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Fundamentality without Metaphysical Monism: Response to Critics of Reason in the World

  • James Kreines (a1)


This article is a reply to comments by Franz Knappik and Robert Stern on my book, Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal. Issues addressed include the systematicity of Hegel’s philosophy, the prioritizing of metaphysical over epistemological questions in his arguments, Hegel’s response to Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason, and my conclusion that there are senses in which Hegel’s own position is both ambitiously metaphysical and also monist, but that the monism present there is epistemological, and the ambitious metaphysics is non-monist.



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Knappik, F. (2016), ‘And Yet He is a Monist: Comments on James Kreines’, Reason in the World, Hegel Bulletin. doi:
Kreines, J. (2015), Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and its Philosophical Appeal. Oxford: OUP.
Pippin, R. (1989), Hegel’s Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pippin, R. (2014), ‘The Significance of Self-Consciousness in Idealist Theories of Logic’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CXIV, part 2: 145–66.
Stern, R. (2009), Hegelian Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stern, R. (2016), ‘Kreines on the Problem of Metaphysics in Kant and Hegel’, Hegel Bulletin. doi:


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