^{page 298 note 1} See Rokkan, S. and Valen, H.: ‘Regional contrasts in Norwegian Polities’ in Allardt, E. and Littunen, T.: Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, Helsinki, 1964 Google Scholar.

^{page 298 note 2} The four non-socialist parties are generally referred to as the ‘borgerlige’ (literally civic) parties, a term naturally implying something more positive in common than lack of socialism; the widespread use of this term in Norway (it has thereby come to have an untranslatable political connotation) is a symptom of the tendency to view these four parties as a single bloc.

^{page 299 note 3} The two oldest Norwegian parties are called Hayre and Venstre (literally Right and Left); their conventional rendering into English as Conservative and Liberal is followed here. The Agrarian Party has renamed itself the Senterpartiet (formerly Bondepartiet) but, because its appeal has continued to be almost exclusively to farmers, it seems more meaningful to render it Agrarian in English.

^{page 300 note 4} Parties may combine to present joint lists under the Norwegian electoral system. The 37,513 votes cast for such joint lists in 1965 have been reallocated among the constituent parties in TabIe I according to the distribution of their votes at the 1963 municipal elections in the fylker concerned.

^{page 301 note 5} The Norwegian system uses 1·4, 3, 5, 7 and so on as the divisors instead of 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on in the d'Hondt system.

^{page 303 note 6} The rise of a similar party in Denmark has also cut into the vote of the non-socialist but pacifist inclined Radikale Venstre party there.

^{page 306 note 7} Valen, H. and Katz, D., Political Parties in Norway, Oslo, 1964, p. 41 Google Scholar.

^{page 306 note 8} The process may have started later in Norway because of the use of a constituency system based on an urban/rural distinction until 1953: only from 1953 have the Agrarians had an incentive to build up a vote in towns. They have not yet contested the two urban fylker at parliamentary elections but they did present a list, unsuccessfully, at the last Oslo city council elections.

^{page 307 note 9} Rokken, S., Valen, H. and Amundsen, A., ‘Stortingsvalget 1965’ in Samtiden, 10, 1965, p. 470 Google Scholar.

^{page 307 note 10} See Rokkan and Valen, op. cit., footnote 1, for a thorough analysis of the factors behind this regional cleavage.

^{page 307 note 11} Insofar as there was any polarization towards the two largest parties at this election it seems to have been among the former abstainers (Rokkan, Valen and Amundsen, op. cit., footnote 9, pp. 478–9) and a return to a more normal participation rate would presumably increase the relative strength of the smaller parties.

^{page 307 note 12} See Valen and Katz, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 37. They conclude ‘… proportional representation will undoubtedly delay the movement towards a two-party system in Norway’ (p. 41).

^{page 309 note 1} Reference to the two parties means CDU and SPD; to the three parties CDU, SPD and FDP.

^{page 309 note 2} Both main opinion polls (Emnid and Allensbach) maintained the neck-and-neck position until polling day. Then Allensbach announced a dramatic movement to the CDU. This provoked a post-election controversy about the polls' reliability.

^{page 310 note 3} Coalition with the CDU (unless the CDU won an absolute majority) but without the participation in the cabinet of Strauss (the leader of the CSU), on whose resignation over the Spiegel affair the FDP had insisted. However, younger elements in the party would have preferred an SPD-FDP link.

^{page 310 note 4} The calculation being that a DFU voter would otherwise vote SPD. A movement of votes from the SPD to the DFU would merely increase the CDU and FDP share of the seats in the Bundestag unless the DFU was able to surmount the 5% hurdle and if the CDU was so enabled to attain an absolute majority it could bring Strauss back into the cabinet regardless of the FDP. In fact the DFU vote dropped 0·6%. Had it risen by only slightly more than this (assuming movement only between the DFU and the SPD), the CDU would have had an absolute majority.

^{page 311 note 5} See Peter Pulzer's view of German tri-partism in terms of ‘horror majoritatis’, Political Quarterly, 1962, p. 426 Google ScholarPubMed. A very similar position in Austria is reflected in a permanent black-red coalition - see Kitzingers, Uwe interpretation in Political Studies, 1961, pp. 119ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 311 note 6} Thus in the eleven Länder elections since 1961, a party had won an absolute majority in five (4 SPD, 1 CSU). In every case this party preferred to form a coalition government with a smaller party (3 SPD–FDP, 1 SPD–GDP, 1 CSU–BP). See Kaltefleiter, W., ‘Wähler und Parteien in den Landtags Wahlen 1961–65’ in Zeitschrift für Politik, 1965, for detailsGoogle Scholar.

^{page 311 note 7} All the analysis is carried out on the basis of the 1965 constituencies which, although they were of no significance as electoral units for the second (list) votes, have the advantage for analytical purposes of being equal in size. The Statistische Bundesamt recalculated the votes cast in 1957 and 1961 in terms of these constituency boundaries.

^{page 313 note 8} See below, p. 321.

^{page 318 note 9} The weight of the Ruhrgebiet in the national result is very strong. Had the relative strengths there of the two parties remained as in 1961, the CDU might have gained an absolute majority in the Bundestag; one-third of the total SPD advance came in this area and perhaps about two-thirds to three-quarters of what the SPD gained from the CDU.

^{page 318 note 10} See Alford, R., Party and Society, pp. 11ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 318 note 11} 1949 is left out of the CDU average because the distribution of the party's support changed so dramatically between then and 1953.

^{page 319 note 12} Kitzinger, Uwe in German Electoral Politics, Oxford, 1960, pp. 295–301 Google Scholar, provides some very suggestive diagrams in support of this interpretation.

^{page 319 note 13} The CVP in Saarland derives from the period before its integration with West Germany (Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 49–53). It polled 5·2% in the Land elections in 1965; 1·4% in the federal elections a few weeks later – another example of the effect of the 5% hurdle.

^{page 320 note 14} The NPD gained about ½ over the DRP vote where the GDP had had less than 1%; about 1% with a former GDP vote of 1–2% and about 1½ if the GDP vote had been larger. It did not, however, do any better where the GDP had had substantial support in North Germany.

^{page 321 note 15} In Bremen and Niedersachsen the GDP split up into a GDP and DP list: the votes cast for each are combined for these calculations.

^{page 321 note 16} The KDP (Communists) and BHE both started by surmounting the 5% clause and the fact that their vote subsequently passed below the limit is clearly due to other reasons. The BP and DP both had sufficient regional concentration to have secured representation through the three direct mandate alternative had they held their initial support. Thus but for other factors seven parties could have maintained Bundestag representation.

^{page 321 note 17} The German electoral system, so frequently misleadingly called a mixed system, is (but for the 5% clause) wholly proportional in that seats are distributed at the national level in proportion to votes cast. It is mixed only in appearance. There is some evidence that the reality of its operation is now better understood by the German electorate. Hitherto there had been more invalid second votes (which affect party representation) than invalid first votes (which do not) (3·8% against 3·0% in 1957; 4·0% against 2·6% in 1961). The 1965 reversal of these proportions (2·4% against 2·9%) suggests a better evaluation of the relative value of the two votes which the ballot paper provides.

^{page 321 note 18} For a survey of the literature on the discussion of proportional or constituency representation in Germany see Zeitschrift für Politik, 1962, pp. 379–84Google Scholar.

^{page 322 note 19} This figure includes a considerable number of Liberal votes cast for Conservative and Labour candidates because no Liberal candidate stood in 263 of the 630 constituencies. Allowing for this would reduce the two-party vote in Britain to about 82%. (1964 general election figures.)

^{page 321 note 20} This reversal of a popular majority is a normal feature of the system in most countries which use it but it is much more often the left-wing party which suffers, e.g. in Great Britain in 1951, in Canada in 1957, in New Zealand in 1954, in Australia in 1954.

^{page 323 note 1} Radical and Conservative are used here to describe both the respective parties and the smaller groups vaguely attached to each. The Rassemblement Démocratique currently acts as an umbrella organization for the Radicals and their allies. One small Conservative group had already adopted Pierre Marcilhacy as a candidate

^{page 324 note 2} Many other factors were at work – including the personality of Deferre, the existence of a strong group in the SFIO which never accepted the full implications of the Deferre project and the growth of links between the MRP and the Conservatives (who had combined in a common grouping in the Assemblée Nationale under the title Centre Democratique).

^{page 325 note 3} Despite the fact that the final IFOP poll gave him only 43% and the main rival, the Sofres poll, 49%.

^{page 325 note 4} There was much dispute as to whether the term ‘Republican’ implied acceptance or rejection of the offer of support from Tixier-Vignancourt: Mitterand presumably left the point ambiguous deliberately. The Gaullists therefore accused him of representing an unnatural combination of extreme-left and extreme-right at the second ballot but since the literature they were handing out included an attack on Mitterand purporting to come from Communists and an appeal for de Gaulle purporting to come from Tixier-Vignancourt voters, the charge need not be taken seriously.

^{page 326 note 5} For the map of right/left traditional voting, départements were classified into three roughly equal groups for four separate periods (1870–1914; 1918–39; the Fourth and the Fifth Republics) – of left, intermediate and right. For the first, the ten parliamentary divisions mapped by Goguel, (Géographie des Elections Françaises, pp. 17–41)Google Scholar were used; for the remainder election results.

^{page 328 note 6} IFOP figures are taken from an IFOP press handout entitled ‘Evolution des Intentions de Vote depuis le 22 Octobre 1965’ published on 4 December 1965. The figures for the Lccanuet support are the average of the last two polls, expressed as percentages of definite responses, since these combined give an overall figure (17%) closer to his actual vote (15·9%) than the final poll (20%) and allow greater confidence in the breakdown.

^{page 329 note 7} And Charente where, in his home département, Marcilhacy took more of the Conservative vote.

^{page 330 note 8} Between the two ballots the relative votes of de Gaulle and Mitterand changed little: de Gaulle increased his share of the vote absolutely more than Mitterand wherever he had a large first ballot lead and Mitterand everywhere else. The only significant exceptions were Nièvre and Basse-Pyrenées – where voting was clearly affected by their being the home départements, respectively, of Mitterand and Tixier-Vignancourt.

^{page 330 note 9} See footnote 5.

^{page 330 note 10} IFOP gave de Gaulle 14% of the vote of those who supported a left party (Communist, SFIO and Radical) but this is the area where survey data (because of respondents' giving the answer they feel to be expected rather than the truth) is least reliable. This may be reflected in the universal underestimation by the polls of Mitterand's first ballot vote.

^{page 330 note 11} This analysis compares the performance of de Gaulle in 1965 with the 1962 OUI relatively; had the map shown the distribution of the absolute fall in the Gaullist share of the vote, it would have reflected the known distribution of Gaullist strength since the higher the OUI% in 1962, the higher was the fall to the de Gaulle% in 1965.

^{page 330 note 12} See Goguel, F. (ed.), Le Référendum d'Octobre et les Élections de Novembre 1962, Paris, 1965, pp. 45, 50 Google Scholar.

^{page 333 note 13} For recent difficulties of the MRP in the face of the presidential elections, see Moreau, J., ‘Le Choix du MRP’, Revue Française de Science Politique, 1965, pp. 67–86 Google Scholar.

^{page 333 note 14} Thus the Radical Party Congress and the Radical vote in the South-west showed more hostility to the Fifth Republic constitution at its adoption than was shown in the SFIO.

^{page 333 note 15} See Pickles, Dorothy The Fifth French Republic, London, 1965, pp. 8–12 Google Scholar.

^{page 334 note 16} The Cartel des Nons united the four non-Communist and non-Gaullist parties on the issue which caused the election and was originally conceived by some as meaning a single democratic NON candidate in each constituency. In the event it broke down completely at the second ballot and MRP voters even fled en masse to a UNR candidate rather than support a Communist-backed Radical or Socialist NON.

^{page 335 note 17} This conflicts with the very high rate of indecision found by the polls. But it may only prove that many of the ‘Don't Knows’ were really ‘Won't Says’.

^{page 336 note 1} Compare with the article by Hirsch, Ernst E., ‘Rationale Legitimierung eines Staatsstreiches als soziologische Problem, erläutert am Beispiel des türkischen Umsturzes von 27 Mai 1960’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 17. Jhrg.1965, Heft 3, pp. 632–46Google Scholar.

^{page 336 note 2} Number of voters: 12,731,037. Number of votes cast: 10,249,423. Participation rate at the referendum: 80·5%; ‘Yes’ votes in proportion to the potential voters, number 49·5%; 12 provinces out of 67 carried a majority of ‘No’ votes: Ayden, Bolu, Bursa, Corum, Denizli, Diyarbakir, Izmir, Kütahya, Manisa, Sakarya, Sa and Tonguldak. For further information see: Aygen, Cemal, ‘Memleketimizdeki Secimler ve Neticeler’, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. XVII, 03 1962, No. 1, p. 215 Google Scholar.

^{page 337 note 3} Tashau, Frank and Ülman, A. Haluk, ‘Dilemmas of Turkish Polities’, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1962, Faculty of Political Science, University of Ankara, p. 12 Google Scholar.

^{page 337 note 4} Rustow, Dankwart D., ‘The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic’, World Politics, Vol. XI, 07 1959, No. 4, p. 513 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page 337 note 5} Weiker, Walter F., The Turkish Revolution 1960–61, The Brookings Institution, Washington, p. 117 Google Scholar.

^{page 338 note 6} Weiker, Walter F., ‘The Aydemir Case and Turkey's Political Dilemma’, Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XIV, No. 9, 11 1963, p. 269 Google Scholar.

^{page 339 note 7} Abadan, Nermin, Studie über die Lage der türkischen Arbeiter in der Bundesrepublik, Hrgb. Staatliche Plannungsorganisation, Ankara, 1964 Google Scholar – Summary of the original Turkish study.

^{page 339 note 8} Frey, Frederick W., ‘Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey’, in Communications and Political Development, ed. by Pye, L., Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 324 Google Scholar.

^{page 340 note 9} Günes, Turan, ‘Tendances intellectuelles et sociales des élites turques d'aujourd'hui’, Synthèses, 205–6, 1963, p. 324 Google Scholar.

^{page 341 note 10} The white horse in Turkish is ‘Kir at’; the popular pronunciation of Democrat is still ‘Demirkirat’, meaning ‘iron white horse’.

^{page 342 note 11} Dankwart A. Rustow, op. tit., p. 184.

^{page 342 note 12} The ‘rationality-activist’ political culture means a political culture where citizens act rationally on the basis of a combination of general principles and calculated self-interest. See Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, 1963, Chaps. 1 and 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.