Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-xm8r8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-21T10:09:48.309Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean on the Eve of the Ethiopian Crisis (July–October 1935)1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Rosaria Quartararo
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Relations between Italy and Britain, even after Mussolini's seizure of power, remained entirely satisfactory within the framework of their traditional partnership in European affairs until the Ethiopian crisis of 1935. It is, however, well known that the first strains in the relationship rcame only in the period from July to October 1935, when British naval forces were concentrated in the Mediterranean. This particular episode as the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, occasionally referred to as ‘The Italo-Ethiopian emergency in the Mediterranean’, has been the subject of several untested and misleading assumptions made by historians whose attention has been focused almost solely on the international aspects of the Ethiopian crisis. This review is wholly based on Anglo-Italian records.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1977 , pp. 185 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

2 In the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Foreign Office records, from the Public Record Office. See Quartararo, R., ‘La Crisi Mediterranea del’ 35–36’, Storia Contemporanea (Dec. 1975)Google Scholar.

3 In this article only the Mediterranean dimension of the Ethiopian crisis is examined.

4 British documents cited are: Cabinet Papers and Minutes (Cab); Sub-Committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence Papers and Minutes (COS and DPR); Overseas Defence Committee Papers (ODC); Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry official and interdepartmental records (Adm, WO, Air); Foreign Office records (FO) and premiers' correspondence and papers (PREM); all from the P.R.O. Command Papers (Cmd); Lord Chatfield private correspondence and papers (Cht), from National Maritime Museum. Italian documents cited are: Ufficio Storico Marina Militare (AUSMM); Archivio Centrale di Stato, Ministero Marina, Gabinetto, Archivio Segreto (ACS AS, Gab.MM), for the years 1934–5. I have preserved the original emphasis in the text of documents quoted and indicated the italics supplied.

5 Marder, A., ‘The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian crisis’, American Historical Review (1969). Marder maintains his views in his latest book, From the Dardanelles to Oran (Oxford, 1974)Google Scholar.

6 Baer, G., La Guerra Italo-Ethiopica e la Crisi dell' EquUibrio Europeo, (Bari, 1970)Google Scholar, Marder, The Royal Navy; Parker, R. A. C., ‘Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian crisis, 1935–36’, English Historical Review (Apr. 1974)Google Scholar; Goldman, A. G., ‘Sir Robert Vansittart in search for co-operation against Hitler’, Journal of Contemporary History (July 1974)Google Scholar; Hardie, F., The Abyssinian Crisis (London, 1974)Google Scholar.

7 Barres, J., Betrayal from within (London, 1969)Google Scholar; Barres, A.J., The civilising mission (London, 1969)Google Scholar; Marder, The Royal Navy; Hardie, Abyssinian Crisis; Parker, ‘Ethiopian crisis’.

8 Baldwin specifically mentioned four in an almost contemporary conversation with the international jurist Arnold McNair (later Lord McNair). Information from Mr J. Barnes.

9 Lord Chatfield, It might happen again (London, 1947), p. 89Google Scholar.

10 Chatfield It might happen again; Vansittart, The mist procession (London, 1958);Google Scholar; Templewood, Nine troubled years (London, 1954);Google Scholar; Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope, A sailor's odyssey (London, 1950)Google Scholar; Kelly, D., The ruling few (London, 1952)Google Scholar.

11 Maffey report, Conclusions, CP 161/35, and Air 8/188, chiefs of air staff copy from cabinet papers, 18 Aug. 1935.

12 Baer, Guerra Italo-Etiopica passim.

13 Ibid.

14 CP 161/35, Maffey report.

15 ‘It was essential to British security to have a friendly Italy in the Mediterranean that would both guarantee our lines of communication to the Far East and make it unnecessary for the French to keep an Army on the Italian frontier…’ Templewood, Nine troubled years, P. 153Google Scholar.

16 Rarely if ever does this viewpoint appear in the memoirs quoted above, e.g. in February 1933 the British COSs stated ‘The whole of our territories in the Far East, as well as the coastline of India and the Dominions and our vast trade and shipping is open to attack’. Quoted in Watt, D. C., Personalities and polities, (London, 1965), p. 84Google Scholar.

17 ‘The Ethiopian imbroglio is a mere child's game in comparison with the German danger…’, Phipps to Vansittart, no. 1129, 6 Nov. 1935, quoted by Eden, Cab 24/260, CP 42 (36).

18 FO 371/19124, F.O. memorandum by Campbell, 9 Aug. 1935.

19 Ibid.

20 Watt, , Personalities and policies, p. 84; Hardie, , Abyssinian crisis, pp. 162–75; Marder, , The Royal Navy. In his memo, of 19 Apr. 1934Google Scholar, Sir Warren Fisher looked forward to achieving ‘an accommodation with Japan, in substance though not in form similar to our agreement of thirty years ago…’, Documents of British foreign policy, XIII, 2nd Ser., Appendix, pp. 924–30. Cf. Medlicott, W. N., Britain and Germany. The search for agreement (London, 1969)Google Scholar; Goldman, ‘Vansittart’.

21 De Felice, R., Mussolini il Rivoluzionario (Torino, 1968)Google Scholar; Mussolini il fascista. L'organizzazione dello stato fascista 1925–9 (Torino, 1969)Google Scholar; Mussolini il duce; gli anni del consenso 1929–36 (Torino, 1974)Google Scholar; Rami, G., Alle Origini delta Politico estera fascista (Ban, 1969)Google Scholar; L'Imperialismo Fascista (Bari, 1974)Google Scholar. Mr E. Robertson's book, Mussolini as empire builder, is due for publication during 1977.

22 Cunningham, , A sailor's odyssey, pp. 122–5Google Scholar; Hardie, , Abyssinian crisis, pp. 162–3Google Scholar.

23 FO 371/19063, Lampson to Vansittart, 7 Oct.; Cab 53/5, COS minutes, 29 Oct.; FO 371/19164, Vansittart to Hoare, 24 Nov. 1935.

24 The mist procession, quoted by Hardie, p. 159Google Scholar. See Templewood, Nine troubled years, p. 153Google Scholar; Kelly, , The ruling few, p. 227Google Scholar; Cunningham, , A sailor's odyssey, p. 122Google Scholar.

25 Middlemas, K. and Barnes, J., Baldwin. A biography (London, 1969), p. 876Google Scholar.

26 Villari, L., Storia Diplomatica del Confiitto Italo-Ethiopico (Bologna, 1943), p. 141Google Scholar. His account is substantiated by Toscano, M., Storia dei TratUUi e Politico Intemazionale, I (Torino, 1963), 36Google Scholar, and Chiavarelli, E., L'Opera delta Marina Itaiiana nelXa Ouerra Italo-Etiopica (Milano, 1969), pp. 60–4Google Scholar.

27 Hardie, , Abyssinian crisis, p. 159Google Scholar.

28 Cunningham, , A sailor's odyssey, p. 222Google Scholar; Hardie, , Abyssinian crisis, pp. 161–2Google Scholar.

29 Adm 116/3468, Fisher, 19 Mar. 1936.

30 Cht, letter to Chatfield, 30 June 1936; Adm 116/3468, 19 June 1936.

31 Marder, , The Royal Navy, p. 1332Google Scholar.

32 Adm 116/3468, 19 Mar. 1936, cited above.

33 Adm 116/3473, Fisher, reports 1933–4.

34 Adm 116/3049, 24 Aug. 1935.

35 Adm 116/3476, Fisher, Dec. 1937; Cab 53/5, COS 147th Mtg, 30 July 1935.

36 Cab 23/82.

37 Middlemas, and Barnes, , Baldwin, p. 852Google Scholar; Marder, , The Royal Navy, pp. 1334–9Google Scholar.

38 AUSMM, Case 230/C, 4–5, Relazione Capponi, Italian Naval Attache in London, 19 July 1935. See Adm 116/3042, Chatfield to Monsell, 27 Apr. 1936, and Adm 116/3038, 10, Aug. 1936.

39 Adm 116/3473, Fisher, 10 Apr. 1933.

40 Cab 53/5, COS 147th Mtg, cited above; Cab 53/22, COS Paper no. 397, 8 Aug. 1935.

41 Information given by Capt. S. W. Roskill.

42 AUSMM, Case 2335/F 16, Relazione Castagna, 31 Aug. 1935. See Air 8/188, CAS Mtg, 16 Sept. 1935.

43 Cht, letter of 5 Sept. 1935. See Relazione Castagna, cited above. In March 1938 Lord Chatfield gave further details: ‘During the crisis, steamers convoyed by the Navy, carrying aeroplanes, were sent to Alexandria. When they got there, six weeks necessarily elapsed before they could be put together…’, Cf. Address of First Sea Lord to Men of the Combined Home and Mediterranean Fleets, 19 Mar. 1938, in Cht papers.

44 FO 371/19159, letters between Cunliffe-Lister and Hoare, 16–17 Aug. 1935. Italics supplied.

45 Ibid.

46 Cab 16/139, DPR no. 40, 18 Oct. 1935.

47 FO 371/19156, F.O. minutes 29–30 Oct. 1935. See Marder, , The Royal Navy, p. 1338Google Scholar.

48 Rosekill, S. W., The War at Sea, I, The Defensive (London, 1954), 68–70Google Scholar.

49 FO 371/19158, Drummond, 5 Nov. 1935, transmitting report of H. Pott, naval attaché at Rome, 29 Oct.

50 Index to the General Correspondence of the F.O., III, 1936, p. 115.

51 AUSMM, Registro Matricolare della Miraglia, 312/566. See ‘Supplemento Rivista Marittima’, July-Aug. 1932. This ship is identified as an ‘Aviation transport’ in FO 371/19199, DPR 45, Annex I, 29 Oct. 1935.

52 ASC AS, Gab.MM, 1934–5, Cases 1, 17, Jan.-Oct. 1934; Jan.-Mar. 1935.

53 FO 371/19158, report from H. Pott, quoted above; AUSMM, Case 2340, cited above.

54 ACS AS, Gab.MM, 1935, Case 17, Promemoria27Oct.-27Nov. 1935. See‘Supplemento Rivista Marittima’ June 1935 and July 1937, and FO 371/19158, report from H. Pott.

55 ACS AS, Gab.MM, cited above, Protocolli 11–27 July 1935, and 25 July-21 Oct. 1935. See FO 371/19158, cited above.

56 AUSMM, Case 2336/4, 8-iv, Requirements in A.O., June 1935.

57 Chiavarelli, E., L'Opera delta Marina Italiana, pp. 28–44Google Scholar; Rochat, G., Militari e Polilici nellapreparazione delta campagnad'Ethiopia (Milano, 1971), pp. 50–110Google Scholar, and Badoglio (Torino, 1974). PP. 640–53Google Scholar, which sheds further light on Badoglio's role in the Ethiopian campaign and his personal relations with Mussolini.

58 Rochat, Mtiitari e Politici.

59 Chiavarelli, E., L'Opera delta Marina Italiana, pp. 29–44, 115–19Google Scholar.

60 Adm 116/3296, C-in-C, East Indies Station, 19 Sept. 1935. AUSMM, Case 2338/C 8-iv, Relaz. delTAmmiraglio G. Bacci de Capaci, Red Sea Division, 25 Jan. 1937.

61 Adm 116/3296, cited above, and Adm 116/3068, East Indies Station, Report of Proceedings.

62 FO 371/19159, report from H. Pott, cited above. See ACS AS, Gab.MM, 17, July-Oct. 1935, and ‘Suppl. Riv. Marit.’, June 1935. The cost of ten submarines, which amounted to 70 million lire, was allotted, as usual, to ‘Expenses for East Africa Defences’, ACS AS, Gab.MM, Promemoria of 27 Nov. 1935.

63 During the financial year 1935–6, allotments for naval expenditure reached 305 million lire, with an increase of over 80 millions in respect of 1934–5. In addition, 414 million lire were allotted for expenditure on materials for new construction, to be spread over 1935–6. Cf. report from H. Pott, cited above; see FO 371/20421, Annual report for 1935, Drummond to Eden, 22 Feb. 1936, and ‘Suppl. Riv. Marit.’ June 1935-July 1937.

64 Marder, , The Royal Navy, p. 1338Google Scholar.

65 For the traditional interpretation, see Chiavarelli, L'Opera della Marina Italiana, and Rochat, Mitari e Politici.

66 FO 37119074, Kelly, 1–3 Sept. 1935. According to Baer, G., the Italian divisions were sent between 12 and 14 Sept., cf. La Guerra Italo-Etiopica, p. 472Google Scholar. The defence of Egypt and the Middle East from the threat of military and air invasion (Sept. 1935-Sept. 1936), requires a separate study. It is probable, however, that the chronology of the Mediterranean crisis needs to be revised. British naval, air and military forces were not withdrawn on 6 July 1936, but transferred to Palestine in stages, between July and Sept. 1936.

67 FO 371/20410, Admiralty to F.O., 29 Apr. 1936, transmitting report from British Naval Intelligence Officer, 5–26 Mar. 1936.

68 de Felice, R., Mussolini U Fascista, I Rapporti fra Fascismo e Ncaionalsocialismo fnoall'andata alpoteredi Hitler(1922–33) (Napoli, 1971)Google Scholar; Mussolini ilDuce; Rumi, G., Alle Origini delta Politico Estera fascista; Santarelli, E., Ricerche sul Fascismo (Urbino, 1971)Google Scholar. As regards the origins of Italian policy in Ethiopia, Robertson, R., ‘Mussolini and Ethiopia. The prehistory of the Rome Agreement of January 1935’, in Studies in Diplomatic History (London, 1970)Google Scholar, and Petersen, J., ‘La Politica Estera del Fascismo come problema storiografico’, in Storia Contemporanea (12 1972)Google Scholar.

69 Mussolini's policy in Egypt and the Middle East between 1933 and 1936 deserves a separate study.

70 FO 371/21431. Report for 1935.

71 See Adm 116/3302. Correspondence between the F.O. and Adm referring to the negotiations for the ‘Gentleman's agreement’, Sept.-Dec. 1936. For the Easter Pact, see Toscano, M., The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Baltimore, 1967)Google Scholar, passim.

72 The SIM intercepted dispatches also from the British embassy in Rome; see Colvin, Ian, Vansittart in office (London, 1965), p. 29Google Scholar. Cf. Vansittart, Mist procession, p. 516Google Scholar, and Templewood, Nine troubled years, pp. 156–7Google Scholar.

73 Adm 116/3038, 8 Aug. 1935.

74 Cab 16/138, DPR 15,3 Sept. See Marder, , The Royal Navy, and Hardie, , Abyssinian crisis, pp. 152–65Google Scholar.

75 Ibid. See Cunningham, , A sailor's odyssey, pp. 122–5Google Scholar.

76 DPR 15, mentioned above.

77 The aerial danger to warships, whether at sea or in port, and the quality of the Italian Air Arm (Regia Aereonautica) were unknown quantities in 1935…', Hardie, , Abyssinian crisis, p. 157Google Scholar.

78 Air 8/188, CAS note on DPR 15, 5 Sept.; Cab 16/138, DPF 15, cited above.

79 DPR 15, 3 Sept., cited above.

80 Cab 16/138, DPR no. 21 or COS no. 397, 5 Oct., DPR 10th Mtg, 2 Oct.; Adm 116/2038, tel. no. 446, Lampson to F.O., 5 Oct. 1935.

81 Air 8/189, Appendix 11 to DPR 21 or COS 397, 16 Sept. 1935. See PREM, 1/175.

82 Cab 16/138’ DPR 20, 21, 29, 37, 15 Sept.-2i Nov. 1935.

83 Air 8/190, DPR 56, Principal Supply Officers Committee, Supply Board, 30 Nov. 1935.

84 Cab 16/138, DPR 37, 21 Nov.; Cab 16/139, DPR 56, 26 1935.

85 85 Cmd 5107/1936.

86 DPR 37.

87 FO 371/18851, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, 51 (35) of 4 Dec. Reader, W. J., The Life of the first Viscount Weir of Eastwood (London, 1952), pp. 222–7Google Scholar.

88 FO 371/18851, mentioned above. See Reader, W. J., Weir, pp. 222–7Google Scholar.

89 Lord Weir, earlier Sir William D. Weir, had been in the inter-war years director of munitions, director-general for aircraft production, secretary of state for air, and president of the air council. See Reader, W. J., Weir, pp. 17–29Google Scholar.

90 Cab 16/123, D P R (DR8), 27 Jan. 1936; cf. Cab 16/112, Annex C to DPR 9.

91 Ibid.

92 Adm 116/3398, Sept.-Nov. 1935; Cab 16/139, DPR 45, 16 Oct.-io Dec. 1935.

93 Gamelin, M., Servir (Paris, 1946), II, 148–9, 167–9Google Scholar; Salvemini, G., Prelude to the Second World War (London, 1953), pp. 207, 233Google Scholar. Malet, A., Pierre Laval (Paris, 1955), pp. 71, 94–5Google Scholar. Baer, G., La Guerra Italo-Etiopica, pp. 214, 228, 406, 408Google Scholar.

94 Before the 1914–18 war Herr Laube, a Swiss Jew, was manager of an aluminium factory at Schaffhausen in Switzerland. During the war he was asked to establish huge works in Saxony, which he accomplished successfully. Afterwards he re-organized a copper

95 Cab 16/139, DPR 32, ated above.

96 For their part, the Germans reassured the F.O. on various different occasions, that they were faithfully respecting the naval pact, in particular as far as submarines were concerned. See DBFP, Mil, no. 499, from Capt. Muirhead-Gould; no. 601, Vansittart to Drummond, 6 Jan. 1936; no. 642, Capt. Muirhead-Gould to Phipps, 3 Feb. 1936.

97 FO 371/20419, Drummond, 11 Feb. 1936, transmitting report from British consul at Trieste. According to Aloisi, ten submarines were secretly under construction in Germany on 30 Apr. 1936, Journal (1932–6) (Paris, 1957), p. 268.

98 Their cost amounted to 15,063,000 lire which were allotted to ‘Expenses for the defence of A.O.’, ACS AS Gab.MM, 17, 1935, Promemoria, 27 Nov. 1935.

99 FO 371/20410, Waterlow, Athens, 11 Feb., and Greig, consul general at Smyrna, 20 Feb. 1936. See FO 372/10415, Campbell, 22 Feb. 1936.

100 Phipps to Vansittart, no. 1129 above. See Medlicott, Britain and Germany.

101 Cab 16/139, DPR 45, 30 Nov. 1935.

102 Cab 16/139, DPR 63, 6 Dec. 1935.

103 Adm 116/3432, Defence 786, 9 Jan. 1936.

104 Adm 116/3496, minute of 14 Aug. 1936.

105 FO 371/19891, Phipps to Vansittart, 12 Mar. 1936, transmitting copy of Phipps' letter to Hankey, reporting visit of Lord Riverdale to Berlin, 12 Mar.; letter from Hankey to Vansittart, 11 Mar.; letter from Lord Riverdale to Hankey, 9 Mar.; letter from Riverdale to Whitman, WO, CID, 9 Mar.; letter from Riverdale to Vansittart, 9 Mar. 1936.

106 Cab 24/260, memo, by Eden, 11 Feb. 1936.

107 A dm 116/3500, Air and Admiralty reports 1934–7.

108 See p. 206 above.

109 WO 106/284, Intelligence summaries, Oct. 1935-May 1936.

110 Cab 16/139, DPR 10th Mtg, 2 Oct. 1935.

111 FO 371/20410, from British consul at Rhodes, 26 May 1936.

112 Cab 16/138, DPR 15, cited above. See pp. 196–197 above.

113 Cht, Adm. Backhouse to Chatfield, letter of 27 Mar. 1936.

114 DPR 15, cited above.

115 Ibid. See Marder, The Royal Navy.

116 Air 8/188, CAS note on DPR 15, 5 Sept. 1935.

117 DPR 15, 3 Sept. 1935, cited above. See p. 198 above.

118 FO 371/19097, Extract from the Evening Standard, 20 Sept. 1935, and F.O. letter to the Admiralty.

119 The table detailed a total of ten sightings, FO 371/19097, Barnes, secretary to the Admiralty, letter of 22 Oct. 1935.

120 FO 371/20411, memo, by Ward Price, 28 May 1926, sent to the F.O. ‘with the compliments of Lord Rothermere’. See Daily Mail, 28 May 1936.

121 FO 371/19097, Correspondence between Admiralty and F.O., from 22 Oct. to 2 Nov.1935.

122 Adm 116/2076, Achilles, report of 12 Oct. 1935; Adm 116/2084, from C-in-C, East Indies Station, 19 Oct. 1935.

123 FO 371/20159, Chatfield to Eden, I Jan. 1936.

124 Cab 16/139, DPR 37, 8 Oct. 1935.

125 Cab 16/139, DPR 37, cited above.

126 See pp. 198 and 202 above. Also Marder, , The Royal Navy, pp. 1336–40Google Scholar.

127 See Marder, , The Royal Navy, pp. 1332, 1336–7, 1343–5Google Scholar. and Hardie, , Abyssinian crisis, pp. 152–7Google Scholar.

128 See Roskill, , The war at sea, I, 68–70Google Scholar.

129 Adm. Richmond, , Statesmen and sea power (London, 1947), p. 297Google Scholar; Chatfield, , It might happen again, p. 89Google Scholar; Marder, A., Portrait of an admiral; The life and papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London, 1952), pp. 19–34Google Scholar.

130 Chatfield, DPR 15, 3 Sept. 1935, cited above.

131 Marder, , The Royal Navy, p. 1342Google Scholar. Letter, Monsell to Marder, 1 Dec. 1968.

132 DPR 15, cited above. See Marder, The Royal Navy.

133 FO 371/19127, Campbell, 16 Sept. 1935, F.O. note on DPR 21.

134 Cab. 16/138, DPR 21 or COS 397, 15–20 Sept. 1935. See Marder, , The Royal NavyGoogle Scholar.

135 Cab. 16/138, DPR 21, cited above.

136 371/20411, F.O. minute by Campbell, 28 May 1936.

137 FO 371/19127, Barnes, Admiralty, to under-secretary of state, F.O., 22 Aug. 1935.

138 FO 371/19197, Admiralty to F.O., 29 Aug.; see Adm 116/3038.

139 Cab 16/140, DPR 76, covering minutes by the ODC, 6 Jan. 1936.

140 Roskill, , The war at sea, 1, 298. Cf. pp. 293–305Google Scholar.

141 Also the Axis forces under-estimated the strategic value of Malta, and rejected the possibility of taking the island, Howard, M., Grand Strategy, vi (London, 1972), 62–4Google Scholar.

142 FO 371/19197, Admiralty to F.O., Adm 116/2476, cited above. It was not a mere coincidence that when Italy entered the war in 1940, Cunningham's plan of counter-offensive was very similar to that of Fisher in 1935, cf. Cunningham, , A sailor's odyssey, pp. 11–24Google Scholar.

143 Jones, T., A diary with letters, 1931–50 (London, 1954), p. 159Google Scholar; Middlemas, and Barnes, , p. 880Google Scholar.

144 Cab 53/5, COS minutes, 149th Mtg, 6 Sept., and 150th Mtg, 13 Sept. 1935.

145 DPR 15, 3 Sept. 1935, mentioned above.

146 See Marder, The Royal Navy, and Hardie, Abyssinian crisis.

147 Cht, letter from Chatfield to Backhouse, 5 Sept. 1935.

148 Cab 53/5, COS minutes of 6 and 13 Sept. 1935.

149 Cf., in particular, minutes of 613 Sept. 1935.

150 FO 371/19127, Campbell, 16 Sept., and COS 149th Mtg, mentioned above.

151 Air 8/188, CAS note on DPR 15.

152 Cab 53/5, COS Mtg, 13 Sept. 1935.

153 Cab 53/5. COS Mtg, 6 Sept. 1935.

154 Cab 53/5, COS 149th Mtg, 6 Sept. 1935. Italics supplied.

155 Adm 116/3473, memo, by Admiral Fisher, 10 Apr. 1933; Cab 16/240, DPR 76, note by the secretary to the cabinet, covering minutes by the Overseas Defence Committee, 6 Jan. 1936; and DPR 78, COS report of 3 Feb. 1936.

156 IM Kelly wrote: ‘The explosion of the Abyssinian crisis came as a stroke to me. For various reasons into which it is better not to enter, I had never believed that we should make a major issue of the Italian attack on Abyssinia to the point of incurring the risk of an immediate war. When Sir William Fisher arrived… he told me that he had prepared a memorandum on the defence of Malta, or rather on the lack of it, and he had been rebuked for wasting time, since Italy was then considered only number five or six on the list of potential enemies.’ The ruling few, pp. 227–8Google Scholar.

157 FO 371/19051, Ellington to Hoare, 20 Sept.; Cab 53/5, COS 149th and 150th Mtgs, 6–13 Sept. 1935.

158 Cab 53/5, COS 150th Mtg, 13 Sept. 1935.

159 Ibid.