after another and studiously refused to offer any satisfaction to the host country on any matter of concern to it. Whether the issue was the supply of Soviet arms for Pakistan or Moscow's stand on Kashmir, or the malicious propaganda against leading Indians by a Unit of Moscow Radio which has been named Radio Peace Progress, or the generous cartographic concessions to China regarding its borders with India, the Soviet delegation…was generally evasive, non-committal and even rude.

See Jain, Girilal, “Indo-Soviet Relations: Need for Cool Appraisal,” Times of India (New Delhi), 09 26, 1968, p. 6Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ In an “off-stage” report of the Indo-Soviet talks of September 1968 a leading newspaper commented thus on the “Chill Contact between India and Russia”:

Spellbound the Indian delegation listened in silence to the Soviet delegation feeling disappointed that Mr. Firyubin did not make even a passing reference to India's abstention in the Security Council vote on a resolution condemning Russia. However, there was a sigh of relief when the Soviet delegation did not bring up the resolution passed in Parliament in praise of Czechoslovakia's national struggle. The Indian delegation was expecting this point to be raised because some days earlier the Soviet ambassador in New Delhi had met the Prime Minister to seek clarification about the resolution.

The Statesman (New Delhi), 09 24, 1968, p. 6Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ According to a senior (non-Indian) official in the UN Secretariat there were informal discussions at the United Nations during the latest Indo-Pakistan conflict, in 1965, about changing the nature and form of the UN presence in Kashmir from a merely interpository to a more positive role. “Not a single country was prepared to offer troops for such a venture,” he said.

⁶¹ “The Administration in private saw no reason to run major risks–political or military–in an affair deemed essentially beyond the U.S. reach. Indeed, the attitude at key levels within the Administration was one of cool detachment. These things happen,” remarked one State Department official.… The dominant mood of the Administration, then, was to resume the dialogue with the Soviets as soon as the opportunity presented itself. “The best course for the United States now is to deal with issues, not emotions,” said one official. “Whatever happens in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union may be looking soon for an opportunity to rebuild its image. The task for us is to exact the maximum price it will pay.”

Newsweek, September 2, 1968, p. 21.

⁶² See Mrs. Gandhi's statement on August 22, 1968, Lok. Sabha Debates, 1968 (Vol. 20), columns 460–461Google Scholar.

⁶³ In an informal interview with a group of Indian scholars in New Delhi in September 1968 the Czechoslovakian chargé d'affaires gave a broad résumé of his conversation with the Indian foreign secretary held at the latter's request. The Czechoslovakian diplomat had earlier expressed his “personal” disappointment at India's sympathy for the people of Czechoslovakia and the Indian government's abstention over the Security Council resolution censuring the Soviet Union. The Indian foreign secretary seems to have succeeded in convincing the Czechoslovakian diplomat that India's move was inspired by “wisdom” and not by “cleverness.” It was not the Indian government's desire to keep the Soviet Union in good humor which led it to abstain. It did so in the hope that its abstention might enable it “to be of help” if the United Nations decided to take some steps toward the solution of the crisis.

⁶⁴ Without giving a precise definition of the term “pressure” an African delegate mentioned two types and in the process explained the term itself.

One type of “pressure” is that which is commonly attributed to the United States and the other is that to which the delegations at the United Nations are subjected because of the total strategy which their governments have selected for themselves, the political commitments they have made, and the diplomatic postures they have adopted in the past.

To illustrate the first type, i.e., the one which the United States is supposed to exert in its dealings with lesser powers, he cited an example in which the near majority vote in favor of a particular judge in his election to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was, within twenty-four hours, “pressed” into the election of another judge apparendy patronized by the United States. To substantiate the second type he mentioned how the Mauritanian delegate who had made a scathing attack on all the Great Powers during the recent peacekeeping discussions at the United Nations was quietly “whisked away” from New York before he could repeat the performance.

⁶⁵ General Assembly Resolution 2153B (XXI) of November 17, 1966.

⁶⁶ Cited in The New York, Times, December 1, 1966.

⁶⁷ Surveying the evolution of the diplomatic method in the United Nations, it appears that the process has evolved from one which stressed public or conference diplomacy to one which stresses private or quiet diplomacy.

Hovet, , Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 30Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Lok Sabha Debates, 1958 (Vol. 18, No. 8), column 1903Google Scholar.