¹ Richard, Crossman, The diaries oja cabinet minister (3 vols., NewYork, 1975–77)Google Scholar; and Harold, Wilson, The governance of Britain (New York, 1976)Google Scholar. Two fine surveys of the controversy are Jones, G. W., ‘Prime ministers and cabinets’, Political Studies, xx, 2 (1972), 213–22; and John P. Mackintosh, ‘Introduction’CrossRefGoogle Scholar, in Mackintosh, John P., ed., British prime ministers in the twentieth century (2 vols., New York, 1977–8), 1, 1–22Google Scholar. Other major specific pertinent works by those writers include Chester, D. N., ‘Development of the cabinet, 1914–1949’ in Gilbert Campion et al., British government since 1918 (New York, 1950), pp. 31–55Google Scholar; Jones, G. W., ‘Development of the cabinet’, in William, Thornhill, ed., The modernization of British government (Totowa, N.J., 1975), pp. 31–62Google Scholar; Mackintosh, John P., The British cabinet (3rd edn, London, 1977)Google Scholar; Walker, Patrick Gordon, The cabinet (rev. edn, London, 1972)Google Scholar; and Richard, Crossman, The myths of cabinet government (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).Google Scholar

² See Jones, , ‘Development of the cabinet’, p. 31Google Scholar; Charles, H. Wilson, Haldane and the machinery of government (London, 1956), pp. 13–15.Google Scholar

³ Hans, Daalder, Cabinet reform in Britain, 1914–1963 (Stanford, 1963), part III.Google Scholar

⁴ See ibid. pp. 306–7. That point is contested in Mackintosh, British cabinet, p. 501. See below, n. 6.

⁵ This categorization is based primarily on Chester, ‘Development of the cabinet, 1914–1949’, pp. 31–55; and Jones, ‘Development of the cabinet’, pp. 31–62.

⁶ Daalder's study of Cabinet reform is excellent. Chief exponents of the postwar Labour cabinet patterns were Sir John Anderson, Herbert Morrison, and Sir Norman Chester. Both Anderson (1940–3) and Morrison (1945–51) were lord president of the council when it became a significant office for interdepartmental co-ordination, and Chester worked under Anderson during the war and became a friend of Morrison. Anderson chaired the machinery of government committee during the war and made a major public statement on postwar application of wartime governmental practices in a Romanes lecture; The machinery of government (Oxford, 1946)Google Scholar. Soon the standard description of the workings of the Attlee cabinet system became Morrison's Government and parliament: a survey from the inside (2nd edn, London, 1959)Google Scholar, which was first published in 1954 and influenced by Chester; see Bernard, Donoughue and Jones, G.W., Herbert Morrison: portrait of a politician (London, 1973), pp. 528–9, 556Google Scholar; and Daalder, Cabinet reform, pp. 306–7, n. 30. Some of Chester's own extensive and pertinent writings include the following: ‘Development of the cabinet, 1914–1949’, pp. 31–55; ‘Machinery of government and planning’, Worswick, G. D. N. and Ady, P. H., eds., The British economy, 1945–1950 (Oxford, 1952), pp. 336–63Google Scholar; and The organization of British central government, ed. by Chester, D. N., written by F. M. G. Willson (London, 1957).Google Scholar

⁷ Dowse, Robert E., ‘Clement Attlee’, in Mackintosh, British prime ministers, II, 37–72.Google Scholar

⁸ Attlee himself partly contributed to the problem. He misleadingly de-emphasized his earlier interest and views concerning cabinet reform in his sketchy autobiography, As it happened (London, 1954)Google Scholar, written while he was still party leader (p. 152) and in his comments in Francis, Williams, A prime minister remembers: the war and post-war memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee (London, 1961), pp. 80–3Google Scholar, although in both he did relate his role in restructing cabinet committees in May 1940 [As it happened, pp. 115, 154; A prime minister remembers, pp. 40–1). As explained below in this paper, Attlee published some of his thoughts on cabinet reform in The Labour party in perspective (London, 1937), pp. 173–5Google Scholar. Williams, who was Attlee's public relations officer for 1945–7, overstressed the significance of those 1937 comments and failed to relate them to his earlier views. See Attlee, C. R., The Labour party in perspective—and twelve years later, with a foreword by Francis Williams (London, 1949), pp. 21–3Google Scholar; and Francis, Williams, The triple challenge: the future of socialist Britain (London, 1948), pp. 41–8, in which a misleading and simplistic comparison is made of Attlee's 1937 comments and the practices of the Attlee cabinet. Moreover, Williams, incorrectly stated (p. 42) that Attlee's views on such cabinet reform were ‘originally’ drafted in 1937 and implied that those views were the main basis for the cabinet practices used by Attlee in office.Google Scholar

As yet there is no full-length biography of Attlee. Roy, Jenkins, Mr Attlee: an interim biography (London, 1948)Google Scholar, made no reference to Attlee's interest in cabinet reform in the 1930s, though it did emphasize his contribution to cabinet committee development in May 1940 (p. 223). W. Golant discussed Attlee's interest in 1932 in cabinet reform in the second of his two-part article, ‘The early political thought of C. R. Attlee’, Political Quarterly, XL, 3 (1969), 246–55, and XLI, 3 (1970), 309–15.Google Scholar

In studies pertaining to the British government, only brief mention is found of Attlee's early interest in cabinet reform. Morrison's Government and parliament emphasized the workings of the Labour government, not how it originated, and while it perfunctorily mentioned Attlee's consideration of his earlier views from Labour party in perspective (pp. 18, 35), it stressed the development from the war experience of the expanded role of the lord president of the council. The most typical treatment of Attlee's pre-1945 views has been to present without an adequate understanding a statement based on Attlee's Labour party in perspective (sometimes also including Williams's description from Triple challenge). See Mackintosh, , British cabinet, pp. 500–1Google Scholar; Carter, Byrun E., The office of prime minister (Princeton, 1956), p. 341CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Daalder, Cabinet reform, pp. 100–2Google Scholar, though Daalderdid discuss Attlee's interest in a ‘policy cabinet’ in the early 1930s (pp. 282, 294; no pertinent footnotes were listed); Bernard, Waleffe, Some constitutional aspects of recent cabinet development in Great Britain and in Belgium: prime minister's position and cabinet committees (Brussels, 1968), pp. 134–5, where WalefFe did conclude that Attlee's views in 1937 influenced the cabinet system under him.Google Scholar

⁹ The meaning of the word ‘socialism’ has always been very controversial, and this paper will not attempt to examine Attlee's views on it further. The word will be used as Attlee used it.

¹⁰ His views are reflected well throughout his Labour party in perspective. Examining aspects of Attlee's ideas and political activities early in his career are articles by W. Golant: the two-part article, ‘Early political thought of Attlee’, pp. 246–55 and 309–15; and ‘The emergence of C. R. Attlee as leader of the parliamentary Labour party in 1935’, Historical Journal, VIII, 2 (1970), 318–32.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Attlee's comments in support of the Trevelyan resolution that the next Labour government, be it a minority or majority, immediately begin implementing socialism. Labour party, Report of the 32nd annual conference (London, 1932), p. 205Google Scholar. In the early 1930s Attlee was active in the New Fabian Research Bureau (its first chairman), the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, and then the Socialist League, all three of which were then encouraging party planning. After joining the party's national executive committee in 1934, he became a member of its policy committee. Golant stressed that Attlee even in 1933 expected Labour to be practical and flexible in its application of such programmes; ‘Emergence of Attlee as leader’, pp. 321–2.

¹² Examples may be found in both his unpublished and published comments. In two 1932 memoranda on cabinet reform (see below, n. 18), Attlee asserted that the second Labour government's failure was due more to lack of an adequate cabinet system than to the failures of its governmental leaders or to its minority in parliament. Socialism and cabinet reform were linked in his Labour party in perspective, ch. va, and in his comments in Williams, , A prime minister remembers, pp. 86–9Google Scholar; socialism and governmental economic planning were linked with national and local governmental changes in his Socialist League statement, ‘ Local government and the socialist plan’, in Addison, Christopher et al. Problems of a socialist government (London, 1933), pp. 186–91.Google Scholar

¹³ See Daalder, , Cabinet reform, pp. 308–11Google Scholar; and Golant, , ‘Early political thought of Attlee’, pp. 247–8Google Scholar. Some of those general ideas are discussed in Marwick, Arthur, ‘Middle opinion in the thirties: planning, progress and political agreement’, English Historical Review, LXXIX, 311 (1964), 285–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and in Susan, Howson and Donald, Winch, The economic advisory council, 1930–39: a study in economic advice during depression and recovery (Cambridge, 1977).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Attlee, , ‘Local government and the socialist plan’, p. 186.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See 356, House of Commons Debates, 1 Feb. 1940, col. 1417.

¹⁶ ‘The problems of British industry’, memorandum by the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, 29 July 1930, Public Record Office, CP283(30)-CAB24/214; one of Attlee's proposals was the creation of a ministry of industry and a board of national development. Minutes of Easton Lodge discussion, 22 March 1931, Fabian papers, Nuffield College, Oxford, F2/3.

¹⁷ Labour Party Headquarters, policy no. 64, NEC 9, 22 June 1932; and policy committee, 21 July 1932 and 21 June 1933, national executive committee minutes and records; and NJC 9, 29 June 1932; and NJC 10, 5 July 1932, national joint council minutes and records. Labour annual report, 1933, pp. 8—11, 166–8. See n. 49 below.

¹⁸ Draft memorandum on cabinet reconstruction by Attlee, Attlee papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, 2/1; a better typed copy is located in the Addison papers, Bodleian Library, box 130, folder 166. These have no contemporary date given, but they were written in April or May 1932. Cole papers, Nuffield, minutes of group at Easton Lodge, 16–17 April 1932, 5/5, and at House of Commons, 13 May 1932, 5/7, and undated letter from Attlee to Cole, 5/5. Attlee wrote a slightly different memorandum on ‘Cabinet reconstruction’, 12 October 1932, Cole papers, box 5. Some of his points were similar to the March 1931 memorandum on the ‘ Reorgapisation of government departments and ministerial functions’ by Ernest Bevin and Colin Clark. Both the New Fabian Research Bureau and the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda discussed cabinet reform but never produced a public statement on it. Fabian papers J 2/1, 6/1–3, 7, 38/2; and Cole papers, box 5, folders 2 and 7. See George, Lansbury, My England (London, 1934), p. 138. However, with major new parliamentary and party duties in 1932, Attlee could devote only limited time to the issue of cabinet reform.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Reports to the NJC by the Labour party, 25 April 1933 (pp. 30N-14) and 23 May 1933 (pp. 35C-12), NJC minutes. ‘The cabinet and the machinery of government’, policy no. 302(a), June 1935; constitutional committee minutes (28), 19 June 1935; and NEC 12, 26 June 1935, NEC minutes.

²⁰ Labour annual report, 1939, pp. 274–81Google Scholar; Labour party, Labour and defence (London, 1939)Google Scholar. Attlee's contribution in developing this compromise statement is partially reflected in NEC 27, 26 June 1939, NEC minutes, and his total efforts in Attlee, , As it happened, pp. 98–9Google Scholar; and Dalton, Hugh, Memoirs (3 vols., London, 1953–62), 11, 91, 127Google Scholar. Examples of his earlier public comments are in 232 H. C. Debs., 4 Dec. 1929, cols. 2416–20; 308 H. C. Debs., 14 Feb. 1936, cols. 1317–21; and Labour party in perspective, ch. x. See also Daalder, , Cabinet reform, pp. 169–73.Google Scholar

²¹ See 351 H. C. Debs., 26 Sept. 1939, cols. 1246–50; 356 H. C. Debs., 16 Jan. 1940, col. 48; 356 H. C. Debs., 1 Feb. 1940, cols. 1415–22; and 358 H. C. Debs., 19 Mar. 1940, cols. 1852–3.

²² Although consistent contemporary documentation is lacking, Attlee appears to have played the most important role in structuring the cabinet and its committees on domestic matters in May 1940. He (with Greenwood) and Churchill decided on the arrangements, which here will be separated into two facets: (a) a small five-man cabinet with only one minister (foreign minister) who headed a department, and (b) a restructured committee system in which the other four cabinet ministers served as chairmen of the most important committees and thus represented those functions in the cabinet.

(a) Although disliking small policy cabinets, Churchill needed to work with others, especially the Labour party, and so he proposed a small war cabinet, since it had been urged by Attlee and Labour, as well as by others. See Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War (6 vols., London, 1948–53), 11, 13Google Scholar; Williams, , A prime minister remembers, p. 35.Google Scholar

(b) Concerning the major establishment of a committee system, the prime minister formally created the committees, and that alone is reflected in internal correspondence between Churchill and Sir Edward Bridges, the secretary of the cabinet. Letters on 17 May 1940 and 24 May 1940, PREM 4/68/3; see Wilson, S. S.The cabinet office to 1945, Public Record Office handbooks, no. 17 (London, 1975), para. 950Google Scholar. Attlee, however, announced to the home policy committee on 28 May that the war cabinet had considered the issue of committee restructuring; HPC(40) 15-CAB75/5. Since the cabinet minutes record no such discussion, the discussion may have occurred when the cabinet secretarial staff was asked to leave a meeting (on May 26) or through unofficial consultations among war cabinet members. Throughout the war Churchill was primarily concerned with the military and strategic aspects of the war and thus with the defence structure within the government; besides, Churchill's overwhelming concern in May was the critical military situation. The structuring of domestic committees in May did not reflect Churchill's approach, as may be inferred from his comments in 368 H. C. Debs., 22 Jan. 1941, cols. 261–5. The structure did reflect Attlee's approach. Attlee, who seldom exaggerated his importance, later stated that he and Greenwood were the ones who revised the committee structure; Attlee, , As it happened, pp. 114Google Scholar, 154 (he elaborated more in the unpublished draft of that section of his autobiography, Attlee papers, Churchill College, 1/16); Williams, , A prime minister remembers, pp. 40–1Google Scholar; and see Jenkins, , Attlee, p. 223Google Scholar. See Addison, Paul, ‘Winston Churchill’, in Mackintosh, British prime ministers, 11, 6.Google Scholar

²³ WM117(42)2-CAB 65. MG(44)6-CAB 87/73; see also Eden's and Bevin's comments in MG(43)4 and MG(43)10-CAB 87/73. An excellent thorough study of the committee is by Lee, J. M., ‘Reviewing the machinery of government, 1942–1952: an essay on the Anderson committee and its successors’ (privately distributed, 1977).Google Scholar

²⁴ This was a subcommittee of the ‘central committee on reconstruction problems’ which existed from 1941 to 1943. See especially that file on the subcommittee ‘machinery of central government’ and RDR 26/Nov. 1941 at Labour Party Headquarters.

²⁵ Gordon Walker, Cabinet, p. 15. Anderson's memorandum, MG(45)11-CAB 87/65; MG(43)4 and MG(43)10-CAB 87/73; Frazer to Rowan, 21 Feb. 1945, PREM 4/6/9.

²⁶ Attlee indicated this in his memorandum in spring 1932 (Attlee papers, Churchill College, 2/1) and in Labour party in perspective, p. 173.

²⁷ Even a brief glance at those 1929–31 cabinet conclusions will reveal the time wasted on full discussion of relatively minor matters; CAB 23. Although not a member of that cabinet, Attlee was clearly aware of the frustrations expressed by some members; see C P 283(30)-CAB 24/214; and Sidney Webb's note of January 1932 which Attlee probably read; Fabian papers, J 38/2. Churchill's own monologues and the often unwieldy discussions in the war cabinet are well known. A very frustrated Attlee strongly criticized that Churchill practice in an undated draft letter addressed to Churchill late in the war (Attlee papers, Churchill College, 2/2), and Dalton believed Churchill encouraged rambling cabinet discussions to postpone decisions on matters he opposed (London School of Economics and Political Science, Dalton papers, diary, 15 April 1943). Despite the small membership of the war cabinet, attendance at its meetings was quite large, for also present were relevant departmental ministers as well as ‘constant attenders’ such as Beaverbrook (even when not a member), Bracken and Cherwell. Non-members often participated fully in discussions and even in the making of cabinet decisions. Attlee strenuously criticized that in the draft letter discussed above, and Dalton commented that he participated with about sixteen others in an actual vote in the war cabinet (Dalton diary, 8 April 1943).

²⁸ Attlee's October 1932 memorandum, Cole papers, box 5. In retirement, he said a maximum of sixteen; Francis Williams, A prime minister remembers, p. 82.

²⁹ Having been unable for the past five years to persuade the Labour party to endorse the concept of a small cabinet, as party leader in 1937 in his treatment of cabinet reform in Labour party in perspective, Attlee refrained from specifically advocating a reduction in the cabinet size but did propose an ill-defined inner cabinet (p. 174). In his 1944 interview with the machinery of government committee, Attlee stated that if the postwar cabinet were as large as generally expected (probably twenty-five to thirty), a formal inner cabinet would be needed especially to consider the formulation of broad governmental planning. Such an inner cabinet was criticized by members of that committee; MG(44)6-CAB 87/73. Gordon Walker, in Cabinet, pp. 44–5, 52–3, and 97–101, presented a succinct analysis of’inner cabinets’ and ‘partial cabinets’, and it was a ‘partial cabinet’ under Attlee which made the decision to develop the atomic bomb. As have most prime ministers, Attlee consulted more closely with a few members of the cabinet, and that small group has been loosely dubbed his ‘inner cabinet’; in fact, there is no consensus as to who was included in the group. See, for instance, Gordon Walker, Cabinet, p. 44; Dalton, Memoirs, 11, 75, 268–70; Emanuel, Shinwell, I've lived through it all (London, 1973), p. 193Google Scholar; and Williams, , Triple challenge, pp. 41–8.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Jones, , ‘Development of the cabinet’, pp. 34–5Google Scholar; and Chester, ‘Development of the cabinet, 1914–1949’, p. 36. In early 1945, Anderson projected for the machinery of government committee that because of the increased number of departments and thus ministers, the postwar cabinet most likely would number almost thirty members, and only under the most optimistic reorganization of ministerial functions over the next several years would there be any expectation of a cabinet limited to some twenty members; MG(45)5 and MG(45)11-CAB 87/75- Churchill's caretaker cabinet of May-July 1945, containing sixteen members, was merely an interim, hybrid cabinet for provisional government between war and peace and for a two-month period of campaigning and awaiting the electron returns; it set no pattern for peacetime practices.

³¹ In the Attlee papers, Bodleian Library, box 2, is a folder on plans for the new government in 1945. It contains some information provided to Attlee and several lists he made as he was deciding on ministerial selections, committee arrangements, and the composition of the cabinet. As he had long advocated (in his 1932 memorandum, Attlee papers, Churchill College, 2/1), in 1945 Attlee seriously considered keeping the lord chancellor out of the cabinet but then consented to include him. Since, for the duration of the war, Attlee would assume the position of minister of defence, he originally planned to have none of the service ministers in the cabinet. He then decided to include only the admiralty but then added war and air as well. The others on his secondary list which he included in the cabinet were agriculture, education, fuel, and health (for health, Wilkinson's name was listed but then marked out and replaced by Bevan's).

³² Attlee, As it happened, pp. 150–6, and his more frank comments in the original draft written in 1949–50, Attlee papers, Churchill College, 1/16; Attlee to Morrison, 15 Sept. 1947, Morrison papers held by Sir Norman Chester, of which latter a portion of the comments on cabinet membership balance is quoted in Donoughue and Jones, Morrison, p. 421; Williams, A prime minister remembers, pp. 80–6.

³³ MG(45)5 and MG(45)11-CAB 87/75. Postwar cabinets have ranged in size from sixteen to twenty-three members.

³⁴ Attlee specifically instructed committee chairmen to conduct their meetings that way, to stress not general discussion but the deciding of issues; undated [Attlee] statement c. 8 Oct. 1947 and CP(47)288-PREM 8/432, and in a note prepared by the cabinet secretariat and carefully scrutinized by Attlee, CP(46)357-PREM 8/434. During the war he had become very upset when Churchill and others who had not read memoranda or had little knowledge on the subjects talked extensively in the cabinet about such issues; see Attlee's undated draft letter to Churchill, Attlee papers, Churchill College, 2/2. Attlee removed from his cabinet two members for talking too much; Attlee's unpublished portion of his autobiography, pp. 15–16, 1 /16, Attlee papers, Churchill College. See general comments in Mackintosh, , British cabinet, p. 502.Google Scholar

³⁵ Proposals for functional groupings of departments were most associated with the 1918 (Haldane) machinery of government report; see Daalder, , Cabinet reform, pp. 266–79. The influence of Haldane's reforms at the war office on Attlee is reflected in Attlee's 1932 memorandum, Churchill College, 2/1.Google Scholar

³⁶ See above n. 22. For the evolution during the war, see , Chester, ‘Development of the cabinet, 1914–1949’, pp. 45–8Google Scholar; and Hancock, W. K. and Gowing, M. M., British war economy (London, 1949), pp. 215–23.Google Scholar

³⁷ Although Attlee in 1945 did not significantly alter the wartime committee structure which had been continued by the Churchill caretaker government (Lee, ‘Reviewing the machinery of government’, pp. 69–70), the size and composition of committees were determined by Attlee against the advice of his senior officials; Bridges to Attlee, 23 Nov. 1945, PREM 8/434; this is also reflected in the folder on the new government, Attlee papers, Bodleian Library, box

³⁸ Suggested in his 1932 memorandum (Cole papers, box 5), these themes were stressed by Attlee as prime minister (Brook to Attlee, 23 Sept. 1946, PREM 8/434; undated [Attlee] statement c. 8 Oct. 1947 and CP(47) 288-PREM 8/432). He criticized the misuse of committees to avoid or postpone decisions; CP 283(30)-CAB 24/214.

³⁹ 493 H. C. Debs., 6 Nov. 1951, cols. 66–7; Attlee's draft autobiography, section on Labour government personnel and machinery, p. 13, 1 /16, Attlee papers, Churchill College, written while he was prime minister.

⁴⁰ Attlee had difficulty chairing the food policy committee early in the war, where his job was basically to produce decisions or compromises between the ministers of food and of agriculture, R. Hudson and Lord Woolton. Woolton had no respect for Attlee (nor actually for Labourites or politicians in general); Bodleian Library, Woolton papers, diary, 1 Nov. 1940, 27 Nov. 1940, 24 Dec. 1940. Hudson believed he could gain Churchill's support and thus refused to accept committee decisions as binding, even that of the lord president's committee under Anderson. Dalton diary, 28 May 1943; Morrison papers, Morrison's draft autobiography section on war cabinet, pp. 4–7. See also Bridges to Churchill, 9 Oct. 1940, 10 March 1941, and 21 Feb. 1942-PREM 4/6/9. I disagree with Paul Addison's conclusion that Attlee's ability as chairman was at fault, (The road to 1945: British politics and the Second World War (London, 1977), pp. 279–80)Google Scholar. Attlee commented on Greenwood and Dalton in his draft autobiographical section, pp. 1, 2, 13, 1/16, Attlee papers, Churchill College. Knowing Greenwood must be given a high position because of his standing within the party, Attlee made him a supervising minister because he believed Greenwood could not handle a departmental job. However, Attlee persuaded Morrison, who wanted a departmental job, to accept office as lord president (in Attlee's draft autobiographical section, p. 1; see also Dalton, , Memoirs, 11, 474).Google Scholar

⁴¹ MG(44)6-CAB 87/73; Attlee's draft autobiography, section on Labour government personnel and machinery, p. 13, 1/16, Attlee papers, Churchill College.

⁴² Four sources while Attlee was prime minister demonstrate this. Responding to periodical complaints of too much committee work, Attlee instructed the cabinet secretariat to draft a memorandum on improving committee practices and specifically to include a statement on the value of committees; Brook to Attlee, 23 Sept. 1946, PREM 8/434. Attlee's praise of the committee system developed by the Labour government was recorded by Dalton, who disliked committees; Dalton diary, 27 Jan. 1950. Attlee devoted several pages to the committee system when he wrote as prime minister the draft section of his autobiography on Labour government personnel and machinery, pp. 10–12, 1/16, Attlee papers, Churchill College. A brief note by Attlee in 1948 on his 1932 cabinet reform memorandum indicated his satisfaction with his earlier general ideas on functional groupings through committee and on other cabinet matters; Attlee papers, Churchill College, 2/1.

⁴³ Attlee's 1932 memoranda, Attlee papers, Churchill College, 2/1, and Cole papers, box 5; Fabian papers, minutes of an Easton Lodge discussion, 22 March 1931, F 2/3; and Labour party in perspective, p. 175. He also indicated his interest in improving the staff structure when he dealt with other issues of governmental machinery. Attlee's memoranda, 29 July 1930, CP 283(30)-CAB 24/214; and 31 Dec. 1942, MG(42)6-CAB 87/74.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ MG(42)6-CAB 87/74. In tnat 1042 memorandum to the machinery of government committee, he recommended placing under the prime minister a separate permanent under-secretary to handle establishments and thus remove from the treasury control over the civil service, although he did not attempt that as prime minister (Attlee to Morrison, 9 Nov. 1945, T 222/75).

⁴⁵ Attlee papers, Churchill College, Attlee's 1932 memorandum, 2/1, and his draft letter to Churchill criticizing Churchill's chairmanship of the war cabinet, 2/2; Cole papers, box 5; The Times, 15 June 1957; and Williams, , A prime minister remembers, pp. 80–4, 90.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Attlee's 1932 memoranda, Attlee papers, Churchill College, 2/1, and Cole papers, box 5.

⁴⁷ Mackintosh, , British cabinet, pp. 428–55.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ A thorough discussion of some of those actions is found in Donoughue, and Jones, , Morrison, pp. 339–47, 447–9, 501–3Google Scholar; but see also Walker, Gordon, Cabinet, p. 149Google Scholar, who related that Attlee had the cabinet decide following the 1950 election whether a defeat in the Commons would lead to the government's resignation or to the dissolution of parliament.

⁴⁹ See above, n. 17 on the Labour party committee to examine leaders’ powers. Attlee's specific views are difficult to document, but it appears that he did not disagree with any parts of the 1932 draft report and that he favoured requiring the prime minister to consult with the cabinet before dissolving parliament or forcing the resignation of a cabinet member: Cole papers, minutes of a meeting on 13 May 1932, 5/7. The proposal for the PLP to select the party leader following a general election was part of the 1932 draft when Henderson was still party leader, so R. T. McKenzie was mistaken in his view that it was designed to remove Lansbury as leader; McKenzie's conclusion is based on the 1933 conference report. British political parties: the distribution of power within the Conservative and Labour parties (2nd edn, London, 1963), P. 321.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Attlee's decisiveness in forming a government in 1945 may be compared to his experience in 1940 in joining a coalition, which in itself caused complications. In 1940, however, Attlee had only recently reasserted himself as leader following his illness and Greenwood's effective temporary leadership the previous autumn, and there was still felt the party's mistrust of leaders and its formal restrictions on them as developed early in the 1930s. During the coalition, Attlee became more sure of himself, party headquarters became respectful of him, and he exerted more power over Labour M.P.s who participated in government because he generally controlled their selection, advancement, or dismissal - a party leader in a coalition handles these aspects of a prime minister's power.