¹ This represents 40 out of 53 cases. The cases concerning which it passed recommendations but did not delegate any peaceful settlement task in the period 1946–1954 were: Trieste, Austrian Peace Treaty, independence of China, Burma, Morocco, Tunisia, and Guatemala. In the period 1955–1965 the same thing occurred in the cases of Cyprus (preindependence), Algeria, Tibet, Cuba–United States, Senegal–Portugal, and France–Tunisia (Bizerte). The cases where it delegated responsibilities can be found in Appendix A below.

² These figures and all of the following figures in this paragraph are taken from the table in Appendix A. In this paragraph all references to the “Secretary-General” refer to both the Secretary-General and bodies which are under his direction.

³ The Secretary-General's domination of the task of “private mediation” would be even greater if one subtracts from the six cases in which he did not have a role the three cases where the specific tasks assigned were those of being United Nations commissioners to arrange for elections in United Nations trust territories (British and French Togoland, British Cameroons, and Western Samoa). If one makes such a subtraction, he was used in 85 percent of the cases.

⁴ 1 have counted six cases in which Trygve Lie attempted independent mediations and thirteen cases apiece for Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant. See footnote (f) to Appendixes for discussion of sources for this information.

⁵ For a summary see Blaisdell, Donald C., International Organization (New York: Ronald, 1966), p.112Google Scholar. For a more comprehensive discussion see Schwebel, Stephen M., The Secretary-General of the United Nations: His Political Powers and Practice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Virally, Michel, “Le Role Politique du Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies,” Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1958 (Vol.4), p.362CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Translation is that of the writer.

⁷ While this point may at first seem open to question, it is borne out by Lie's, own testament, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years With the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954)Google Scholar. The book does not record a single success for the first Secretary-General in mediating international conflicts. Lie's lack of success can be attributed to both the nature of the disputes which he tried to solve and his own diplomatic approach.

⁸ “Needs” refer basically to the demands or objectives of states. A knowledge of these demands can be derived from studying policy statements and actions of states.

⁹ United Nations, Office of Public Information, Note to Correspondents No. 1773, April 2, 1958, p. 3.

¹⁰ Hammarskjöld, Dag, “Why the United Nations? What the Organization means in the life of today,” United Nations Review, 07 1958 (Vol. 5, No. 1), p.15Google Scholar.

¹¹ Jacob, Philip E. and Atherton, Alexine L., The Dynamics of International Organization: The Making of World Order (Homewood, Ill: The Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 315Google Scholar.

¹² Virally, , Annuaire Français de Droit International, Vol. 4, p. 376Google Scholar.

¹³ In the eleven cases in which committees were utilized they were asked to perform a fact-finding task in eight cases, to propose a settlement in five cases, and to mediate a conflict in four cases.

¹⁴ Of the eleven cases in which committees were delegated responsibilities seven were “colonial” (including South Africa and South West Africa). Of the four cases in which they were asked specifically to mediate three were colonial. Of the sixteen cases in which the Secretary-General was delegated responsibilities only six were colonial. Of the fifteen cases in which he was asked to mediate six were colonial.

¹⁵ Foote, Wilder (ed.), Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarshjöld (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 335Google Scholar.

¹⁶ United Nations, Office of Public Information, Note to Correspondents No. 2166, May 5, 1960, p. 23.

¹⁷ For sources concerning the precedents established by Trygve Lie see footnote 5 above.

¹⁸ For a detailed discussion of this mediation and its importance in the development of the United Nations and the Secretary-Generalship see the author's “Dag Hammarskjöld's Conception of the Political Role of the United Nations” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1966), pp.75–82Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Thompson, Kenneth W., “The New Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace,” International Organization, Summer 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 3), p. 404CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ Interview with Francis O. Wilcox, April 23, 1965.

²¹ Virally, , Annuaire Français de Droit International, Vol. 4, pp. 396—397Google Scholar. The reference to Hammarskjöld as the “fifth great power” refers to his having been invited by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to attend a summit meeting with the four Great Powers and India in July 1958.

²² Lasswell, Harold O. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 135Google Scholar.

²³ Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), p. 3Google Scholar.

²⁴ The New York Times, July 20, 1958.

²⁵ O'Brien, Conor Cruise, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 186–190Google Scholar.

²⁶ Bunche, Ralph J., “The United Nations Operation in the Congo,” in Cordier, Andrew W. and Foote, Wilder (ed.), The Quest for Peace: The Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lectures (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 134Google Scholar.

²⁷ Foote, (ed.), Servant of Peace, p. 224Google Scholar.

²⁸ Interview with Andrew W. Cordier, April 21, 1965. Mr. Cordier noted that the Secretary-General's diplomatic influence was derived from both his constant diplomatic contacts with the Members and his issuance of reports on conflicts which UN operations were observing or attempting to stabilize.

²⁹ Foote, (ed.), Servant of Peace, p.227Google Scholar.

³⁰ Cited in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, The U.N. Secretary-General: His Role in World Politics (Fourteenth Report and Papers Presented to the Commission) (New York, 1962), p. 52Google Scholar.

³¹ Stevenson, Adlai E., “From Containment to Cease-Fire and Peaceful Change,” in Cordier, and Foote, (ed.), The Quest for Peace, p. 53Google Scholar.

³² Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964), p.132Google Scholar. Another important development which has furthered an autonomy for the UN has been the creation of peacekeeping forces under the executive direction of the Secretary-General. Haas has noted that these forces “constitute merely another nibble at the structure of the self-confident national state,” and the same could be said about the impact of the development of the Secretary-General's peaceful settlement activities. (Ibid., p. 496.)

³³ Foote, (ed.), Servant of Peace, p. 227Google Scholar.

³⁴ Goodwin, Geoffrey L., “The Political Role of the United Nations: Some British Views,” International Organization, Autumn 1961 (Vol. 15, No. 4), p. 591CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ This judgment requires some explanation in light of the demands by some Members during and since the Congo crises for limitations on the powers of the Secretary-General. It should be understood that these demands were directed specifically at his powers over peacekeeping forces and were not relevant to his powers as an agent of peaceful settlement. Whereas the Secretary-General can have some final authority over theoutcome of disputes through the direction of peacekeeping forces, his opinions can always be rejected by the Members when he acts as a mediator.

³⁶ See Haas, pp. 492–496.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 492. Italics in original.

³⁹ For an excellent discussion of this role of the Commission see Lindberg, Leon N., The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ The concept of “agreements which upgrade die common interest” is taken from the writings of Professors Haas and Lindberg. Lindberg has written:

Accommodation on the basis of “upgrading common interests,” whether deliberately or inadvertantly, depends on the participation of institutions or individuals with an autonomous role that permits them to participate in actually defining die terms of the agreement. It implies greater progress toward political integration, for it shows that “the parties succeeded in so redefining their conflict as to work out a solution at a higher level, which almost invariably implies the expansion of the mandate or task of an international or national governmental agency.”

(Ibid., p. 12.)