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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2019
The fall of the Berlin Wall has substantially changed the global security architecture. The end of the Cold War has opened a lot of new opportunities for international cooperation: Bi-polar world divisions have disappeared, state borders have become softer, and with the assistance of advanced information and communication technology, the process of globalization has been developing rapidly to an unprecedented level.
1 See Cater, Charles, The Political Economy of War and Peace, International Peace Academy, 2002, p. 4.Google Scholar
2 See UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World 2 (2002).Google Scholar
3 See Šimonović, Ivan, “State Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More Equal,” 28 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 381-404 (2002).Google Scholar
4 See Wood, Bernard, Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (Second draft), An independent study prepared for the Emergency Respond Division, UNDP June 2001. The ambitious way for the UN to face these challenges is contained in the Brahimi Report (Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809). It calls for radical rethinking of the whole system, arguing for a holistic approach to the development and implementation of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building activities.Google Scholar
5 See for example Schachter, Oscar, “The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion,” 78 American Journal of International Law 645 (1984).Google Scholar
6 On the concept of “responsibility to protect,” see International Development Research Centre, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).Google Scholar
7 See Ocran, Modibo, “The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping,” 25 B.C. International & Comparative Law Review 1 (2002).Google Scholar
8 See Reisman, Michael, “Comment, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,” 84 American Journal of International Law 866, 871-72 (1990).Google Scholar
9 See more extensively Paul Collier, “Economic causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen O. and Aall, Pamela. eds., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp. 143–162.Google Scholar
10 The Security Council convened open debates on peace building in 1998 and 2001. The Secretary-General has been active as well, opening pilot peace building support offices in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, The Central African Republic and Tajikistan.Google Scholar
12 See Wood, Bernard, Development Dimension of Conflict-prevention and Peace-building (second draft), an independent study prepared for the Emergency Response Division, UNDP, June 2001, p. 15.Google Scholar
13 Of course, we are referring to prevention of violent conflicts. Perhaps the most significant measure of the successful conflict peace building is creating the capacities that ensure that successful and peaceful conflict resolution will take place.Google Scholar
14 See The Development of the United Nations Concepts and Strategies for Conflict-prevention and Peace-building, Presentation by Mr. Ibrahima Fall, The Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to the Open-ended Working Group on the Causes of Conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, 29 May to 1 June 2001, para 32.Google Scholar
15 See for example Cater, Charles, The Political Economy of War and Peace, p. 8 and UN Millennium Report of the Secretary-General, New York, 2000, p. 49.Google Scholar
16 In Sierra Leone, for example, 8000 newly unemployed soldiers (after the reduction of resources to subsidize the army, and without providing alternative job opportunities) defected the guerrillas, and has substantially contributed to reemergence of conflict.Google Scholar
17 One of them certainly is being the difference between the promised and delivered resources. Resources are notoriously overly promised and not being delivered when crisis is no longer on prime-time news.Google Scholar
18 It seems that within Bretton Woods Institutions understanding for specific needs of post-conflict societies varies. While IMF still unconditionally favors macroeconomic stability, the World Bank develops certain sensitivity for social aspects of post conflict peace building. This is also reflected by the establishment of the Post-Conflict Unit of the Bank and introduction of Transitional Support Strategies for countries in conflict in 1998 as a step towards more comprehensive, full-scale reconstruction program.Google Scholar
19 Clearly, to assume this role, ECOSOC has to substantially improve its operational capabilities.Google Scholar
20 Ad hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau, reinforced by the President of ECOSOC and the head of the Security Council's and ad hoc group on Africa also visited the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in December 2002 to discuss problems regarding economic support to Guinea-Bissau, necessary to prevent reoccurrence of conflict in the country. Problems regarding financial support of Guinea-Bissau are not specific - they are similar in most post-conflict societies. International financial institutions, favoring macroeconomic stability, and reluctant to support social spending, can undermine peace efforts and contribute to the reoccurrence of conflict.Google Scholar
21 In 1914 there were 1083 international NGOs. By 2000 there were more than 37 000, of which 2150 have consultative status within ECOSOC. See UN Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World 2 (2002), p. 10.Google Scholar
22 In some conflicts, governmental structures have been deeply involved in conflict, and sometimes ruthlessly profited from it.Google Scholar
23 See Chesterman, Simon, Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, International Peace Academy, September 2002.Google Scholar
24 See United States Institute for Peace, Special Report 97, Lawless Rule vs. Rule of Law in the Balkans, December 2002, pp 12–13.Google Scholar
25 See Chesterman, Simon, Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, International Peace Academy, p. 13.Google Scholar
29 On importance of a smooth hand-over from peacekeeping to peace building, see Elisabeth Diaz, Towards Comprehensive Peace-building, p. 3.Google Scholar
30 Sometimes there will simply have to be trade off in terms of higher formal qualifications of foreigners and higher level of sustainability provided by early inclusion of locals. For example, none of the East Timorese have ever before UNTAET served as a judge or a prosecutor. See Chesterman, pp. 6–7.Google Scholar
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