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Morocco: Anatomy of A Palace Revolution that Failed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Frank H. Braun
Frank H. Braun
Affiliation:
Frankfurt A. M., Germany
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Extract

The process of modernization in Morocco is dramatically symptomized by the decline of traditional authority. Postindependence politics have been in a state of permanent crisis, and the monarchy could only survive as any other political alternative promised imminent chaos. The abortive military coup of Skhirat in July 1971 was only another link in the chain of events that have perpetuated internal crisis. The army's massive interference in national politics was, however, a novelty. It had the effect of greatly accelerating the latent process of disintegration of traditional society and politics.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , February 1978 , pp. 63 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

1 For a summary of Morocco's clan constellations, see Marais, Octave, ‘La classe dirigeante au Maroc’, Revue Française de Science Politique, 14 (08. 1964), 711–712.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 The Moroccan army has only one Arab general, Driss Ben Oamar.

3 Waterbury, John, The Coup Manqué, American Universities Field Staff Reports, North Africa Series, 15, 1 (07 1971), 16.Google Scholar

4 The Times,4 03 1972, p. 13.Google Scholar

5 This figure is a rough estimation, based on Hurewitz, J. C., Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 341.Google Scholar

6 For details on the FAR's military hardware, see H. Schaar, Stuart, The Arms Race and Defense Strategy in North Africa, American Universities Field Staff Reports, North Africa Series, 53, 9 (12. 1967), 3–15.Google Scholar

7 General Mohammed Ben Amar, commander of the military region 2 (Casablanca), was arrested for alleged implication in the putsch, but later released. General Mohammed Mezziane was temporarily placed under house arrest.

8 The degree of status insecurity among some of the senior officers is indicated by King Hassan's reference to General Medbouh as a ‘paranoid schizophrenic’. See Le Monde, 19 07 1971.Google Scholar

9 For a more detailed description of the corruption incidents, see Wterbury, , Coup Manqué, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

10 Ibid., p. 3.

11 Zartman, I. William, Morocco: Problems of New Power (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 107.Google Scholar

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14 Akhbar Ad-Dounia, 29 06 1962.Google Scholar

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20 The border settlement with Algeria included the understanding of Algerian support for Moroccan claims on Spanish territories. This may have contributed to General Mezziane's alienation from the king. Mezziane is a veteran of the Spanish civil war and was a close friend of General Franco.

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23 General Oufkir's ambiguous role is indicated by the fact that his closest collaborator in the Ministry of the Interior, Allem, was also a cousin of one of the putsch leaders, Colonel Chelouati. Moreover, the putschists made no effort to take over strongholds of Oufkir's personal power, in particular the National Security Police headquarters and the regional headquarters of the Auxiliary Forces. See also comments in Le Monde, 16 07 1971,Google Scholar and Waterbury, , Coup Manqué, p. 32.Google Scholar

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28 General Oufkir in unison with General Driss had attempted to transform the Program of National Advancement, launched in 1967, into an instrument of rural mobilization under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. See Schaar, , Arms Race, p.21.Google Scholar

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30 In his press conference on 13 July, General Oufkir stated that he considered Abadouh rather than Medbouh the real leader of the putsch. See Le Monde, 15 07 1971.Google Scholar