¹ Material from Crown Copyright records in the Public Record Office appears by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office. I am grateful to the Hon. Mark Bonham Carter for permission to refer to the Asquith MSS; to the Cambridge University Library for permission to refer to the Hardinge MSS; and to Commander Vyner and the Trustees of the Estate of the First Marquess of Ripon for permission to refer to the Ripon MSS.

² Bonner-Smith, D. and Dewar, A.C. (eds.), Russian War 1854: Baltic and Black Sea: Official Correspondence (Navy Records Society, LXXXIII, 1943),Google Scholarpassim; and Bonner-Smith, D. (ed.), Russian War 1855: Baltic: Official Correspondence (Navy Records Society, LXXXIV, 1944),Google Scholarpassim.

³ Memorandum by Palmerston, 19 March 1854: Gooch, G.P. (ed.), Lord John Russell: Later Correspondence 1840–1878 (London, 1925), 11, 160–1.Google Scholar

⁴ Palmerston to Clarendon, 9 October 1855: Marquess of Lome, Palmerston (London, 3rd edn. 1906), p. 176.Google Scholar

⁵ Palmerston to Clarendon, 25 September 1855: Bell, H.F.C., Lord Palmerston (London, 1936), 11, 138.Google Scholar

⁶ Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Sweden and Norway, 21 November 1855: Hertslet, E., The Map of Europe by Treaty, II (London, 1875), no. 262;Google Scholar R. W. Brant, ‘Memorandum respecting the origin and negotiation of the treaty of 1855 guaranteeing the territories of Sweden and Norway against Russian aggression’, 8 May 1905: Gooch, G.P. and Temperley, H.W.V. (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, VIII: Arbitration, Neutrality and Security (London, 1932), no. 81;Google ScholarKnaplund, Paul, ‘Finmark in British Diplomacy 1836–1855’, American Historical Review, XXX (1925), 478–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

The Norwegian fjords in the vicinity of the North Cape are, in spite of the high latitude in which they are situated, practically ice-free all the year round, because of the action of the Gulf Stream. Since 1851 the Russians had been pressing the Swedes to concede fishing-rights and territory on the Varanger fjord to them, and had avenged their refusal by closing the frontier to the migrant Norwegian Lapps, in violation of the Russo-Swedish agreement of 1826. This episode was the immediate occasion of the 1855 guarantee, which was designed to protect Sweden against further and more serious reprisals. Palmerston subsequently explained that the purpose of the treaty was ‘for securing against Russian aggression some important naval stations on the northern coast of Norway’. (Lome, Palmerston, p. 199.)

⁷ Convention between Great Britain, France and Russia respecting the Aland Islands, 30 March 1856: Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, II, no. 267.

⁸ For Palmerston's attitude to the pan-Scandinavian project see Ragnhild Hatton,' Palmerston and Scandinavian Union’, in Bourne, K. and Watt, D.C. (eds.), Studies in International History: Essays presented to W. N. Medlicott (London, 1967), pp. 119–44.Google Scholar

⁹ Minute by Russell, 25 June 1864: Temperley, H.W.V. and Penson, L.M. (eds.), Foundations of British Foreign Policy 7792–1902 (London, 1938), no. 95.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 22 February 1864: Bell, Palmerston, 11, 380.

¹¹ Palmerston to Russell, 13 September 1865: Temperley and Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, no. 97.

¹² Minute by Northbrook, 20 May 1875: Kazemzadeh, Firuz, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864–1914 (New Haven, 1968), p. 29.Google Scholar

¹³ Salisbury to Lytton, 22 June 1877: Greaves, R.L., Persia and the Defence of India 1884–1892 (London, 1959), p. 196.Google Scholar Similarly, at the height of the Near Eastern crisis of 1877–8, the measures which the cabinet contemplated for bringing Russia to reason were confined to the eastern Mediterranean.

¹⁴ Hansard, 3rd series, ccxcvi, 663; Langer, W.L., European Alliances and Alignments 1871–1890 (New York, 2nd edn. 1950), pp. 312–15;Google Scholar Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 95–8; Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, pp. 71–84; D. R. Gillard, ‘Salisbury and the Indian Defence Problem 1885–1902’, in Bourne and Watt, Studies in International History, pp. 239–40.

A War Office paper, ‘England's means of offence against Russia’, 10 April 1885, endorsed Salisbury's view that the Russian threat could be countered only in Central Asia itself. However, it may be added that the War Office's Indian Mobilisation Committee in 1887 suggested that an economic blockade of Russia's Baltic coast would be a useful adjunct to the main operations in Central Asia. (Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, pp. 196, 40.)

¹⁵ As The Times acidly observed in 1855: ‘When we send out the finest fleet in the world, we naturally expect it to do more than shut in a third-rate naval Power, and assist an Army to destroy an unfinished fort.’ (The Times, 3 April 1855, quoted Bonner-Smith, Russian War 1855, p. 6. See also Marder, A.J., The Anatomy of British Sea Power: British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era 1880–1905 (New York, 1940), p. 66.)Google Scholar

In January 1856, when the British and French governments were discussing possible operations for the coming season, General Canrobert explained that 120,000 troops would be needed to take Cronstadt or St Petersburg, though Napoleon III thought that 60,000 or 80,000 would be enough. The war committee of the British cabinet declined to sanction combined operations on such a scale. (Bonner-Smith, Russian War 1855, p. 12).

¹⁶ Spring-Rice, Annual Report on Sweden for 1911, 29 January 1912, para. 2: Foreign Office Confidential Print vol. 9990.

¹⁷ The first Admiralty paper on war with Germany was produced in August 1904 (Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power, pp. 479–81); an Admiralty committee which reported in January 1905 took it for granted that Britain's most probable enemy was Germany, with Russia second. (Report of committee on the supply of submarine mines, January 1905: Kemp, P.K. (ed.), The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, I (Navy Records Society, CII, 1960), 84–90.Google Scholar)

¹⁸ Fisher to Selborne, 1 December 1900: Marder, A.J. (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (London, 1952–1959), 1, no. 83.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Fisher to Lansdowne, 22 April 1905: Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought, 11, no. 16.

²⁰ Director of Naval Intelligence, Memorandum: ‘British intervention in the event of an attack on France by Germany’, 26 June 1905: Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power, pp. 502–3.

²¹ War Plans, 1907: Kemp, Fisher Papers, 11, 318–468.

²² Ibid. pp. 371, 395–7. The necessity of sealing up the Kiel canal explains why Fisher regarded Heligoland (for surrendering which Lord Salisbury was ‘the worst and weakest Foreign Minister this country ever had’) not only as ‘the key of Germany in the North Sea’, but equally as ‘the key of the Baltic’. (Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought, II, nos. 135. 307. 263.)

The attacks proposed in the war plans against various strategic points in the North Sea were intended, in addition to their own intrinsic merits, to facilitate the blocking of the Elbe and the Kiel canal.

²³ Kemp, Fisher Papers, 11, 434.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 436.

²⁵ Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command 1914–1918 (London, 1961), 1, 39.Google Scholar

²⁶ Fisher to Esher, 20 September 1911: Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought, 11, no. 317. It may be observed that the size, as well as the effectiveness, of the expeditionary force continually increased in Fisher's imagination: by 1912 he wanted to land 200,000 men ‘90 miles from Berlin on that 14 miles of sandy beach, impossible of defence against a Battle Fleet sweeping with devastating shells the flat country for miles around, like a mower's scythe’ (Fisher to Esher, 25 April 1912: Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought, 11, no. 364.)

²⁷ In his observations on the war plans of 1907, Wilson had not much to say about the Baltic aspects, contenting himself with the observation that ‘if any troops were available beyond what was necessary to maintain our position on the Elbe, they might be moved round to the Baltic to threaten Kiel or Stettin from that side’. He advocated the seizure of an island in the Baltic (Alsen or Fehmarn) as a base for Baltic operations. (Remarks on the War Plans by Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, 1907: Kemp, Fisher Papers, 11, 454 ff. and especially 462–3. See also Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1, 77–8.)

²⁸ Minutes of the 114th meeting of the C.I.D., 23 August 1911: Papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Cab. 38/19 no. 49, especially p. 13. See also Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1, 81; and Marder, A.J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 1: The Road to War (London, 1961), 389–93.Google Scholar

¹ For an account of the negotiations, see Alston, B., ‘Memorandum respecting Sweden and Norway’, 4 10 1905;Google ScholarGooch, and Temperley, (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914 (hereafter referred to as BD), VII, no. 82; also Sidney Lee, King Edward VII (London, 1927), 11, 324.Google Scholar

³⁰ Lansdowne to Rodd, tel. no. 3, 23 May 1905: BD, VIII, 94–5.

³¹ Mallet to Bertie, 31 March 1905; Bertie to Mallet, 26 May 1905: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/ 179, Sc 05/1 and 05/2.

³² ‘If we refuse to guarantee the two Scandinavian Powers against Russian aggression, we have to face the probability that sooner or later Russia will, by playing upon their mutual distrust and jealousy, be able to put diplomatic pressure on one or the other as she pleases, and even, in the last resort, to attack them in detail… The conclusion reached is, then, that Scandinavia's extremity may, unless we interpose, prove to be Russia's opportunity. If the Franco-British guarantee no longer protects Finmark, the risks Russia would run in seizing it seem negligibly small when compared with the advantages its possession must imply. The effect upon the maritime situation in Europe of the establishment of a great Russian naval base in the North Atlantic would in itself be very inimical to British interests, and if—as in the fulness of time seems more than probable—the Russian incursion into Finmark should be followed by a Muscovite domination of the entire Scandinavian peninsula, the balance of European power would be shaken to its foundations.’ (Admiralty Memorandum: ‘The threatened dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden: naval aspects of the question’, 5 June 1905: Cab. 38/9 no. 47.)

That it was not only the Admiralty which was exercised about the Russian threat is indicated by the reception accorded in the Foreign Office to an article on the subject in the Morning Post: headed ‘Russian Expansion: Encroachment on Norway: An Outlet to the Atlantic’, it concluded with the question: ‘Can the “Heir of Norway” be prevented from constructing a new and stronger Port Arthur in the Finmark'fjords, and can Norway rely on the provisions of the Treaty of 1855?’ Foreign Office minutes characterized this article as ‘very thoughtful’ and ‘excellent’. (Morning Post, 12 November 1906, filed with Leech to Grey no. 128, 10 November 1906, with minutes by Crowe and Barrington: Foreign Office papers, F.O. 371/98.)

³³ Lindberg, Folke, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics 1905–1908 (Stockholm, 1958), p. 15.Google Scholar This work is invaluable for the study of the Baltic question from the separation of Norway and Sweden to the signature of the Baltic and North Sea declarations in April 1908.

³⁴ The fleet which left the Baltic under the command of Rozhdestvensky in September 1904 consisted of seven first-class battleships and one second-class. Thereafter Russia had no first-class battleships in the Baltic. (Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 434.)

³⁵ Lee, Edward VII, II, 317–18; also ‘British Naval Policy and German Aspirations’, Fortnightly Review, September 1905: Kemp, Fisher Papers, 11, 301–14. At Björkö the Kaiser sought to promote his projected Russo-German alliance by drawing the Tsar's attention to the danger of a British intrigue over the new Norwegian throne. (Lepsius, J., Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A. and Thimme, F. (eds.), Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914 (Berlin, 1922–1927), XIX, ii, nos. 6218,Google Scholar 6220.)

³⁶ ‘British Naval Policy and German Aspirations’, Fortnightly Review, September 1905: Kemp, Fisher Papers, 11, 303. Fisher's inclusion of this article in his ‘Naval Necessities’ indicates that he thought highly of it, if indeed he did not directly inspire it, and it is there fore of some value in t he interpretation of his policy.

³⁷ F.O. 371/99, files 20829, 26822 passim.

³⁸ Lee, Edward VII, II, 315–26; Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics, pp. 16–37.

³⁹ First Norwegian Draft Treaty, 13 December 1906: BD, VIII, no. 88.

⁴⁰ Rodd to Grey, tel. no. 21, 14 November 1906: F. O. 371/98.

⁴¹ First Russian Counter-Draft Treaty, 22 January 1907: BD, VII, no. 89.

⁴² Minute by Crowe on First Russian Counter-Draft Treaty, 22 January 1907: BD, VIII, no. 89; Grey to Poklewsky, 14 February 1907: Foreign Office Confidential Print (hereafter referred to as F.O.C.P.) vol. 8979, no. 74.

⁴³ Pichon, the French foreign minister, thought it was ‘ quite likely that Germany hoped to keep out of the Baltic the war-ships of every Great Power except her own and those of Russia, and to have herself the advantage of passing her own ships in and out of the Baltic and the North Sea through the Kiel Canal’. (Bertie to Grey no. 482, 2 December 1906: F.O. 371/98.) The Norwegian minister in Paris was reported to share the view that the neutralization of the three Scandinavian powers would necessarily imply the closing of the straits. (Bertie to Grey no. 531, 20 December 1906: F.O. 371 /98). Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, suggested that the Kaiser's apparent willingness to agree to the neutralization of Norway indicated that he was confident of Danish co-operation in closing the straits to Britain, while Germany would be unaffected because of the Kiel canal. (Bertie to Grey no. 536, 23 December 1906: F.O. 371/98.)

⁴⁴ Minute by Crowe on Rodd to Grey no. 2, 8 January 1907: FO 371/295.

⁴⁵ Minute by Crowe on First Norwegian Draft Treaty, 28 December 1906: BD, VIII, no. 88.

⁴⁶ Hardinge, ‘Memorandum on the question of Danish neutrality and the free navigation of the straits giving access to the Baltic’, 18 February 1907: BD, VIII, no. 91.

⁴⁶ War Plans, 1907: Kemp, Fisher Papers, II, 354, 370–1.

⁴⁷ Minutes of 95th meeting of the C.I.D., 21 February 1907; Cab. 38/13 no. 10. The British ambassador in Paris, Bertie, subsequently used the same argument as Ottley had advanced to the C.I.D., in order to demonstrate to Clemenceau, the French prime minister, the dilemma in which a guarantee of Norwegian neutrality might place France in the event of an Anglo-German war. (Bertie to Grey no. 342A, 9 July 1907: BD, VIII, no. 106.)

⁴⁹ Vaughan to Grey no. 34, 11 April 1907; no. 41, 25 April 1907: FOCP 9038, nos. 20, 41. For the secret Danish-German negotiations of 1906–7 see Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics, pp. 6–8.

⁵⁰ Minutes by Crowe, Campbell and Hardinge on Vaughan to Grey no. 41, 25 April 1907; no. 45, 30 April 1907; and no. 47, 1 May 1907: F.O. 371/243.

⁵¹ Dumas to Lascelles, 6 March 1907: BD, VIII, no. 104.

⁵² Admiralty to Foreign Office, 4 May 1907; Grey to Vaughan no. 30, 17 May 1907: FOCP 9038, nos. 54, 68.

⁵³ Minutes by Hardinge and Grey on Dumas to Lascelles, 6 March 1907: BD, VIII, no. 104.

⁵⁴ Grey to Herbert no. 13,7 February 1907: F.O. 371/295.’ It will not do for us to propose that neutrality should be dropped; it will make Russia and Germany suspect that we have some design.' (Minute by Grey on Bertie to Grey no. 79, 9 February 1907: F.O. 371/295.)

⁵⁵ Grey to Herbert no. 11, 30 January 1907; no. 13, 7 February 1907: F.O. 371/295.

⁵⁶ Second Norwegian Draft Treaty, 13 March 1907: BD, VIII, no. 93.

⁵⁷ Minutes by Hardinge and Grey on Second Norwegian Draft Treaty, 13 March 1907: BD, VIII, no. 93; also Grey to Bertie no. 245, 22 April 1907: FOCP 9038, no. 25.

⁵⁸ Minutes of 97th meeting of the C.I.D., 25 April 1907: Cab. 38/13 no. 19.

⁵⁹ Nicolson to Grey no. 331, 19 June 1907: BD, VIII, no. 94; with minutes by Spicer, Hardinge and Grey: F.O. 371/295. Spicer observed: ‘We have no explanation of this apparent change of front on the part of the Norwegian Government, who in the early spring were ready to abandon the condition as to “neutrality”… Norway seems suddenly to have abandoned the idea of remaining free to come to the help of Sweden.’ Hardinge observed bluntly that ‘there can be no question of our being a party to the proposed convention’.

⁶⁰ Kroupensky, the Russian minister in Christiania, was obligingly explicit: ‘In fact… your Government has changed its opinion, from what I hear, because Sir John Fisher has come forward and altered the whole position by pointing out that, in case of war between Germany and England, the former would certainly occupy some point in Denmark and then England would take a port in Norway.’ In London, it was privately admitted that Kroupensky was not far from the truth: ‘It looks as if Sir John Fisher had again been indiscreet, for I understand that the view here attributed to him had in fact been put forward by him. The result is most unfortunate.’ (Herbert to Grey no. 30, 29 May 1907, with minute by Crowe: F.O. 371/295). For Fisher's conversation with Nansen, which was presumably the occasion of the indiscretion in question, see Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics, pp. 65–6.

It may be observed that the view attributed to Fisher was identical with that expressed by Ottley in the C.I.D. on 21 February 1907.

⁶¹ Minutes of 95th meeting of the C.I.D., 21 February 1907; Cab. 38/13 no. 10.

⁶² Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 103, 17 June 1907: F.O. 371/338.

⁶³ Minute by Hardinge on Nicolson to Grey no. 328, 18 June 1907: F.O. 371/338.

⁶⁴ Memorandum communicated by the Russian ambassador, 25 June 1907: BD, VIII, no. 95; also Grey to Nicolson, tel. no. 97, 3 July 1907: FOCP 9119, no. 11.

⁶⁵ Minute by Hardinge, 29 June 1907: F.O. 371/295.

⁶⁶ Bertie to Grey no. 342 A, 9 July 1907:BD, VIII, no. 106; see also aide-mémoire by Hardinge for Edward VII, 2 July 1907: Hardinge MSS, vol. 9 fo. 36.

⁶⁷ Hardinge privately acknowledged that the Åland Islands question ‘came up very usefully at that moment’. (Hardinge to Bertie, 18 July 1907: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/179 Sc 07/2.)

⁶⁸ C.I.D. note, ‘The Norwegian draft treaty and the position of the Åland Islands’, 9 July 1907: Cab. 38/13 no. 24.

⁶⁹ Grey to Nicolson no. 250, 1 July 1907; to Herbert no. 65, 1 July 1907: FOCP 9119, nos. 6, 7; also aide-mémoire by Hardinge for Edward VII, 2 July 1907: Hardinge MSS 9 fo. 36. Hardinge's aide-mémoire was intended for confidential communication to the king of Norway, to explain Britain's objections to t he Norwegian treaty to h im and his government.

⁷⁰ For example: ‘M. Isvolsky said that he wished to state that, if t he Åland Island question caused any difficulty, he would postpone it for a time. I said that, as it had been raised, it seemed to me difficult to leave it out of consideration.’ (Nicolson to Grey no. 376, 14 July 1907: FOCP 9119, no. 42.)

⁷¹ Grey to Nicolson no. 268, 12 July 1907: FOCP 9119, no. 28.

⁷² Draft treaty communicated by the Russian embassy, 10 September 1907: BD, VIII, no. 98.

⁷³ For instance, Rodd to Grey, tel. no. 8, 20 July 1907, with minutes by Hardinge and Grey: F.O. 371/295:

Hardinge: ‘Sweden is determined to be tiresome but we cannot go back on our word tov Norway.’

Grey: ‘We have taken all the responsibility of proposing to amend the Russian draft by omitting neutrality; we cannot undertake the burden of starting new objections about integrity.’

⁷⁴ Minute by Grey on Rodd to Grey no. 120, 20 September 1907: F.O. 371/295. When Britain first refused to sign the neutrality treaty in July, Bertie remarked to Clemenceau that France must secretly be glad that she had done so, ‘ for it was… taking the chestnuts out of the fire for France’. Clemenceau replied that it was very difficult for France to oppose Russian wishes in Scandinavian and Baltic affairs. (Bertie to Grey no. 357, 14 July 1907: F.O. 371/295.)

⁷⁵ Grey to Bertie no. 602, 28 October 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 84.

⁷⁶ Max Muller to Grey, tel. no. 23, 2 November 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 105.

⁷⁷ Rodd to Grey no. 146, 27 October 1907; no. 148, 28 October 1907: FOCP 9284, nos. 94, 95. For anti-British sentiment in Sweden, see Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics, pp. 134–42.

⁷⁸ Bertie to Grey no. 534, 7 November 1907, with minutes by Spicer, Hardinge and Grey: F.O. 371/296.

Grey: ‘We did delay the signature for a time in order to see if any other Powers wished to support Sweden, but not one of them showed the least inclination to doso: on the contrary, there was a disposition to blame us for not agreeing to sign.’

⁷⁹ Nicolson to Grey no. 459, 7 September 1907: BD, VIII, no. 107.

⁸⁰ Dering to Grey no. 144, 22 October 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 63.

On 14 September the Swedish foreign minister had told Sir Rennell Rodd, British minister in Stockholm, that in view of t he impending Norwegian guarantee treaty Sweden would have to reconsider her ‘attitude and policy’; the next day Crown Prince Gustav said that, because of her isolation, Sweden would now be driven into a rapprochement with ‘whatever Power might seem to offer her the best guarantee for her security in t he near future’. (Rodd to Grey, tel. no. 11, 14 September 1907; tel. no. 12, 15 September 1907: FOCP 9119, nos. 92, 93.) Following the signature of the Norwegian guarantee, the Swedish foreign minister commented: ‘Well, that question is closed, and now we shall have to negotiate with Russia.’ (Rodd to Grey no. 162, 13 November 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 127.)

⁸¹ For example: ‘Germany might well be disposed to play the part of honest broker between Sweden and Russia in such questions as that of the Aland Islands;… the apparent desire of Russia to emphasise the isolation of Sweden, and the apparent conspiracy to father upon us t he responsibility for a Treaty which has undoubtedly evoked a strong feeling of resentment in Sweden, are not inconsistent with the presumption of an aim to draw Sweden into a new Baltic combination.’ (Rodd to Grey no. 162, 13 November 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 127),

⁸² Minutes by Hardinge on Bertie to Grey no. 526, 1 November 1907; and no. 544, 13 November 1907: F.O. 371/338.

⁸³ Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 23s, 11 November 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 119.

At Swinemünde, Isvolsky proposed to Bülow a secret protocol, of which the central clause envisaged ‘Il'exclusion complète des affaires de la mer Baltique de toute influence politique étrangère’. (Die Grosse Politik, XXIII, ii, no. 8083.) This draft was heavily amended by the Germans, so that the protocol as signed on 29 October 1907 related merely to the maintenance of t he status quo in t he Baltic, qualified by t he abrogation of t he Aland Islands convention. (Die Grosse Politik, XXIII, ii, no. 8095.)

⁸⁴ Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 246, 19 November 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 136. Rodd commented from Stockholm:' This dark saying appears to me to constitute fairly strong evidence in favour of the existence of some Arrangement, or conditional Arrangement, concluded between Russia and Germany o n Baltic questions, and to suggest that advances have been made to Sweden with a view to her becoming a party to it.' (Rodd to Grey no. 169, 22 November 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 147.)

⁸⁵ Grey to Nicolson, 21 November 1907: BD, VI, no. 71. The revelation about the Bagdad railway discussions was made during the Kaiser's visit to Windsor, 11–15 November 1907: see BD, VI, no. 64.

⁸⁶ Grey to Tweedmouth, 19 November 1907: BD, VIII, no. 112.

⁸⁷ Hardinge to Grey, 23 November 1907: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/71.

⁸⁸ Grey to Bertie, 29 November 1907: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/49. Grey went on:‘We are, of course, powerless to interfere… All we can do, therefore, is to keep our hands free and maintain and exercise the right of ingress into the Baltic, if we can, when we require it.’

⁸⁹ Die Grosse Politik, XXIII, ii, no. 8095.

⁹⁰ Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 255, 4 December 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 152. Isvolsky's reference to ‘recent discussion’, with its implication that the closing of the Baltic had formed the subject of earlier discussions, does not appear to have attracted the attention it might have merited.

⁹¹ Grey to de Salis no. 366, 4 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 113.

⁹² ‘The object of it is so transparently to brouller us and Russia with France, at least to sow suspicion… It will come as an additional shock to France after the secrecy of the Baltic negotiations.’ (Mallet to Tyrrell, undated [4 or 5 December 1907]: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/91.) ‘I think we should guard ourselves carefully against the danger of creating an impression that we have been “carrying on” secretly with Germany over the North Sea.’ (Tyrrell to Grey, 5 December 1907: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/91. See also Hardinge to Nicolson, 11 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 122; and minute by Spicer on Lister to Grey no. 591, 11 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 121.)

⁹³ ‘I am, I confess, very suspicious about this proposal—I have a great horror of needless engagements, which often lead the countries that enter into them into serious difficulties… Give Metternich no encouragement, and be especially careful to have nothing to do with any scheme of this kind from which France is excluded. The Emperor would like nothing better than to be able to hint at Paris that we were discussing a North Sea Convention with Germany behind the back of the French Government.’ (Ripon to Grey, 12 December 1907: Ripon MSS, British Museum Add. MSS 43640 fos. 103 ff.)

Ripon led for the government, and was therefore concerned with the defence of its foreign policy, in the House of Lords; he kept in close touch with foreign affairs, but his active interventions in Grey's department were rare. Compare Monger, G., The End of Isolation (London, 1963), p. 308;Google Scholar and Wolf, Lucien, Life of the First Marquess of Ripon (London, 1921), II, 291–2.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Grey to Nicolson, tel. 343, 7 December 1907; to de Salis no. 372, 9 December 1907: BD, VIII, nos. 116, 118.

⁹⁵ Grey to Lister no. 701, 11 December 1907; to de Salis no. 375, 12 December 1907: BD, VIII, nos. 120, 125; Grey to Lister no. 703, 12 December 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 180.

⁹⁶ Grey to Ripon, 13 December 1907: Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-five Years 1892–1916 (London, 1925), 1, 149.Google Scholar Ripon was still not satisfied, and continued to oppose the North Sea agreement on traditional grounds: ‘All that we need in the North Sea is to have our hands quite free, as they now are.’ (Ripon to Grey, 15 December 1907: Grey, Twenty-five Years, I, 149.)

⁹⁷ Grey to Lister no. 701, 11 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 120.

⁹⁸ Lister to Grey no. 591, 11 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 121. Pichon suggested (erroneously, as we have seen) that the Baltic arrangement was Germany's way of exacting compensation from Russia for the Anglo-Russian agreements of 31 August 1907.

⁹⁹ Grey to Nicolson, tel. no. 348, 11 December 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 175.

¹⁰⁰ Lister to Hardinge, 12 December 1907: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/177 Rus 07/7. This letter contains Lister's original account of his conversation with Clemenceau, which the editors of the British Documents were unable to trace: see BD, VIII, 134 note 2.

¹⁰¹ Grey to Lister, 16 December 1907: F.O. 371/527.

¹⁰² Bertie to Grey, 23 December 1907: F.O. 371/527. The documentary proof to which Clemenceau referred seems to have represented accurately the substance of Isvolsky's Swinemünde proposals. It was apparently an official German document, no doubt illicitly obtained, and therefore not the sort of evidence which could be produced in dealings with another government. (Bertie to Grey, 2 January 1908: F.O. 371 /527.) Grey appears to have had some suspicion that it might have been deliberately disclosed to the French by the Germans, in order to destroy confidence between Paris and St Petersburg. (Grey to Bertie, 30 December 1907: F.O. 37I/527.)

¹⁰³ Lister to Tyrrell, 27 December 1907: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/49.

¹⁰⁴ It is clear that Grey was quite unaware of the signature of the Russo-German secret protocol of 29 October 1907. His view of the progress of the negotiations was that Russia and Germany had agreed between themselves the form of a note guaranteeing the status quo which each was to exchange with Sweden, but that there was to be no exchange of notes between Russia and Germany; the only difficulty preventing the exchange of notes was that Russia was unable to persuade the Swedes to agree about the Aland Islands, and the Germans were therefore waiting for the Russians to sort this question out with Sweden. (Grey to Nicolson, 25 December 1907: Grey MSS, F.O.800/71; see also minute by Grey on Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 262, 12 December, 1907: BD, VIII, no. 124.) It may be observed that Grey's view followed very closely the account given by Benckendorff on 10 December, when Benckendorff maintained that the exchange of notes guaranteeing the status quo was intended to make the Swedes feel secure enough to agree to a modification of the status quo specifically in respect of the Aland Islands. (Grey to Nicolson no. 428, 17 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 132.)

¹⁰⁵ Grey to Bertie, 29 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 136. Grey's allusion to agreements ‘of the kind which are in vogue’ was principally a reference to the exchange of notes between France, Spain and Britain on 16 May 1907, guaranteeing the status quo in the western Mediterranean; this exchange was frequently alluded to in discussions about the Baltic and North Sea agreements. (See for instance Grey to Lister no. 698, 9 December 1907: BD, VIII, no. 117; Vaughan to Grey, tel. no. 3, 21 January 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 58; note by Grey, circulated to the cabinet with correspondence respecting the North Sea agreement, 10 February 1908: Cabinet papers, Cab. 37/91 no. 13.) Grey frequently reverted to the desirability of letting the Germans demonstrate that they, too, could make such arrangements. (Grey to Bertie, no. 52, 4 February 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 107.)

¹⁰⁶ ‘The French should not be too much carried away by information, written or otherwise, from a German source.’ (Grey to Bertie, 30 December 1907: F.O. 371/527.) Some plausibility was given to such suspicions of German machinations by the knowledge that the German ambassador in Paris, Radolin, had specifically informed Pichon that it was the Russians who had initiated the Baltic negotiations. (Grey to Lister no. 708, 16 December 1907; no. 711, 17 December 1907: FOCP 9284, nos. 189, 191.)

¹⁰⁷ Bertie to Grey, 2 January 1908: F.O. 371/527.

¹⁰⁸ Nicolson to Grey, 15 December 1907: F.O. 371/527.

¹⁰⁹ Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 263, 15 December 1907: FOCP 9284, no. 182; Rodd to Grey, tel. no. 1, 1 January 1908; tel. no. 2, 3 January 1908; Johnstone to Grey, tel. no. 1, 3 January 1908; Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 7, 13 January 1908: F O C P 9282, nos. 2, 8, 9, 36.

¹¹⁰ Nicolson to Grey, 16 January 1908: BD, VIII, no. 138.

¹¹¹ Nicolson to Hardinge, 2 January 1908: BD, VIII, appendix n, p. 723; Nicolson to Grey, 12 February 1908: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/72; Nicolson to Hardinge, 10 March 1908: Hardinge MSS 12, fos. 44 ff.

¹¹² Nicolson to Hardinge, 2 January 1908: BD, VIII, appendix II, p. 723; see also Hardinge to Nicolson, 7 January 1908; and 21 January 1908: BD, VIII, nos. 137, 139.

¹¹³ ‘It would be very detrimental to our interests if entrance to the Baltic should be impeded or made more difficult than at present for nations who do not own coast-line on that sea.’ (Tweedmouth to Grey, 30 December 1907: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/86.)

¹¹⁴ Admiralty to Foreign Office, 8 January 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 18.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum by Hardinge, 16 January 1908: F.O. 371/527; Grey to Bertie no. 38, 24 January 1908; Vaughan to Grey, tel. no. 2, 17 January 1908: FOCP 9282, nos. 65, 51.

¹¹⁶ Minute by Fitzmaurice on Memorandum by Hardinge, 16 January 1908: FO 371/527. For Fitzmaurice's misgivings about Russia, see Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 293; and Monger, The End of Isolation, pp. 289–90.

As Parliamentary Under-Secretary Fitzmaurice was not, of course, in a position to oppose Grey's policy at cabinet level. He therefore passed on his views to Ripon, in the hope of providing Ripon with more ammunition for his campaign against the agreement. (Fitzmaurice to Ripon, 18 January 1908: Ripon MSS, B.M. Add. 43543 fos. 66 ff. See Steiner, Zara, ‘Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office 1906–1910’, Historical Journal, x (1967), 431.)Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Tweedmouthto Grey, 17 January 1908: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/86; Grey to Bertie no. 42, 25 January 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 69.

¹¹⁸ Memorandum by Grey for the cabinet, 16 January 1908: Cab. 37/91 no. 4; Grey to Lascelles no. 53, 18 February 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 157.

¹¹⁹ Memorandum by Grey for the Cabinet, 16 January 1908: Cab. 37/91 no. 4.

¹²⁰ Ripon to Grey, 19 January 1908; to Campbell-Bannerman, 20 January 1908: Ripon MSS, B.M. Add. 43640 fos. 119 ff., 43518 fos. 152 ff.; Wolf, Life of Ripon, 11, 294.

¹²¹ Grey to Metternich, 22 January 1908: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/60; Grey to Lascelles no. 26, 24 January 1908: BD, VIII, no. 140.

¹²² Cabinet letter, Asquith to Edward VII, 24 February 1908: Asquith MSS, vol. 5, fos. 6 ff.; Grey to Ripon, 25 February 1908: Ripon MSS, B.M. Add. 43640 fos. 129 ff.

¹²³ Rodd to Grey no. 21, 28 January 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 89. For the evolution of Swedish attitudes under Russo-German pressure, see Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics, pp. 145–66, 191–224, 233–58.

¹²⁴ Vaughan to Grey, tel. no. 7, 4 February 1908; tel. no. 8, 5 February 1908; tel. no. 17, 7 February 1908: FOCP 9282, nos. 106, 109, 127.

¹²⁵ Grey to Rodd, tel. no. 4, 10 February 1908; to Lascelles no. 44, 12 February 1908; Rodd to Grey no. 43, 25 February 1908: FOCP 9282, nos. 129, 137, 185.

¹²⁶ Grey had been very careful himself to make sure that the establishment of a naval base at Rosyth would not be regarded as a violation of the status quo in the North Sea. (Minute by Grey on Nicolson to Grey, tel. no. 17, 22 January 1908: F.O. 371/527.)

¹²⁷ Minute by Hardinge on Vaughan to Grey, tel. no. 7, 4 February 1908: F.O. 371/528; Nicolson to Hardinge, 25 February 1908: Hardinge MSS 12, fos. 29 ff.

¹²⁸ Hardinge to Nicolson, 19 February 1908: BD, VIII, no. 143.

¹²⁹ Rodd to Grey, tel. no. 16, 3 March 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 203. In May, Isvolsky warned the Swedish foreign minister that Sweden should not continue to base her relations with Russia on a treaty which no longer represented the real state of affairs, and was a repugnant limitation of Russia's sovereign rights. This was regarded as a clear warning that Russia would revert to the question at a convenient moment. (O'Beirne to Grey no. 228, 18 May 1908: FOCP 9405, no. 87.)

¹³⁰ Grey to Rodd no. 24, 26 February 1908; Rodd to Grey no. 44, 3 March 1908: BD, VIII, nos. 146, 148.

¹³¹ Grey to Rodd no. 33, 19 March 1908; tel. no. 8, 23 March 1908; Rodd to Grey, tel. no. 18, 24 March 1908; tel. no. 20, 31 March 1908: FOCP 9282, nos. 229, 238, 241, 248.

¹³² The signatories of the Baltic declaration were Denmark, Germany, Russia and Sweden; text at BD, VIII, no. 156. The signatories of the North Sea declaration were Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden; text at BD, VIII, no. 153.

¹³³ Rodd to Grey no. 67, 24 April 1908: FOCP 9405, no. 70.

¹³⁴ Minute by Grey on Nicolson to Grey no. 202, 22 April 1908: FO 371/529.

¹³⁵ Hardinge to Grey, 28 April 1908: Hardinge MSS 13, fos. 171 ff.; also Rodd to Grey, 29 April 1908: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/78.

¹³⁶ Admiralty to Foreign Office, 19 December 1907: FOCP 9284 no. 193.

Of the four passages from the North Sea into the Baltic—the Sound, the Great Belt, the Little Belt, and the Kiel canal—only the Sound, lying between the Danish island Zealand and the coast of Sweden, was not wholly controlled by Germany or Denmark. The Sound is divided by the Danish island of Saltholm into two channels, Drogden on the Danish side, and the Flint channel (Flintrånnan) on the Swedish. Neither channel could be used by vessels drawing more than 23 feet, whereas British battleships in 1907 required a depth of at least 28 feet. Dredging of the Flint channel would provide a passage into the Baltic entirely through Swedish waters, thus relieving British warships of the necessity of using the Great Belt. The Danes contended that the Flint channel lay partly in Danish waters; but the chart shows that, because of shoals lying off Saltholm, the actual channel lies much closer to Malmo than to Saltholm; and whereas Drogden was buoyed on the Danish system, the Flint channel was buoyed on the Swedish system. The Danes opposed improvement of the Flint channel, fearing that it would divert trade from Copenhagen to Malmö; for the same reason, the Swedes were thought to favour it. (The Baltic Pilot, part 1 (Admiralty, 4th edn. 1904), pp. 1, 206, 249, 264; The Baltic Pilot, part 1 (Admiralty, 5th edn. 1912), pp. 265–6; Admiralty chart no. 790 (1878, with corrections to 1912); Dumas to Lascelles, 6 March 1907: BD, VIII, no. 104; Spring-Rice, Annual Report on Sweden for 1909, para, n, 12 January 1910: FOCP 9600; Villiers to Grey no. 15 (commercial), 12 February 1910: F.O. 371/988.)

¹³⁷ Minutes by Hardinge and Grey on Admiralty to Foreign Office, 19 December 1907: F.O. 371/338; Foreign Office to Admiralty, 1 January 1908: FOCP 9282, no. 4.

¹³⁸ Fisher to Edward VII, 14 March 1908: Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought, vol. II, no. 118.

¹³⁹ Rodd to Hardinge, 20 April 1908: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/91.

¹⁴⁰ Minute by Grey on Memorandum by Villiers, 6 May 1908: BD, VIII, no. 155.

¹⁴¹ Spring-Rice to Crowe, 13 February 1910: F.O. 371/988. The Swedish scheme was to dredge the Flint channel to a depth of 26 feet, which would still have been inadequate for British Dreadnoughts. The dredging was not in fact carried out.

¹⁴² Minute by Crowe on Memorandum by Villiers, 6 May 1908: BD, VIII, no. 155; Dumas to de Salis, 23 July 1908: Hardinge MSS 12, fols 208 ff.; Foreign Office Memorandum, ‘Britain's treaty obligations’, 11 November 1908: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/91.

¹⁴³ Minute by Hardinge on Spring-Rice to Grey no. 74, 27 April 1909: F.O. 371/745.

¹⁴⁴ Minute by Hardinge on Spring-Rice to Grey no. 114A, 7 July 1909: F.O. 371/746.

¹⁴⁵ Grey to Spring-Rice no. 45, 30 July 1909: FOCP 9620, no. 192.

¹⁴⁶ Spring-Rice to Grey no. 129, 17 August 1909, with minutes by Spicer, Langley and Grey: F.O. 371/745.

¹⁴⁷ Spring-Rice, Annual Report on Sweden for 1909, 12 January 1910, para. 2; see also paras. 12, 16, 17: FOCP 9600.

¹⁴⁸ This Government very unfortunately is being driven by Russia's Finnish policy more and more into the arms of Germany…As they believe that this Russian preparation (really against a German invasion by sea and land north of St Petersburg) is directed against Sweden, they naturally look to Germany for help.’ (Spring-Rice to Bertie, 30 August 1910: Bertie MSS, F.O. 800/179 Sc 10/1.)

¹⁴⁹ Swedish military and naval officers were seconded to serve with the German army and navy, a German military mission was received in Sweden, and the German budget of 1911 made provision for a military attache to reside permanently in Stockholm; a delegation from the German Navy League was cordially received in Stockholm in June 1911, and the Swedish navy adopted the same system of wireless telegraphy as that in use in the German fleet. (Spring-Rice, Annual Report on Sweden for 1909, 12 January 1910, para. 12: FOCP 9600; O'Beirne to Grey no. 382, 17 September 1910: F.O. 371 /989; Spring-Rice, Annual Report on Sweden for 1910, 31 January 1911, paras. 5–12: FOCP 9799; Kilmarnock to Grey no. 105, 21 June 1911; Spring-Rice to Grey no. 112, 14 July 1911; no. 115, 17 July 1911: F.O. 371/ 1226; Spring-Rice to Grey no. 165, 11 December 1912: F.O. 371/1478.)

As Crowe observed: ‘It does look as if Germany was getting hold of the Swedish navy, as they have got hold of the Swedish army.’ (Minute by Crowe on Spring-Rice to Grey no. 115, 17 July 1911: F.O. 371/1226.)

¹⁵⁰ Spring-Rice to Grey, 25 March 1912: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/78; Kilmarnock to Grey no. 56, 30 April 1912: F.O. 371/1477.

¹⁵¹ Spring-Rice to Grey, 25 March 1912; to Tyrrell, 2 April 1912: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/78.

¹⁵² Spring-Rice, Annual Report on Sweden for 1911, 29 January 1912, para. 5: FOCP 9990.

¹⁵³ Spring-Rice to Grey no. 27, 5 March 1912: F.O. 371/1477.

¹⁵⁴ Spring-Rice to Grey no. 165, II December 1912, with minute by Campbell: F.O. 371/1478.

¹⁵⁵ Spring-Rice to Grey no. 169, 16 December 1912, with minutes by Clerk, Crowe and Grey: F.O. 371/1477.

¹⁵⁶ The question of the sovereignty of Spitzbergen had not been determined, and the islands had no regular administration or established judicial processes. Several countries, including Britain and the United States, had mining interests in the islands, and it was this economic development which was making the establishment of a regular administration to preserve order and legality increasingly necessary; but only Sweden, Norway and Russia were held to have direct political interests in Spitzbergen. (FOCP 9620, nos. 146, 242, and passim.)

¹⁵⁷ Grey to Spring-Rice no. 38, 16 July 1909: FOCP 9620, no. 177.

¹⁵⁸ Grey to Nicolson no. 319, 15 December 1909: FOCP 9620, no. 279; Grey to Herbert no. 18, 24 February 1910; no. 40, 12 April 1910: FOCP 9792, nos. 71, 120.

¹⁵⁹ Herbert to Grey no. 84, 12 August 1910: FOCP 9792, no. 210. The preliminary accord was supposed to clear the way for a full conference of all the powers interested in Spitzbergen. This conference, planned for 1912, was delayed until 1914 because of difficulties raised by Germany and the United States. It opened on 16 June 1914 in Christiania, achieved a measure of agreement, was adjourned, and then overtaken by the outbreak of the war. (Michelet to Grey, 9 January 1914, with minute by Campbell: F.O. 371/2055; Findlay to Grey no. 45, 17 June 1914; no. 55, 31 July 1914: F.O. 371/2056.)

¹⁶⁰ Memorandum by the General Staff: ‘The military aspect of the continental problem’, 15 August 1911; Remarks by the Admiralty on the Memorandum of the General Staff, 21 August 1911: Cab. 38/19 nos. 47, 48.

¹⁶¹ Minutes of 114th meeting of the C.I.D., 23 August 1911: Cab. 38/19 no. 49. See also Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 1, 388–93; and Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1,82.

¹⁶² Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 1, 246–51, 256.

¹⁶³ Ibid. pp. 343–4.

¹⁶⁴ Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1, 84; Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 1 394–

¹⁶⁵ Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 11, 178–82.

¹⁶⁶ Greene to Grey no. 9, 6 February 1911, with minute by Villiers: F.O. 371/1360. The increasing frequency of Russian naval visits to the western Baltic, especially during the Agadir crisis, was greeted as a ‘welcome sign’. (Minute by Villiers on Greene, Annual Report on Denmark for 1911, 1 January 1912: F.O. 371/1360.)

¹⁶⁷ Churchill to Grey, 28 October 1911: BD, VII, no. 652.

¹⁶⁸ Battenberg to Asquith, 28 June 1912: Asquith MSS 24, fos. 150 ff. On the other hand, the naval attaché in St Petersburg observed in March 1914 that the improvements in Russia's naval matériel did not compensate for the incompetence of Russian personnel, and that consequently the Germans had little to fear from the Russian fleet. He proved a more accurate prophet than Battenberg. (Grenfell to Buchanan, 19 March 1914: BD, x, ii, no. 531.)

¹⁶⁹ Buchanan to Grey no. 100, 3 April 1914: BD, x, ii, no. 537.

¹⁷⁰ Grey to Bertie no. 249, 1 May 1914: BD.x, ii, no. 541. See also Nicolson to de Bunsen, 27 April 1914: BD, x, ii, no. 540.

¹⁷¹ Grey to Bertie no. 314, 21 May 1914: BD, x, ii, no. 543. See also Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 1, 309–11.

¹⁷² Greene, Annual Report on Denmark for 1911, 1 January 1912, paras. 1–7: F.0.371/1360; Annual Report on Denmark for 1912, 14 January 1913, paras. 2–3: FOCP 10160; Lowther, Annual Report on Denmark for 1913, 27 January 1914, with minute by Clerk: F.O. 371/1962.

¹⁷³ Minutes by Clerk on Seymour to Grey no. 5, 16 January 1913; on military attaché to Seymour, 6 February 1913; on Lowther to Grey no. 34, 28 May 1913; and on Findlay to Grey no. 65, 17 September 1913: F.O. 371/1634.

¹⁷⁴ Memorandum by Grey, 24 September 1912: BD, IX, i, no. 805.

¹⁷⁵ Wingfield, Annual Report on Norway for 1910, 7 January 1911, para. 10: FOCP 9774.

¹⁷⁶ Wingfield, Annual Report on Norway for 1910, 7 January 1911, paras. 15–17: FOCP 9774. ‘In the middle of the month the Emperor issued a kind of rescript, addressed to the “Norwegian people”, in which he thanked them for their hospitality towards him during his various visits to this country, and announced that he would present a statue to the nation of Fridtjof, the author of “Fridtjof's Saga” and of the story of Ingeborg. This story is really said to be an Icelandic saga of the thirteenth century, and uncertain as to its historic accuracy. However, it is flattering to the Norwegian mind that the author of this popular story should be said to be a Norwegian.’ (Herbert to Grey no. 79, 31 July 1910: FOCP 9792 no. 196.)

Fridtjof is believed to have lived in the area of the Sogne fjord in the late eighth or early ninth century. The earliest written account of his story is the Icelandic saga composed in the first half of the thirteenth century, although there are indications, in the verse passages contained within the prose narrative, which suggest an oral tradition going back to the settlers who reached Iceland from Norway in the late ninth and tenth centuries. Only to this extent can the saga be ascribed to Norwegian authorship, though there was a school of thought among nineteenth-century German and Norwegian scholars which held that all Icelandic poetry was, properly speaking, Norwegian. Early in the nineteenth century the Swedish poet Esaias Tegné (a pan-Scandinavian romantic) wrote a modern version of the saga in verse, which achieved a great success and popularized the story all over Scandinavia. This version was translated several times into German, and was no doubt the vehicle through which the Kaiser became familiar with Fridtjof's saga. (Information kindly supplied by Miss Jean M. Rankine, B.A., M.Phil., of the British Museum.)

¹⁷⁷ Findlay to Grey, tel. no. 5 A, 7 July 1911; no. 67, 18 September 1911: F.O. 371/1174.

¹⁷⁸ ‘The Norwegian fjords, which are easy of access and deep enough miles inland to float the Lusitania, might in certain eventualities form a very convenient base for German operations in the North Sea.’ (Minute by Villiers on Findlay to Grey no. 66, 13 September 1911: F.O. 371/i 175. See also Wingfield, Annual Report on Norway for 1910, 7 January 1911, para. 10: FOCP 9774.)

¹⁷⁹ Wingfield, Annual Report on Norway for 1910, 7 January 1911, para. 11: FOCP 9774.

¹⁸⁰ Grey to Goschen, private tel., 26 July 1911: F.O. 371/1174.

¹⁸¹ Findlay to Grey, private, 12 January 1912: F.O. 371/1414. The Norwegian naval staff apparently believed that the German fleet was in Norwegian waters in July 1911 either in readiness for the outbreak of war, or else to practise what action it would take in such a case. The distribution of the German ships was said to have been carefully worked out to paralyse Norwegian resistance and force the surrender of a port. (Findlay to Grey no. 31, 5 March 1912: F.O. 371/1415.) Further, it was widely alleged in the Norwegian press that, during the Agadir crisis, the British fleet was lying off the Sogne fjord in readiness for an attack upon the German fleet off the Molde: thus narrowly had Norway escaped a violation of her neutrality. (Findlay, Annual Report on Norway for 1911, 19 March 1912, para. 9: F.O.371/1415.)

¹⁸² Findlay to Grey, 12 January 1912: F.O. 371/1414.

¹⁸³ Grey to Churchill, 11 May 1912: F.O. 371/1414. Grey's reason for complying with the Norwegian request was his wish to avert suspicion that ‘we were using Norwegian ports as a base for practising a long-distance blockade of German ports across the northern exits of the North Sea. The deduction would also be made that we should (in case of war with Germany) repeat these manoeuvres in earnest and that, in order to do so, we would seize the base from which we had carried out our practice.’ (Findlay to Grey, 7 May 1912: F.O. 371/1414.)

¹⁸⁴ Findlay to Grey, 19 June 1912: F.O. 371/1414. A squadron of four British warships visited Norway in September 1912. (Admiralty to Foreign Office, 15 October 1912:F.O. 371/ 1415.)

¹⁸⁵ Findlay to Grey no. 14, 6 February 1913: F.O. 371/1698.

¹⁸⁶ Findlay to Grey, tel. no. 9, 23 July 1913; F.O. 371/1699; no. 46, 20 June 1914; no. 54, 16 July 1914: F.O. 371/2056.

¹⁸⁷ Foreign Office to Admiralty, 29 July 1913; Admiralty to Foreign Office, 19 August 1913. with minutes by Clerk, Crowe, and Grey; Findlay to Grey no. 62, 10 Septemper 1913, with minutes by Clerk and Crowe: F.O. 371/2056.

¹⁸⁸ Findlay to Grey no. 47, 23 June 1914: FO 371/2056.

¹⁸⁹ Findlay to Grey no. 4, Annual Report on Norway for 1912, 16 March 1913, paras. 1, 2, 11: FOCP 10212; Findlay to Grey no. 52, 5 August 1913: F.O. 371/1699; Findlay, Annual Report on Norway for 1913, 3 March 1914, paras. 8, 10–12: FOCP 10478.

Although the main Norwegian concern was the threat of German action in wartime, there did remain a residual anxiety about the possibility of Russian aggression to secure an ice-free harbour in Finmark. Unlike the Swedes, the Norwegians for some time apparently believed that the Anglo-Russian rapprochement made such aggression less rather than more likely, since Russia's dependence on British goodwill would be a surety for her good behaviour. But at the beginning of 1914 there were renewed fears about Russan aggression in the north, and doubts as to whether the Anglo-Russian entente would be a sufficient safeguard in wartime. (Findlay, Annual Report on Norway for 1912, 16 March 1913, para. 12: FOCP 10212; Annual Report on Norway for 1913, 3 March 1914, paras. 14–16: FOCP 10478.) These fears show that the Anglo-Russian connexion was potentially an embarrassment in Anglo-Norwegian as well as in Anglo-Swedish relations, though it was not the determining factor, as it was in the case of Sweden; and they reflect Norwegian anxiety about the dangers to be apprehended from both great-power groupings.

¹⁹⁰ Spring-Rice to Grey no. 23, 20 February 1912, with minute by Villiers: F.O. 371 /1477.

¹⁹¹ Hayman to Grey, 24 April 1912, with minute by Clerk: F.O. 371/1476; Seymourto Grey no. 96, 27 November 1912, with minute by Clerk: F.O. 371/1360.

¹⁹² The identic declaration of neutrality by t h e three powers was published on 23 December 1912. (Kilmarnock to Grey, tel. no. 22, 24 December 1912: F.O. 371/1478.) It included regulations dealing with the rights and obligations of belligerents in Scandinavian waters, based on t he recommendations of the 1907 Hague conference. (Spring-Rice, Annual Report on Sweden for 1912, 10 February 1913, para. 22: FOCP 10190.)

¹⁹³ Minutes by Crowe on Spring-Rice to Grey no. 141, 15 October 1912; and on Findlay to Grey no. 93, 21 October 1912: F.O. 371/1477. Some disquiet persisted, since the bargain did not seem to be altogether equal, and Sweden's pro-German orientation apparently remained: for whereas Norway was prepared to assist Sweden against Russian aggression, Sweden was not prepared to assist Norway against German aggression. (Minute by Clerk on Findlay to Grey no. 66, 28 September 1913; F.O. 371/1755; see also minute by Crowe on Howard to Grey no. 9, 27 January 1914: F.O. 371 2107: and Howard to Grey, 3 February 1914: Grey MSS, F.O. 800/78.)

¹⁹⁴ Communication from the Swedish minister, 16 December 1913: F.O. 371/1755; Howard to Grey no. 8, 27 January 1914: F.O. 371/2107.

¹⁹⁵ Grey to Howard no. 2, 23 January 1914: F.O. 371/2107.

¹⁹⁶ Howard to Grey no. 9, 27 January 1914: BD, x, ii, no. 496.

¹⁹⁷ Grey to Kidston no. 18, 11 May 1914: BD, x, ii, no. 507. Compare with Grey's assurances to the Belgian minister, in Grey to Villiers no. 16, 7 April 1913: BD, VIII, no. 330.

¹⁹⁸ For this, and the subsequent history of the Aland Islands question, see James Barros, The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (New Haven, 1968).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ Heckscher, E. F., Bergendal, K., Keilhau, W., Cohn, E. and Thorsteinsson, T., Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland in the World War (Economic and Social History of the World War, New Haven, 1930), pp. 55–6, 100–1, III and passim.Google Scholar