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The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 February 2019
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References
Lipscy, P., & Lee, H.. 2019. The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises. International Organization 73 (1): 35–64.Google Scholar
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