¹ For parliamentary protests, see the second reading debate on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill, 8 Nov. 1921, Parl, debates (commons), 146, 5s., cols. 1283–6, 1304, 1306–8, 1313–7, 1320–2.

² E.g. Gilbert, B. B., British social policy, 1914–1939 (London, 1970), p. 161Google Scholar.

³ E.g. Ashworth, W., An economic history of England 1870–1939 (London, 1972 edn), p. 390Google Scholar.

⁴ This approach is implicit in Howson, S., Domestic monetary management in Britain 1919–38 (Cambridge, 1975)Google Scholar and in Moggridge, D. E., British monetary policy 1924–31, the Norman conquest of $4.86 (Cambridge, 1972)Google Scholar.

⁵ For the development of these ‘peak organizations’ for British industry, see Turner, J., ‘The politics of organised business in the First World War’, in Turner, J. (ed.), Businessmen and politics: studies of business activity in British politics, 1900–1945 (London, 1984)Google Scholar, ch. III.

⁶ Exchequer issues in 1913–14 were £197,493,000; in 1921–2, they came to £1,079,187,000.

⁷ In 1919–20, an estimated 3,900,000 were chargeable with the tax; an equal number was estimated to have been above the exemption limit for the tax but to have been relieved from payment through the operation of abatements and allowances. Mallet, B. and George, C. O., British budgets, second series, 1913–14 to 1920–21 (London, 1929), p. 398Google Scholar.

⁸ See Hawtrey, R. G., ‘The gold standard’, The Economic Journal, XXIX (1919), 428–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Feinstein, C. H., National income, expenditure and output of the United Kingdom, 1855–1965 (Cambridge, 1972)Google Scholar, table 65, index of average weekly wage earnings for manual workers in the main industries and services and index of retail prices. These suggest that in the aggregate, the weekly wage earnings of manual workers were greater in real terms in 1917, 1918 and 1919 than they had been in the previous year. However, averages of this sort reveal little of the way price rises would have affected particular groups and shaped their attitudes.

¹⁰ Keynes, J. M., A tract on monetary reform (London, 1923), p. 14Google Scholar.

¹¹ Full figures are not available, but in 1921, Rothermere's Daily Mirror and Northcliffe's Daily Mail and The Times seem to have accounted for nearly half of the circulation of metropolitan morning papers. Rothermere also controlled the largest selling Sunday newspaper, The Sunday Pictorial. Seymour-Ure, C., ‘The press and the party system between the wars’, in Peele, G. and Cook, C. (ed.), The politics of reappraisal, 1918–1939 (London, 1975), p. 237Google Scholar. The inter-war Daily Mail is discussed in Jeffery, T. and McClelland, K., ‘A world fit to live in: the Daily Mail and the middle classes 1918–39’, in Curran, J., Smith, A. and Wingate, P. (ed.), Impacts and influences. Essays on media power in the twentieth century (London, 1987)Google Scholar, ch. II.

¹² For the simplistically optimistic treatment of deflation, see Daily Mail, 31 Mar. 1920, editorial, p. 6.

¹³ For Rothermere's, views, see Sunday Pictorial, 2 10 1921, p. 7Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See Daily Mail, 14 Jan. 1921, editorial, p. 4 and 11 Feb. 1922, editorial, p. 6;Daily Mirror, 11 Feb. 1922, p. 3.

¹⁵ For their political ambitions, see Morgan, K. O., Consensus and disunity: the Lloyd George coalition government 1918–1922 (Oxford, 1979), pp. 170–2Google Scholar. Note also the equivocal reaction of their newspapers to the appointment of the Geddes committee, something they might have been expected to welcome had economy been their sole concern: Daily Mail, 4 Aug. 1921, editorial, p. 4 and Daily Mirror, 5 Aug. 1921, p. 5.

¹⁶ E.g. budget debate of 25 Apr. 1921, Parl debates (commons), 141, 5s., cols. 22–125 passim.

¹⁷ The Times, 20 Jan. 1922, p. 14.

¹⁸ Finance committee conclusion 4, 7 Dec. 1920, London, Public Record Office (P.R.O.), cabinet papers, CAB 27/71, F.C. 29th minutes; Chamberlain's, A. speech, 22 06 1921, Parl. debates (commons), 143Google Scholar, 5s., col. 1352.

¹⁹ Report of the machinery of government committee of the ministry of reconstruction (Parl. papers (P.P.), 1918, Cd. 9230, XII), passim, but especially pp. 10–21.

²⁰ For an example of Liberal anti-waste rhetoric, see Maclean's, D. speech, 25 05 1921, Parl, debates (commons), 142Google Scholar, 5s., cols. 194–6. Compare this with the continuing commitment to social reform evident in, ‘The case against the coalition. Some counts in the indictment’, leaflet no. 2571, 1920, in, Pamphlets and leaflets for 1920, being the publications for the year of the Liberal publication department (London, 1921)Google Scholar. For the tension in Labour's thinking, compare the candour of Snowden, P., Labour and the new world (London, 1921), p. 138Google Scholar, with the vigorous advocacy of a contraction of the state to be found in MacDonald, J. R., A policy for the Labour party (London, 1920), pp. 156–8Google Scholar.

²¹ For differences regarding the role of the state, see the regret expressed by a number of spokesmen for chambers of commerce at the Geddes committee's proposals to abolish the department of overseas trade and to cut education expenditure, The Times 13 Feb. 1922, p. 5. Compare this with the more radical laissez-faire views of the National Association of Merchants and Manufacturers, The Times, 20 Jan. 1922, p. 14. For examples of the diverse fiscal policies propounded by politicians who agreed on the need to cut public spending, see the debate on the financial statement, 25 Apr. 1921, Parl. debates (commons), 146, 5s., cols. 67–135.

²² For an example of that insistence, see the deputation of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce to the chancellor of the exchequer, 14 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., T 172/1243.

²³ See Morgan, Consensus, esp. chs. IV and VI.

²⁴ See for example the alarm raised in cabinet by press complaints at the provision of official cars for ministers: war cabinet conclusion 7, 10 July 1919, P.R.O., CAB 23/11, W.C. 591. Also, war cabinet conclusion 1, 30 July 1919, P.R.O., CAB 23/11, W.C. 602.

²⁵ Finance committee minutes 1 and 3, 20 Aug. 1919, P.R.O., CAB 27/71, F.C. 3rd minutes. War cabinet conclusion 9, 10 July 1919, P.R.O., CAB 23/11, W.C. 591.

²⁶ Finance committee conclusion 4, 7 Dec. 1920, P.R.O., CAB 27/71, F.C. 29th minutes. Cabinet conclusion 1, 8 Dec. 1920, P.R.O., CAB 23/23, Cab. 67(20).

²⁷ Cabinet conclusion 14, 11 July 1921, P.R.O., CAB 23/26, Cab. 58(21). Cabinet conclusion 1, 2 June 1921, P.R.O., CAB 23/26, Cab. 47(21).

²⁸ Morgan, , Consensus, pp. 97–8Google Scholar.

²⁹ See, for example, Eric Geddes's contribution to the conference of ministers on unemployment and the state of trade, 25 Feb. 1919, P.R.O., CAB 24/75, G.T. 6887.

³⁰ See E. S. Montagu to Lloyd George, 9 Dec. 1921, London, House of Lords Record Office (H.L.R.O.), Historical Collection 192, Lloyd George papers, F/41/1/38; Churchill, W. memorandum, ‘The unemployment situation’, 28 09 1921Google Scholar, P.R.O., CAB 24/128, C.P. 3345; A. Mond to Lloyd George, 1 July 1921, Lloyd George papers, F/37/1/26.

³¹ See Fisher to Lloyd George, 10 Jan. 1922, H.L.R.O., Lloyd George papers, F/16/7/77.

³² See George Younger to A. Chamberlain, 10 June 1921, H.L.R.O., Lloyd George papers, F/7/4/8(a); Lord Derby to Lloyd George, 29 Aug. 1921, Lloyd George papers, F/14/5/31; Montagu, E. S., ‘The financial position’, 4 08 1921Google Scholar, P.R.O., CAB 24/127, C.P. 3208. For the cabinet's efforts to emphasize its record of public economy, see cabinet conclusion 6, 24 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/29, Cab. 13(22).

³³ The coalition had 478 of the 707 seats in the new parliament in 1919. The turnout in the December 1918 poll has been just 58.9 per cent.

³⁴ The three League victories came in Dover, Hertford and St George's, Westminster. Hertford had been won in 1918 by an independent, the other two were coalition Unionist seats. The coalition vote in Dover held up, but the total poll was much higher than it had been in 1918.

³⁵ Percentage derived from Butler, D. and Sloman, A., British political facts 1900–1975 (London, 1975 edn), p. 187CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ In June 1921, there was a commons debate on a motion calling for the removal from the estimates of the salary of Christopher Addison, the minister most closely associated with the government's expensive social programme. The prime minister, apparently for fear of a Unionist revolt, effectively abandoned his erstwhile colleague (who no longer held a cabinet portfolio). See, the debate on supply, 23 June 1921,Parl. debates (commons), 143, 5s., cols. 1597–1643, passim. Also, A. Chamberlain to Lloyd George, 9 June 1921, H.L.R.O., Lloyd George papers, F/7/4/5.

³⁷ Lloyd George's role in the appointment of the committee is apparent from the following: Taylor, A. J. P. (ed.), Uoyd George: a diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971), p. 225Google Scholar. Geddes to Home, 9 Aug. 1921, P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 14. Austen Chamberlain to Ivy Chamberlain, 9 Aug. 1921, Birmingham, Birmingham University Library, Austen Chamberlain papers, AC 6/1/401. Cabinet consent was not secured without some expressions of dissent regarding the use of a committee of outsiders; see cabinet conclusion 2, 2 August 1921, P.R.O., CAB 23/26, Cab. 62(21).

³⁸ Lloyd George to A. Chamberlain, 9 June 1921, H.L.R.O., Lloyd George papers, F/7/4/6.

³⁹ For Lloyd George's enthusiasm for ‘men of push and go’, see, P. K. Cline, ‘Eric Geddes and the “experiment” with businessmen in government, 1915–22’, in K. D. Brown (ed.), Essays in anti-labour history; responses to the rise of labour in Britain (Cambridge, 1971), ch. IV, passim. Of the committee members: Geddes, formerly deputy general manager of North-Eastern Railway, had worked in the wartime administration since 1914 and was a cabinet minister from 1917; Lord Inchcape, a senior partner in the trading firm, Mackinnon, Mackenzie & Co., had sat on numerous government committees and had organized the post-war disposal of captured enemy shipping; Lord Faringdon, chairman of Great Central Railway, had sat on a number of government committees on commercial questions; Sir Guy Granet, formerly general manager of Midland Railway Company, served in the wa r as director general of Military Railways; Sir Joseph Maclay, a shipping magnate, was minister of shipping, 1916–21.

⁴⁰ For an example of Maclay's views, see his memorandum, 25 Oct. 1919, P.R.O., CAB 2490, G.T. 8410.

⁴¹ Geddes to Horne, 3 Aug. 1921, P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 14.

⁴² See cabinet conclusion 2, 2 Aug. 1921, P.R.O., CAB 23/26, Cab. 62(21).

⁴³ Reduction of public expenditure. Copy of Treasury circular, dated 13th May, 1921, relative to securing a large reduction in the estimates for the financial year 1922–-23 (P.P., 1921, Cmd. 1309, xix). This circular did not require the submission of estimates until the end of July.

⁴⁴ See O'Halpin, E., ‘Sir Warren Fisher, head of the civil service, 1919–39’ (unpublished University of Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1982)Google Scholar, ch. II.

⁴⁵ E.g. memorandum by R. R. Scott on staff economies, n.d., P.R.O., CAB 27/72, F.C. 52.

⁴⁹ E.g. Blackett, B. P., ‘Note on the present conditions in finance and industry’, 28 06 1920Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 171/180.

⁴⁷ E.g. The Times, 2 Aug. 1919, editorial, p. 13.

⁴⁸ Finance department memorandum on Federation of British Industries report on financial control, n.d. [but probably July 1920], P.R.O., T 171/184.

⁴⁹ E.g. Skidelsky, R., ‘Keynes an d the Treasury view: the case for and against an active unemployment policy, 1920–1939’, in Mommsen, W. J. (ed.), The emergence of the welfare stale in Britain and Germany, 1850–1950 (London, 1981), pp. 167–87Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Lowe, R., ‘The demand for a ministry of labour, its establishment and initial role, 1916–1924’ (University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1975), pp. 211–34Google Scholar. Lowe, R., ‘The erosion of state intervention in Britain, 1917–24’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XXXI, 2 (1978), 282–3Google Scholar.

⁵¹ See, for example, the Treasury's ire at the percentage grant system used by a number of the social service ministries: Special report by the Treasury on the board of education [probably 1921], PRO., T 163/10/7.

⁵² For the hostility to trade boards, see Lowe, , ‘State intervention’, pp. 278–9Google Scholar.

⁵³ See Grigg, P. J., Prejudice and judgement (London, 1948), p. 183Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Blackett, memorandum, ‘Liquidation of post-war liabilities’, 09 1922Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 171/202.

⁵⁵ Blackett, in his memorandum ‘Dear money’ (12 02 1920Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 176/5, part 2) advocated the use of a budget surplus and Treasury bills to absorb the public's purchasing power and thus to depress prices. For the use of dear money for deflationary ends, see Niemeyer to Blackett, 3 Feb. 1920, P.R.O., T 176/5, part 2.

⁵⁶ Blackett, memorandum, ‘Budgeting for a deficit’, 24 03 1922Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 171/202.

⁵⁷ Niemeyer to Horne, 22 Apr. [1922], P.R.O., T 171/205.

⁵⁸ Excess profits duty and special miscellaneous revenue (essentially the realization of war assets) contributed more than one third of exchequer receipts in 1920–21. The yield of other, more permanent taxes could not be maintained at the 1920–21 level since they reflected the post-war economic boom. Moreover, the reduction of the expenditure side of the budget was to be made especially difficult by the growth in real terms of the burden of interest on the national debt. For this last point, see Report of the committee on national debt and taxation (P.P., 1927, XI, Cmd. 2800, 371), p. 66.

⁵⁹ Figure derived from Return showing, approximately, the composition of the internal debt, other than Treasury bills and ways and means advances, as at 30th September 1921 (P.P., 1921, 249, XIX), p. 3.

⁶⁰ Blackett to A. Chamberlain, 14 Mar. 1921, P.R.O., T 171/196.

⁶¹ Financial statement (1922–23) (P.P., 1922, 77, XI), p. 4. Report on national debt (P.P., 1927, Cmd. 2800, XI), p. 42.

⁶² Report on national debt (P.P. 1927, Cmd. 2800, XI), pp. 45–6. Morgan, E. V., Studies in British financial policy, 1914–1925 (London, 1952), p. 151Google Scholar. In April 1922, Niemeyer was contemplating the prospect of £100m of maturities in 1922–3, followed by £245m in the subsequent year (Niemeyer to Blackett, 22 Apr. [1922], P.R.O., T 171/205).

⁶³ The new Treasury bonds initially came on to the market in July 1921, but this was only the first of a series of issues, the last of which did not come until March 1922. In the summer and autumn of 1921, the floating debt still stood at over £1,350m, a figure well in excess of its level at 31 March 1921 (Morgan, E. V., Financial policy, pp. 118–19Google Scholar).

⁶⁴ In the 1920–1 budget, special miscellaneous revenue was put at £302m; the estimated surplus for that year was only £234,198,000 and £164m of this was required to meet definite debt obligations. In the 1921–2 budget, special miscellaneous revenue was estimated at £158,500,000; after provision for contingencies, the surplus was put at £80m, all of which was required to meet definite debt obligations (Mallet, and George, , British budgets, second series, pp. 306–7Google Scholar; Mallet, B. and George, C. O., British budgets, third series, 1921–22 to 1932–33 (London, 1933), pp. 426–7Google Scholar; Niemeyer memorandum, Aug. 1920, P.R.O., T 171/184; Niemeyer, memorandum, ‘Budget position’, 4 11 1921Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 171/205).

⁶⁵ Blackett, memorandum, ‘Permanent debt charge’, 27 02 1921Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 171/196.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Chamberlain, A., ‘National revenue and expenditure’, para. 10 and table III, 7 02 1921Google Scholar, P.R.O., CAB 27/72, F.C. 69.

⁶⁸ Chamberlain's, A. financial statement, 25 04 1921, Parl. debates (commons), 141Google Scholar, 5s., col. 78. For the confusion regarding the purpose of the £100m allocation, compare Reduction of public expenditure (P.P. 1921, Cmd. 1309, XIX), p. 3 with Niemeyer's speech notes for Horne regarding sinking funds [n.d., but probably before 24 Feb. 1922], P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 4.

⁶⁹ Reduction of public expenditure (P.P., 1921, Cmd. 1309, XIX), p. 4.

⁷⁰ For the Treasury's continued use of the £113m target figure, see Warren Fisher to R. Horne, 27 July 1921, P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 14.

⁷¹ ‘British government's financial position’, Aug. 1921 and the following, untitled paper forecasting the 1922–3 budget, undated [but probably written at approximately the same time as the previous paper], P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 14.

⁷² Untitled paper forecasting the 1922–3 budget, undated [but probably c. Aug. 1921], P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 14. On the basis of the figures contained herein, one would have expected that if excess profits duty were included in ordinary revenue, a reduction of £154,151,000 in ordinary supply estimates would have been sought. If e.p.d. were excluded, one could have expected a target of £ 194,151,000.

⁷³ E.g. Special report by the Treasury on navy expenditure [probably 1921], P.R.O., T 163/11/4.

⁷⁴ In 1919–20, £606,428,590 or 607 per cent of the supply estimates appearing in the financial statement were attributable to five departments whose expenditure was closely related to the war (i.e. the three armed forces, the ministry of pensions and the civil demobilization and resettlement department of the ministry of labour; other departments such as the ministry of shipping bore an equally close relationship to the war, but were not of such financial significance). In 1921–2, the estimates for these five came to £319,111,666, or 477 per cent of the supply estimates.

⁷⁵ Treasury report on the ministry of health [probably 1921], P.R.O., T 163/11/5.

⁷⁶ Special report by the Treasury on the board of education [probably 1921], P.R.O., T 163/10/7. The Burnham pay scales agreement expired in 1923 in the London metropolitan area.

⁷⁷ Compare the vigour of the Treasury's report on the Admiralty with the more measured memorandum on Admiralty expenditure sent to Barstow on 18 Aug. [1921] by E. W. H. Millar the Treasury assistant secretary with responsibility for the armed forces (P.R.O., T 163/11/4). It was probably Barstow, a long-standing opponent of navy expenditure, or his deputy R. S. Meiklejohn, who determined that the Treasury was to pursue the line embodied in the report. Similarly, the Treasury's report on the ministry of health suggests a more aggressive approach than that apparently favoured by the assistant secretary, A. W. Hurst. However, Hurst seems to have been replaced by F. Phillips by October 1921, and it is conceivable that Phillips might have had some responsibility for the tougher line (P.R.O., T 163/11/5). Previously, Phillips had been the assistant secretary with responsibility for the board of education. His memorandum to Barstow on 30 Aug. [1921] did raise major questions regarding the education estimates, but one must again surmise that it was Barstow or his deputy who opted to pursue these issues with the radicalism that is evident in the report on the board of education (P.R.O., T 163/10/7).

⁷⁸ See Treasury memorandum, ‘Staffs of government departments’, para (8) (2), 8 Oct. 1919, P.R.O., CAB 27/72, F.C. 8; Second interim report of committee on national expenditure (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1582, IX), pp. 14–15 and pp. 34–5.

⁷⁹ Compare the Treasury report on forestry commission [probably 1921], P.R.O., T 163/10/10 with Second report of expenditure cttee (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1582, IX), pp. 52–4.

⁸⁰ Second report of expenditure cttee (P.P. 1922, Cmd. 1582, IX), pp. 36–8; cabinet conclusion 2, 15 July 1920, P.R.O., CAB 23/22, Cab. 40(20); cabinet conclusion 4, 28 Dec. 1920, P.R.O., CAB 23/23, Cab. 78(20).

⁸¹ Compare the Treasury report on the ministry of health [probably 1921], P.R.O., Treasury papers, T 163/11/5 with the First interim report of committee on national expenditure (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1581, IX), pp. 106–23. Compare the Special report by the Treasury on the board of education, [probably 1921], Treasury papers, T. 163/10/7, with First report of expenditure cttee (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1581, IX), pp. 126–37.

⁸² Third report of committee on national expenditure (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1589, IX), p. 49.

⁸³ E.g. First report ofexpenditure cttee (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1581, IX), pp. 105–6, 120–1, 129–32, 148.

⁸⁴ See First report of expenditure cttee (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1581, IX), pp. 143–6. See also Second report of expenditure cttee (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1582, IX), pp. 14–15, 25, 30, 52–4.

⁸⁵ E.g. Second report of expenditure cttee (P.P., 1922, Cmd. 1582, IX), pp. 14–15.

⁸⁶ E.g. the efforts of the Churchill committee, aided by the prime minister, to reduce the air ministry estimates: G.R.C. (D.D.) 4th minutes, 23Jan. 1922; G.R.C. (D.D.) 11th minutes, 23 Feb. 1922; Summary of effect of air ministry proposals on air estimates 1922–3 and Supplementary memorandum by the air ministry for Mr Churchill's committee, G.R.C. (D.D.) 17, 26 Jan. 1922; report of committee appointed to examine part I (defence departments) of the report of the Geddes committee on national expenditure, 4 Feb. 1922, C.P. 3692, para. 43: all P.R.O., CAB 27/164. See also cabinet conclusion 5, 17 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/29, Cab. 11(22) and cabinet conclusion 3(d), 24 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/29, Cab. 13(22).

⁸⁷ E.g. report of committee appointed to examine part I (defence departments) of the report of the Geddes committee on national expenditure, para. 39, 4 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 27/164, C.P. 3692. See also Barstow and L. Worthington-Evans to Churchill, 17 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 8.

⁸⁸ E.g. H. A. L. Fisher's defence of the education estimates, 5th conclusions, Geddes report (parts II and III) committee, 24 Jan. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 27/165. See also, ‘Forestry expenditure’, memorandum by forestry commission, Feb. 1922, G.R. 6 and report of committee appointed to examine the second interim report of the committee on national expenditure, conclusion 3(e), 23 Feb. 1922, C.P. 3773, both P.R.O., CAB 27/166.

⁸⁹ The education estimates suffered reductions of just £6.5m, rather than the Geddes committee's proposed £18m, despite the prime minister's advocacy of economy in education. The cabinet and its committees also gave a reprieve to the department of overseas trade and it deferred a decision on the future of the percentage grant system of funding local government services. See notes of a conference between the prime minister and representatives of the teaching profession, 2 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 21/228. Cabinet conclusion 3 and 4b, 24 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/29, Cab. 13(22). Cabinet conclusion 5, 21 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/29, Cab. 12(22).

⁹⁰ The £12m came from the cancellation of capital ships consequent on the Washington naval conference and from the policy decision to reduce provision for the navy's oil reserves (the former may also have helped the Admiralty to agree to cuts which did fall within the scope of the Geddes total). Even the £52m was not wholly according to the Geddes committee's plan, since some departments had submitted reductions other than those proposed by the committee. Of the £64m total, probably less than £55m was achievable within the 1922–3 financial year. This compares with the £100m target set for the Geddes committee. Cabinet conclusion 6, 24 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/29, Cab. 13(22); Treasury memorandum, ‘Budget 1922/23’, ‘Assumptions’, table II, n.d. [but probably Feb. 1922], P.R.O., CAB 27/72, F.C. 80; appendix VII to the report of committee appointed to examine part I (defence departments) of the report of the Geddes committee on national expenditure, 4 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 27/164, C.P. 3692.

⁹¹ Cowling, M., The impact of Labour, 1920–1924. The beginning of modern British politics (Cambridge, 1971). pp. 56–7Google Scholar.

⁹² Notes of a conference between the prime minister and representatives of the teaching profession, 2 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 21/228. Memorandum by the minister of health on the national health insurance bill, 14 Mar. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 24/134, C.P. 3838.

⁹³ E.J. Strohmenger to Warren Fisher, 4 Jan. 1922, P.R.O., T 163/11/5. Strohmenger was the accountant-general of the ministry of health.

⁹⁴ Memorandum by Admiralty on report of Geddes committee on navy estimates, 1922–3, Jan. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 27/164, G.R.C. (D.D.) 4. Board of education memorandum and H. A. L. Fisher's covering note, 30 Jan. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 27/165, G.R.C. (C.S.D.) 20.

⁹⁵ Cabinet committee on parts II and III of the interim report of the committee on national expenditure, first report, para. 36, 29 Jan. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 24/132, C.P. 3666.

⁹⁶ Blackett, memorandum, ‘Liquidation of post-war liabilities’, 09 1922Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 171/202. Inland Revenue estimates for 1922–3, 6 Mar. 1922, P.R.O., T 171/205. These two papers reveal how, only a few months before the presentation of the budget, the Treasury was working on estimates which later had to be radically revised: in January 1922, £175m remained the target reduction in supply estimates and the final Inland Revenue estimates were not ready until 6 March (the figure then quoted to the Treasury was £20m below the estimate being used on 2 February).

⁹⁷ Barstow and C.Harris to L. Worthington-Evans and Horne, 17 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., Treasury papers, T 172/1228, part 8. Barstow's memorandum for Horne, 10 Feb. 1922, Treasury papers, T 172/1228, part 8.

⁹⁸ See, e.g. Association of British Chambers of Commerce deputation to Horne, 14 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., T 172/1243. See also The Times, 13 Feb. 1922, pp. 5, 10.

⁹⁹ Mond, , ‘Reduction of taxation’, 30 03 1922Google Scholar, P.R.O., CAB 24/136, C.P. 3947; Montagu to Lloyd George, 9 Dec. 1921, H.L.R.O., Lloyd George papers, F/41/1/38; Churchill to Horne, 30 Mar. 1922, P.R.O., T 171/202. Montagu resigned from the government on 9 Mar. 1922. For a different view of the preparation of the 1922–3 budget, see Short, M. E., ‘The politics of personal taxation: budget-making in Britain, 1917–31’ (unpublished University of Cambridge Ph.D. thesis), 1985, pp. 170–86Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ There is no evidence that the cabinet accepted, or even discussed, the Cunliffe reports' recommendations on the return to the gold standard. For evidence of their concern regarding the social consequences of inflation, see note 25 above.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Lloyd George to E. Hilton Young, 26 Sept. 1921, H.L.R.O. Lloyd George papers, F/28/8/1 and E. S. Montagu to Lloyd George, 9 Dec. 1921, Lloyd George papers, F/41/1/38.

¹⁰² The expectation of a special budget deficit is apparent in Niemeyer's calculations at the foot of his speech notes for Horne regarding the sinking funds for 1922–3 [n.d., but probably before 24 Feb., 1922], P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 4. By the time that pressure for tax cuts was threatening to undermine what had formerly been seen as the ordinary budget, the distinction had disappeared: Niemeyer to Horne, 22 Apr. [1922], P.R.O., T 171/205.

¹⁰³ See Blackett, , ‘Budgeting for a deficit’, 24 03 1922, P.R.O., T 171/202.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Horne summarized the economy measures in cabinet conclusion 6, 24 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/29, Cab. 13(22). On the basis of the figures given there, there would seem to have been reason to expect a balanced budget according to the formulae sketched out prior to the final settlement of the expenditure reductions: Niemeyer's calculations at the foot of his speech notes for Horne regarding the sinking funds for 1922–3 [n.d., but probably before 24 Feb., 1922], and the anonymous note, in Blackett's handwriting and apparently directed at Horne, on p. 3 of the same file [n.d., but before 24 Feb., 1922], both P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 4. In the Niemeyer note, definite debt obligations were put at £35m; in August 1921 it had been estimated they would come to £106.4m.

¹⁰⁵ Anonymous note, in Blackett's handwriting and apparently directed at Horne [n.d. but before 24 Feb., 1922], P.R.O., T 172/1228, part 4. Blackett, , ‘Budgeting for a deficit’, 24 03 1922Google Scholar, P.R.O., T 171/202. Niemeyer to Horne, 22 Apr. [1922], P.R.O., T 171/205. Mond and Churchill were still putting the case for tax cuts at the end of March 1922; see note 99 above.

¹⁰⁶ The principal elements in the tax reductions represented cuts of £32.5m in the estimated yield of income tax and of £4.91m in the estimate for the duties on tea, cocoa, coffee and chicory. The concessions in respect of post office charges were thought to represent the surrender of £5.65m of revenue. This package was very similar to that prepared for Horne by Niemeyer, 22 Apr. [1922], P.R.O., T 171/205.

¹⁰⁷ Niemeyer to Horne, 22 Apr. [1922], P.R.O., T 171/205. Of the accountancy expedients proposed therein, the suggestion to trim the provision for supplementary estimates was not adopted, but the estimates for miscellaneous revenue were inflated, as Niemeyer had proposed. It may be noted that the miscellaneous revenue receipts for the year turned out to be £36,842,000 below their estimates.

¹⁰⁸ ‘Industry and the weight of taxation, a paper prepared by the Inland Revenue in consultation with the board of customs and excise’, Jan. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 24/132, C.P. 3649.

¹⁰⁹ See Mallet, and George, , British budgets, third series, pp. 61–2Google Scholar. The Treasury's circular of May 1921 effectively told spending departments to prepare their estimates on the assumption that the cost of living index would be 100 per cent over its pre-war level. The mean of the monthly averages of the ministry of labour retail prices and cost of living index for the 1922–3 financial year was just less than 80 per cent over the July 1914 figure.

¹¹⁰ See cabinet conclusion 3 and appendix 1, 6 Oct. 1921, P.R.O., CAB 23/27, Cab. 76(21).

¹¹¹ Cabinet committee on parts II and III of the interim report of the committee on national expenditure. Third report. Education expenditure, para. 3, 28 Feb. 1922, P.R.O., CAB 27/165, C.P. 3783. The board of education also showed itself willing to apply a ration in the 1923–4 estimates: see the draft memorandum by the president of the board of education on the board of education estimates, 1923–4, 16 Oct. 1922, P.R.O., board of education papers, ED 24/1287.

¹¹² Horne memorandum, 26 May 1922, P.R.O., CAB 24/136, C.P. 3997. Cabinet conclusion 5, 13 June 1922, P.R.O., CAB 23/30, Cab. 34(22).

¹¹³ Middlemas, K., Politics in industrial society. The experience of the British system since 1911 (London, 1980 edn)Google Scholar, passim, but especially ch. XIII.