¹ Rothwell, V. H., British war aims and peace diplomacy, 1914–18 (Oxford, 1971), p. 76Google Scholar.

² On 6 Aug. Asquith explained that Britain was fighting ‘to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed…by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering power’ (Spender, J. A. and Asquith, C., Life of Lord Asquith and Oxford (London, 1932), 11, 114Google Scholar). On 9 Nov. his reference to ‘the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe’ involved placing these ‘upon an unassailable foundation’, though he failed to suggest how this might be done (Asquith, H. H., Speeches (London, 1927), p. 224Google Scholar).

³ Public Record Office, FO 371/2162, 5 Aug. 1914.

⁴ Grey to Buchanan, 13 May 1916, P.R.O. CAB 37/147/40.

⁵ George, D. Lloyd, War memoirs (London, 1936), 11, 835Google Scholar.

⁶ Hanak, H., Great Britain and Austria-Hungary in the first world war (Oxford, 1962), p. 274Google Scholar.

⁷ P.R.Q., FO 800/214, Feb. 1914.

⁸ P.R.O., FO 800/196.

⁹ George, D. Lloyd, The truth about the peace treaties (London, 1938), 1, 31Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Both Slovaks and Ruthenes were included in what was called, somewhat oddly, ‘a purely Magyar state’.

¹¹ George, D. Lloyd, Truth, 1, 50Google Scholar.

¹² Hanak, , Britain and Austria-Hungary, p. 106Google Scholar.

¹³ Masaryk came to his conception of a fully independent Czechoslovak state late. He had written earlier as part of a Realist party programme: ‘We believe that the previous complete independence of the Bohemian lands is impossible. Our limited number of inhabitants, our inland position and the fact that the Bohemian lands are inhabited by German and Polish populations forced us in the past and still force us into an association with other nationalities and with other states.’ By 1916 he had refined this ‘association’ to mean the link with Slovaks and Ruthenians and the reference to ‘other states’ had been dropped.

¹⁴ Hanak, , Britain and Austria-Hungary, p. 103Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 125.

¹⁶ Initially an admirer of the Magyars and convinced that Austria-Hungary formed a vital barrier against Russia, Seton-Watson had abandoned these views before the war. On 16 Sept. 1914 The Times published a letter from him arguing the Slav case and in that same year he collaborated with John Dover Wilson, Alfred Zimmern and Arthur Greenwood to produce The war and democracy. He wrote numerous articles for the Spectator, Westminster Gazette, Scottish Review and The Times, as well as political pamphlets like What is at stake in the war (1915) and several books dealing with central European affairs.

¹⁷ The war and democracy (London, 1919), pp. 271–2Google Scholar. Aware that the Bohemian German issue was likely to prove contentious, Seton-Watson, wrote that ‘so far as there is any sacrifice it must be made by the losers rather than the winners in this war’ (p. 272)Google Scholar. He could and did argue the Czech case on better grounds than this.

¹⁸ 20 April 1915. He met George Clerk.

¹⁹ He attacked Grey's ‘honest aimlessness and naïve obstinacy’ and consulted Steed about the possibility of forming ‘a new national party’ with ‘a constructive programme for after the war’. H., and Seton-Watson, C., The making of a new Europe (London, 1981), p. 171Google Scholar.

²⁰ Masaryk, who thought the new periodical ‘an absolute necessity’ contributed towards its expenses.

²¹ Nicolson, H., Peacemaking 1919 (London, 1933), p. 33Google Scholar. The New Europe included among its contributors Masaryk, Benes, Rex Leeper, Bernard Pares, Headlam-Morley, Namier and Sir Samuel Hoare.

²² The New Europe, I, I, 19 Oct. 1916.

²³ , H. and Seton-Watson, C., Making, p. 192Google Scholar.

²⁴ The Nation reflected the views of H. N. Brailsford, who generally opposed the Slav cause, especially when it seemed that support for that cause, by hindering a separate peace, might prolong the war.

²⁵ Quoted in , H. and Seton-Watson, C., Making, p. 214Google Scholar.

²⁶ After joining the Royal Fusiliers on 5 Sept. 1914, Namier had been recruited as an adviser on eastern European affairs and worked from Wellington House from Feb. 1915. According to Hanak, he was reluctant to talk about his work during this period and Julia Namier's biography covers the period only sketchily. She does state, however, that Namier supplied ‘interesting paragraphs for the…reports of people like Rex and Allen Leeper’. During the earlier part of the war Namier's influence is difficult to assess, but once the decision for a full-scale reorganization of Europe was taken that influence was clearly considerable, for his initials appear on almost all significant documents, and the very clear minutes he wrote frequently form the basis for future action.

²⁷ The American Leader, 9 July 1914.

²⁸ Austria, Germany's vassal (1915), The nineteenth century and after (July 1916 and Feb. 1917).

²⁹ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/142344.

³⁰ Masaryk poured scorn on fears expressed over German minorities: ‘A strange concern for things that might happen and unconcern for things that are! Whole nations are now oppressed by the Germans and the Magyars.’ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/161521.

³¹ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/152437, 1 Sept. 1918.

³² P.R.O., CAB 24/67/6091, 17 Oct. 1918.

³³ P.R.O., CAB 24/70/GT/6355, 19 Oct. 1918.

³⁴ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/177223. Amery stressed ‘the subjection to Czech rule of over three million Germans’.

³⁵ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/177223. It will be seen that at this point Namier expected both anschluss and the creation of a Ukrainian state. At Cecil's recommendation, Namier's minuteand a supporting letter from Sir Ronald Graham were sent to the War Office. A reply from Major-General Thwaites suggested a compromise over ‘German-Bohemia’ involving sovereignty changes there and in Silesia. TheForeign Office (and Namier himself) were doubtful.

³⁶ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/165214.

³⁷ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/178793.

³⁸ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/186706.

³⁹ P.R.O., FO 371/3136/177223. Namier wrote that the League ‘might do much tolocalize the dangers and eventually to stabilize the situation’ likely to result from the ‘confusionand rivalry’ over self-determination.

⁴⁰ The Nation, 7 Sept. 1918, regarded Czechoslovakia as ‘pure nationalism… designed to aggrandize one racial stock at the expense of another’.

⁴¹ The Contemporary Review, July 1919.

⁴² The New Statesman, 20 Jan. 1917; the Contemporary Review, Jan. 1918. Seton-Watson attacked their views in The New Europe.

⁴³ The Daily Chronicle thought ‘negotiations would be fruitless’; the Daily Telegraph dismissed the proposals as a ruse ‘to gain time… for the reorganization of shattered forces’ and the Daily Mail detected ‘another form of the old German trick…The Kaiser is the ventriloquist whose voice we hear in the Austrian telegram’. The Manchester Guardian gave greatest coverage to the Czechoslovak issue from the outset and showed awareness of its complexities. Not until 6 Nov. 1918 did the Guardian admit that Austria-Hungary was doomed with ‘the beginning of a new era in southern and south-eastern Europe’.

⁴⁴ Steed was frequently consulted by both Masaryk and Seton-Watson and was a long-standingsupporter of Czech independence, but his contributions during the war – at least until 1918 – were limited by his work on The Times. He did, however, support Masaryk in articles written for the Edinburgh Review and The New Europe.

⁴⁵ Calder, K. J., Britain and the origins of the new Europe (Cambridge, 1976), p. 213Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Calder, , Origins, p. 176Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ On 16 Aug. 1918 Cecil paid tribute to the Czechs, who ‘had done more for the Allied cause’ than any other suppressed nationality. He went on, ‘We have felt compelled to endorse thei claims to independence and… we have unquestionably received full value for our endorsement’ (FO 371/3137/147786). Yet a month later he could argue, ‘our recognition of the Czechs was very carefullyworded, and though it would undoubtedly be consistent with the dismemberment of Austria, it does not in fact bind us to that solution’ (FO 371/3136/152102).

⁴⁸ Calder, , Origins, p. 213Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Foreign relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference (Washington, 1942–1947), IV, 546Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Mantoux, P., The Paris peace conference – proceedings of the Council of Four (Geneva, 1964)Google Scholar. Lloyd George's immediate agreement is surprising in view of his Fontainebleau memorandum and general lack of sympathy with the smaller states. Philip Kerr wrote to Jan Masaryk on 4 March 1938 that Lloyd George had wished for a different Czech-German settlement and had been defeated by ‘Poincare and his associates’ (Scottish Record Office, Lothian Papers, Additional, G D 40/17/81). Lloyd George himself also implied this in his Memoirs and Truth about the peace treaties. Colonel House, however, thought that Lloyd George showed neither knowledge nor interest.

⁵¹ Lockhart, R. H. Bruce, Retreat from glory (London, 1934), p. 50Google Scholar.

⁵² Hoffman, R., ‘The British military representative in Vienna’, Slavonic and East European Review (1974), p. 252Google Scholar.

⁵³ Zorach, J., ‘The British view of the Czechs in the era before the Munich crisis’, Slavonic and East European Review (1979), p. 56Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 60.

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 67.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 66.