THE TEST OF A THEORY IS IN ITS APPLICATION. THE DIFFICULTY IS that in political theory, application is rarely a sufficient test. This is especially true of the kind of theory in which I am interested. It is abstract, highly generalized, and for this reason, tends to be illustrated by means of applications which neither prove nor disprove. A lack of clear guides for disproof is one of the more serious deficiencies of highly general theory. If that is so, what is the point of doing it? One answer is that if such theory can lead in an a priori way to logically inferred predicaments which repeat themselves in many forms in the real world, this should allow us to anticipate events. This, in turn, allows us to compare these common predicaments in diverse settings to discover the necessary and separate it from the contingent. This can represent a big step forward if it results in new types of data and different forms of linkages between variables. The ‘tests’ then are more insightful generalizations rather than ‘validations’. If such generalizations can be made subject to quantitative proof, so much the better. In any case, the route to validation is bound to be indirect. Propositions locked into a logical structure of thought will remain for long cumbersome and wearisome. Despite this, as long as not too many people waste their time with it, a general theory approach seems worth the effort.

MOST STUDENTS OF SAINT-SIMON HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY CONCERNED with his relations with the different 19th-century ideological movements; hence few have approached his work from the point of view of the incompatibility between his attitudes and those of the Jacobins. Yet such an approach re-situates his intellectual biography in its proper context – and indeed protects his work from the anachronistic interpretations which have plagued it in the history of ideas. Moreover it illuminates even more rewardingly his present relevance. His clash with Jacobinism might be taken as the startingpoint of the opposition between Jacobinism and industrialism, between the modern industrial societies and the ‘politics of power’ of the old centralized nation states. From this then derives his theory of the difference between the politics of power and the politics of abilities. The importance of this theory, especially for political science, has not been sufficiently stressed in the classic studies on Saint-Simon's work. Mostly sociological, these studies are divided amongst themselves on whether his work must be seen as socialism, Utopian or otherwise, or as elitism, technocratic or otherwise. And yet it is this theory which provides the logical link between these two seemingly contradictory interpretations.

THE PROCESS WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE Jewish community in Palestine was a process of the formation of a non-sovereign political centre which progressively increased its authority through the exercise of control over the mobilization and distribution of resources. The bearer of this process was a power conscious elite – oriented on the formation of an institutionalized national centre. The mobilization of resources outside of the system enabled this centre to allocate more resources than it had to extract from its periphery. Thus, a dynamic equilibrium was created in which progressively increasing demands were balanced by an increased mobilization of resources. The operation of the system was dependent upon a division of functions between an evolving coalitionary national centre and various particularistic sub-centres. The lack of sovereignty paradoxically contributed to the development of ‘rules of the game’ which made the resolution of conflicts possible within a quasi-parliamentary framework.

THE OPUS DEI WAS FOUNDED AS A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION IN 1928 by Father Escrivá de Balaguer in Spain. Its existence is public but its membership has always been secret. During the period of the Civil War it went briefly underground, to re-emerge in Nationalist Spain. In 1947 it was recognized as the first Secular Institute by the Pope and the centre of the organization moved to Rome. It has been most successful in Spain where it profited from the extremely favourable conditions created by Franco's government for Catholic groups. Its aim was the re-conversion of all social classes and especially intellectual and bourgeois groups to a universal Catholic spirituality. It worked towards this aim through the positioning of its members in places of power within society: preferably in university chairs, banking, business or bureaucratic positions. Each member had the duty to lead an upright Catholic life and at the same time to convert the maximum possible number of his fellows to active Catholicism (or to membership of the Opus Dei), through the example of his life. This implied not only proficiency and diligence at work, but also the traditional spiritual values such as humility, chastity, obedience, etc. Escrivá de Balaguer argued that the further Opus members could rise up the social ladder the more influence they would have on society in general and on their fellows.

THE WARY WRITER COVERS HIMSELF IN ADVANCE AS BEST HE CAN against the most obvious lines of criticism. Let me say, therefore, that this article is not intended to break, or even blunt, a lance in the methodology debate of comparative politics, nor is it put forward as a contribution in its own right to the science of comparative politics. The intention is much simpler. I want to argue that there are practical forms of comparison which the political scientist can use when in a less than scientific mood and that useful ends can be served by such practical activity. What is offered here, then, is a series of personal reflections and no more. To prevent the appearance of scholarly intent, scholarly reference to the literature has been avoided. A plausible argument to forestall the critic, but probably sensible, is that the case for an unsophisticated approach to comparative politics should be presented in an unsophisticated way. Put another way, it may be that to be practical one should sometimes be naive.