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The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Mahmut Bali Aykan
Mahmut Bali Aykan
Affiliation:
Teaches international relations at Middle East Technical University, Ankara 06531, Turkey.
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Extract

Since the 1950s Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East has centered on the question of support for the Arab position on the Palestinian question. Ever since the U.N. General Assembly resolution of November 1947 that partitioned Palestine between the Palestinians and Israelis, all the Arab countries—even though diversity of regime has prevented them from otherwise acting as a unit in Middle Eastern politics—have consistently supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state (in opposition to the Israelis and the United States) as a condition for stability in the Middle East. In November 1973, the heads of the Arab states declared the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—created in 1964 through the initiative of the Arab League—to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and they have supported its efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip ever since.

Type
Articles
Information
International Journal of Middle East Studies , Volume 25 , Issue 1 , February 1993 , pp. 91 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

NOTES

1 See, for example, Christian Science Monitor, 26 August 1981, p. 5Google Scholar.

2 For an analysis of the historical experiences of the Turks and Arabs with each other in the OttomanEmpire, see Zeine, N., The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayats, 1966), chap. 5Google Scholar.

3 See Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Diş Politika Ilkeleri ve Diptomasisi (Atatürk's Foreign Policy Principles and Diplomacy), (Istanbul: 1966), 93–94Google Scholar.

4 Statement made by the Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, date and place not given. Aym Tarihi (History of the Month) 201 (August, 1950): 25–27Google Scholar.

5 Ibid.

6 By the time Iraq signed the Baghdad Pact in February 1955, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were opposed to it, while Lebanon and Jordan chose to remain “neutral.”Google Scholar

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8 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1955–1956, p. 15231 (hereafter cited as Keesing's)Google Scholar.

9 See the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet, 29 11 1956, p. 5Google Scholar; see also Keesing's, 1955–1956, p. 14106.

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12 Statement made by the Turkish foreign minister İhsan S. Çaǧlayangil before the Turkish National Assembly on 22 December 1965, T. C. Dişşisleri Bakanhǧi Belleteni (Bulletin of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (hereafter cited as Belleten) 15 (December 1965): 99Google Scholar.

13 Batu, Hamit, “Turkey's Foreign Policy,” Belleten 6 (March 1965): 21–25Google Scholar.

14 Keesing's 1965–1966, p. 21663. Nasser had considered Faisal's idea to be the successor of “the Baghdad Pact”Google Scholar; see ibid., p. 21661.

15 Keesing's 1967–1968, pp. 22157, 22160, 22161.

16 See the Turkish newspaper Milliyet, 23 September 1969, pp. 1, 11. In contrast to Faisal's disuniting ideas on the Arab world in 1966, the subject of the Rabat conference had, in the words of Turkish foreign minister Çaǧlayangil, a “uniting quality” that would make participation in it a political gain for Turkey; see Belleten 61 (October 1969): 91Google Scholar.

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19 See the speech of the Turkish Permanent Representative to the United Nations Osman Olcay, in November 1974, UN Monthly Chronicle 11 (December 1974): 125Google Scholar. The right of the Palestinians to “self-determination and statehood in their own territory” was stated forcefully for the first time by Osman Olcay in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly in 11 1974;Google Scholar see ibid. Until the 1970s, Turkish representatives refrained from making any comment in the United Nations on the political aspects of the Palestinian issue but commented extensively on the humanitarian aspects; see, for example, the speech made by Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin before the U.N. General Assembly on 1 January 1965; Belleten 4 (January 1965): 64Google Scholar.

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23 See Yearbook of the UN: 1974 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1974), 226, 227Google Scholar.

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25 New York Times, 20 January 1975, p. 4Google Scholar. Turkey's voting on 10 November 1975, in the United Nations in favor of a draft resolution describing Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination” was also revealing in terms of showing the level Turkey's support for the Arab cause had reached in the mid-1970s; see Keesing's 1975, pp. 27487–88Google Scholar.

26 At that time this resolution was overwhelmingly supported by all Arab Countries; Keesing's 1973, pp. 25725–26Google Scholar.

27 See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter referred to as FB1S) (Haslow, UK: Longman Group Ltd.), Western Europe, 7 January 1975, p. 22Google Scholar.

28 FBIS, Western Europe, 25 February 1975, p. ZlGoogle Scholar.

29 See UN Monthly Chronicle 11 (December 1974): 125Google Scholar.

30 Christian Science Monitor, 17 May 1976, p. 26Google Scholar.

31 On these reasons see Cumhuriyet, 1 August 1979, pp. 1,11Google Scholar; Cumhuriyet, 18 July 1979, p. 6;Google ScholarCumhuriyet, 8 May 1979, p. 6Google Scholar.

32 For the first time since 1969, it was agreed at the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers that “the representatives of the Turkish Muslim community of Cyprus be invited to attend future meetings of the Islamic Conference”;Google Scholar see ibid. See the speech of the PLO representative Farouk Kaddoumi during this conference, as reported in Milliyet, 16 May 1976, p. 7Google Scholar.

33 See the interview with Professor Erbakan made by Cumhuriyet, 2 August 1979, p. 6Google Scholar.

34 Ibid.

35 For instance, because the Justice party dominated the Turkish coalition cabinet consent was not given to Professor Erbakan to make a speech during the opening ceremony of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers of May 1976 in Istanbul, see Professor Erbakan's statement to this effect as reported in Milliyet, 12 May 1976, p. 7. Still, National Salvation party independent contacts with Islamic countries provoked intense criticism of the coalition led by the Justice party even though they did not affect the course of Turkey's foreign relations.

36 See this Turkish declaration in Milliyet, 11 May 1976, p. 7Google Scholar.

37 Milliyet, 15 May 1976, p. 6Google Scholar.

38 Ibid.

39 Turkish reservations at subsequent Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers have been submitted in written form to the secretariat of the Islamic Conference Organization. See “Turkey's Relations with the Islamic Conference Organization,” an unpublished document of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry.

40 See statement by the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to this effect, Cumhuriyet, 21 July 1979, p. 5Google Scholar.

41 See statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ökçön, Gündüz to this effect, Cumhuriyet, 22 July 1979, pp. 1, 11Google Scholar.

42 Christian Science Monitor, 22 August 1979, p. 4Google Scholar.

43 Cumhuriyet, 18 July 1979, p. 6Google Scholar.

44 “Our doors are open to everybody willing to fight against the enemy for the Palestinian cause,” said PLO representative Abu Firas, denying that certain Turkish conditions had been laid down for the PLO office to be opened in Ankara. See Cumhuriyet, 8 August 1979, pp. 1, 11Google Scholar. Previously, it had been reported in the Turkish press that the Turkish government had asked for “certain assurances” from the PLO concerning PLO involvement in terrorist activities in Turkey before the PLO office could be opened in Ankara. See Cumhuriyet, 1 August 1979, pp. 1, 11Google Scholar.

45 Cumhuriyet, 30 July 1980, pp. 1, 9Google Scholar.

46 Interview with Turkish Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen by a Turkish reporter, Cumhuriyet, 4 August 1980, pp. 1, 9Google Scholar.

47 FBIS, Western Europe, 3 December 1980, p. TIGoogle Scholar.

48 See Christian Science Monitor, 26 August 1981, p. 5Google Scholar. Similar views have recently been aired, although unconvincingly, in the Turkish press. See Çetin Yetkin, “Post-September 12, 1980, and Muslim Fundamentalism,” Milliyet, 30 April 1990, p. 13Google Scholar.

49 See Sirmen, Ali, “A Turning Point?,” Cumhuriyet, 4 December 1980, p. 3Google Scholar.

50 In a recent interview with Ïetin Yetkin, Turkey's president at the time Kenan Evren “absolutely” denied that a deal had been made with Saudi Arabia according to which Turkey would downgrade its relations with Israel in December 1980 in return for Saudi oil. Evren declared that this would have been too great a concession for Turkey to make in return for the oil, which was later received from Saudi Arabia. See Milliyet, 30 April 1990, p. 13.

51 See statement by Türkish Foreign Minister İiter Türkmen to this effect, Milliyet, 4 December 1980, p. 7Google Scholar.

52 See FBIS, Western Europe, 6 March 1981, p. T4Google Scholar.

53 See Cumhuriyet, 6 December 1980, p. 8Google Scholar.

54 For the text of the resolution and Turkey's reservations, see Yearbook of the UN: 1982 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1982), 508, 515, 516Google Scholar.

55 See McCrystal, Cal, The Sunday Times (London) 9 February 1986, p. 11Google Scholar.

56 Chrislian Science Monitor, 20 January 1984, p. 9Google Scholar.

57 See President Evren's address to the Fourth Islamic Summit in FBIS, Middle East, 18 January 1984, p. A2Google Scholar.

58 See statement by Turkish Prime Minister Ulusu in FBIS, Western Europe, 2 June 1983, pp. T6, T7Google Scholar.

59 The Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, 16 January 1984, p. 11Google Scholar.

60 joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), Near East, 10 March 1986, p. 119Google Scholar.

61 See Hürriyet, 17 11 1988, p. 17Google Scholar.

62 Milliyet, 16 11 1988, p. 13Google Scholar.

63 See Cumhuriyet, 8 February 1989, pp. 1, 10Google Scholar; see also ibid., 13 February 1989, pp. 1, 10.

64 “The Jewish Federation Council” in the United States stated that Turkish recognition of the new Palestinian state “conveyed the appearance of Turkey being not a Western, but a Third World country.” Hürriyet, 19 11 1988, p. 8.

65 See Keesing's 1987, p. 35136Google Scholar.

66 Milliyet, 1 September 1987, p. 12Google Scholar.

67 It was reported that the Jewish votes in the U.S. Congress in support of Turkey's position on the Armenian issue were observed to have increased by 40 percent in August 1987. Milliyet, 1 September 1987, p. 12Google Scholar.

68 Lobbying activities of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee to secure American foreign aid for countries other than Israel is well known. Reportedly, the Reagan Administration encouraged cooperation between Turkey and the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee on this issue through informal channels; see ibid.

69 See Cumhuriyet, 26 March 1991, p. 10Google Scholar.

70 For examples of Arab solidarity against Turkey on various issues such as the water issue and Kurdish separatism, see Hürriyet, 18 May 1990, p. 18Google Scholar; Hürriyet 19 May 1990, p. 17;Google ScholarHürriyet, 31 May 1990, p. 18Google Scholar; Hörriyet, 2 June 1990, p. 17Google Scholar; Milliyet, 24 August 1991, p. 9Google Scholar.

71 See statement by Turkish joint chief of staff General Doǧan Güreş on these issues in Cumhuriyet, September 1991, pp. 1, 15Google Scholar.

72 See Milliyet, 12 January 1990, p. 13Google Scholar.

73 See Milliyet, 26 March 1990, p. 14Google Scholar.

74 Foreign minister of the self-declared Palestinian state Faruk Kaddoumi was reminded by Turkish foreign minister Safa Giray of the PLO attitude on these matters as well as its lack of support for the Turkish Cypriot cause. Mr. Kaddoumi was told that consistent Turkish support for the Palestinian cause in the future, as in the past, would depend upon the PLO's attitude in its relations with Turkey; Milliyet, 11 August 1991, p. 10.

75 Ibid., p. 11.

76 See, for example, Sedat Ergin in Hörriyet, 25 March 1991, p. 10Google Scholar.

77 See Cumhuriyet, 18 12 1991, p. 8Google Scholar.

78 Hürriyet, 20 12 1991, p. 18Google Scholar.

79 Ibid., 19 121991, p. 23.

80 High-level officials of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry evaluated the concept of “strategic cooperation” as “hollow” and “unfeasible.” See Cumhuriyet, 27 March 1991, p. 11Google Scholar.

81 Milliyet, 12 February 1992, p. 15Google Scholar.

82 See Cumhuriyet, 18 12 1991, p. 8Google Scholar.

83 See Hörriyet, 22 11 1988, p. 16Google Scholar. See also, Milliyet, 22 March 1990, p. 8Google Scholar.