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²⁵ Id. at 356–61. See also Scott Burris, Michael Kamper & Clifford Shearing, Changes in Governance: A Cross- Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 Akron L. Rev. 1 (2008).Google Scholar

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³¹ David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 827, 848 (2008).Google Scholar

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⁴⁶ Id. at 109–19. However, as Melissaris points out, Hart added a subtle normative twist when he justified secondary rules in terms of certainty, flexibility and efficiency. Compare Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law, supra note 5, at 12–15 with Hart, supra note 37, at 94–98.Google Scholar

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⁵⁰ Id. at 30–33.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Id. at 33–35.Google Scholar

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⁵⁴ Id. at 46. While Melissaris recognizes that the word “law” may be laden with ideological baggage—such as its association with the state—he correctly points out that it should be possible to cast off this baggage.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Id. at 49–50.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Id. at 115.Google Scholar

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⁶⁵ Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 36. Cover also appears to endorse a kind of political liberalism, in which the state and its judges maintain peace by choosing which of these competing legalities to nurture and which ones to kill. Melissaris suggests a re-reading of Cover in which this “jurispathic” function of state legality is recast as a trans-contextual discussion of law. Instead of espousing an order imposed through violence (as Cover sometimes seems to do), Melissaris suggests that we read Cover as being concerned with the possibility of meaningful communication across legal contexts. See Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law, supra note 5, at 55–59.Google Scholar

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⁶⁹ Id. at 123–24.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Id. at 115.Google Scholar

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⁷³ Id. at 456–78. This chapter of Toward a New Common Sense is based on an earlier article: Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. L. & Soc'y 279 (1988).Google Scholar

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⁷⁶ Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1443, 1451 (1992).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Id. at 1453–61.Google Scholar

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