² Carter, Jennifer, ‘Cabinet Records for the Reign of William III’, English Historical Review, LXXVIII (1963), 112–13;CrossRefGoogle ScholarDavies, Godfrey, ‘The Control of British Foreign Policy by William III’, in his Essays on the later Stuarts (San Marino, 1958), esp. pp. 98, 105.Google Scholar

³ Plumb, J. H., ‘The Organization of the Cabinet in the Reign of Queen Anne’, T[ransactions of the] R[oyal] H[istorical] S[ociety], 5th ser., vii (1957), 147.Google Scholar

⁴ Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III (ed. James, G. P. R., London, 1841), iii, 194, 202, 218.Google Scholar James Vernon to George Stepney, 14, 24 March, 28 April 1702.

⁵ There are numerous examples of this interchange in the Godolphin-Harley correspondence, some parts of which have been published in H[istorical] M[anuscripts] C[ommission], Portland MSS, iv and Bath MSS, 1. See the writer's ‘Godolphin and Harley: a study of their partnership in polities’, Huntington Library Quarterly, xxx (1967), 241–71.Google Scholar

⁶ E.g. Godolphin to Harley, 13 August [1703], Portland miscellaneous volume, Bath MSS., Longleat, fos. 166–7; Harley to Godolphin, 21 September 1703, Blenheim MSS., B2–33. I am indebted to the duke of Marlborough and the marquess of Bath for permission to inspect and quote from the MSS. in their possession.

⁷ Plumb, , op. cit. 137–9 et seq.Google Scholar

⁸ Panshanger MSS., Hertfordshire Record office. The notes are contained in a folder marked ‘Political Papers, Queen Anne’. I am grateful to Lady Salmond and the Record Office for permission to print these notes.

⁹ Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs (Oxford, 1857), vi, 207.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Robert Harley's minutes are on deposit in the B[ritish] M[useum], Portland loan, 29/9. Sunderland's are in Blenheim MSS., C i–16.

¹¹ P.C. 2/81, Public Record Office.

¹² The letter itself is untraced. The quotation is taken from the description in the Leeds sale catalogue, Sotheby and Co., April 1869, where the letter appeared in a sale of MSS. belonging to the duke of Leeds.

¹³ All Godolphin's letters to Marlborough for 1707 are to be found in Blenheim MSS., A2–23. Marlborough’s are in Blenheim MSS., A1–37. Letters from this correspondence will be quoted without annotation in this paper unless they have been printed. The writer is currently preparing a complete edition of the Marlborough-Godolphin correspondence, 1701–11, for publication.

¹⁴ H.M.C., Marlborough MSS, p. 41b.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Godolphin to Marlborough, 27 August; SirChurchill, Winston S., Marlborough, His Life and Times (London, 1947), ii, 301–6;Google ScholarParnell, Arthur, War of the Succession in Spain (London, 1888), p. 245;Google ScholarMahon, Lord, History of the War of the Succession in Spain (2nd ed.London, 1836), pp. 243–7,Google Scholar appendix, lxi; Braubach, Max, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen (München, 1963–1965), ii, 210–11;CrossRefGoogle ScholarArneth, Alfred, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen (Vienna, 1858), ii, 2–10.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Subsequently the emperor communicated his objections to this plan and it had to be abandoned. Churchill, , Marlborough, ii, 306.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Thomson, Mark A., ‘Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance 1705–1710’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xxxiv (1961), 16–19;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWelch, P. J., ‘Maritime Powers and the Evolution of the War Aims of the Grand Alliance’ (unpublished M.A. thesis, London, 1940).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Count Wratislaw, an imperial minister, even reminded Marlborough in July that the English had ‘asked nothing of them at first, for the warr of Spain, but the person of the Archduke’. Godolphin's irate answer was ‘It is very true, and if wee had had nothing but his person, he had been at this houre upon the throne of Spain.’ Godolphin to Marlborough, 27 July.

¹⁹ As Godolphin feared (exemplified in his letter to the queen, cited above) the struggle of the whigs and tories for control of the ministry manifested itself in a critical and exhaustive investigation into various aspects of the war during the 1707–8 parliament. The failure to provide an adequate military establishment in Spain was a particular object of censure. The session is surveyed in Robert Walcott, R., English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1956), pp. 125–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ Godolphin to Marlborough, i, 2 September.

²¹ Cf. Churchill, , Marlborough, ii, 333 ff.;Google ScholarByng Papers, ed. Tunstall, Brian (Navy Records Society, 1930–1932), ii, 155–260;Google ScholarLediard, Thomas, Naval History of England (London, 1735), ii, 832–3, n. n.Google Scholar

²² The idea of a ‘descent’ goes back to the reign of William III, who first considered it in 1689. Godolphin sent Marlborough a project for a descent in 1703, but the general never showed as much enthusiasm for the project as the treasurer. In December 1707 Marlborough remarked to Heinsius that ‘a descent…would be of the greatest consequence, and we are not without thoughts of it, if the ill success we have hitherto had in those expeditions do not give too great a discouragement’. Ehrmann, John, The Navy in the war of William III (Cambridge, 1953), pp. 258–9, 381–2 et seq.;Google Scholar Marlborough to Godolphin, 20 April/i May 1703, Blenheim MSS., A 1–14; Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, ed. Hoff, B. van't (The Hague, 1951), p. 357.Google Scholar

²³ Taylor, Frank, Wars of Marlborough (Oxford, 1921), ii, 19.Google Scholar

²⁴ ’As for Portugall, 'tis plain by our last Letters, and by all Wee have had from thence since the battell of Almansa, they will never think of acting offensively against Spayn any more.’ Godolphin to Marlborough, 21 July. And 5 September: ‘Wee must send [to Portugal] 2 or 3 regiments of foot more, to encourage them to continue in our Allyance, since Wee can not bee without the port of Lisbon. If Wee had succeeded at Tholoun Wee should not have been forced to make so much Court to them.’

²⁵ Noorden, Carl von, Europäische Geschichte im achzehnten Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1870–1882), ii, 181.Google Scholar

²⁶ Marlborough to Godolphin, 22 July/2 August 1708, Blenheim MSS., A2–39.

²⁷ Palmes' dispatches to Sunderland during 1708 are calendared in H.M.C., Marlborough MSS, pp. 19b–20a.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Bourne, Ruth, Queen Anne's navy in the West Indies (New Haven, 1939).Google Scholar

²⁹ Godolphin to Nottingham, 15 September 1702, B.M. Add. MSS., 29588, fos. 233–5.

³⁰ Cowper’s comment that the Dutch were content with France's proposal appears to be in error unless one considers the barrier offered to them in the Spanish Netherlands. It certainly does not refer to the problem of the Indies.

³¹ Geikie, Roderick and Montgomery, Isabel A., The Dutch Barrier (Cambridge, 1930), 58–74.Google Scholar

³² H.M.C., Bath MSS., i, 155.Google Scholar

³³ Shute was sent to Scotland on the instigation of Lord Somers. He was a dissenter and had a great influence among the presbyterians. He was promised a place as his reward, and Sunderland stood guarantor for it. Calamy, Edmund, Historical Account of my own Life (ed. Rutt, J. T., London, 1829), ii, 44–5;Google ScholarCorrespondence of Jonathan Swift, ed. Ball, F. E. (London, 1910–1914), i, 227–8 n. 1;Google Scholar Sunderland to Duchess of Marlborough, 28 July 1708, Blenheim MSS., E–I5.

³⁴ There is an account by a Jacobite of the strength of the Cameronians and their willingness to participate in an uprising in Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke, ed. Macray, W. D. (Rox-burghe Club, 1870–1871), ii, 308.Google Scholar

³⁵ ‘It seems to bee agreed by all the Queen's servants in Scotland that ther's no relying upon troops of that country in case of an invasion.’ Godolphin to Marlborough, 3 October 1708, Blenheim MSS., A2–38.

³⁶ ‘The same procedure had been followed the previous year as a precaution against a possible uprising while the Union was being debated in the Scottish parliament. Johnston, S. H. F., ‘The Scots Army in the Reign of Queen Anne’, T.R.H.S., 5th ser., iii (1953), 17–19.Google Scholar

³⁷ The reorganization of the Scottish establishment, especially the treasury, is treated in Riley, P. W. J., The English Ministers and Scotland 1707–1727 (London, 1964).Google Scholar For the condition of trade see Smout, T. C., Scottish Trade on the Eve of the Union (Edinburgh, 1963).Google Scholar

³⁸ Shute was not created a commissioner of the customs until November 1708, and then only after repeated protestations by Sunderland. He acted thereafter as an adviser to Sunder land on the dissenters. In the reign of George I he was rewarded with an Irish peerage for his management of the dissenters. Shute to Sunderland, 28 August 1708, Blenheim MSS., Bi–32; [5 March 1710], Private Correspondence of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough (2nd ed.London, 1838), ii, 406–9;Google ScholarRanke, Leopold von, History of England in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1875), v, 378.Google Scholar

³⁹ New elections for the Irish parliament were only required on the death of the sovereign. As a result they were usually called only on such an occasion until the passage of the octennial act in 1768.

⁴⁰ Godolphin to Marlborough, 27 June 1709, in Private Correspondence, II, 322–3;Google Scholar Wharton. to Sunderland, 24 June 1709, Blenheim MSS., C1–23.

⁴¹ On a single slip of paper, it bears no indorsement, title, or date. It has been assigned the press mark CI. 3.23.

⁴² I.e. the convoy for the merchant ships to the West Indies.

⁴³ A reference to the allied strongholds on the east coast of Spain.

⁴⁴ At the opening of parliament, 27 October 1705.‘Nothing can be more evident, than that if the French King continues Master of the Spanish Monarchy, the Balance of Power in Europe is utterly destroyed, and he will be able in a short time to engross the Trade, and the Wealth of the World.’ Parliamentary History, vi, 451a.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ ‘The separate Treaty in Italy and the sending of those troops to Naples was infallibly the cause of disappointing us at Thoulon.’ Godolphin to Marlborough, 1 September.

⁴⁶ See third memorandum.

⁴⁷ Indorsed: ‘Notes of Conference w[i]th L[or]d Tr[easurer] at Winds[or] Sept[ember] i, [i]707. It bears the press mark CI. 3.22. At the head of the notes there is a reference to a vacant living in Norfolk.

⁴⁸ The German and Austrian troops under the duke of Savoy which were subsidized by the allies. They had been sent to the duke so that he could undertake the expedition to reduce Toulon. The first contingent had been sent in 1706 to raise the siege of Turin.

⁴⁹ A suggestion to consider the coast of Spain, as well as that of France, as a possible objective for an amphibious operation or ‘descent’.

⁵⁰ Godolphin thought that troops from Flanders could be joined with others from the home establishment to make up the forces for a ‘descent’ in 1708. The ‘little floating army’ (Godolphin's expression) as it was finally constituted was made up of 7,000 troops under Lieutenant-General Erie joined with a squadron under the command of Admiral Byng. The troops were drawn mostly from Ireland and had been intended for Galway in Portugal.

⁶¹ The purpose of this proposal is obscure. The ministers may have considered an attempt on the Spanish colony at Buenos Aires, the principal city and slave depot in the southern Spanish colonies. The naming of Jennings, the marines, and the stated destination suggest such a mission. But the Adventure was a fifth-rate or frigate rather than a ship of the line and ships of this class were ordinarily assigned to convoy duty or as an auxiliary vessel to a fleet of warships. It was probably intended, therefore, as a convoy for the Portuguese Brazil fleet. A Portuguese colony had existed on the east side of the Rio de la Plata since 1680, opposite the Spanish colony, and the Adventure could have escorted trading ships from that colony as well. In any event all assignments were cancelled on the attempted invasion of the Pretender in February 1708. Afterwards the Adventure was sent with the semi–annual convoy to the Leeward Islands under Captain Robert Clarke. Jennings was ordered to serve under Byng with the fleet operating out of Lisbon.

⁵² Charles XII of Sweden had caused the deposition of Augustus, elector of Saxony, as king of Poland and substituted his own candidate by 1705. By his invasion of Saxony in 1706 he wrung a formal renunciation of the Polish crown from Augustus in the treaty of Altranstadt, September 1706. His presence in Saxony alarmed the allies who feared that Louis XIV might persuade him to revive the old Swedish-French alliance. Charles' protracted stay was due, however, to other reasons. He needed time to prepare his campaign against Tsar Peter and to complete his negotiations with the emperor on behalf of the Silesian protestants. Their status was protected by the treaty of Osnabruck for which the king of Sweden stood guarantor. They had appealed to Charles to intervene in their behalf and the king, ‘a zealous protestant’, was determined to see their rights preserved. The emperor finally conceded to Charles' demands for them in a convention ratified at Altranstadt on 21 August/1 September 1707, the English and Dutch acting as guarantors. (Continued overleaf.) Charles XII and the maritime powers had a defensive alliance of January 1700, but each was precluded from giving effective help to the other by their separate involvement in war. The mediation efforts of the English in the great northern war can be explained by their desire to obtain the stipulated help and, possibly, recruit Charles XII for the Grand Alliance. Even after Marlborough's visit to the headquarters at Altranstadt in April 1707, when it became clear to him that Charles was determined on an invasion of Russia, Godolphin still hoped to hire Swedish troops. The treasurer had already suggested to Marlborough on 27 August that harmony being restored in the empire the king of Sweden might no longer have use for his large army and probably lacked the means to support it. ‘Therefore might it not bee proper some way or other to sound that Court about receiving subsidy’s from the Ally's for a part of them?’ This would give new strength to the allied armies and reduce the threat of Swedish intervention on the French side in the war of the Spanish succession. Such an arrangement was only practicable, however, if it could be concluded without giving offence to Denmark and the tsar. Both were neutrals in the war with France but bitter enemies of Charles, and Russia was contending with Sweden for control of the Baltic. The allies must be sure that an arrangement with Sweden would not drive Denmark and Russia into the arms of France. Charles XII needed all his troops for his expedition to Russia and refused offers of the kind Godolphin had in mind, though until the battle of Poltava, hope remained that Charles, victorious in Russia, might join the Grand Alliance.

⁵³ A replacement was needed for the English envoy to the king of Portugal, Paul Methuen, who was anxious to return home. Sunderland wrote to the earl of Galway, the senior English general in Spain, offering him the combined posts of ambassador and English commander in Portugal. Galway, who found it impossible to co-operate with Archduke Charles and his ministers, had been requesting his recall from Spain for over a year, therefore he was ‘easy to go’. The English ministry had been reluctant to accede to his request until a reliable general was appointed by the Austrians to command all the allied forces in Spain. Their preference was Prince Eugene, but it was most unlikely that the emperor would post off his best general to Spain while he might be needed to ‘bridle the king of Sweden’ (Godolphin to Marlborough, 25 July).

⁵⁴ If the duke of Savoy were to take the offensive again it would ‘oblige France to keep a great army on that side to prevent his impressions, and consequently make them less strong in Spain, upon the Rhyne, and in Flanders’. Godolphin to Marlborough, 1 September.

⁵⁵ Philipp Ludwig, Count van Sinzendorff, ambassador to France at the outbreak of the war, a chancellor of the empire; Johann Wenzel, Count Wratislaw, vice-chancellor of Bohemia; and Karl Theodor Otto, Prince Salm, privy councillor and first minister. For a discussion of their relative influence with the emperor see Noorden, , op. cit. ii, 128–9;Google ScholarBraubach, , Prinz Eugen, ii, 133–9.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ On 1 September Godolphin wrote to Marlborough that he ‘should send immediately to Vienna that either Comte Wratislaus or Comte Zinzendorf may meet you at the end of the Campagne’. Wratislaw came to the Hague in October in answer to his request. For an account of the meeting see Klopp, Onno, Fall des Houses Stuarts (Vienna, 1875–1889), xii, 525–30.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ The peace negotiations are considered from the English viewpoint in Geikie and Montgomery, loc. cit.; from the Dutch in Stork-Penning, J. G., Het Grote Werk (Groningen, 1958), pp. 72–144;Google Scholar from the French in Legrelle, Arsène, La Diplomatie Française et la Succession d' Espagne (Gand, 1888–1892), iv, 382 ff.;Google Scholar and from the Austrian (German) in Noorden, , op. cit. II, 420–36Google Scholar and Klopp, , op. cit. XII, 215–35.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ William Carstares, principal of Edinburgh University, was chiefly responsible for reconciling the presbyterians to the union. His counterpart at the University of Glasgow, John Stirling, also helped to assuage the fears of the ministers of the Kirk. For Shute see notes 33 and 38.

⁵⁹ The fisheries of Scotland were among the richest in Europe, but the Scots had neither money nor equipment to take full advantage of them. It was the Dutch and to a lesser extent the English who exploited them most effectively. It was not until 1727 that parliament finally appropriated money to improve this important natural resource.

⁶⁰ Indorsed: ‘Notes for 2nd confer[ence] w[i]th L[or]d Tr[easurer] ab[ou]t scheem of war for y[ea]r ensuing.’ It bears the press mark CCI.3.24.

⁶¹ By ‘the usual means’ Cowper notes that the army must receive its full quota of troops and supplies. The army of the Rhine had declined so badly that Marlborough informed Godolphin on 12/23 October, ‘I am not surprised to find 50 [the elector of Hanover] so very desirous as he seems to be of being quit of this troublesome employment, for the truth is everything here is in more disorder then with us [in Flanders].’

⁶² Although the English intended that the duke of Savoy should take the offensive in Dauphine next spring, the plan was shelved by Marlborough and Prince Eugene in conferences at the Hague the following April. Churchill, , Marlborough, ii, 300, 339.Google Scholar

⁶³ The Austrian Habsburgs had long sought to recover the duchy of Milan from their Spanish relations. Leopold had extracted a secret agreement from his son Charles to cede the government of Milan to Vienna once he took possession of the Spanish crown. The imperialist occupation of the duchy in 1707 was thus a move to secure this goal. The expedition to seize the kingdom of Naples was a further instance of Habsburg designs to extend their Italian domains, although it was taken in the name of Charles as king of Spain. At the very least it would prove a useful bargaining counter when peace negotiations commenced. But the emperor's schemes caused consternation among the other Italian states and dismayed the maritime powers, for protracted disputes in Italy could only detract from the main effort against France. The duke of Savoy insisted on his investiture with the duchy of Montferrat and certain territories belonging to Milan now that they were in allied hands. They had been promised to him by the emperor in 1703 as his price for joining the Grand Alliance and he refused to take the field in 1708 until he had possession. The maritime powers undertook to persuade the emperor to honour his commitment and also attempted to obtain additional troops for the duke of Savoy from the Austrian garrison in Milan and Naples. Godolphin to Marlborough, 29 October 1706; Noorden, , op. cit. iii, 107–46.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ For the best account of the affair of the bishops see Bennett, G. V. ‘Robert Harley, the Godolphin Ministry, and the bishoprics crisis of 1707’, English Historical Review, LXXXII (1967), 726–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Dr Charles Trimnel did receive the bishopric of Norwich. Dr Richard Willis, dean of Lincoln, does not receive mention as a candidate for one of the other vacancies until 1709 when the whigs advanced him, unsuccessfully, as a candidate for the vacant see of Chichester.

⁶⁵ By the terms of article 8 of the treaty of union a drawback was to be paid on all foreign salt used in the curing of fish which were exported in turn. The drawback was claimed by the Scots as soon as the union became effective though no duty had been paid on the salt already imported into Scotland. A controversy over the payment of this drawback together with attempts by traders to take advantage of the customs union in other ways threatened to break the union before it had fairly commenced. Godolphin steadfastly ignored the complaints of the English traders on the drawbacks issue and they were soon forgotten as he expected. Indeed, it was English and Dutch merchants, working through Scottish firms, who made the greatest profit from the unique situation so that it was not fair to charge the Scots alone, as Cowper notes. For further details see MacKinnon, James, Union of England and Scotland (London, 1896), pp. 255–6;Google ScholarDefoe, Daniel, History of the Union (London, 1786), preface, p. 31.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ The following are apparently notes made during the second conference or at the conclusion of it.

⁶⁷ The Dutch, who bore the heaviest expense for the war in Flanders, would not permit Marlborough to assume any command elsewhere or permit any diminution of his army for the benefit of forces on another front.

⁶⁸ Marlborough’s letter to Godolphin of 1/12 September, printed in part in Coxe, William, Memoirs of John duke of Marlborough (London, 1818–1819), ii, 326–8.Google Scholar The letter must have arrived before the second conference. Godolphin wrote to Marlborough on 9 September acknowledging this letter and a later one of 4/15.

⁶⁹ Franz Adolf von Zinzerling, formerly an agent of the elector Palatine, had accompanied the archduke to Spain in 1704 as his principal secretary. His influence over the young ruler was deplored by the English. In the spring of 1707 he had been sent by Charles to London as his confidential agent. After a series of conferences with the English ministers, in which he presented a number of memorials for his master, he went on to the Continent where he met with the Dutch ministers at the Hague and elector Palatine at Frankfurt. His principal effort was directed towards obtaining more troops for the archduke. The English agreed to subsidize any troops sent from Naples or Savoy once the Toulon expedition was over. They also agreed to send the Palatine troops in the joint pay of the maritime powers in Flanders. Zinzerling obtained the consent of the Dutch at The Hague and Marlborough and the Dutch deputies were empowered to issue the necessary orders. The imperial court proposed using their troops in Naples to reduce Sicily rather than send them to Spain. In spite of his great necessities, Charles supported this scheme through Zinzerling. It was argued that by occupying Sicily the allied armies would obtain another source of provisions and the allied fleet would have the winter port in the Mediterranean which was deemed so essential. Heinsius seconded Zinzerling's proposal but Marlborough did not think there was sufficient time to get orders to the fleet that year. Godolphin considered Sicily too far from the main areas of hostilities to be of much value and thus the plan was abandoned for lack of English support. Godolphin, to Marlborough, , 19, 22 September; Correspondence of Marlborough and Heinsius, pp. 341, 346–8;Google ScholarLandau, Marcus, Geschichte Kaiser Karls VI (Stuttgart, 1889), pp. 448–9;Google ScholarKlopp, , op. cit. xiii, 320;Google ScholarLetters and Dispatches of the duke of Marlborough, ed. SirMurray, George (London, 1845), iii, 573–4.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ The discussions for a Dutch barrier had been opened when the peace offers of the French were considered in 1706. The barrier negotations were complicated by questions of the ultimate sovereignty of Flanders, the guaranteeing of the protestant succession in England, besides the peace offers. Godolphin in his letter to Marlborough on 9 September was adamant that the Dutch were not to have Ostend as one of their fortress towns. He was willing to accede to the rest of their demands if they agreed to an augmentation of their troops for the coming year, leaving Dutch claims for sovereignty to any other part of Flanders to be decided at a peace conference. See Coxe, , Memoirs, ii, 334–5.Google Scholar The standard authority on the barrier is the work by Geikie and Montgomery, previously cited, but it should be compared with Dr Stork-Penning's study for a corrective against Geikie’s harsh treatment of the Dutch.

⁷¹ After the occupation of Flanders by the allies in 1706 the Austrians wanted the inhabitants to take an oath of allegiance to Archduke Charles as king of Spain. The Dutch were afraid this would prejudice their claims to sovereignty over parts of the Spanish Netherlands. Consequently the English agreed with the Dutch to govern the southern Netherlands jointly until the end of the war, when final disposition would be made of them. The problem of the government of the Spanish Netherlands during the war is treated in Haute, Gabryelle van den, Les Relations Anglo-Hollandaises au début du XVIII siècle (Louvain, 1932)Google Scholar and Veenendaal, A. J., Het Engels Nederlands Condominium in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden (Utrecht, 1945).Google Scholar

⁷² The reference to Marlborough is obscure. It probably refers to the general's inability to persuade the Dutch to let the government in the Spanish Netherlands be conducted by the representatives of Archduke Charles. It could even refer to the offer made by Charles to Marlborough of the governorship of the Low Countries which the general had had to refuse owing to the opposition of the Dutch. Alternatively it could refer to his inability to persuade the Dutch to take the offensive that year and the fact that he could show no prospect of any improvement the next.

⁷³ Cowper had replaced Harley as Godolphin's collaborator in the preparation of the queen's speech to parliament.