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Hegel and Arguments for Natural Kind Essentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 March 2018

Franz Knappik
Franz Knappik*
Affiliation:
University of Bergen, Norwayfranz.knappik@uib.no
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Abstract

Natural Kind Essentialism (NKE) is the view that the objects of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology fall into natural kinds, and that such kinds have essences—sets of properties possession of which is necessary and sufficient for kind-membership. Since Putnam and Kripke brought NKE back onto the philosophical agenda, it has found many advocates. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the question of how this view can be positively motivated. After illustrating the current need for an argument for NKE through critical discussions of Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Ellis’s arguments for NKE, this article aims to show that Hegel offers the resources for an original argument for the view. This argument works by deriving metaphysical implications from an account of what it means to understand an explanandum.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 42 , Issue 3 , December 2021 , pp. 368 - 394
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Copyright
© The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2018

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