1 For a vivid picture of continuity in difference see Brian Crowe's article in this issue, pp. 174–86. For light on the policy process inside the EC see Mazey, Sonia P. and Richardson, Jeremy J., ‘British Pressure Groups: the Challenge of Brussels’, Parliamentary Affairs, 45, 1992, pp. 92–107.Google Scholar

2 The importance of these reasons has long been stressed by Alasdair Maclntyre (e.g. ‘Ideology, Social science and Revolution’, Comparative Politics, 5, 1973, pp. 321 – 42). They are of especial significance for the understanding of revolutions (particularly dramatic instances of the disruption of routine politics: John Dunn, Rethinking Modem Political Theory, Cambridge, 1985, chapter 4).

3 Hont, Istvan, ‘Free Trade and the Economic Limits to National Politics: Neo‐machiavellian Political Economy Reconsidered’, in Dunn, J. (ed.), The Economic Limits to Modem Politics, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 41 ‐ 120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 In social analysis the term network was First extensively employed by social anthropologists studying African urbanization. It is significant that non‐official and relatively critical participants in the new processes of policy‐making should place such emphasis on the instrumental value and personal sustenance of networking. For the use of the concept of social network see J. Clyde Mitchell (ed.), Social Networks in Urban Situations, Manchester 1969.

5 The urgency of this question comes out very sharply in Roger Williams's article in this issue, pp. 152 – 69. To see technical innovation as a single integrated causal field identifies an explicandum; but it does not dictate the choice of an explanatory model of the field itself. To balance fatalist against voluntarist elements within such a model is to bring into focus the inherent political plasticity of that process, the degree to which it really is open to modification by human comprehension and political choice. To balance demand‐led (contractors' or patrons') contributions to it against supply‐led contributions (the pursuit of scientific comprehension from unrestrainable intellectual curiosity or the personal quest for fame and fortune) is to identify the principal source of its impetus. It is remarkable how unclear we still remain over how to discharge either of these tasks. It is also extremely dangerous that we remain so unclear.

6 MacNeill, Jim, Winsemius, Pieter and Yakushiji, Taizo, Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World's Economy and the Earth's Ecology, Oxford, 1991.Google Scholar

7 Dunn, John, Rethinking Modem Political Theory, chapter 7; Dunn, J., Interpreting Political Responsibility, chapter 12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Dunn, John, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, 2nd ed, Cambridge, 1993,Google Scholar Conclusion.

9 See, for example, Winham, Gilbert R., International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation, Princeton, 1986;Google Scholar Haus, Leah H., Globalizing the GATT, Washington, DC 1992;Google Scholar Nicholas, Bayne, ‘In the Balance: the Urguay Round of International Trade Negotiations’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 26, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 302–15Google Scholar; Crockett, A. D., ‘The International Monetary Fund in the 1990s’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 267–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Cf. Dunn, John, Storial delle dottrine politiche, Milan, 1992.Google Scholar

11 For the centrality of prudence see Dunn, Interpreting Political Responsibility, chapter 12.

12 See, for example, Dodwell, David, ‘Trade War: What it Means to You’, Financial Times, 7 11 1992, p. 10.Google Scholar

13 See, for example, Gilpin, Robert, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, 1987;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Haus, Globalizing the GATT..

14 See Dunn, Introduction and Hont, op. cit., in Dunn (ed.), Economic Limits to Modem Politics, pp. 1 ‐ 13, 41 ‐ 120.

15 In the case of states the continuity can readily be exaggerated, it is often the state as ideological fiction (Quentin Skinner, ‘The State’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 90–131; Dunn, Interpreting Political Responsibility, Introduction and chapter 8) which has had a clearly continuous historical identity rather than the state as a reasonably determinate causal entity.

16 Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony, Princeton, 1984;Google Scholar Gilpin, , Political Economy of International Relations; Lawrence, Robert Z. and Schultze, Charles L. (eds), An American Trade Strategy: Options for the 1990s, Washington, DC, 1990.Google Scholar

17 Gowa, Joanne, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods, Ithaca, New York, 1983.Google Scholar

18 MacNeill, Winsemius and Yakushiji, Beyond Interdependence; Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds), The International Politics of the Environment, Oxford, 1992.

19 John Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, op. cit., Conclusion.

20 The scale of this task is very well brought out in Roger Williams's article in this issue, op. cit.

21 Locke, , Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett, P., Cambridge, 1960 Google Scholar, II, para 6; John Dunn, Locke, Oxford, 1984.

22 Compare Hampton, Jean, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge, 1986;Google Scholar Baumgold, Deborah, Hobbes's Political Theory, Cambridge, 1988.Google Scholar

23 This case has been pressed extremely effectively in recent years by Amartya Sen in response to his extensive work on famine and crises of subsistence.

24 See David Held's article in this issue, pp. 261 ‐85 and compare John Dunn, ‘Political Obligation’, in Held, David (ed.), Political Thmty Today, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 23–47.Google Scholar

25 Skinner, The State..

26 For the importance of this see Dunn, John, ‘Property, Justice and Common Good after Socialism’, in Hall, J. A. and Jarvie, I. C. (eds), The Transition to Modernity, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 281–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar