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The Impact of the European Communities on National Policy‐Making*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Extract

THE NOW FAIRLY EXTENSIVE LITERATURE ON THE EUROPEAN Communities, much of which sets out to analyse ‘the European decision-making process’, has tended to concentrate on how this process looks from the perspective of the Community itself and of its institutions. National governments and actors in the six political systems have been discussed primarily in so far as they are participants in the Community system. However, if we are to reach an understanding of the impact of the Communities on national processes, then some attention must be given to how the Communities are viewed from the national capitals, to the extent to which Community business impinges on the governmental systems in the member states and to the importance given to European matters among the competing issues which vie for prominence in national politics. Any analysis of the politics of European integration which looks from the Communities outwards makes the assumption that European issues are the only ones that count; but if those same issues are examined from a national perspective, we need to ask whether they represent simply one bundle of issues among many, or whether they have come to add a new dimension to the full range of governmental business and political debate. In other words, has the advent of the European Communities changed the political configuration of the six national systems, and, if so, marginally or fundamentally?

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1971

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References

1 Studies of the European Communities since their establishment, both European and American, have been overwhelmingly Community oriented. Some studies have, however, been made of the relationship between the Community and national levels, notably in Institutions Communautaires et Institutions Nationales dans le Développement des Communautés, Institut d'études Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1967, and La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes (based on a conference held in Lyons in 1966 and published, under the direction of Pierre Gerbert and Daniel Pépy, by the Université Libre de Bruxelles in 1969).

Two German projects on the relationship between national governments (particularly the German government) and the EEC are now reported to be under way, one under the auspices of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, the other directed by Professor Karl Kaiser at Saarbrücken.

2 The phrase is used here as defined by Charles, E Lindblom, in The Policy‐Making Process, Prentice Hall, 1968 Google Scholar. For discussions of the distinction between the foreign policy and domestic policy processes see James, N. Rosenau. ‘Foreign Policy as an Issue Area’, in Rosenau (editor), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, Free Press, New York, 1967 Google Scholar, and Wallace, William, Foreign Policy and the Political Process, Macmillan, London, 11 1971 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 The concept of ‘issue area’ is taken originally from Dahl, Robert A, Who Governs?, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1961 Google Scholar.

4 Lindberg, Leon N and Scheingold, Stuart A, Europe's Would‐be Polity, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970, p. 79 Google Scholar.

5 Detailed accounts of the national coordinating machineries are to be found in La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes in the series of articles on ‘la preparation nationale de la décision communautaire’ (pp. 165–255) by Theodor Holtz (Germany), Marie‐Paule Mahieu (Belgium), Pierre Gerbet (France), Marco M. Olivetti (Italy), Guy de Muyser (Luxembourg) and Robert de Bruin (Netherlands). My information on Germany is supplemented by talks with various officials during a recent visit to Bonn.

6 This phenomenon is widespread. See Mahieu in La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes, p. 191 on Belgium, de Bruin in ibid., p. 239 on the Netherlands, Holtz In ibid., p. 177 on Germany.

7 I am indebted for this example and the point which it illustrates to a discussion with a member of the German Foreign Office. For the decision itself see European Community, London, February 1970, p. 4. The same official estimated that 95% of Community issues were settled at the level of ‘technical experts’.

8 Noel, E. on ‘Le Comité des Représentants Permanents’ in Institutions Communautaires et Institutions Nationales, p. 12 Google Scholar, and Gerbet, P. in La Décision dans Les Communautés Européennes, p. 199 Google Scholar.

9 Ami, Giancarlo, ‘Le rǒle respectif des institutions communautaires et nationales dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique agricole commune’, in Institutions Communautaires et Institutions Nationales, pp. 115f Google Scholar., Hélène Delorme, ‘L'adoption du prix unique des céreales’, and J. R. Verges, ‘L’élaboration du système de financement de la politique agricole commune’, both in La Décision dans les Communautés Ewopéennes. Note too the extent to which evidence from the agricultural sector is relied upon in more general works.

10 See for example Lindberg and Scheingold, op. cit., pp. 45f; but note table 3.5 on p. 75 which shows the consistent discrepancy between the percentages showing support for a united Europe and those listing European problems as among the most important.

11 Coombes, D., Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community, London, PEP, Allen and Unwin, 1970Google Scholar; Noel, E. and étienne, H, ‘Quelques aspects des rapports et de la collaboration entre le Conseil et la Commission’, in La Décision dans les Communatés Européennes, pp. 3355 Google Scholar. Detailed information on more recent developments is drawn from papers presented in Manchester by H. étienne on 9 February 1971, and by H. Nord on 10 November 1970.

12 One such model was described by Sidjanski, D., in ‘The European Pressure Groups’, Government and Opposition, Vol. 2, No. 3, 04‐July 1967, pp. 400f CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 This trend was corroborated by H. Etienne and H. Nord in the papers cited above. More detail on the control of national governments over the participation of national experts can be found in the articles by P. Gerbet (p. 204) and M. Olivetti (p. 212) in La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes.

14 See the arguments made by Miriam Camps, in European Unification in the Sixties, Oxford University Press, 1967, Ch. VI, pp. 196f Google Scholar., and by Lindberg and Scheingold, op. cit., pp. 287f.

15 Lindberg, , The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford University Press, California, 1963, p. 286 Google Scholar.

16 In 1967 there were 37 Council meetings covering 68 days, distributed as 48 days for Ministers of Agriculture, 28 for Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 16 for Ministers of Economic Affairs, with a smaller number for other ministers. These figures include the presence of more than one minister per country at some meetings.

17 This point was made in interviews with Dutch and German civil servants.

18 Several former Permanent Representatives have moved on to high positions either in the Communities or in their national administrations. E. Noel, in his article in Institutions Communautaires et Institutions Nationales, p. 12, cites amongst others the examples of M. de carbonnel (France) and M. Cattani (Italy), who each became secretary‐general in their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

19 This argument appears regularly in discussions of the Communities. See, for example, Lindberg and Scheingold, op. cit., p. 41, on the ‘permissive consensus’.

20 See the articles by Holtz (p. 177), Gerbet (p. 203), de Bruin (p. 254). in La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes; also John Newhouse, Collision in Brussels, Norton, New York, 1967, p. 96.

21 See Mahieu (p. 185) and Gerbet (p. 198) in La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes.

22 See Mahieu, ibid., p. 185.

23 Chatham House/PEP, London, 1971. The author elaborates in this study on many of the points summarized below.

24 Sidjanski, op. cit., and in his paper delivered at Manchester on 27 October 1970.

25 The information on the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund is drawn from a recent visit to their headquarters. For a description of the general attitudes of national interest groups see Werner Feld, ‘National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC’, in Political Science Quarterly, September 1966.

26 For a detailed account of the German government's changing views see Geoffrey Denton, Planning in the EEC, Chatham House/PEP, London, 1967.

27 Directives have not been much studied, but see the series in Cabiers du Droit Européen, covering in 1969 the Netherlands and in 1970 France.

28 Gerbet in La Décision dans les Communautés Européennes, p. 199, and J. E. S. Hayward in a paper delivered at Manchester on z March 1971.

29 Feld, Werner, ‘Political Aspects of Transnational Collaboration in the Common Market’, in International Organisation, Spring 1970, pp. 209f Google Scholar.

30 This point was developed by S. Henig in a paper given at blanchester on 24 November 1970.

31 See Stephenson, Peter, ‘Problems and Political Implications for the UK of introducing the EEC Value Added Tax’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, 06 1970, pp. 305f Google Scholar.; Community Topic no. 29, Tax Harmonisation in the European Community, European Communities Information Office, London, 1968; Thompson, Dennis, The Proposal for a European Company, Chatham House/PEP, London, 1969 Google Scholar.

32 The points which follow derive from the Werner Report (published as a supplement to Bulletin II of the European Communities, 1970), and from a paper given at Manchester by Peter Oppenheimer on 9 March 1971.

33 I am indebted to the paper given by Roger Williams at Manchester on 8 December 1970 for the arguments presented here.