Robert, Axelrod. 1970. Conflict of interest. Chicago: Markham.
John, Banzhaf III,. 1965. Weighted voting doesn't work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review 19:317–43.
Brams, Stephen J., and Paul J., Affuso. 1985. New paradoxes of voting power in the EC Council of Ministers. Electoral Studies 4:134–39.
Volker, Eichener. 1993. Social dumping or innovative regulation? Process and outcomes of European decision-making in the sector of health and safety at work harmonization. Working paper no. 92/28, European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
Barry, Eichengreen. 1992. Should the Maastricht Treaty be saved? Princeton Studies in International finance working paper. Princeton, N.J.: International Finance Section.
Peter, Evans, Jacobson, Harold, and Putnam, Robert, eds. 1993. Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Geoffrey, Garrett. 1992. International cooperation and institutional choice. International Organization 46:533–60.
Geoffrey, Garrett. 1995. From the Luxembourg compromise to codecision: Decision making in the European Union. Electoral Studies 14 (3): 289–308.
Hosli, Madeleine O. 1993. The admission of the European Free Trade Association states to the European Community. International Organization 47:629–43.
Francis, Jacobs, Richard, Corbett, and Michael, Shackleton. 1992. The European Parliament. 2d edEssex, England: Longman.
Johnston, R. J. 1995. The conflict over qualified majority voting in the European Council of Ministers: An analysis of the UK negotiating stance using power indices. British Journal of Political Science 25:245–54.
Johnston, R. J., and Hunt, A. J.. 1995. Voting power in the EEC's Council of Ministers. Geoforum 8:1–9.
Jan-Erik, Lane, and Reinert, Moeland. 1995. Voting power under the EU constitution. Journal of Theoretical Politics 7:223–30.
Arend, Lijphart. 1984. Democracies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Giandomenico, Majone. 1993. The European Community between social policy and social regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies 31:153–70.
Lisa, Martin. 1993. International and domestic institutions in the EMU process. Economics and Politics 5:125–44.
Andrew, Moravcsik. 1991. Negotiating the Single European Act. International Organization 45:651–88.
Andrew, Moravcsik. 1993. Preferences and power in the European Community. Journal of Common Market Studies 31:473–524.
William, Nicoll, and Salmon, Trevor C.. 1994. Understanding the new European Community. Hemel Hempstead, United Kingdom: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
Emile, Noël. 1995. Towards a new institutional balance of power. In What future for the European Commission? Edited by Davignon, Etienne, Ersbøll, Niels, Lamers, Karl, Martin, David, Noël, Emile, and Vibert, Frank. London: Phillip Morris Institute.
Nugent, Neil. 1994. Government and politics of the European Union. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Riker, William. 1962. The theory of political coalitions. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Ross, George. 1995. Jacques Delors and European integration. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ariel, Rubinstein. 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining game. Econometrica 50:97–109.
Sandholtz, Wayne. 1992. High-tech Europe: The politics of international cooperation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Schneider, Gerald. 1995. The limits of self-reform: Institution-building in the European Union. European Journal of International Relations 1:59–86.
Shapley, Lloyd S., and Shubik, Martin. 1954. A method of evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. American Political Science Review 48:787–92.
Smith, Dale, and Wanke, Jiirgen. 1993. Completing the single European market. American Journal of Political Science 37:529–54.
Stephen, Roland. 1995. Interests, issue linkage, and the power of the European Parliament. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the European Community Studies Association, 11–14 May, Charleston, S.C.
Steunenberg, Bernhard. 1994. Decision-making under different institutional arrangements: Legislation by the European Community. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150:642–69.
Streeck, Wolfgang, and Schmitter, Philippe. 1991. From national corporatism to transnational pluralism: Organized interests in the single European market. Politics and Society 19:133–64.
Tsebelis, George. 1990. Games: Rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Tsebelis, George. 1994. The power of the European Parliament as a conditional agenda setter. American Political Science Review 88:128–42.
Tsebelis, George. 1995a. Conditional agenda setting and decision making inside the European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies 1:65–93.
Tsebelis, George. 1995b. Will Maastricht reduce the democratic deficit? APSA Comparative Politics 6:1.
Widgrén, Mika. 1994. Voting power in the EC: Decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements. European Economic Review 38:1153–70.
Widgrén, Mika. 1995. Probabilistic voting power in the EU Council: The cases of trade policy and social regulation. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97:345–56.