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Right to Resistance and Terrorism – the Example of Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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The right to resistance against state power is very often characterized by actions against an existing legal order that is perceived as being unjust and therefore both – illegitimate and illegal. Terrorism, on the other hand, is often defined as politically motivated violence that is prosecuted by state power according to the law and although the terrorist views his actions as being justified by the perceived illegitimacy of state power, the state by itself is not willing to accept such a point of view – henceforth the prosecution. Therefore we can often find situations where both sides claim legitimacy and legality, mutually excluding each other's positions. This situation is only one of many that epitomize and exemplifies the more common problem of paradox in law: any society that aims at harmonizing conflicts through law will find itself in the not so comfortable position that the basic principle of justice – the quest for treating similar things alike – inevitably leads to cases where we have to face a direct conflict of laws. Either one law is just and therefore ought to apply, or the other, but we will not be able to apply both at the same time, since they may turn out conflicting results.

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Articles
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Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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18 BGBl I, 739 (30 August 1951).Google Scholar

19 BGBl I, 593 (5 August 1964).Google Scholar

20 See Fischer, Thomas, § 129a, Rn 5, in Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze (Penal code and by-laws, 58th ed., 2011).Google Scholar

21 Some authors explicitly explain the nature of § 129a StGB as being an aggravated form of crime (Qualifikationstatbestand) when compared to § 129 StGB; see Matthias Krauß, § 129a Rn. 2, in Strafgesetzbuch -Leipziger Kommentar (Penal code— Leipzig commentary, Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte, Ruth Rissing-van Saan & Klaus Tiedemann (eds.), 2009).Google Scholar

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23 Criticizing this header with its focus on political motivations as being misleading, see Thomas Fischer, § 129a, Rn 2, in Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze (Penal code and by-laws, 58th ed., 2011).Google Scholar

24 BGBl I, 2181 (18 August 1976).Google Scholar

25 For a distinction of member and supporter in context of § 129b StGB that follows parallel lines of argumentation but asks for international involvement, see Christoph Safferling & Timo Ide, Prosecuting Terrorism Financing in Germany: Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice), Judgment of 14 August 2009 – 3 StR 552/08, in 11 Germ. L. J. 1296 ff. (2010), available online at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1298 (last accessed: 31 August 2012).Google Scholar

26 BGBl I, 373 (28 March 1980); BGBl I, 393 (13 April 1986).Google Scholar

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30 BGBl I, 3390 (22 August 2002).Google Scholar

31 BGBl I, 2836 (28 December 2003).Google Scholar

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34 In order to give just one example of the conflict of criminal law on one hand and behavior that is subjectively perceived as being committed in good faith on the other hand, we may have a look at a special form of demonstration: civil disobedience accounts as a crime as long as an action violates values that are protected by criminal law. In all those cases, the prosecutor is not interested in matters of faith, but in holding up social order. This ‘blindness’ towards political or religious commitment is no suppression and no violation of fundamental human rights as long as there are legal ways to address related issues. For critique of and limits to civil obedience as a realization of the right to resistance, see Josef Isensee, § 13, Rn. 84, in, Handbuch des Staatsrechts Vol. I (Handbook of Political rights, Vol. I, Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof (eds.), 1995).Google Scholar

35 Since criminal prosecution depends upon having reasonable evidence for suspecting somebody has committed a crime, any case that is related to abroad will pose natural barriers for prosecuting suspects on the very fact that much of criminal evidence is located out of reach of national law enforcement agencies. In other words, since national law enforcement agencies are in lack of reasonable evidence, not even an investigation can be opened. Therefore transfer of criminal evidence, cross boundary definitions of crimes, as well as cross boundary cooperation of law enforcement agencies are essential in alleviating respective dangers. For a discussion of related issues, see Davide Casale, EU Institutional and Legal Counter-terrorism Framework, in 1(1) Defence Against Terrorism Review 49 ff. (2008).Google Scholar

36 Therefore, §§ 5 and 6 StGB only speak of the applicability of German Criminal Law on actions committed abroad and directed against national legal values (§ 5) or violating internationally recognized universal values (§ 6). However, since the UN has not succeeded in signing and enacting an international covenant on counter terrorism, applicability of § 6 (9) is very limited.Google Scholar

37 BGBl I, 3390 (22 August 2002).Google Scholar

38 See in this volume, the contribution of Bernhard Kretschmer, Criminal Involvement in Terrorist Associations — Classification and Fundamental Principles of the German Criminal Code Section 129a StGB, 13(9) Germ. L.J. (2012).Google Scholar

39 It is noteworthy that German criminal law has an important complement to §129b StGB, the so-called ‘Völkerstrafgesetzbuch’ (Law on Crimes against Peoples). Although the defendants Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni had conspired and participated in mass murder and therefore qualified under § 129b I as members of a terrorist organization committing serious crimes, they were indicted according to the Law on crimes against peoples; concerning the law on crimes against people, see in general, Christoph Safferling, Internationales Strafrecht (International criminal law, 319 ff. (2011); concerning the indictment of Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Mussoni, see http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2011-05/ruanda-kriegsverbrecher- (last accessed: 31 August 2012).Google Scholar

40 Tunisia, as well as Syria, are both states where recent large scale uprisings against a corrupt and at times undemocratic regime resulted in the over through of the existing regime and a subsequent attempt at organizing a more democratic form of government. In both cases, European governments were first relatively slow in their reaction. However, in the case of Libya they later even actively sought UN and NATO support for resistance against a Libyan regime that tried to militarily crush peaceful demonstrators and their grassroots organizations, thus not only respecting armed resistance as being a legal form of getting rid of an oppressive regime, but actively supporting it; see i.e. UN Security Council, Operation Unified Protector: Protection of civilians and civilian-populated areas & enforcement of the No-Fly Zone – October 2011, 8 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, §§ 4 (2011), available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111005_111005-factsheet_protection_civilians.pdf (last accessed: 31 August 2012).Google Scholar

41 While isolated media reports on the US facilitating arms smuggling into Syria are hard to verify, US Secretary of State did confirm to finance communications equipment of the Free Syrian Army, thus directly supporting armed opposition against violent oppression of dissent by the Syrian government. In such a situation, it might be counterproductive if Germany treats organizing of violent resistance in Syria being equivalent to organizing a terrorist group; see Reena Ninan, Hillary Clinton Says Syrian President Assad ‘Must Go,’ abc news (1 April 2012), see http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/secretary-hillary-clinton-syrian-president-assad/story?id=16049737#.T_DGH_W6odQ (last accessed: 31 August 2012).Google Scholar

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45 For parallel application of both West and East German law in one case (and therefore the vindication that East German law had been recognized as law with legitimate binding force), see in general, Klaus Marxen & Gerhard Werle, Gewalttaten an der deutsch-deutschen Grenze (Violence in German-German border), Vol. 2-1 XXXVII ff. (2002); for application in a concrete case, see i.e. LG Berlin (527) 2 Js 26/90 Ks (10/92), in Klaus Marxen & Gerhard Werle, Gewalttaten an der deutsch-deutschen Grenze Vol 2-2 (Violence in German-German border) 568, 573ff. (2002).Google Scholar

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49 See Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, supra note 47.Google Scholar