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The Social Rationality of Theological Discourse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2014

Terence J. Martin Jr.*
Affiliation:
Saint Mary's College

Abstract

Drawing lessons from literary dialogues on religious issues, this essay offers a rhetorical and hermeneutical analysis of the workings and achievements of theological discourse. The rationality proper to theological discourse is found to be a function of interlocutors' communicative actions and reactions, describing the social processes by which speakers sustain common space and time for persuasion and understanding. Standards of rationality are idiosyncratic not simply to individual cultural-linguistic frameworks, but to public, dialogical situations which speakers must create and sustain in their communicative interaction.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The College Theology Society 1986

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References

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47 In The Nature of Doctrine, Lindbeck assumes that his “communal enclaves” in which people are well-versed in and confident in their field's supremacy will “stress service not domination” (128) and will not fall into “traditionalist rigidity” (134). This is a dangerous assumption.

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