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Normative Models for Strategic Decision Making in Industrial–Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2015

William P. Bottom  and
Dejun Tony Kong
William P. Bottom*
Affiliation:
Washington University in St. Louis
Dejun Tony Kong
Affiliation:
Washington University in St. Louis
*
E-mail: bottomb@wustl.edu, Address: Olin Business School, Washington University, One Brookings Drive, Campus Box 1133, St. Louis, MO 63130
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Abstract

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Type
Commentaries
Information
Industrial and Organizational Psychology , Volume 3 , Issue 4 , December 2010 , pp. 417 - 420
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology 2010 

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Footnotes

*

Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis.

References

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