¹ Cf. Wallerstein, Immanuel, The modern world-system: capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-economy in the sixteenth century (New York, 1974)Google Scholar; Jones, E. L., The European miracle: environments, economies and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia (Cambridge, 1981)Google Scholar. For a recent study, published after Kennedy, see Parker, Geoffrey, The military revolution: military innovation and the rise of the west (Cambridge, 1988)Google Scholar.

² This analysis was originally set out in Kennedy, Paul M., ‘The first world war and the international power system’, International Security, IX, 1 (1984), 7–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ For similar recent argument see Gilpin, Robert, War and change in world politics (Cambridge, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and, on one great power, Porter, Bernard, Britain, Europe and the world, 1850–1986: delusions of grandeur (London, 1987)Google Scholar.

⁴ A persistent theme of Calleo's, David P. work on the transatlantic alliance. Most recently see Beyond American hegemony: the future of the western alliance (New York, 1987)Google Scholar.

⁵ Amusingly, one line of ‘conservative’ criticism of the book in America has been, in effect, to re-iterate American ‘exceptionalism’. Responding to commentators such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and George Will, Paul Kennedy observes that ‘the great irony of the conservatives’ attack is that they fail to appreciate that there were conservatives in Edwardian Britain and conservatives in the Spain of Philip IV who said, “We are not like those earlier Great Powers; we have a superior system, we are representing values, we are representing something special in world history and any comparison between us and previous declining Great Powers has got to be resisted and criticized because this is insulting the British people or insulting the Spanish people'.” Boston Globe, 30 April 1988, p. 2. For a liberal version of American exceptionalism, arguing that Kennedy fails to understand that the U.S.A. has been a balance-of-power state and not a hegemonial one, see Rostow, W. W., ‘Beware of historians bearing false analogies’, Foreign Affairs, LXVI, 4 (1988), 863–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and his exchange with Kennedy in ibid, LXVI, 5 (1988), 1108–13.

⁶ Stern, Fritz, ed., The varieties of history: from Voltaire to the present (London, 2nd edn, 1970), p. 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For recent comments see Cannadine, David, ‘British history: past, present – and future?’, Past and Present, CXVI (1987), 169–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bedarida, Francois, ‘The modern historian's dilemma: conflicting pressures from science and society’, Economic History Review, 2nd series, XL, 3 (1987), 335–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. Theodore Zeldin's observation: ‘In order to write a general history of France from 1848 to 1945, one should presumably be acquainted with the books published in those years. I calculate that there are about one million of them’. France, 1848–1945: ambition and love (Oxford, 1979), p. 4Google Scholar.

⁷ Cf. Edward N. Luttwak in The Washington Post, reprinted in The Guardian Weekly, 21 Feb. 1988, p. 20.

⁸ Gilbert, Felix and Graubard, Stephen R. (eds.), Historical studies today (New York, 1972), p. XGoogle Scholar, quoting from Graubard's preface.

⁹ ‘A dialogue on politics’ (1836) in von Ranke, Leopold, The theory and practice of history, ed. Iggers, George G. and Moltke, Konrad von (New York, 1983), pp. 117–18Google Scholar.

¹⁰ On the works of Eckhart Kehr, Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler see the introductions to Joll, James, The origins of the first world war (London, 1984)Google Scholar and Koch, H. W., The origins of the first world war: great power rivalry and German war aims (London, 2nd edn, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Drawing particularly on the important essay by Finer, Samuel E., ‘State- and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military’, in Tilly, Charles (ed.), The formation of national states in Europe (Princeton, 1975), pp. 84–163Google Scholar.

¹² Quoted in von Laue, Theodore H., Leopold Ranke: the formative years (Princeton, 1950), p. 85Google Scholar. Cf. Blanning's, T. C. W. recent Rankean re-interpretation of the French revolution from the standpoint of international relations: The origins of the French revolutionary wars (London, 1986)Google Scholar.

¹³ He notes in passing the important recent study by Doyle, Michael W., Empires (Ithaca, New York, 1986)Google Scholar, which seeks to synthesize the debates among colonial historians about metrocentric versus peripheral interpretations of imperialism with the hegemonic approach to empire advocated by some theorists of the international system.

¹⁴ Cf. the debate in Rowland, Benjamin M., (ed.), Balance of power or hegemony: the inter-war monetary system (New York, 1976)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ For examples of various viewpoints see Hinsley, F. H., Power and the pursuit of peace: theory and practice in the history of relations between stales (Cambridge, 1963)Google Scholar, ch. 17; Northedge, F. S., The international political system (London, 1976), pp. 291–6Google Scholar; Bull, Hedley, The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics (London, 1977), pp. 189–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mandelbaum, Michael, The nuclear revolution: international politics before and after Hiroshima (Cambridge, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gaddis, John Lewis, ‘The long peace: elements of stability in the postwar international system’, International Security, X, 4 (1986), esp. 120–3Google Scholar.

¹⁶ ‘Any genuine concept of decline must postulate a rise: but Spain never rose. So-called decline was nothing less than the operation and persistence over an extended period of basic weaknesses in the Spanish economy.’ Kamen, Henry, ‘The decline of Spain: a historical myth?’, Past and Present, LXXXI (1978), 25Google Scholar.

¹⁷ E.g. Coleman, D. C. and MacLeod, Christine, ‘Attitudes to new techniques: British businessmen, 1800–1950’, Economic History Review, 2nd series, XXXIX, 4 (1986), 588–611CrossRefGoogle Scholar; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas’, ibid. 501–25, and XL, 1 (1987), 1–26.

¹⁸ Cf. Rasler, Karen A. and Thompson, William R., ‘Global wars, public debts, and the long cycle’, World Politics, XXXV, 4 (1983), 489–516CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ What follows draws on Lukes, Steven, Power: a radical view (London, 1974)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Frankel, Joseph, International relations in a changing world (Oxford, 1979), pp. 100–18Google Scholar; Rosen, Steven J. and Jones, Walter S., The logic of international relations (Cambridge, Mass., 2nd edn, 1977)Google Scholar, ch. 7; Couloumbis, Theodore A. and Wolfe, James H., Introduction to international relations: power and justice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 2nd edn, 1982)Google Scholar, ch. 5; Spanier, John, Games nations play: analyzing international politics (New York, 4th edn, 1981)Google Scholar, ch. 7.

²⁰ James Rosenau notes that ‘for reasons having to do with the structure of language, the concept of “power” does not lend itself to comprehension in relational terms. Without undue violation of language, the word “power” cannot be used as a verb. It is rather a noun, highlighting “things” possessed instead of processes of interaction. Nations influence each other;…enhance, deter, or otherwise affect each other, but they do not “powerize” each other. Hence, no matter how sensitive analysts may be to the question of how the resources used by one actor serve to modify or preserve the behavior of another, once they cast their assessment in terms of the “power” employed they are led – if not inevitably, then almost invariably – to focus on the resources themselves rather than on the relationship they may or may not underlie.’ Rosenau, James N., The study of global interdependence: essays on the transnationalization of world affairs (London, 1980), p. 37Google Scholar.

²¹ Cf. this comment on the literature: ‘Two of the most important weaknesses in traditional theorizing about international politics have been the tendency to exaggerate the effectiveness of military power resources and the tendency to treat military power as the ultimate measuring rod to which other forms of power should be compared.’ Baldwin, David A., ‘Power analysis and world politics: new trends versus old tendencies’, World Politics, XXXI, 2 (1979), 180Google Scholar. For the importance of ‘reputation’ in assessing power, and by implication the role of propaganda, diplomacy and bluff, see Berridge, G. R. and Young, John W., ‘What is “a great power”?’, Political Studies, XXXVI, 2 (1988), 224–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² Similarly William H. McNeill uses it as synonym for ‘arme d force’. See his The pursuit of power: technology, armed force, and society since A.D. 1000 (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar.

²³ Professor Kennedy of course does not suggest that military power is the key to economic wealth, but it is interesting to note the very different(Innenpolitik) explanation for the rise and fall of nations recently proposed by Mancur Olson: the sclerotic effect on the economy of special-interest groups in societies blessed (or cursed) with enduring political stability. See Olson, Mancur, The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities (New Haven, 1982)Google Scholar. Olson's use of historical evidence is, however, infinitely less sophisticated than Kennedy's.

²⁴ Cf. O'Brien, Patrick K., ‘The costs and benefits of British imperialism, 1846–1914’, Past and Present, CXX (1988), 163–200CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ ‘Informally if possible, formally if necessary’. Gallagher, John (ed. Seal, Anil), The decline, revival and fall of the British empire (Cambridge, 1982), p. 99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ Cf. Rosenau, The study of global interdependence; Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and interdependence: world politics in transition (Boston, 1977)Google Scholar. For a good introduction to this approach see the extracts in Smith, Michael, Little, Richard and Shackleton, Michael (eds.), Perspectives on world politics (London, 1981)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Keynes, J. M., A tract on monetary reform (1923)Google Scholar, in The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. IV (London, 1971), 65Google Scholar. The celebrated sentence is worth quoting in context: ‘…this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.’

²⁸ Cf. Mosse, W. E., The European powers and the German question, 1848–71 (Cambridge, 1958)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Cf. Reynolds, David, ‘Power and superpower: the impact of two world wars on America's international role’, in Kimball, Warren F. (ed.), World War Two and the shaping of modem America (Newark, Del., 1990)Google Scholar, forthcoming.

³⁰ Cf. his own lament: ‘It is a truncated version of the book that has attracted all the attention. Everyone is stampeding past the first four-fifths to get to Chapter 8, the section on the U.S.A.’ Quoted in Schmeisser, Peter, ‘Is America in decline?’, The Mew York Times Magazine, 17 04 1988, p. 26Google Scholar.