¹ Grundgesetz für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], 23 May 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.).Google Scholar

² Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 9 Feb. 2010 (Hartz IV), 125 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 175 (__), 1 BvL 1/09 of 9 Feb. 2010, para. 134, 2010 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100209_1bvl000109.html (last visited 7 Nov. 2011).Google Scholar

³ Gosselin v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁴ R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁵ Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁶ Gosselin, 4 S.C.R 429, para. 112 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁷ John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993).Google Scholar

⁸ Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).Google Scholar

⁹ Regulation Respecting Social Aid, R.R.Q., 1981, c. A-16, r. 1, §. 29, amended by 113 O.G. II 4118 (Can.).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, Women's Poverty Is an Equality Violation, in Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the Charter 323 (Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson eds. 2006).Google Scholar

¹¹ Id. Google Scholar

¹² Id.; see also Gosselin v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, para. 130 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dubé, J. dissenting).Google Scholar

¹³ See Gosselin, 4 S.C.R. 429 (Can.) (explaining that the Court split 5-4 on the decision with L'Heureux-Dubé, Bastarache, Arbour, & LeBel, JJ., dissenting).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Law v. Canada (Minister of Emp't & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 7 (Can.).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Gosselin, 4 S.C.R. 429, paras. 42–44 (Can.).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷ Law, 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 105 (Can.).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Gosselin, 4 S.C.R. 429, para. 55 (Can.).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id. Google Scholar

²⁰ Id. Google Scholar

²¹ Id. at para. 8.Google Scholar

²² See id. at para. 64 (noting that “the availability of other resources, like family assistance” likely mitigated any adverse impacts of the law).Google Scholar

²³ Id. at para. 44.Google Scholar

²⁴ Id. Google Scholar

²⁵ Id. at para. 27.Google Scholar

²⁶ Id. at paras. 43–44.Google Scholar

²⁷ Id. Google Scholar

²⁸ Id. Google Scholar

²⁹ Id.; see, e.g., id. at para. 65.Google Scholar

³⁰ Id. at para. 47.Google Scholar

³¹ Id. at paras. 131–32.Google Scholar

³² Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).Google Scholar

³³ Gosselin, 4 S.C.R. 429, para. 75 (Can.).Google Scholar

³⁴ Id. (L'Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring in the dissent).Google Scholar

³⁵ Id. at para. 75.Google Scholar

³⁶ Id. Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. at para. 80 (McLachlin, C.J.) (quoting Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 1003 (Can.)).Google Scholar

³⁸ Id. Google Scholar

³⁹ Id. at para. 81:Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Id. at para. 83.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Id. (Arbour, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁴² See id. (“The right to a minimum level of social assistance … can be readily accommodated under the s. 7 rights to ‘life, liberty and security of the person’ without the need to constitutionalize ‘property’ rights or interests.”).Google Scholar

⁴³ In Dunmore v. Ontario (Att'y Gen.), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (Can.), the Supreme Court recognized that constitutional violations are not limited to instances of government misfeasance, but that legislative nonfeasance can also invite Charter scrutiny.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Gosselin, 4 S.C.R. 429Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Id. (Arbour, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Id. Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Id. Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See S. Afr. Const., 1996; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), (10 Dec. 1948), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng (last visited 7 Nov. 2011); Kende, Mark S., The South African Constitutional Court's Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 6 Chap. L. Rev. 137 (2003).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Human dignity has a long-standing history, however, as a conceptual value and the “lodestar” of Charter rights interpretation. See R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, para. 21 (Can.). In R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136 (Can.), Justice Dickson stated: “The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality … and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.”Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 51 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Id. Google Scholar

⁵² Id. at para. 39.Google Scholar

⁵³ Id. Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Id. Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Id. at paras. 62–74.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, para. 23 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Id. at para. 15.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, para. 17 (Can.); see also Kapp, 2 S.C.R. 483 at para. 23 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Andrews, 1 S.C.R. 143, para. 17 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Notably, in the Supreme Court's more recent decision in Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (Can.), the Court did not refer to Law, “human dignity”, or the four contextual factors for a finding of discrimination employed in Law. The removal of human dignity as a legal principle from s. 15 Charter analysis would appear complete.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Kapp, 2 S.C.R. 483, para. 20 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁶² Id. (emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁶³ Id. at para. 22.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Id. at para. 23.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Id. at para. 24.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Id. at para. 23.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Gosselin v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, para. 112 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 10 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Gosselin, 4 S.C.R. 429, para. 55 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Law, 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 10 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Id. (emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁷² Ontario (Disability Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne (2010), O.A.C. 593, paras. 90–91 (Can. Ont. C.A.), may be a source of optimism. Although directly concerned with a challenge to the equality guarantees of the Human Rights Code, the court noted that:Google Scholar

⁷³ Gosselin, 4 S.C.R. 429, para. 136 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dubé, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Id. at para. 113. Under R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136 (Can.), “the analysis of the right at issue should be kept separate from the inquiry into an impugned distinction's justification.” See also Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, para. 182 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ In Law, 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 10 (Can.), the Court emphasized that “There is [sic] a variety of factors which may be referred to by a s. 15(1) claimant in order to demonstrate that legislation demeans his or her dignity. The list of factors is not closed ….”Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See id. at para. 7 (Iacobucci, J.) (“The contextual factors which determine whether legislation has the effect of demeaning a claimant's dignity must be construed and examined from the perspective of the claimant. The focus of the inquiry is both subjective and objective. The relevant point of view is that of the reasonable person ….”). This was echoed by Justice L'Heureux-Dubé in her dissent in Gosselin:Google Scholar

⁷⁷ For a useful analysis, see Denise Réaume, Discrimination and Dignity, 63 La. L. Rev. 1 (2004), which describes protection against the denial of dignity constituting benefits as a key feature of the Section 15 equality guarantee. See also Chris Essert, Dignity and Membership, Equality and Egalitarianism: Economic Rights and Section 15, 19 Can. J. L. & Juris. 407 (2006).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Law, 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 10 (Can.) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See generally Essert, supra note 77.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Law, 1 S.C.R. 497, para. 51 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁸¹ R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, para. 23 (Can.).Google Scholar

⁸² See Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 156 (Can.) (Laskin, C.J., taking no part in the decision) (“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and freedoms.”).Google Scholar

⁸³ Rösler, Hannes, Harmonizing the German Civil Code of the Nineteenth Century with a Modern Constitution—The Lüth Revolution 50 Years Ago in Comparative Perspective, 23 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 4 (2008).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Article 48 is well-known for giving the President extensive powers in times of emergency, including the authority to rule the Republic without the Reichstag.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Id. Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Id. Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Markovitz, Inga, Constitution Making After National Catastrophes: Germany in 1949 and 1990, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1309 (2008).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Id. Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Id. Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Id. at 1310.Google Scholar

⁹¹ GG, 23 May 1949, BGBl. I, art. 1(1) (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁹² Kommers notes that the FCC has characterized human dignity as both “an objective and a subjective right:” Objective, because it imposes a positive obligation on the state to establish the prerequisite conditions of its realization, and subjective because it restrains the state from interfering with personal dignity and autonomy. See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 312 (2d ed. 1997).Google Scholar

⁹³ See BVerfG 15 Jan. 1958 (Lüth), 7 BVerfGE 198, (__), 1 BvR 400/51 of 15 Jan. 1958 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 12 (Ulrich Karpen ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1988).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ L. Weinrib, Constitutional Courts and Constitutional Rights (Fall 2010) (unpublished handout) (on file with author).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ L. Weinrib, Original Preamble to the German Basic Law, 1949 (Fall 2010) (unpublished handout) (on file with author).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See Rösler, supra note 83, at 10; see also Ingo Müller, Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991); Michael Stolleis, The Law Under the Swastika: Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany (Thomas Dunlap trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998); Dubber, Markus Dirk, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 Col. L. R. 1807 (1993) (reviewing Müller, surpa).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ GG, 23 May 1949, BGBl. I, art. 93(1) (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Rösler, supra note 83, at 14.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Id. at 13.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Over 96% of the cases filed with the FCC since its establishment have been complaints of this nature. Id. at 14.Google Scholar

¹⁰² BVerfG 15 Jan. 1958 (Lüth), 7 BVerfGE 198 (__), 1 BvR 400/51 of 15 Jan. 1958 (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Mann, Dennis-Jonathan, Legalization and Juridification: Judicial Review as a Catalyst of Institutional Change 4 (European University Institute Draft), available at http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Researchers/mann/pdf/Mann,-Dennis-Jonathan_Judicial-Review_Catalyst_Institutional-Change.pdf (last visited 9 Nov. 2011).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ “Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.” GG, 23 May 1949, BGBl. I, art. 5(1) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See Kommers, supra note 92, at 363.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198 (__), 1 BvR 400/51 of 15 Jan. 1958, para. 1 (Ger.) (translated by Tony Weir).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Id. at para. 4.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Id. at para. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Id. at para. 3.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Id. Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Engle, Eric Allen, Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung), 5 Hanse L. R. 165 (2009).Google Scholar

¹¹² Lüth, 7 BVerfGE 198 (__), 1 BvR 400/51 of 15 Jan. 1958 (Ger.), translated in Kommers, supra note 92, at 363; see also Engle, supra note 111, at 165–66.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Weir, supra note 106, at 5.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Rösler, supra note 83, at 31.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ See id. at 32; see also RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Mann, supra note 103, at 4.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ See id. for further development of this argument.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Weir, supra note 106, at 4.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Id. Google Scholar

¹²⁰ “Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws.” GG, 23 May 1949, BGBl. I, art. 14(1) (Ger.). “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state” Art. 20(1) GG; “The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles of a republican, democratic and social state governed by the rule of law, within the meaning of this Basic Law … “ Id. art. 28(1).Google Scholar

¹²¹ Id. art. 14(1).Google Scholar

¹²² See, e.g., Codetermination case, 50 BVerfGE 290 (339) (1979); Hamburg Flood Control case, 24 BVerfGE 367 (389) (1968); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Property As a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 5 (2003).Google Scholar

¹²³ GG, 23 May 1949, BGBl. I, art. 14(2) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ “Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected.” Id. art. 14(3).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Kommers, supra note 92, at 241.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Id. at 242.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Alexander, supra note 122, at 5.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Kommers, supra note 92, at 242.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ BVerfG 9 Feb. 2010 (Hartz IV), 125 BVerfGE 175 (__), 1 BvL 1/09 of 9 Feb. 2010, para. 118, 2010 (Ger.), available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20100209_1bvl000109.html (last visited 7 Nov. 2011).Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Id. at para. 120.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Id. Google Scholar

¹³² Id. Google Scholar

¹³³ Id. Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Id. Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Id. at para. 121.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Id. Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Id. at para. 122.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Id. Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Id. at para. 124.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Id. at para. 121.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Id. at para. 122.Google Scholar

¹⁴² “Abstract review” is a procedural practice, similar to the Canadian reference jurisdiction, which allows the FCC to review the constitutional compliance of a specific law without the requirement of an individual litigant bringing a positive complaint to the court.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Rawls, supra note 7, at 156.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See Heller, Hermann, The Nature and Structure of the State, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1139, 1185–86, 1191 (David Dyzenhaus trans., 1996); see also David Schneiderman, Social Rights and “Common Sense”: Gosselin Through a Media Lens, in Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, Legal Activism 58 (Margot Young et al. eds., UBC Press 2007) (discussing Heller's social theory of law as it relates to the Gosselin case).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Dyzenhaus, David, Hermann Heller and the Legality of Legitimacy, 16 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 645 (1996) [hereinafter Legality of Legitimacy].Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Heller, supra note 144, at 1157.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Dyzenhaus, Legality of Legitimacy, supra note 145, at 653.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Id. at 652.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Id. at 653; see also Rawls supra, note 7 (explaining how Rawls dealt at length with the potential problems pluralism posed for modern political regimes).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Dyzenhaus, Legality of Legitimacy, supra note 145, at 654.Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Id. at 656.Google Scholar

¹⁵² Heller, supra note 144, at 1185–86; see also Schneiderman, supra note 144, at 58.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Dyzenhaus, David, Hermann Heller: An Introduction, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1129, 1131 (1996).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ Heller, supra note 144, at 1191; see also Schneiderman, supra note 144, at 59.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Scott, Craig & Macklem, Patrick, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1992).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ In Kant's original conception, individual autonomy is limited by the categorical imperative to treat persons as ends in and of themselves. Indeed, Kant, more than any other natural law thinker, was concerned with human dignity in his defense of private reason.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Schneiderman, supra note 144, at 57.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ Id. at 58.Google Scholar

¹⁶² Dyzenhaus, Legality of Legitimacy, supra note 145, at 645.Google Scholar

¹⁶³ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ Gosselin v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, para. 27 (Can.).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ See Schneiderman, supra note 144, at 61–63 (expanding on this point).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ Dyzenhaus, Legality of Legitimacy, supra note 145, at 645; see also Schneiderman, supra note 144, at 61–63.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ Rawls, supra note 7, at 166.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ See Berlin, Isaiah, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford Univ. Press 1969).Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Berlin saw in positive liberty the potential for political totalitarianism, and seemed to prefer the negative conception of this value—although he recognized that both forms of liberty were necessary to secure the conditions of free political society. Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷² Rawls, supra note 7, at 166.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Examples include Rawls, Schneiderman, Réaume, Brodsky and Day, as well as Justices L'Heureux-Dubé and Arbour in Gosselin. Google Scholar