1 Unpublished report of the Directorate‐General for Research and Documentation, European Parliament, ‘On the Loss of Power by the Parliaments of the Member States’. The report examined specific areas of transfer or reduction of powers as the result of Community policies to July 1973. See The Guardian, 1 May 1974.

2 Barr Carson, George Jr. ‘The Spinning Wheel, the Stone Axe, and Sovereignty’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 03 1974, pp. 76–8.Google Scholar

3 Ibid., pp. 73–6 reviews significant judgements by the European Court of Justice in tracing the line between member‐state sovereignty and Community sovereignty.

4 The Conservative government was blunt on this point. See ‘The United Kingdom and the European Communities’, July 1971, Cmnd. 4715, p. 8, para. 29.

5 Vedel Report (‘Report of the Working Party Examining the Problem of the Enlargement of the Powers of the European Parliament’), Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 4/72, March 1972, pp. 25–8.

6 Hansard (House of Commons), 24 January 1974, cols. 1925–6 (Shore) and 1954 (Marten).

7 The formal position of the national parliaments is discussed by Michael Niblock, The EEC: National Parliaments in Community Decision‐making, Chatham House/PEP, April 1971, pp. 20–4.

8 House of Commons, Second Report from the Select Committee on European Community Secondary Legislation, October 1973, Vol. I, pp. xxxvii—viii: the paragraph by Michael Foot which the Committee did not agree to.

9 Few people at Westminster had a clear idea about the quantity of legislative proposals which became law during that time. Lord Crowther—Hunt mentioned some 252 regulations approved by the Council of Ministers up to mid‐November 1973, ‘none of these has been scrutinised, still less approved by Parliament’. (Hansard, House of Lords, 6 December 1973, col. 790.) This is not to suggest that Parliament was oblivious to the influx of draft instruments, as full use was made of oral and written questions, but the lack of procedures for systematic scrutiny was serious.

10 Hansard (House of Commons) 18 April 1973, cols. 579–80 (Johnston) and 606–7 (Foster).

11 Hansard (House of Commons), 15 February 1972, cols. 274–8.

12 Para. 37; also paras. 38–40.

13 Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, Thames & Hudson, 1973, p. 384.

14 Hansard (House of Commons), 24 January 1974, cols. 1985–6.

15 The definition and sources of secondary legislation are given in paras. 3–4 of the First Report of the Foster Committee, and in paras. 5–6 of the Second Report. The Select Committees were not concerned with the direct legislative functions of the Commission because there is no proposal stage. The Foster Committee pointed out that these powers could be of importance in some instances, e.g. state aids, and therefore merited study by Parliament. Second Report, paras. 7–12.

16 ‘Westminster and European Communities Legislation’, The Table, 1974.

17 This was taken up later by the Labour government; the first statement was on 26 June 1974.

18 The government motion agreed that the statements would be made, but with the qualification that only ‘whenever the substance of meetings of the Council of Ministers has warranted it.…’ Col. 619. Sir John Foster’s reaction was that the recommendation was ‘very much watered down’. Col. 608.

19 Pp. xiii, xvii.

20 Paras. 5,6–9.

21 Paras. 140, 113–14.

22 Paras. 118, 129.

23 See below, p. 57

24 Cols. 790–1.

25 Cols. 764–6, 837–8.

26 Hansard (House of Lords), 5 February 1974, cols. 714–15. See col. 716 for Lord Maybray‐King’s views of the outcome.

27 Paras. 36, 37, 41, 53. Para. 51 recognized a difference of degree, but considered that ‘it should be possible to exert at least as much control over this legislation as is currently available in respect of delegated legislation in the United Kingdom’.

28 Paras. 37, 39, and 40.

29 Para. 64. The tasks of the scrutiny committee are set out in para. 69, which reads in part: ‘to give the House the fullest information as to why it considered the particular proposal of importance’.

30 See the Memorandum of the Lord President of the Council, Evidence, pp. 272–4. The suggestion was criticized in other memoranda, see p. 294 (Kirk and Bessborough), pp. 184–5 (de Freitas), and pp. 251–3 (Chapman).

31 Para. 73, and Hansard (House of Commons) 24 January 1974, col. 1929.

32 Paras. 74–7.

33 Para. 72. Anti‐market members were particularly interested in this point, see Hansard, 24 January 1974, cols. 1924 (Shore), 1955 (Marten), and 1967–8 (Powell).

34 On 3 July the Commons held a take note debate on a ‘Draft Council decision on the adjustment to the guidelines for economic policy for 1974’ as well as on four other economic and regional policy documents. The Draft Council decision was published on 15 May, and was to be considered in the Council of Ministers on 6 June. But the government wanted to have the views of Parliament, and a reserve was placed on it. The Paymaster‐General provided the committees with an explanatory memorandum on 23 May, which enabled them to consider it at meetings in June. See First Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the European Communities, 3 June 1974. The problems arising from this debate are discussed later in this paper.

35 Paras. 43, 45, 53. See also Hansard, 24January 1974, col. 1980 (Percival).

36 Paras. 45–6, 56, 90–2.

37 Hansard, 24 January 1974, col. 2025.

38 Ibid., cols. 1907, 1914–15 (Prior); see also col. 1952 (Marten).

39 Hansard, 18 March 1974, cols. 796–7.

40 Hansard, 2 May 1974, cols. 523–5.

41 Hansard, 11 June 1974, cols. 1425–9.

42 House of Commons, Second Special Report from the European Secondary Legislation & C. Committee, 20 August 1974, para. 2.

43 Second Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the European Communities, 12 June 1974, para. 3. The sub‐committees, and their membership, are listed in para. 4.

44 See Second Special Report, August 1974, re backlog (para. 23), and the constraints of time (paras. 18, 30, 31).

45 Ibid., paras. 3, 21, 31.

46 Ibid., para. 33. For the government’s statements, see Hansard, 11 June 1974, cols. 1425–9 and 1547.

47 See the comments of the chairman, John Davies, reported in The Times, 23 August 1974.

48 See Second Special Report, August 1974, para. 32; also paras, 11 and 16.

49 First Special Report, 16 July 1974, p. 5; Second Special Report, p. 44; The Times, 31 July 1974.

50 See the reports in The Guardian, ‘Holes in the safety net’, 5 July, and ‘Benn regrets his Market action’, 17 July 1974. The Foster Committee made no reference to the form of debate (see Second Report, para. 80), except for a general recommendation in para. 53 (b) that Parliament must be able to reach and express a conclusion on the proposals. In the January debate on the Second Report, a member of the Foster Committee, Eric Deakins, saw little point in take‐note resolutions and considered it essential that debates under para. 72 be on substantive motions. Hansard, col. 2003.

51 The amendments by Douglas Jay and his allies declined to approve the documents both because of disagreement on the specific policies and because of anxiety about the removal of powers from the British Parliament.

52 Second Special Report, para. 28.

53 Ibid., paras. 8–9; The Guardian, 23 August 1974.

54 Ibid., paras. 19, 18.

55 Ibid., Annex 3. See also John Mackintosh’s comments in the debate on the Second Foster Report, Hansard, 24 January 1974, col. 1947.

56 See the Memorandum by the Second Clerk Assistant, House of Commons, Foster Report Evidence, pp. 23–4. In the January debate the prevailing view of the importance of the Chamber, as distinct from committee work, was expressed by Sir Robin Turton, col. 1943. Mackintosh put the case for a series of committees, col. 1949; see also his paper, ‘The British Parliament’, European Parliament Symposium, pp. 11, 16–20.

57 For detailed accounts of the West German system, see the Memorandum and evidence of Herr Werner Blischke, Ministerialrat, Bundestag, Maybray‐King Second Report, pp. 101–16. See also ibid., pp. 212–27, for the meeting in Bonn with West German representatives.

58 The Bundestag finance committee has on more than one occasion travelled to Brussels to meet with members of the Commission, ibid., pp. 113, 224, paras. 416, 79; and Second Report of Foster Committee, Evidence, p. 103, paras. 417–19. An example of a Bundestag committee report on a Commission proposal is included in the evidence of the Maybray—King Committee, pp. 114–16.

59 The Luns interpretation, see Maybray‐King Second Report, p. 108, paras. 371–3.

60 Ibid., pp. 215–17, paras. 18–23, 26–31, 37; Blischke Memo., ibid., p. 104.

61 Sasse, p. 48; Foster Second Report, Evidence, pp. 98, 107; Uwe Thaysen, ‘The German Bundestag—the Guardian of Democratic Stability?’ European Parliament Symposium, p. 18.

62 Sasse, p. 48, and Foster Second Report, Evidence, p. 106 note.

63 Maybray‐King Second Report, p. 105.

64 Pp. 202–3; see also P. 209. paras. 876–7.

65 P. 140. This was reiterated in the January debate, cols. 1954–5: ‘pinioned by the vote’.

66 Pp. xxxvii–ix.

67 Hansard, 18 April 1973, col. 606.

68 This point seems to be ignored in the Shonfield proposals, see below, p. 68.

69 In the January debate on the Second Report, Mackintosh criticized the proposed procedure of scrutiny for not allowing the House ‘to play the role of a pressure group demanding action’. Hansard, col. 1948.

70 See Donald Chapman, ‘Parliament and European Union’, European Parliament Symposium on European Integration and the Future of Parliaments in Europe, May 1974; also Stanley Henig, ‘New Institutions for European Integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, December 1973, for stimulating discussions of possible future developments.

71 For further discussion of this view, including opinions in the European‐Parliament itself in the mid‐1960s, see Niblock, The EEC: National Parliaments in Community Decision‐making, pp. 73–5.

72 See the statement of Mr van den Eede, Clerk of Committees in the European Parliament, Foster Committee Evidence, p. 269, para. 1113.

73 Maybray‐King Committee Evidence, p. 138, para. 504. See also the Vedel Report, p. 68 for an expression of similar concerns.

74 Maybray‐King Committee Evidence, pp. 133, 136, paras. 484, 498; and p. 138, para. 504.

75 Foster Committee Evidence, p. 171, para. 714; Maybray‐King Evidence, p. 144, para. 529.

76 Foster Committee Evidence, pp. 161–4; Maybray‐King Evidence, p. 121, para. 428.

77 See the Second Report of the Maybray‐King Committee, pp. xxi‐xxii. Bundestag committees have conferred with members of the Commission, see ibid, pp. 113, 224.

78 See Shonfield, Andrew, ‘Dutch oil ban a test of faith for EEC’, The Times, 12 08 1974;Google Scholar Grierson, Ronald, ‘Wishful thinking in Brussels is the barrier to real progress in the European Community’, The Times, 13 08 1974.Google Scholar See also Vedel Report, pp. 25–31.

79 Marten, Neil, ‘The Common Market ‐ No Middle Way’, Common Market Safeguard Campaign pamphlet, 05 1974, p. 8.Google Scholar

80 The suggestions of the Vedel Report would, if adopted, give verisimilitude to the phrase ‘European Parliament’. The suggestions include: power of suspensive veto, power of co‐decision, strengthening of consultative procedures, participation in discussions concerned with economic policies, strengthening of budgetary powers, strengthening of parliamentary techniques of controls, participation in the appointment of the President of the Commission, and suggestions regarding direct elections and relations with national parliaments. All of these are within the terms of the Treaty, and would not require fundamental redistribution of powers among the institutions of the Community. But the name of Parliament implies something more than a consultative role. To exercise the legitimating functions expected of it, the European Parliament needs authoritative powers of influence and control, if not of independent action.

81 See Richard Rose, ‘Electing a European Parliament’, European Parliament Symposium, p. 2.

82 Sir Geoffrey de Freitas Memorandum, Foster Committee Evidence, p. 186; Lord Crowther‐Hunt, Hansard, House of Lords, 6 December 1973, col. 791; Erik Damgaard, ‘Functions of Parliament in the Danish Political System’, European Parliament Symposium, pp. 13–14; Erik Rasmussen, ‘The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and the Principle of Responsible Cabinet Government’, European Parliament Symposium, p. 9.

83 Foster Committee Evidence, p. 154, para. 635. See also the meeting of the Maybray‐King Committee with the members of the two Houses of the Dutch Parliament at The Hague, pp. 207–9.

84 Foster Committee Evidence, p. 249, para. 1054; see also his speech in the European Parliament, July 3, 1973, pp. 27–8.

85 Foster Committee Evidence, p. 136, para. 570; pp. 131–5.

86 Op. cit., pp. 185–6.

87 Maybray‐King Committee Evidence, p. 20, para. 10, pt. 4.

88 Foster Committee Evidence, p. 262, para. 1101. See also Vedel Report, pp. 68–9.

89 Summary Report, European Parliament Symposium, p. 90.

90 Ibid., p. 65; Maybray‐King Committee Evidence, p. 66, and see also Hansard, House of Lords, 6 December 1973, cols. 793–4 (E. Bessborough) and col. 806 (E. Dudley).

91 Hansard, cols. 1934–6, 1970.

92 Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination, Penguin, 1973, pp. 81–2.

93 See Rasmussen, pp. 13, 17; Damgaard, pp. 13–14.