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RELIGION, CHILDREN AND EMPLOYMENT: THE BABY LOUP CASE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2015

Myriam Hunter-Henin
Myriam Hunter-Henin*
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in Law, University College London, m.hunter-henin@ucl.ac.uk.
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Abstract

This article offers a systematic analysis of the plenary Chamber of the French Cour de Cassation's final decision in the Baby Loup case which held that a private nursery had acted lawfully when requiring an employee to remove her jilbab at work, in accordance with the religious neutrality requirements of the nursery's policy. The article examines the decision in light of ECHR and French domestic legal requirements. First, it is argued that laïcité—rightly held to be irrelevant—still unduly taints the reasoning. As a result, proportionality and anti-discrimination provisions are not properly applied. Secondly, the decision is compared and contrasted with recent ECtHR cases, notably Eweida and Others v UK. It is argued that a Baby Loup-type restriction does not meet ECHR standards. Additionally the margin of appreciation, used by the ECtHR to save the French ban on the full-covering of the face in the SAS case, should not, as will be demonstrated, come into play in a Baby Loup context.

Keywords

Article 9 ECHRchildren's freedom of consciencediscriminationlaïcitémargin of appreciationproportionality
Type
Shorter Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 64 , Issue 3 , July 2015 , pp. 717 - 731
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2015 

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References

1 The employee wished to wear a jilbab, a long coat garment covering the whole body and the hair but leaving the face visible. Since it leaves the face visible, the jilbab would not fall under the French 2010 Law (Loi no 2010–1192, JO 12 October 2010, 18344) which was passed to prohibit full-face-covering garments in all public spaces, including workplaces which are open to the general public.

2 Cass Ass Plén 25 June 2014, (2014) Rec D 1386.

3 The issue could however be raised again before the European Court of Human Rights. See a report of the employee's intention to challenge the Plenary Cour de Cassation decision in Strasbourg at <http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2014/06/25/cedh-vincent-lambert-affaire-baby-loup-presentation-institution-europenne_n_5526082.html>.

4 Conseil des Prud'hommes Mantes-la-Jolie 13 December 2010, (2011) Rec D 85 and (2012) Rec D 904, Comments by J Porta.

5 CA Versailles 27 October 2011, (2012) Revue de Jurisprudence Sociale 106.

6 According to the employment tribunal, the nursery's activities could be characterized as a public service, hence triggering the application of laïcité and general religious neutrality requirements. In contrast, for the Versailles Court of Appeal, religious neutrality requirements were mandated by the nursery's mission of offering care to young children.

7 The term ‘referral’ is used rather than ‘appeal’ because Court of Appeal decisions in France can only be challenged on points of law. The functions of the Cour de Cassation are primarily to review the legal basis of decisions reached by the Court of Appeal, rather than to act as a third level of appeal on the merits. For an explanation in English of the French court system, see J Bell, S Boyron, and S Whittaker, Principles of French Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) ch 2. See also, Aubert, J-L, ‘La Distinction du fait et du droit dans le pourvoi en cassation en matière civile’ (2004) Rec D 2239Google Scholar.

8 Soc 19 March 2013, (2013) Rec D 962; Opinion B Aldigé at 956; Comments J Mouly at 963 and J Porta at 1026.

9 See by contrast, reaffirming the importance of the adherence to the doctrine of precedent in English Law, Supreme Court 3 November 2010 Pinnock v Manchester City Council [2010] UKSC 45.

10 P Deumier, ‘La Doctrine de la Cour de cassation: opinion ou précédent?, observations sous Cass Com 8 novembre 2005, Bull IV n 219, 235 et Cass Soc 13 septembre 2005, Bull V n 253, 222’ (2006) 1 RTC 73.

11 CA Paris 27 November 2013, (2014) Rec D 65, Comments by J Mouly.

12 See section IIB for further comments and analysis on the divide between private and public agents.

13 Hunter-Henin, M, ‘Why the French Don't Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National Identity and Religious Freedom’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 1, 9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 French secularism or laïcité is usually defined as a system in which there is a separation between religion and the State. See J Rivero, ‘La notion juridique de laïcité’ (Recueil Dalloz 1949) 137. However, the principle of separation between religion and State coexists with the principle of freedom of conscience. French secularism therefore does not convey any hostility or even indifference towards religion. It was devised as a means to ensure the free exercise of religious beliefs. See Weil, P, ‘Why French Laïcité is Liberal’ (2009) 30 CardozoLRev 2699Google Scholar.

15 See CE avis 3 May 2000 Mlle Marteaux, (2011) RFDA 141, Conclusions R Schwartz.

16 The Court of Appeal of Paris put laïcité back into the equation on the basis of art 4(2) of the Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 which allows churches, religious associations or communities as well as philosophical and non-confessional organizations to promote a special ethos. Staff employed by these institutions may legitimately be expected to show a certain degree of allegiance to the ethos promoted by the employer's institution even at some cost to their individual freedom to manifest differing beliefs. See Official Journal L 303, 02/12/2000 P. 0016, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1435477629771&uri=CELEX:32000L0078>.

17 In such rare instances of two consecutive deferrals to the Cour de Cassation in the same case on the same grounds, the second deferral is necessarily examined in plenary Chamber. The decision of the plenary Chamber is then final and binding on lower courts. See J Boré and L Boré, La Cassation en matière civile (Dalloz 2003).

18 <http://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/Avis_PG_pleniere_140625ano.pdf>.

19 See Lock, T, ‘An Additional Protective Layer: The Case of Religious Discrimination in the United Kingdom and Germany’ (2013) 38(5) ELRev 655Google Scholar.

20 See (n 16).

21 Loi no 2008–496 of 27 May 2008 portant diverses dispositions d'adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations (Act Implementing EU Law Anti-Discrimination provisions), available at <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000018877783>.

22 According to art 55 of the French Constitution, direct effect of international treaties is subject to a condition of reciprocity, but this condition does not apply to treaties on human rights. See F Sudre, ‘La Dimension internationale et européenne des libertés et droits fondamentaux’ in R Cabrillac, M-A Frison-Roche and T Revet, Libertés et droits fondamentaux (18th edn, Dalloz 2012) 35.

23 Such review has been carried out by French private law courts since the important decision of Cass Civ 24 May 1975 Jacques Vabre, (1975) Rec D 496, Conclusions Touffait. The Jacques Vabre case deals with a provision of the EC Rome Treaty but its reasoning can be (and was indeed) extended to the ECHR. Similar review has been carried out by French administrative law courts since the decision of the French Conseil d'Etat of 20 October 1989, (1989) Rec Lebon 108243.

24 English Courts are expected to do likewise under section 3 of the Human Rights Act (hereafter HRA) whereby, ‘91) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’. Moreover, under section 6 HRA, Courts, as public authorities must not act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. However contrary to French courts, English Courts have not been persuaded by their status under section 6 HRA to absorb Strasbourg principles directly into private law. See J Wright, ‘A Damp Squib? The Impact of Section 6 HRA on the Common Law: Horizontal Effect and Beyond’ (2014) PL 289.

25 For an illustration, see ECHR 18 March 2011 Lautsi v Italy (App No 30814/06) 68.

26 See von Bogdandy, A and Schill, S, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 1417Google Scholar.

27 For reflections on the case in light of EU requirements, see Hunter-Henin, M, ‘Living Together in an Age of Religious Diversity: Lessons from Baby Loup and SAS’ (2015) OJLR 1, 11–13, 18Google Scholar.

28 See (n 21).

29 See (n 16).

30 See (n 8).

31 See (n 2).

32 See also, Laronze, F, ‘Affaire Baby-Loup: l'épuisement du droit dans sa recherche d'une vision apolitisée de la religion’ (2014) Droit social 100Google Scholar; Peyronnet, M, ‘Baby-Loup: passage en force des juges d'appel’ (2013) Rec D ActualitésGoogle Scholar.

33 For a plea in favour of a more robust use of proportionality requirements in law and religion cases, see M Hunter-Henin, ‘Believing in Negotiation: Reflection in Law's Regulation of Religious Symbols in State Schools’ in F Guesnet et al., Negotiating with Religion (Ashgate forthcoming). More generally, see the debate in the International Journal of Constitutional Law, Tsakyrakis, S, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7 ICON 468Google Scholar and (2010) 8 ICON 709; Klatt, M and Meister, M, ‘Proportionality—A Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the I CON Controversy’ (2012) 10 ICON 687Google Scholar. Also Rivers, J, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 409CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Private company policies are subject to inspections by work inspectors (inspecteurs du travail) who are civil servants, but the policy remains a private law regulation (see Cass Soc 16 December 1992, Bull Civ V n 602). Challenges to the policies of private companies will normally therefore fall under the jurisdiction of private law courts. However, in the Caterpillar case, the challenge to the company's policy was raised by the work inspector and consequently fell under the jurisdiction of administrative law courts.

35 Art R 4228–20 of the French Employment Code.

36 CE 12 November 2012, JCP E 2012 Act 745, Comments by D Corrighan-Coursin.

37 ECHR 15 January 2013 Eweida and Others v UK (App Nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10).

38 CE 28 June 1963 Narcy, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative 293 and CE 22 February 2007 APREI (association du personnel relevant des établissements pour inadaptés) Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative 294.

39 For an overview of the debates surrounding the definition of ‘public authorities’ and ‘hybrid public authorities’ in English Law, see D Oliver, ‘The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public Functions under the Human Rights Act’ (2000) PL 476.

40 F Rome, ‘Baby Loup dans la bergerie’, (2013) Rec D 761; M Peyronnet, ‘Laïcité et illicéité du règlement intérieur d'une entreprise ne gérant pas un service public’ (2013) Rec D Actualités.

41 M Hunter-Henin, ‘Living Together in an Age of Religious Diversity’ (n 27) 10.

42 Contra, F Champeaux, Comments (2014) Semaine Sociale Lamy, 1367; S Mouton and T Lamarche, ‘Affaire Baby Loup: suite et fin? Une décision en demi-teinte qui ne protège pas la neutralité nécessaire aux missions d'intérêt général’ (2014) AJDA 1842.

43 According to Frédéric Dieu, the Cour de Cassation thus avoids splitting laïcité into two notions: one portraying laïcité as an overarching constitutional principle and another depicting laïcité as an ethos: ‘L'affaire Baby Loup: quelles conséquences sur le principe de laïcité et l'obligation de neutralité religieuse? ’ (2014) JCP A 2114.

44 On the difficult reconciliation of Islam and French secularism, see JR Bowen, Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State (Princeton University Press 2011).

45 ECHR 1 July 2014 SAS v France (App No 43835/112014).

46 ECHR 15 February 2001 Dahlab v Switzerland (App No 42393/98).

47 See (n 37) para 83.

48 See M Hill, R Sandberg and N Doe, Religion and Law in the United Kingdom (Kluwer Law International 2011) 53.

49 See (n 46).

50 Art 164ff of the Cantonal Constitution.

51 See (n 45).

52 See (n 11).

53 See (n 2).

54 See (n 45).

55 ibid, para 122

56 For a critical appraisal of the case, see Hunter-Henin (n 27).

57 The Law was approved by an overwhelming 335/1 majority before the Lower House of the French Parliament and a 246/1 majority before the Upper House.

58 On the ECtHR's caution not to tread on Church/State constitutional national arrangements, see Adhar, R and Leigh, I, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: Or How God Never Really Went Away’ (2012) 75(6) MLR 1064Google Scholar.

59 See the French parliamentary resolution adopted on 11 May 2010 (Ass Nat XIII législature, TA no 459; (2010) JCP, Comments by Anne Levade, 551.

60 Conseil Constitutionnel 7 October 2010, Journal Officiel 12 October 2010, 18345.

61 Supporting this new social responsibility conferred upon employers, see Desbarats, I, ‘Affaire Baby Loup: l'orthodoxie en guise d'épilogue’ (2014) JCP 1445Google Scholar; also Lamarche, M, ‘Des femmes, des voiles, des enfants et des juges circonspects’ (2014) JCP 902Google Scholar.

62 D Spielman, ‘Obligations positives et effet horizontal des dispositions de la Convention’ in L'Interprétation de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, Actes du Colloque de l'IEDH à Montpellier des 13 et 14 mars 1998 (Bruylant 1998) 161.

63 ECtHR 21 June 1988 Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v Austria Series A, N 139 (1991) 13 EHRR 204.

64 See L Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas: Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the USA (OUP 2007).

65 See (n 37).

66 Ladele v Islington BC (CA) [2009] EWCA Civ 1357.

67 Eweida v British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 80.

68 See Leigh, I and Hambler, A, ‘Religious Symbols. Conscience and the Rights of Others’ (2014) 3(1) OJLR 2Google Scholar.

69 Dissenting opinion of judges Vučinič and De Gaetano; see (n 37) para 6.

70 Above paragraph B, sub-paragraph 1.

71 McCrea, R, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (2013) 4 MLRGoogle Scholar.

72 Ray, J-E, ‘Baby Loup. Les enfants d'abord!’ (2014) JCP 804Google Scholar.

73 Non-legally binding opinion delivered by the Procureur Général, prior to the final Baby Loup decision, (n 18).

74 See CJEU 10 July 2008 C-54/07, (2010) JCP S 1421, Comments by J Cavallini.

75 Under art 2 Protocol 1 of the ECHR, the State is to ‘respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions’.

76 On the concept of indoctrination in the ECtHR case-law, see M Hunter-Henin, ‘Law, Religion and the School’ in S Ferrari (ed), Handbook of Law and Religion (Routledge 2015) 259.

77 ECtHR 18 March 2011 Lautsi v Italy (App No 30814/06).

78 On the multiple significations that may be assigned to the crucifix in the Lautsi case, see J Temperman (ed), The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Martinus Nijhoff 2012).

79 See (n 45) para 119.

80 ECtHR 26 June 2014 Mennesson v France (App No 65192/11) and Labassee v France (App No 65941/11).

81 If children's best interests may in abstracto justify that surrogacy be prohibited (so as to avoid the commodification and reification of children), consideration of children's interests in concreto demands that children born illegally out of surrogacy may nevertheless have their legal parentage recognized with their commissioning parents, or at least with their commissioning father when the commissioning father also happens to be the child's biological father. As well as the widely different context of both cases, one important difference must, however, be noted: in Baby Loup the abstract assessment of the best interest principle did not contravene children's rights but the rights of the childcare workers in contact with children. The surrogacy cases nevertheless confirm the recent ECtHR trend to avoid blank abstract assessments of right violations.

82 Litigation has come to an end at domestic level. However, the Cour de Cassation plenary Chamber decision may now be challenged before the ECtHR. See (n 3).

83 See S Hennette-Vauchez and V Valentin, L'Affaire Baby Loup ou la nouvelle laïcité (LGDJ 2014).

84 The dismissal of a supermarket employee who had refused to remove her scarf was held to be void. <http://www.ouest-france.fr/carrefour-condamne-pour-avoir-licencie-une-salarie-voilee-2833628>.