Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-7drxs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-21T22:03:44.423Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

IV. The Civil List in Eighteenth-Century British Politics: Parliamentary Supremacy versus the Independence of the Crown1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2010

E. A. Reitan
E. A. Reitan
Affiliation:
Illinois State University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In the constitutional evolution of eighteenth-century Britain a major problem was the resolution of the tensions which arose between the executive powers vested in the Crown and the legislative supremacy of Parliament. Although the seventeenth-century conflicts of Crown and Parliament had settled the question of ultimate supremacy in favour of Parliament, eighteenth-century politics, by common consent, were confined to the level where a balance of power could be seen to operate, in which king, Lords, and Commons exercised agreed functions and powers and where the ultimate weapon—parliamentary supremacy—need not be used. The independence of the Crown—however it may have operated in practice—was a cardinal doctrine of the ‘mixed and balanced’ constitution. Although this doctrine was usually invoked to support the right of the king to choose his own ministers, it gave an important constitutional role to the Civil List, for by supplying the Crown with a financial provision not subject to parliamentary control the Civil List served the pur-pose of supporting the independence and the ‘influence’ of the Crown. The uncontrolled expenditure of the Civil List, with its large number of attractive places, pensions, and other benefits, was an important part of that ‘influence’ which some considered necessary for the effective exercise of executive power and which others decried as a threat to the independence of Parliament. The disputes and jealousies created by the Civil List developed in the reigns of George I and George II and came to a climax in the reign of George III. The result was an alteration of the constitutional foundation of the Civil List which further weakened the doctrine of the independence of the Crown and which marked an important step in the evolution of parliamentary government.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , 1966 , pp. 318 - 337
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1966

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

2 In Blackstone's view the Civil List assured to the monarch ‘that constitutional independence, which at his first accession seems, it must be owned, to be wanting’ (Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 7th ed., 4 vols., London, 1775, I, 335)Google Scholar.

3 9 Will, III, c. 23. The Civil List revenue was derived from the hereditary revenues (recited in the act and including the hereditary excise), the temporary excise voted to the king for life, the ‘new subsidy’ of tonnage and poundage, and the revenues arising from the Duchy of Cornwall and the 4½ per cent duties in the West Indies. If the income of these duties exceeded £700,000 per annum, the surplus was not to be spent without authority of Parliament. A useful review of Civil List income and expenditure is found in the Report on Public Income and Expenditure, H.C. 1868-69 (366), xxxv, part n, pp. 585 ff. In 1699 these revenues were esti-mated to produce £776,676 (ibid. p. 586).

4 A detailed account of the charge of the Civil List in 1699 is given ibid. pp. 586-93.

5 This summary account of Civil List income and expenditure is drawn from ibid. pp. 594 ff.

6 The first Civil List Act of George I (1 Geo. I, c. 1) continued the Civil List of Anne. After the election had returned a more dependable Parliament a second Civil List Act was passed (1 Geo. I, Sess. 2, c. 12) which added £120,000 to the Civil List revenues to bring Civil List income up to £700,000 per annum. However, since the prince of Wales received £100,000 per annum from the Civil List plus the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall, George I was not much better off than Anne had been. During his reign George I received additional sums for his Civil List which brought the average annual income of his Civil List to £805,000 (Report on Public Income and Expenditure, part 11, p. 596).

7 The passage of the Civil List Act of George II may be followed in The Parliamentary History of England (36 vols., London, 1806–1820), VIII, cols. 599-605Google Scholar, and in Lord Hervey's Memoirs, ed. Sedgwick, Romney (London, 1952), pp. 36–7Google Scholar.

8 1 Geo. II, c. 1. During the reign certain duties applicable to the Civil List were repealed or altered, but in every case care was exercised that the king should not lose by these changes. Parliament also provided portions for the princesses and voted a pension of £25,000 per annum for the duke of Cumberland. In 1729 and 1747 supply grants of £115,000 and £456,734 were voted by Parliament to pay Civil List arrears. The average annual income of the Civil List of George II, including the parliamentary grants, was £815,000 (Report on Public Income and Expenditure, part 11, p. 597).

9 ‘An Account of the clear Produce in every Year, of the several Branches of the Revenue, which was settled for the Support of the Household of His late Majesty King George the 2. and of the honor & Dignity of the Crown’ (Newcastle Papers, British Museum Add. MSS. 33045, fo. 140). According to this account Civil List income for the last ten years of George II averaged £823,956 per annum.

10 In 1737 Walpole expressed a common view when he declared that ‘his Majesty has as absolute a right to the whole civil list revenue, during his life, as any gentleman in England can have to his own estate’ (Parliamentary History, ix, col. 1405). In 1760 Newcastle said of the Civil List to George II: ‘It is Your Majesty's own Money; You may do with it, what you please’ (Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 August 1760, Hardwicke Papers, B.M. Add. MSS. 35419, fo. 255).

11 In 1736 the ministers opposed giving account to Parliament of Civil List revenue on the grounds that ‘it would entirely alter the very nature of that grant of the Civil List…for his Majesty is to have during his life the produce of all these duties…without any account; yet now it is modestly proposed, that he should from henceforth be obliged to give an account, every year, to parliament’ (Parliamentary History, ix, col. 1089). Newcastle expressed the typical ministerial view in 1739 when he said: ‘If the purposes for which the civil list is granted, are answered, we have no right to ask an account in what manner the money is applied, or through whose hands it passes’ (ibid, x, col. 1360).

12 In 1739 Chesterfield commented: ‘Civil Lists are always granted in a tender moment. All parties are contending for the favour of a most gracious prince. Sentiments of patriotism are laid aside. The new King, therefore, must be better provided for than the former, and the next Civil List will be better than this…’ (ibid. col. 1357 n.). Chesterfield's prediction was not to be fulfilled. A hint of the attitude toward the Civil List which was to prevail in 1760 is seen in Pulteney's comment in 1737: ‘I hope I shall never see such a revenue granted in any future reign, nor granted in such a manner’ (ibid. IX, col. 1442).

13 Walpole's handling of the Civil List in 1720 and 1721 is told in Plumb, J. H., Sir Robert Walpole: The Making of a Statesman (London, 1956), pp. 287-8, 291-2, 355–6.Google Scholar In 1720 Walpole found money for Civil List debt by chartering two insurance companies; in 1721 he did it by a tax of (yd. in the pound on Civil List salaries and pensions; in 1725 by issuing Exchequer bills funded on the 6d. duty. For 1725, see Parliamentary History, vm, cols. 453-455. 459-460.

14 In 1747 Parliament granted £456,734 to pay Civil List debts (Report on Public Income and Expenditure, part n, p. 597). For the political background see Owen, John B., The Rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957), ch. VIIIGoogle Scholar.

15 Foord, A. S. in His Majesty's Opposition, 1714-1830 (Oxford, 1964), pp. 77-81, 98 n.Google Scholar, includes the Civil List in the issues of the ‘Country Party Programme’, but does not discuss it in detail.

16 ‘Dissertation Upon Parties’, The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1841), 11, 160–1Google Scholar.

17 Parliamentary History, IX, col. 1442.

18 Parliamentary History, x, col. 1363.

19 Dodington, George Bubb, Melcombe, Baron, The Diary of the Late George Bubb Dodington, ed. Wyndham, H. P. (Salisbury, 1784), pp. 459–60Google Scholar.

20 Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, ed. Russell, Lord John (3 vols., London, 1842), I, 320–2Google Scholar and Dodington, op. cit. pp. 14-15. , Foord'sHis Majesty's Opposition, pp. 264-5, 271–9Google Scholar, casts much new light on the ‘Glorious Plan’ of Frederick, including reform of the Civil List. See also Newman, A. N., ‘Leicester House Politics, 1748-1751’, English Historical Review, CCCI (October 1961), 577–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 1 Geo. Ill, c. 1. Certain lesser hereditary revenues were not transferred to the public in 1760 and continued to be paid to the Crown. They were used for purposes similar to the Civil List and may be properly regarded as a supplement to the £800,000 per annum voted by Parliament. These included the Duchy of Cornwall (average £11,000 per annum), the 4½ per cent duties (average £9,420 per annum) and a variety of smaller revenues, among them the Duchy of Lancaster, Gibraltar, and the Virginia quit-rents (see Report on Public Income and Expenditure, part II, pp. 470–4, and Parliamentary Papers of John Robinson, 1774–1784, ed. W. T. Laprade, London, 1922, p. 138).

22 Above, p. 320.

23 Account of the Annual Income of the Temporary and Hereditary Revenues of the Crown from s January 1777 to 5 January 1801, The Journals of the House of Commons, LVI, 872—3.

24 For Civil List expenditure from 1761 until 1769 see the accounts printed in the Journals of the House of Commons, XXXII, 627, 730. My figures are based on the account of Civil List expenditures ‘which incurred and became due’ in each year (p. 730).

25 Account of Money from Civil List of George II applied to Civil List of George III, ibid. pp. 466–7.

26 Account of Civil List expenditure ‘which incurred and became due’, ibid. p. 730.

27 Account of Civil List Debt, ibid. p. 256.

28 Ibid. p. 255.

29 Dowdeswell to Grenville (28 February 1769), The Grenville Papers, ed. Smith, William J. (4 vols., London, 1852-1853), IV, 411–12Google Scholar; Grenville to Dowdeswell (28 February 1769), Huntington Library, Grenville Letterbooks, vol. 11.

30 For the Civil List debates of 1769 and 1770 see Parliamentary History, XVI, cols. 599-602, 843-852, and Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates of the House of Commons, ed. John Wright (2 vols., 1841-43), I, 267-307, 479-83.

31 The accounts were presented the following year and are printed in the Journals of the House of Commons, XXXII, 466-603, 626-7, 729-30.

32 Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents, The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (8 vols., London, 1871), 1, 365Google Scholar.

33 Parliamentary History, XVI, col. 852.

34 Account of Civil List Debt on 5 January 1777, Journals of the House of Commons, XXXVI, 334. For Civil List expenditure from 1769 until 1777 see the accounts printed ibid, pp. 332-3. My figure for average annual expenditure during the period is based on the account of Civil List expenditures ‘which incurred and became due’ in each year (p. 332).

35 Parliamentary History, XIX, col. 103.

36 The accounts are printed in the Journals of the House of Commons, XXXVI, 332–3, 337–98.

37 Parliamentary History, XIX, col. 107.

38 Ibid. col. 104.

39 Ibid. cols. 126-127, 155-156.

40 Ibid. col. 117.

41 Ibid. cols. 106-108, 123-124.

42 Ibid. cols. 142-160.

43 Ibid. col. 213.

44 Ibid. cols. 224-234.

45 Burke to Richard Champion (9 May 1777), The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, gen. ed. Copeland, Thomas (Chicago, 1958–), III, 339Google Scholar.

46 Parliamentary History, XVI, col. 847.

47 Cavendish Debates, 1, 292.

48 Parliamentary History, XVI, col. 849.

49 Cavendish Debates, I, 272.

50 Grenville stated: ‘The ministerial gentlemen who sit in this House have a difficult task to perform. It is not always those gentlemen who increase the public expense; it is not in the power of the noble lord to restrain it. I know it is not; I wish it was. I bear my testimony to this fact; but I cannot justify it to myself to give away the public money without having the account’ (ibid. p. 285).

51 Parliamentary History, XVI, col. 849.

52 Ibid, XIX, col. 107. However, part of North's confidence rested on the hope of future increases in the revenues of the 4½ per cent duties and the American quit-rents ‘after the present unnatural rebellion’.

53 The Treasury attempted to introduce better management into the Civil List expenditure by requiring from each spending officer quarterly accounts which would show the expenditure of his department, compare the expenditure with the previous quarter, and explain the reasons for increase or decrease (Treasury Minute, 22 July 1777, Public Record Office, T. 29/46, pp. 251-2). This effort was soon forgotten in the midst of the problems of the war.

54 Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents, Works, I, 364.

55 Parliamentary History, XIX, col. 105.

56 A Letter from the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, to a Noble Lord, Works, V, 121.

57 See Butterfield, Herbert, George III, Lord North, and the People, 1779-1780 (London 1949)Google Scholar, and Christie, Ian, Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform (London, 1962)Google Scholar.

58 Ibid. pp. 74-6.

59 Christie, Ian, Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, pp. 77–84Google Scholar.

60 The Parliamentary Register, reprinted for Stockdale, John (17 vols., London, 1802), XIV, 104-5, 108Google Scholar.

61 Ibid. pp. 112-15.

62 Ibid, XV, 188-94.

63 Christie, op. cit. p. 100.

64 Speech on Presenting to the House of Commons…A Plan for the Better Security of the Independence of Parliament, and the Economical Reformation of the Civil and Other Establishments, Works, II, 55-126.

65 Ibid. p. 55.

66 Ibid. pp. 89-90, 107-15.

67 The household offices to be abolished were the offices under the lord steward, the master of the Household, the Great Wardrobe, the Removing Wardrobe, the Jewel Office, the Robes, and the masters of the Buckhounds, Fox Hounds, and Stag Hounds (ibid. pp. 86-9, 91-2, 107).

68 The departmental spending offices which were to be abolished were the Board of Green Cloth, the treasurer of the Household, the cofferer of the Household, the comptroller of the Household, the treasurer of the Chamber, and the paymaster of the Pensions (ibid. p. 91).

69 Ibid. pp. 97-100, 116.

70 Ibid. p. 81.

71 The order of payment was (1) judges, (2) ambassadors, (3) tradesmen, (4) domestic servants and lesser offices, (5) the privy purse and allowances to the royal family, (6) efficient greater offices, (7) pensions, (8) offices of honour, (9) first lord of the Treasury, chancellor of the Exchequer, junior lords of the Treasury (ibid. pp. 117-18).

72 Ibid. p. 55.

73 The Parliamentary Register, XVI, 243.

74 Ibid. p. 374.

75 Ibid. p. 242.

76 Ibid. pp. 349-50.

77 Ibid. p. 366.

78 Ibid. pp. 423-4.

79 Ibid. p. 249.

80 Ibid. p. 353.

81 Dunning's resolutions and the votes, ibid, XVII, 111.

82 Ibid. pp. 16–24.

83 Ibid. pp. 20, 24. On 4 April Burke wrote to Joseph Harford that his objects were ‘radical, systematic economy’ and ‘the establishment of order and responsibility’. He declared that ‘by refusing to destroy the subordinate Treasuries, or to enter into the Household the House has in my opinion rejected the whole plan’ (Burke, Correspondence, IV, 219–20).

84 The Parliamentary Register, XVI, 432.

85 Ibid, XVII, 239, 240, 340–5.

86 The Parliamentary Register, ed. Debrett, James (2nd ser. 45 vols., London, 1781-1796), II, 1–48.Google Scholar The debates of 1781 essentially repeated the arguments of 1780.

87 Details in Christie, Ian R., Hie End of North's Ministry, 1780-1782 (London, 1958)Google Scholar.

88 Parliamentary Register, VI, 399.

89 Ibid. p. 404.

90 George III to Thurlow (18 March 1782), The Correspondence of King George III, ed. Sir Fortescue, John (6 vols., London, 1927–1928), V, 392Google Scholar.

91 George III to Shelburne (12 April 1782), ibid. pp. 452-5; Shelburne to George III (17 April 1782), ibid. p. 463; George III to Rockingham (28 April 1782), ibid. pp. 496-502. See Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, Life of William, Earl of Shelburne (3 vols., London, 1875–1876), III, 155-9, 160–2Google Scholar.

92 Burke, op. cit. IV, 433-4.

93 Rockingham to George III (April 1782), Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham and His Contemporaries, ed. marquis of Albemarle (2 vols., 1852), II, 477–8.

94 22 Geo. III, c. 82.

95 Fortescue, op. cit. V, 453-4, 501.

96 Account of Civil List debt on 5 April 1782, Journals of the House of Commons, XXXVIII, 971.

97 Civil List expenditure in the year from 5 April 1782 to 5 April 1783 was £916,028 (Civil List Accounts, Public Record Office, T. 38/203). This sum does not include £50,000 per annum deducted from the Civil List according to the terms of Burke's Act to repay Civil List debt which had accumulated from 1777 to 1782.

98 Letter to a Noble Lord, Works, v, 115–21.

99 ‘Report from the Committee on Accounts relating to His Majesty's Civil List’, Reports from Committees of the House of Commons (16 vols., London, 1803), XI, 193–226.Google Scholar The report showed that from 1786 to 1802 Civil List expenditure averaged slightly over £1,000,000 per annum, and that in 1802 the Civil List was almost £900,000 in arrear.

100 See Ian Christie's ‘Economical Reform and “The Influence of the Crown”, 1780’, Cambridge Historical Journal, XII (1956), 144-54, and also his Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, pp. 151-3.