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Hegel, A Non-Metaphysician? A Polemic Review of H T Engelhardt and Terry Pinkard (eds), Hegel Reconsidered

  • Frederick C Beiser (a1)


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1 See Kroner, Richard, Von Kant bis Hegel (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921); Taylor, Charles, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1975), and Findlay, J N, Hegel: A Re-Examination (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 1958).

2 Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp 78–9.

3 On Hartmann's writings on Hegel, see especially Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View’, in MacIntyre, Alasdair, ed Hegel: A Collection of Essays (Garden City, N J: Doubleday, 1971), pp 101–24; Die ontologische Option’, in Die Ontologische Option (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976), pp 131 ; and On Taking the Transcendental Turn’, in Studies in Foundational Philosophy (Amsterdam: Rodopoi, 1988), 192219 .

4 Hegel Reconsidered: Beyond Metaphysics and the Authoritarian State, edited by Engelhardt, H T and Pinkard, Terry (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp x + 258, Hb £73.

5 Hegel Reconsidered, ‘Introduction’, p 1.

6 See Royce's Lectures on Modern Idealism. This is still one of the best introductions to the subject.

7 See Stern, Robert, ‘British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?’, European Journal of Philosophy, 2 (1994), pp 293321 .

8 See the introduction by Engelhardt, p 1, and the article by Bole, Thomas J, ‘The Cogency of the Logic's Argumentation’, p 103 .

9 Hegel, , Sämtliche Werke, ed Glockner, H (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927) I, 49 .

10 Ibid, IV, 24.

11 §84; Werke VIII, 201 .

12 In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel said that Spinoza's substance is the starting point of philosophy. See Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke XIX, 376 .

13 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B, 395.

14 Unfortunately, it is necessary to rely on Hartmann's students since Hartmann's own explanation of this problem is very obscure. See ‘Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View’, in Studies in Foundational Philosophy, pp 281-2: “His [Hegel's] position on God and religion…is one that ‘places’ God and the religious congregation; it offers as their categorial account that unity of spirit which, as absolute, is not subject to plural…instantiation and thus transcends the real. The ontologist need not claim that God exists apart from the congregation forming a unity with them. The category would be sufficiently instanced by ‘religion’, a concrete universal leading up to, and surpassed by, philosophy”. The reader will want to know how God can be God if he does not exist apart from the congregation believing in his existence. This would make God into a regulative faith a la Kant and Fichte, which Hegel explicitly eschewed time and again in his Jena writings. Hartmann warns us, however, that his solution is “subtle”, so perhaps there are untold depths here which his students understand.

15 Cf pp 22-3, 105, 107, 114.

16 See Hartmann, , ‘Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View’, pp 285–6. Cf. Bungay's and Khushf's comments on Hegel's philosophy of history, in Hegel Reconsidered, pp 36-7, 133.

17 See ‘Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View’, pp 285-6.

18 Ibid, pp 281, 286.

Hegel, A Non-Metaphysician? A Polemic Review of H T Engelhardt and Terry Pinkard (eds), Hegel Reconsidered

  • Frederick C Beiser (a1)


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