We quantitatively assessed the fit failure rate of N95 respirators according to the number of donning/doffing and hours worn.

Experimental study.

A tertiary-care referral center in South Korea.

In total, 10 infection control practitioners participated in the fit test.

The first experiment comprised 4 consecutive 1-hour donnings and fit tests between each donning. The second experiment comprised 2 consecutive 3-hour donnings and fit tests between each donning. The final experiment comprised fit tests after an 1-hour donning or a 2-hour donning.

For 1-hour donnings, 60%, 70%, and 90% of the participants had fit failures after 2, 3, and 4 consecutive donnings, respectively. For 3-hour donnings, 50% had fit failure after the first donning and 70% had failures after 2 consecutive donnings. All participants passed the fit test after refitting whenever fit failure occurred. The final experiment showed that 50% had fit failure after a single use of 1 hour, and 30% had fit failure after a single use of 2 hours.

High fit-failure rates were recorded after repeated donning and extended use of N95 respirators. Caution is needed for reuse (≥1 time) and extended use (≥1 hour) of N95 respirators in high-risk settings such as those involving aerosol-generating procedures. Although adequate refitting may recover the fit factor, the use of clean gloves and strict hand hygiene afterward should be ensured when touching the outer surfaces of N95 respirators for refitting.

Understanding the extent of aerosol-based transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is important for tailoring interventions for control of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Multiple studies have reported the detection of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid in air samples, but only one study has successfully recovered viable virus, although it is limited by its small sample size.

We aimed to determine the extent of shedding of viable SARS-CoV-2 in respiratory aerosols from COVID-19 patients.

In this observational air sampling study, air samples from airborne-infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) and a community isolation facility (CIF) housing COVID-19 patients were collected using a water vapor condensation method into liquid collection media. Samples were tested for presence of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid using quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR), and qRT-PCR-positive samples were tested for viability using viral culture.

Samples from 6 (50%) of the 12 sampling cycles in hospital rooms were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA, including aerosols ranging from <1 µm to >4 µm in diameter. Of 9 samples from the CIF, 1 was positive via qRT-PCR. Viral RNA concentrations ranged from 179 to 2,738 ORF1ab gene copies per cubic meter of air. Virus cultures were negative after 4 blind passages.

Although SARS-CoV-2 is readily captured in aerosols, virus culture remains challenging despite optimized sampling methodologies to preserve virus viability. Further studies on aerosol-based transmission and control of SARS-CoV-2 are needed.

To investigate risk factors for healthcare worker (HCW) infection in viral respiratory pandemics: severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), SARS CoV-1, influenza A H1N1, influenza H5N1. To improve understanding of HCW risk management amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

Systematic review and meta-analysis.

We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, and Cochrane CENTRAL databases from conception until July 2020 for studies comparing infected HCWs (cases) and noninfected HCWs (controls) and risk factors for infection. Outcomes included HCW types, infection prevention practices, and medical procedures. Pooled effect estimates with pathogen-specific stratified meta-analysis and inverse variance meta-regression analysis were completed. We used the GRADE framework to rate certainty of evidence. (PROSPERO no. CRD42020176232, 6 April 2020.)

In total, 54 comparative studies were included (n = 191,004 HCWs). Compared to nonfrontline HCWs, frontline HCWs were at increased infection risk (OR, 1.66; 95% CI, 1.24–2.22), and the risk was greater for HCWs involved in endotracheal intubations (risk difference, 35.2%; 95% CI, 21.4–47.9). Use of gloves, gown, surgical mask, N95 respirator, face protection, and infection training were each strongly protective against infection. Meta-regression showed reduced infection risk in frontline HCWs working in facilities with infection designated wards (OR, −1.04; 95% CI, −1.53 to −0.33, P = .004) and performing aerosol-generating medical procedures in designated centers (OR, −1.30; 95% CI, −2.52 to −0.08; P = .037).

During highly infectious respiratory pandemics, widely available protective measures such as use of gloves, gowns, and face masks are strongly protective against infection and should be instituted, preferably in dedicated settings, to protect frontline HCW during waves of respiratory virus pandemics.

Widespread testing for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is necessary to curb the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), but testing is undermined when the only option is a nasopharyngeal swab. Self-collected swab techniques can overcome many of the disadvantages of a nasopharyngeal swab, but they require evaluation.

Three self-collected non-nasopharyngeal swab techniques (saline gargle, oral swab and combined oral-anterior nasal swab) were compared to a nasopharyngeal swab for SARS-CoV-2 detection at multiple COVID-19 assessment centers in Toronto, Canada. The performance characteristics of each test were assessed.

The adjusted sensitivity of the saline gargle was 0.90 (95% CI 0.86-0.94), the oral swab was 0.82 (95% CI, 0.72–0.89) and the combined oral–anterior nasal swab was 0.87 (95% CI, 0.77–0.93) compared to a nasopharyngeal swab, which demonstrated a sensitivity of ˜90% when all positive tests were the reference standard. The median cycle threshold values for the SARS-CoV-2 E-gene for concordant and discordant saline gargle specimens were 17 and 31 (P < .001), for the oral swabs these values were 17 and 28 (P < .001), and for oral–anterior nasal swabs these values were 18 and 31 (P = .007).

Self-collected saline gargle and an oral–anterior nasal swab have a similar sensitivity to a nasopharyngeal swab for the detection of SARS-CoV-2. These alternative collection techniques are cheap and can eliminate barriers to testing, particularly in underserved populations.

We sought to contain a healthcare-associated coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak, to evaluate contributory factors, and to prevent future outbreaks.

Quasi-experimental cluster-control outbreak evaluation.

All patients and staff on the outbreak ward (case cluster), and randomly selected patients and staff on COVID-19 wards (positive control cluster) and a non-COVID-19 wards (negative control cluster) underwent reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing. Hand hygiene and personal protective equipment (PPE) compliance, detection of environmental SARS-COV-2 RNA, patient behavior, and SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibody prevalence were assessed.

In total, 145 staff and 26 patients were exposed, resulting in 24 secondary cases. Also, 4 of 14 (29%) staff and 7 of 10 (70%) patients were asymptomatic or presymptomatic. There was no difference in mean cycle threshold between asymptomatic or presymptomatic versus symptomatic individuals. None of 32 randomly selected staff from the control wards tested positive. Environmental RNA detection levels were higher on the COVID-19 ward than on the negative control ward (OR, 19.98; 95% CI, 2.63–906.38; P < .001). RNA levels on the COVID-19 ward (where there were no outbreaks) and the outbreak ward were similar (OR, 2.38; P = .18). Mean monthly hand hygiene compliance, based on 20,146 observations (over preceding year), was lower on the outbreak ward (P < .006). Compared to both control wards, the proportion of staff with detectable antibodies was higher on the outbreak ward (OR, 3.78; 95% CI, 1.01–14.25; P = .008).

Staff seroconversion was more likely during a short-term outbreak than from sustained duty on a COVID-19 ward. Environmental contamination and PPE use were similar on the outbreak and control wards. Patient noncompliance, decreased hand hygiene, and asymptomatic or presymptomatic transmission were more frequent on the outbreak ward.

Due to shortages of N95 respirators during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, it is necessary to estimate the number of N95s required for healthcare workers (HCWs) to inform manufacturing targets and resource allocation.

We developed a model to determine the number of N95 respirators needed for HCWs both in a single acute-care hospital and the United States.

For an acute-care hospital with 400 all-cause monthly admissions, the number of N95 respirators needed to manage COVID-19 patients admitted during a month ranges from 113 (95% interpercentile range [IPR], 50–229) if 0.5% of admissions are COVID-19 patients to 22,101 (95% IPR, 5,904–25,881) if 100% of admissions are COVID-19 patients (assuming single use per respirator, and 10 encounters between HCWs and each COVID-19 patient per day). The number of N95s needed decreases to a range of 22 (95% IPR, 10–43) to 4,445 (95% IPR, 1,975–8,684) if each N95 is used for 5 patient encounters. Varying monthly all-cause admissions to 2,000 requires 6,645–13,404 respirators with a 60% COVID-19 admission prevalence, 10 HCW–patient encounters, and reusing N95s 5–10 times. Nationally, the number of N95 respirators needed over the course of the pandemic ranges from 86 million (95% IPR, 37.1–200.6 million) to 1.6 billion (95% IPR, 0.7–3.6 billion) as 5%–90% of the population is exposed (single-use). This number ranges from 17.4 million (95% IPR, 7.3–41 million) to 312.3 million (95% IPR, 131.5–737.3 million) using each respirator for 5 encounters.

We quantified the number of N95 respirators needed for a given acute-care hospital and nationally during the COVID-19 pandemic under varying conditions.