¹ Khuri, Fuad, Tribe and Stare in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in An Arab State (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chap, 4.Google Scholar

² The number of members of National Assembly with political allegiance to the Arab National Movement ranged between five and twelve in the various elections.

³ Article 4 of the Constitution.

⁴ Article 56.

⁵ Articles 65 and 66.

⁶ This is what Herbert J. Spiro refers to as the need for historical depth in constitutions as a guarantee for their survival. For a full discussion of the conditions of constitutional success see Herbert, J. Spiro, Government by Constitution (New York: Random House, 1959).Google Scholar See also Carl, J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Book, 1968).Google Scholar

⁷ As a constitutional law the Law of Succession cannot be changed or amended except by the same process required to amend the constitution.

⁸ On September 29, 1962, Sabah Salem al-Sabbah was acclaimed crown prince and on May. 31, 1966, Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabbah was acclaimed crown prince after the death of Abdallah and the crowning of Sabah as the governor. This process took place in accordance with the Succession Law and the Constitution.

⁹ Although Kuwait has been involved in border disputes with Iraq, which in 1961 and 1974 accelerated to open military confrontation, the provision of this article has not been implemented. Kuwait has yet to declare martial law.

¹⁰ ln such cases the Emir seeks the cooperation of all of his Cabinet and the Assembly (Article 68).

¹¹ Article 70.

¹² 1n the summer of 1976, as in previous summers, I was privileged to attend the sessions of the Kuwaiti National Assembly when it was deliberating its foreign aid appropriation to the Arab and African countries. The government's pledges to provide a certain amount of aid to certain countries made at the Algiers Conference in 1973 were subjected to severe scrutiny and criticisms by assemblymen who advocated a different set of priorities in the national budget and who blamed the government for making pledges before it consulted the Assembly. In other words, while the government of Kuwait usually enjoys the confidence of the Assembly and can, therefore, be expected to live up to its pledges, it is wrong to assume that such pledges can be honored or can be fulfilled without the scrutiny, amendment, and approval by the Assembly which alone has the right of decision in such cases.

¹³ Khuri has argued that in the case of Bahrain the refusal of the royal family to participate in election was a refusal of the royal family to base its authority and consequently its legitimacy on the basis of election (Khuri, , Tribe and Stare in Bahrain, chap. 4).Google Scholar

¹⁴ lnterview with MrAbdul, Latifal-Fuleij, Secretary General of the Assembly, Summer 1975.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Since the crown prince is usually the prime minister the constitution stipulates that the prime minister cannot hold any ministerial post so that he, as well as the emir, can act as arbitrators in case of a conflict among the Cabinet ministers or between one minister and the Assembly. This is another illustration of keeping the emir or his successor above party or interest group politics and to strengthen their role as reconcilators.

¹⁶ Article 107. This article was not followed in 1976.

¹⁷ Non-Kuwaiti residents are not eligible to vote or to run for election.

¹⁸ lnterview with Mr. Abdul Latifal-Fuleij, Secretary General of the Assembly.

¹⁹ For details of these elaborate procedures, see articles 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71.

²⁰ The emir is allotted annually a sum of 10 million Kuwaiti dinars to cover all the expenses of the royal family and his assistants, staff, rents, travel, and representation.

²¹ The law of succession, which has a constitutional status, regulates who is and who is not eligible. There is no absolute requirement that the emir has to follow the primogeniture laws. The emir, however, has to submit his nominee within a maximum of one year after he assumes his responsibilities as a ruler.

²² Since independence, two crown princes have been chosen, Sabah Salem al-Sabbah in 1962, and Jaber Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabbah in 1966. In both cases the Assembly unanimously approved the nominee.

²³ Article 56 stipulates that in appointing the Cabinet, the emir has to follow traditional consultation practices with leaders within and outside the Assembly. Once appointed, members of the Cabinet, even those who are not members of the Assembly, acquire the same privileges as the members of the Assembly. It means that they participate in the deliberations of the Assembly, present bills, and vote on bills like any other Assembly member. There are a few exceptions, however: first, they cannot serve as members of the various legislative committees and, second, they cannot cast a vote of confidence in Cabinet.

²⁴ Political life in Kuwait is such that this process was never resorted to. In the first place, the prime minister is the crown prince and it is, therefore, unlikely for the Assembly to refuse to cooperate with him. In the second place, the emir, during the course of consultation to formulate the Cabinet, insures that it is representative of the majority of the Assembly.

²⁵ See Article 101. This Article has not been resorted to yet.

²⁶ With the exception of election year when the Assembly is supposed to meet within two weeks of election and the session lasts for three and a half months.

²⁷ Between 1973 and 1975, four bills which passed the Assembly were returned for reconsideration. The Assembly decided to refer these bills to the appropriate committees for recommendations. No action has yet been taken.

²⁸ See on this subject: Abdo, I. Baaklini, “The Kuwaiti Legislature as Ombudsman: The Legislative Committee on Petitions and Complaints,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, III, 2 (05 1978), pp. 293–307.Google Scholar

²⁹ Khuri, , Tribe and State in Bahrain, chap. 9.Google Scholar

³⁰ One member of the Khalifa family ran for election, won, and became known as the Red Sheikh (ibidx.).

³¹ There is a growing body of literature on development. For a representative sample see: Braibanti, R., ed., Political and Administrative Development (Durham, N. Car.: Duke University Press, 1969);Google Scholar Goulet, Denis, The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development (New York, N.Y.: Athenaeum, 1971);Google Scholar Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968);Google Scholar Montgomery, J. and Siffen, W., eds., Approaches to Development, Politics, Administration, and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966);Google Scholar Barrington, Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966);Google Scholar Nisbet, Robert, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970);Google Scholar Riggs, F., ed., Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964);Google Scholar Riggs, F., ed, Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971);Google Scholar Widner, E., Development Administration in Asia (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1970).Google Scholar

³² This is the argument frequently cited by revolutionaries on the eve of abolishing representative institutions. See Abdo, I. Baaklini, “Legislatures in New Nations: Towards a New Perspective,” Polity, 8, 4 (1976), 558–580.Google Scholar