Part of the research for this article was made possible by travel grants from the St. Louis Country Day School and from the American Research Institute in Turkey. I would like to thank Abraham Bodurgil of the Library of Congress for his special assistance, Altay Cataloglu for his helpful comments, and especially Professors John H. Kautsky and Victor T. Le Vine of Washington University for their critical reading of an earlier draft.

¹ The following provide a balanced, analytical account of recent events in Turkey: Simpson, Dwight J., “Turkey: A Time of Troubles,” Current History 62, 365 (01 1972), 38–43, 50–52Google Scholar; Howard, Harry N., “Continuing Trouble in the Turkish Republic,” Current History, 64, 377 (01 1973), 26–29, 38–39Google Scholar; Ahmad, Feroz, “The Turkish Guerrillas: Symptom of a Deeper Malaise,” New Middle East, 55 (04 1973), 13–16Google Scholar; Carlson, Sevinc, “Turkey's Fragile Democracy; The Danger That Lies Ahead,” New Middle East, 44 (05 1972), 15–18Google Scholar; Burnouf, Denis, “La situation en Turquie après les interventions du Haut-Commandement dans les affaires publiques,” Politique Étrangère, 37, 1 (1972), 101–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Of a more impressionistic, journalistic, or bland nature are the following: Giritli, Ismet, “Coup by Memorandum: Events and Prospects in Turkey,” New Middle East, 32 (05 1971), 40–42Google Scholar; Martin, Nicolas, “La Turquie dans l'attente d'un coup d'état,” Jeune Afrique, 560 (09 26, 1971), 42–44Google Scholar; Erim, Nihat, “The Turkish Experience in the Light of Recent Developments,” Middle East Journal, 26, 3 (Summer 1972), 245–252Google Scholar; Wakebridge, Charles, “The Problem Turkey Has Yet To Solve,” New Middle East, 52–53 (01/02 1973), 54–56.Google Scholar

² On April 27, 1971, martial law was declared in the eleven provinces of Adana, Ankara, Eskisehir, Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Zonguldak, Diyarbakir, Hatay, and Siirt. Except for the last three named, where Kurdish dissension was reported, these provinces contain Turkey's largest cities and thus its greatest university-student, urban-worker, and urban-guerrilla populations.

³ The first five presidents of modern republican Turkey were Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923–1938), Ismet Inönü (1938–1950), Celâl Bayar (1950–1960), Cemal Gürsel (1961–1966), and Cevdet Sunay (1966–1973).

⁴ Friendly, Alfred, “Turkey's Lifesaving Legacy,” Washington Post, 03 13, 1971, p. A1.Google Scholar See also Hurni, Ferdinand, “Democracy and the Turkish Military” Swiss Review of World Affairs, 21, 2 (05 1971), 14.Google Scholar Some support for Friendly's contention can be found in the fact that dozens of military officers after March 12, 1971, were relocated, retired, and even arrested and tried. See, for instance, Ahmad, “The Turkish Guerrillas.”

⁵ Cumhuriyet, 02 26, 1972, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁶ Devir, 04 2, 1973, p. 12.Google ScholarDevir is a weekly news magazine first published in October 1972 in Izmir by Altemur Kiliç.

⁷ With the (convenient) resignation of National Defense Minister Senator Mehmet Izmen, a senate vacancy opened up for Gürler's appointment by Sunay.

⁸ The effect of the spectacular Madanoğlu conspiracy trial on the thinking of deputies has not yet been determined. Retired General Cemal Madanoğlu, one of the top officers in the National Unity Committee that ruled Turkey for seventeen months after the 1960 coup, was accused of conspiracy with thirty others to overthrow the government. Madanoğlu himself was to become president of Turkey if the coup were successful. The trial began on February 7, 1973, several weeks before the presidential election. Full background coverage of the conspiracy was printed in a series of articles in Milliyet, beginning the next day and extending through February 18. One may speculate about how the revelations of the trial may have strengthened the beliefs of some parliamentary deputies that strong civilian control of the government was necessary and that the more the armed forces became involved in politics, the greater the likelihood of coups and countercoups.

⁹ de Onis, Juan, “Vote on Turkish President in Parliament Inconclusive,” The New York Times, 03 14, 1973, p. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁰ This refusal signaled a reversal of JP policy during the coalition government period of 1961–1965 and thus represents an accommodation to the military's adamant posture against the restoration of rights to former Democrats. See Dodd, C. H., Politics and Government in Turkey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), chaps. 4–7.Google Scholar

¹¹ Orkunt, Sezai, “Dünyada ve Türkiye'de asker-sivil ilişkileri,” Milliyet, 02 16, 1973Google Scholar, and “Asker, siyaset ve çözülemeyen muamma,” Milliyet, 03 26, 1973.Google Scholar Orkunt was the National Assembly's leading resident military spokesman during the Third Assembly (1969–1973). His articles, periodically printed in Milliyet, include a spirited defense in that daily on April 21, 1971, of the military's intervention by memorandum on March 12.

¹² Milliyet, 02 22, 1973, p. 1.Google Scholar

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., Feb. 23, 1973, p. 9.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., March 3, 1973, pp. 1 and 9.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸ Ibid., March 7, 1973, pp. 1 and 9.

¹⁹ For a good account of the tense atmosphere pervading Ankara on March 13 and the nervous excitement and electric mood of the voting deputies and senators, see Hayat, 03 22, 1973. pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

²⁰ Sketch, 03 16, 1973, p. 11.Google Scholar

²¹ Cumhuriyet, 03 14, 1973, p. 7.Google Scholar

²² The one possible exception to this generalization would be the short-lived candidacy of Istanbul University law professor, Ali Fuad Başgil, in 1961. Başgil had been prominently identified with the outlawed Democrats and was as a result persuaded by the military command to withdraw his candidacy. General Cemal Gürsel, the Chairman of the revolutionary junta, was forthwith elected Turkey's fourth President by the GNA.

²³ Milliyet, 03 17, 1973, pp. 1 and 9.Google Scholar

²⁴ Rustow, Dankwart A., “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, 2, 3 (04 1970), 358 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ Milliyet, 03 17, 1973, p. 9.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ibid., March 19, 1973, pp. 1 and 9.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 9. There had been ample warning indeed before the March 12 Memorandum. In a New Year's Day speech (1971), General Memduh Tağmac, chief of the General Staff, had spoken of the armed forces’ responsibility to prevent internal chaos, whatever the source. See Simpson, “Turkey: A Time of Troubles.”

²⁸ In an interview with Senator Anburun on August 27, 1973, in the office of the president of the Senate, the former presidential candidate reminisced about the events of March-April 1973. Ariburun said that he had warned General Gürler (before the official announcement of Gürler's candidacy) that the GNA in its present mood (i.e., rebellious over martial law and armed forces memoranda which “interfere in the parliament's rightful business”) would not elect Gürler. On March 20 they met again in that office and mutually agreed to simultaneously withdraw their candidacies and let the parties and the GNA decide anew.

²⁹ Milliyet, 03 23, 1973, p. 1.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid., March 24,1973, pp. 1 and 9, and Cumhuriyet, 04 3, 1973, p. 1.Google Scholar

³¹ Middle East Economic Digest, 16, 5 (02 4, 1972), 137.Google Scholar

³² Ibid., 17, 13 (March 30, 1973), 373.

³³ Milliyet, 03 27, 1973, p. 1.Google Scholar

³⁴ In my interview with Senator Anburun, he said that he was opposed to both the Sunay Formula and the Taylan candicacy because acceptance of either compromise would have been tantamount to admitting that no qualified person existed in a joint assembly of 634 deputies and senators.

³⁵ Cumhuriyet, 04 3, 1973, pp. 1 and 7.Google Scholar

³⁶ Ibid., April 7, 1973, p. 7.

³⁷ Korutürk was elected in the fifteenth round of balloting. The total of 557 votes cast was distributed as follows: Korutürk 365, Bozbeyli 51, Gürler 87, Inönü 3, Ariburun 17, minor candidates 4, and blank/invalid 30.

³⁸ Rustow, Dankwart A., “The Military: Turkey,” in Ward, Robert E. and Rustow, , eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 378.Google Scholar

³⁹ The New York Times, 07 23, 1973Google Scholar; The Guardian, 07 4, 1973Google Scholar; Yanki (a Turkish weekly news magazine), 121 (07 9–15, 1973), 14–16Google Scholar; and Middle East Economic Digest, 17, 28 (07 13, 1973), 810.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Devir, 04 16, 1973, p. 15.Google Scholar Also in an unpublished interview with Ecevit on March 15, less than forty-eight hours after the balloting began, David Barchard, a special correspondent for The Guardian, reported speculation that the commanders had sent a message to Ecevit indicating that there would be no armed intervention and that they were prepared to drop their insistence on Curler's candidacy in return for an RPP pledge to support the extension of Sunay's term. If this is true, and it is likely that Demirel as well would have known, then this helps explain how the two major party leaders could afford to assume such an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis the military during the deadlock. They knew the military was not solidly behind Gürler and that the commanders would not go so far as to intervene and force a solution.