¹ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, in 1 Constitutional and Political Theory: Selected Writings 325 (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds., 2017) [hereinafter Böckenförde].Google Scholar

² For the most elaborate version of this approach, see Teubner, Gunther, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (2012).Google Scholar

³ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The State as an Ethical State, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 92.Google Scholar

⁴ Id. at 94. For an analysis of the role of the state along similar lines, see Judt, Tony, Ill Fares the Land 190–97 (2010) (arguing that the state remains necessary to protect individuals and democratic processes from the influence of supranational actors such as banks or corporations).Google Scholar

⁵ Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 336 (“[T]he national state no longer has sovereignty over currency, capital allocations, business locations, and over national economies as such” is that “the experience of powerlessness will spread among the citizens, and their image of the state, the foundation of their willingness to integrate and participate, will start to teeter.”).Google Scholar

⁶ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 360. (“If the European Community wants to become a political union, it must be given a deliberately federal structure in its design and decision-making. In its organization, too, it must present itself as a union of peoples; the federal element must prevail against the state element.”).Google Scholar

⁷ Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 329.Google Scholar

⁸ See generally, Kelsen, Hans, The Essence and Value of Democracy 27–34 (Nadia Urbinati & Carlo Invernizzi Accetti eds., 2013).Google Scholar

⁹ See, e.g., Habermas, Jürgen, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of law and Democracy 418 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (arguing that, according to this conception, “no one [can be] free as long as the freedom of one person must be purchased with another's oppression”).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 340 (“[A] second—and very urgent—question: can statehood today still be established and prevail on the level of the nation state, or only on a larger level, for example, that of Europe?”). That acknowledgment, irrespective of implications, should not be derided. See Perju, Vlad, Dual Sovereignty in Europe? A Critique of Habermas's Defense of the Nation-State, 53 Tex. J. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2018) (critiquing Habermas for assuming that only nation-states can be constitutional states and for not entertaining the possibility that a European supranational state could be imagined and designed to have those characteristics).Google Scholar

¹¹ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 360.Google Scholar

¹² Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 330.Google Scholar

¹³ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁴ Id. at 337.Google Scholar

¹⁵ There has been a vibrant debate as to whether the unity of the people presupposes homogeneity. In their editorial notes, Mirjam Künkler and Tine Stein emphasize the difference between Carl Schmitt's substantial/substantive homogeneity and Böckenförde's relative homogeneity. See Böckenförde, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 75 n. 5.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 360.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁸ Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 340.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 344. For an early study, and to this day unmatched, of European legal integration, see Pescatore, Pierre, The law of Integration 26 (1974).Google Scholar

²⁰ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 357. Böckenförde takes this concept from Rudolf G. Adam. See id., at 357 n. 49. While he mentions this concept only once, I give it greater weight in this section because I believe it captures well Böckenförde's view of the tension between economic integration and political unification. See, e.g., id. at 357:Google Scholar

²¹ Id. at 350.Google Scholar

²² See Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 329 (arguing that “democracy always refers to a particular group of people who are united into an entity, not to humanity as such”).Google Scholar

²³ See, e.g., Fischer, Joschka, From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the finality of European integration, (May 12, 2000), http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do?docId=192161&cardId=192161; Guy Verhofstadt, Europe's last Chance: Why the European States Must Form a More Perfect Union (2017).Google Scholar

²⁴ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 359 (“[T]he European Parliament cannot represent what does not exist: The European people; and it cannot mirror something that does not (yet) exist: A European political public that takes shape beyond national boundaries around the decisive questions of European politics.”).Google Scholar

²⁵ Id.Google Scholar

²⁶ Id. at 351. For a view similar in this respect, see Habermas, supra note 9, at 502 (characterizing the present European political sphere as fragmented and discussing the importance and likelihood of creating “an obligation towards the European common good” in order to achieve transnational unification).Google Scholar

²⁷ Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 341 (“[G]iven the separation of the EC competencies from the power of the state, without the European Communities in turn constituting a political union comparable to a federal entity, the question about the fragmentation of statehood arises most urgently.”). For a recent study of the allocation of competencies within the EU, see The Question of Competence in the European Union (Loic Azoulai ed., 2014).Google Scholar

²⁸ Conversely, to citizens, the decisions made by the EU “appear as something distant and foreign that is imposed upon them, not as something that emanates from them.” Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 341.Google Scholar

²⁹ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 352.Google Scholar

³⁰ Id. Google Scholar

³¹ Id. Google Scholar

³² See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. André Donner, former president of the European Court of Justice, captures this well:Google Scholar

A. M. Donner, Role of the Lawyer in the European Communities 82 (1968).Google Scholar

³³ Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.Google Scholar

³⁴ Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Pescatore, supra note 19, at 26. Pescatore argues further that “[w]e are experiencing the beginning of a process which undermines categories of thought which have been settled for centuries, overturns deeply-rooted political ideologies and strikes at powerfully organized interests.” Id. at 43.Google Scholar

³⁶ Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2), 1976 E.C.R. 455.Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. Google Scholar

³⁸ Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.Google Scholar

³⁹ Id. Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Comm'n, 1990 E.C.R. II-309, para. 42 (“[W]hen applying [Community law], the national courts are acting as Community courts of general jurisdiction.”).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Case 106/77, Italian Minister of Finance v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.Google Scholar

⁴² Id. Google Scholar

⁴³ Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. I-4135.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Case 179/84, Bozzetti v. Invernizzi, 1985 E.C.R. 2301.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. I-2433.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Id. Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-10239.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 351.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See, e.g., von Bogdandy, Armin & Schill, Stephan, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1417, 1436 (2011).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials 267 (Peter Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 6th ed. 2015).Google Scholar

⁵¹ J.H.H. Weiler & Trachtman, Joel P., European Constitutionalism and Its Discontents, 17 Nw. J. Int'l & Bus. 354, 374 (1996-1997) (describing “the flow of authority in the EU [as] bidirectional”).Google Scholar

⁵² Klemen Jaklič, Constitutional Pluralism in the EU 3 (2013) (describing constitutional pluralism as the dominant approach in European constitutionalism).Google Scholar

⁵³ Miguel Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is as Good as It Gets?, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 74–102 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Mattias Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?, 36 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 351 (1999).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ J.H.H. Weiler, In Defense of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 7-26 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 74 (“Sovereignty cannot be limited by law or become dispensable without the state ceasing to exist as a self-sustaining political unity.”). Like Schmitt, and like Bodin and Hobbes previously, Böckenförde sees all forms of fragmentation as a threat to political unity. For a historical account that shows how Hobbes and Bodin sought to counter theories of split sovereignty, see generally Lee, Daniel, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought (2016).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Yet, the Solange challenge was not as far-reaching as many scholars have portrayed, since the German judges accepted some core building blocks of European constitutionalism, including the claim that the constitutive Treaty is an independent source of law, that it has created its own legal order, and that the European legal order was autonomous from domestic law. See generally Perju, Vlad, On Uses and Misuses of Human Rights in European Constitutionalism, in Human Rights, Legitimacy, and a World in Disorder (Silja Voeneky & Neuman, Gerald L. eds., forthcoming 2018).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], Oct. 12, 1993, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 155 [hereinafter Maastricht Decision].Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Id. at 16.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Id. at 21. Christian Calliess refers to this approach, which the German Constitutional Court will continue to pursue in its Lisbon judgment, as “almost tragic” because, in taking the international law perspective, “the Court is adopting a restrictive democratic approach towards the very organization which—contrary to classic institutional organizations like the UN and the WTO—actually has a parliament that is directly elected by its citizens and has far-reaching decision-making and control powers.” See Calliess, Christian, The Future of the Eurozone and the Role of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 31 Y.B. EU L. 402, 406 (2012).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Maastricht Decision at 19:Google Scholar

⁶² Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 358.Google Scholar

⁶³ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Infra Part C.IV.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ G. Federico Mancini, Europe: The Case for Statehood, 4 Eur. L.J. 29, 31 (1994) (“[T]he closer the Union moved toward statehood, the greater the resistance to the attainment of this goal becomes.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Dworkin, Ronald, Hart's Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy, in Justice in Robes 140–86 (2006).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ For a discussion of some related issues in the context of the crisis of West German democracy in the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Radicals Decree and the German Autumn, see Böckenförde, The Exercise of State Authority in Extraordinary Circumstances, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 108–32.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For the alternative use, see Bermeo, Nancy, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. Dem. 1, 5–19 (2016).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ My examples in this Article are from Eastern Europe. It has been argued that populism comes in a variety of forms, only some of which steer politics into an authoritarian direction. See Bojan Bugarič & Alenka Kuhelj, Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?, 10 Hague J. Rule Law 21–33 (2018) (distinguishing between populism in Hungary and Poland, which undermines the rule of law and democracy, and populism in Western Europe, whose civilizational emphasis does not, in the authors' view, pose existential threats to the essence of liberal democracy). For analyses of the political scene in some of the Western European countries, see Anderson, Perry, The Italian Disaster, 36 London Rev. Books 1, 3–16 (2014); Jan-Werner Müller, Austria: The Lesson of the Far Right, N.Y. Rev. Books (2016), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/07/25/austria-freedom-party-populism-lesson-far-right/.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See generally Kelemen, R. Daniel, Europe's Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe's Democratic Union, 52 Gov't and Opposition 211–38 (2017); Laurent Pech & Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU, 19 Cambridge Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 3–47 (2017); Mark Dawson & Elise Muir, Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 German L.J. 1959–79 (2013).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Tony Judt, A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe (1996).Google Scholar

⁷² Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The State as an Ethical State, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 92.Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ The debate around reasonable pluralism in democratic societies has been central to contemporary Anglo-American political thought. See Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (1993). Here, as elsewhere, Böckenförde engages neither that debate nor that philosophical tradition post-Hobbes.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, The Concept of the Political: A Key to Understanding Carl Schmitt's Constitutional Theory, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 75 n. 5.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Rodrik, Dani, Populism and the Economics of Globalization, J. Int'l Bus. Pol'y (2018), https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf. For the connection between Washington consensus and democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe, see generally Bojan Bugarič, A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: “Lands In-between” Democracy and Authoritarianism, 13 Int'l J. Const. L. 219 (2015).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ It makes for useful reading to see how, even before the authoritarian tempest arrived, wise and thoughtful thinkers predicted it. See An Uncanny Era: Conversations between Václav Havel and Adam Michnik (Elzbieta Matynia trans., 2014) (identifying, in 2007, the dangers of future autocrats such as Viktor Orbán, Václav Klaus, Jarosłtaw Kaczyńsk, and Viktor Yanukovych).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Case C-286/12, Comm'n v. Hungary, 2012 E.C.R. I-687.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Gábor Halmai, The Early Retirement Age of the Hungarian Judges, in EU law Stories: Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence (Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davis eds., 2017).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See infra Part C.IV.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, Oct. 10, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 [hereinafter TEU]:Google Scholar

⁸² See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM/2014/0158, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0158&from=EN.Google Scholar

⁸³ For systemic infringement, see Scheppele, Kim Lane, Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions, in Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 105–32 (Carlos Closa & Dimitry Kochenov eds., 2016).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See generally Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Critique of Value-based Grounding of Law, in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 1, at 217–34.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Id. at 229.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Id. at 232–33.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See Waldron, Jeremy, “Partly laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign law in American Courts (2012).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy: Democracy and Statehood in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization, supra note 1, at 337.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ I mean neutrality in the well-established meaning of Herbert Wechsler. See Wechsler, Herbert, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See generally Perju, Vlad, The Romanian Double Executive and the 2012 Constitutional Crisis, 13 Int'l J. Const. L. 246 (2015).Google Scholar

⁹¹ For details, see Eur. Comm'n, Commission Opinion on The Rule of Law in Poland and The Rule of Law Framework: Questions & Answers (June 1, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2017_en.htm.Google Scholar

⁹² One exception is the judgment on the retirement of judges. See Case C- 286/12. Comm'n v. Hungary, 2012 E.C.R. 687.Google Scholar

⁹³ Under the new, 2013 Hungarian constitution, the procedure is laid down in Article S. See Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej ogłtoszono w Dz.U. 1997, NR 78 poz. 483, art. 235; art. 151, Const. Ro., para. 3.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 358.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Art. F(1) TEU of the Maastricht Treaty (“The Union shall respect the national identities of its member states.”).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Article 4(2) TFEU states that:Google Scholar

⁹⁷ One assumes this explains in good part Böckenförde's support for that commitment. Böckenförde, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 358. Constitutional identity represents a distinctively German approach in origins (“identitätsbestimmende Staatsaufgaben”), mentioned in passim as early as Solange I and more heavily relied upon more in the Lisbon decision. See generally Polzin, Monika, Constitutional Identity, Unconstitutional Amendments and the Idea of Constituent Power: The Development of the Doctrine of Constitutional Identity in German Constitutional Law, 14 Int'l J. Const. L. 411 (2016).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Article F(1) TEU of the Maastricht Treaty was later replaced by Article 6(3) TEU of the Amsterdam Treaty. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (“The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.”).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ The preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reads: “[N]ational identities of the Member States and the organization of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels.” Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 02, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:en:PDF.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Leonard F.M. Besselink, National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6 Utrecht L. Rev. 36, 48 (2010) (remarking that “the provision of Article 4(2) EU forms an important qualification of the rule on the primacy of EU law, and a modification of the case law under Costa v. ENEL”).Google Scholar

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¹⁰² von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 49, at 1436.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁴ 8.3.2006 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of March 8, 2006], Case Pl. 50/04 (Czech); 3.5.2006 (ÚS) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of May 3, 2006] Case Pl. 66/04.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ For a detailed study, see von Bogdandy & Schill, supra note 49.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ The full list includes:Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁷ Schmid, Christoph U., All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's “Banana Decision,” 7 Eur. L.J. 95–113 (2001).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) (Constitutional Court) Nov. 30, 2016, 22/2016 (XII.5) (Hung.), http://hunconcourt.hu/letoltesek/en_22_2016.pdf). For analysis, see Kelemen, Katalin, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Concept of National Constitutional Identity, 15–16 Ianus–Diritto e finanza 23, 30–32 (2017).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ For an early analysis and critique, see Halmai, Gábor, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and Constitutional Identity, Verfassungsblog (Jan. 1, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/the-hungarian-constitutional-court-and-constitutional-identity/.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See Kovacs, Kriszta, The Rise of an Ethnocultural Constitutional Identity in the Jurisprudence of the East and Central European Courts, 18 German L.J. 1703 (2017).Google Scholar

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¹¹² Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609.Google Scholar

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¹¹⁴ Case C-112/00, Schmidberger v. Austria, 2003 E.C.R. I-5659.Google Scholar

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¹¹⁷ Scholars have argued that constitutional identity in fact re-packages the court's long-time jurisprudence of exceptions to the freedom of movement. See Konstandinides, Theodore, Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order Within the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement, 13 Cambridge Y.B. of Eur. Legal Stud. 195 (2011).Google Scholar

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¹¹⁹ In the Gauweiler order for reference, the German Constitutional Court pointed out the tensions between the conception of national identity under the Article 4(2) TEU and the broader protection for national constitutional identity under the German constitution. For an illuminating analysis, see Claes, Monica & Reestman, Jan-Herman, The Protection of National Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case, 16 German L.J. 917, 938-41 (2015).Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Case 75/63 Hoekstra v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten, 1964 E.C.R. 177.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-6467.Google Scholar

¹²² Case 152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, 1974 E.C.R. 153.Google Scholar