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Multinational Corporations and Political Risk in the Persian Gulf

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Charles R. Kennedy Jr
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Extract

On New Year's Eve, before the tumultuous events of 1978–79, President Jimmy Carter, while toasting the Shah in Tehran, referred to Iran as an “island of stability” in the Persian Gulf. President Carter's remarks reflected the consensus opinion about Iran not only among United States government officials but among most business firms operating in Iran as well. A typical U.S. corporate attitude was represented by a 1975 Business International (hereafter BI) report about business prospects in the Middle East.

These characteristics (infrastructure development, population size and high absorptive capacity), which favorably distinguish Iran from the Arab Middle East, make the country the prime market in the area for many Western exporters. Political stability, the government's benevolent attitude toward private enterprise, and a well-protected internal market give Iran a similar edge in the eyes of foreign investors. Few international companies will thus want to stand aside as Iran races toward its goal of becoming the Japan of the Middle East.1

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , August 1984 , pp. 391 - 403
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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References

NOTES

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4 Because of corporate secrecy, a specific prediction made by Shell about Iran is not available. However, it is unlikely that Shell was seriously concerned with the stability of the Shah, given the fact there are no visible signs of corporate activity by Shell to reduce their vulnerability there in spite of having a major stake in Iran.

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