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The Strange Non-Death of Statism: Tracing the Ever Protracted Rise of Judicial Self-Government in France

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

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The article explores the “strange non-death” of the French statist tradition in matters regarding the judiciary. It traces the formation of the specific French model of government of the judiciary describing the stronghold established by the duopole of the Cour de cassation and the ministry of justice's bureaucracy (the so-called Chancellerie) over time (1810-1993) and the failed attempt of the IVth Republic (1946-1958) to unsettle this power balance. It then considers the new context that emerged in the 1990s and analyzes successive reforms that have tried to undermine this deep-seated tradition. In the last part, the article provides an overall assessment of the impact of these reforms on the independence, accountability, and legitimacy of the French judiciary.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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