¹ See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Universal Banks Are Not the Answer to America's Corporate Governance “Problem:” A Look at Germany, Japan and the U.S., in The Revolution in Corporate Finance 552, 560 (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2003).Google Scholar

² See Hannes Schneider & Martin Heidenhain, The German Stock Corporation Act 3 (Kluwer Law International 2000).Google Scholar

³ See id. German Law JournalGoogle Scholar

⁴ See, e.g., Peter O. Mülbert, § 119, in Großkommentar, Aktiengesetz n.14–16 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. Supp. XIV 1999).Google Scholar

⁵ See Barbara Grunewald, Gesellschaftsrecht 284 n.100 (7th ed. 2008).Google Scholar

⁶ See id. Management Board's Directive PowersGoogle Scholar

⁷ See also Lars Böttcher & Sebastian Blasche, Die Grenzen der Leitungsmacht des Vorstands, 15 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 569 (2006).Google Scholar

⁸ See Duden, Bedeutungswörterbuch 584 (3d ed. 2002)(search keyword: “direction”).Google Scholar

⁹ See Duden, Deutsches Universalwörterbuch 1011 (5th ed. 2003)(search keyword: “direction”). This explanation uses the term “company” in the entrepreneurial meaning.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Duden, Stilwörterbuch 511 (8th ed., 2001)(search keyword: “direct”)[This article will hereinafter use the English term direction for the German term Leitung pursuant to § 76 AktG].Google Scholar

¹¹ See § 77 para. 1 AktG (“If the management board comprises more than one person, the members of the management board shall manage the company jointly. The articles or by-laws for the management board may provide otherwise; however, the articles or by-laws may not provide that one or more members of the management board may resolve differences of opinion within the management board against the majority of its members.”).Google Scholar

¹² See Duden, Deutsches Universalwörterbuch 638 (5th ed. 2003)(search keyword: “management”).Google Scholar

¹³ See Duden, Sinn- und sachverwandte Wörter 301 (2d ed. 1997)(search keyword: “direction”).Google Scholar

¹⁴ However, the AktG does not use both terms consistently. See § 2 para. 2 AKtG.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Hartwig Henze, Leitungsverantwortung des Vorstands - Überwachungspflicht des Aufsichtsrats, 5 Betriebsberater (BB) 209 (2000).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See § 78 para. 1 AktG(“The management board shall represent the company in and out of court.”).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Holger Fleischer, Zur Leitungsaufgabe des Vorstands im Aktienrecht, 1 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht und Insolvenzpraxis (ZIP) 1, 3 (2003).Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Klaus J. Hopt & Markus Roth, § 111, in Großkommentar, Aktiengesetz n.160 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. Supp. XXIV 2005).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Holger Fleischer, supra note 17, at 2; Hartwig Henze, supra note 15.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Fleischer, supra note 17, at 2.Google Scholar

²¹ This can be seen, among others, from § 119 para. 1 AktG, which, however, is not conclusive. See, e.g., Uwe Hüffer, § 119, in Aktiengesetz n.7–9 (8th ed. 2008); Dietmar Kubis, § 119, in 4 Münchener Kommentar, Aktiengesetz n.6–9 (2d ed. 2004); Peter O. Mülbert, § 119, in Großkommentar, Aktiengesetz n.10–16 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. Supp. XXIV 1999).Google Scholar

²² See Peter O. Mülbert, § 119, in Großkommentar, Aktiengesetz n.14–16. (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. Supp. XXIV 1999).Google Scholar

²³ From this it does not follow that the management board is excluded from the implementation of such measures.Google Scholar

²⁴ See § 179a para.1 AktG (“A contract by which a stock corporation binds itself to transfer the entirety of its assets and whereby the transfer does not fall under the provisions of the German Transformation Act requires a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting according to Section 179 even if it does not involve a change in the objects of the company. The articles may only provide for a larger majority.”).Google Scholar

²⁵ First of all in Arts. 207 et seq. ADHGB (1861), later in §§ 178 et seq. HGB (1897).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Ernst Geßler, Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat im neuen Aktiengesetz, 9 Juristische Wochenschrift 497 (1937); Michael Kort, Before § 76, in Großkommentar, Aktiengesetz n.5 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. Supp. XIX 2003).Google Scholar

²⁷ See Michael Kort, id. See also Gerald Spindler, Before § 76, in 2 Münchener Kommentar, Aktiengesetz n.9 (3d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

²⁸ See Adolf Baumbach, Alfred Hueck & Götz Hueck, Summary Preamble § 76, in Aktiengesetz n.4 (13th ed. 1968); cf., Aktiengesetz 1965, in Aktiengesetz 96 (Bruno Kropff ed., 1965)(providing the considerations in the ministerial bill).Google Scholar

²⁹ Printed in Herbert Wiedemann, Gesellschaftsrecht Volume 1, 337 § 6.III.2.b.aa (1980).Google Scholar

³⁰ See Ernst Geßler, supra note 26; Hugo Dietrich, Zum neuen Aktiengesetz, 11 Juristische Wochenschrift 649 (1937); Gerald Spindler, Before § 76, in 2 Münchener Kommentar, Aktiengesetz n.14–15 (3d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

³¹ See Holger Fleischer, supra note 17; see Aktiengesetz 1965, in Aktiengesetz 97 (Bruno Kropff ed., 1965) (providing the reasoning of the Ministerial Bill). However, the aforementioned values are included in § 76 para.1 AktG for comprehensible reasons.Google Scholar

³² See Holger Fleischer, Section 1, in Handbuch des Vorstandsrechts n. 8 (Holger Fleischer ed., 2006)(providing using the interpretation of direction as the basis for the reasoning that the management board should assume the role of the entrepreneur). The Local Court of Frankfurt am Main recently stated that the political guidelines have to be purported by the shareholders and executed by the management board. See 13 Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 618, 621 (2010).Google Scholar

³³ See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH - Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 2004, BGHZ 159, 30–44 [hereinafter Gelatine]; also any confidentiality obligations must be observed.Google Scholar

³⁴ See Thomas Liebscher, Ungeschriebene Hauptversammlungszuständigkeiten im Lichte von Holzmüller, Macroton und Gelatine, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 1, 7 (2005); Michael Arnold, Mitwirkungsbefugnisse der Aktionäre nach Gelatine und Macrotron, 36 ZIP 1573, 1575 (2005).Google Scholar

³⁵ See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH - Federal Court of Justice], Case No. II ZR 133/01, 25 Nov. 2002, BGHZ 153, 47–48 [hereinafter Macrotron].Google Scholar

³⁶ See Gerald Spindler, §119, in Aktiengesetz n.49 (Karsten Schmidt & Marcus Lutter eds., 2008).Google Scholar

³⁷ See Macrotron, supra note 35, at 54 (referencing expressly to the Holzmüller decision). The BGH in this regard uses the German term Mediatisierung to mean, the interposition of an additional corporate body minimizing the direct influence of the shareholders.Google Scholar

³⁸ See supra Part III 2.Google Scholar

³⁹ See Macrotron, supra note 35, at 55–56.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See id. at 55–56.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See id. at 54.Google Scholar

⁴² See id. at 55.Google Scholar

⁴³ See id. at 56.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See id. at 57–58.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 1613/94, 27 Apr. 1999, BVerfGE 100, 289, 308.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See id. at 305.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ However, it must not be denied that also in the event of a missing legal provision under particular preconditions the necessity to consent is given. See also id. III 2(b) & 3.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ It would be different if the articles of association demanded a quotation. In this case the consent would be required because of the structural change.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See OLG Hamburg 11 ZIP 1000, 1001 & 1005 (1980).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 31.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See also Wulf Goette, Comment on BGH II ZR 155/02, 22 Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 927 (2004); Mathias Habersack, Mitwirkungsrechte der Aktionäre nach Macrotron und Gelatine, 5 Die Aktiengesellschaft 137 (2005); Andreas Pentz, Übersicht zur höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung zum Aktienrecht (2004); 26 BB 1397, 1401–1403 (2005); Jochem Reichert, Mitwirkungsrechte und Rechtsschutz der Aktionäre nach Macrotron und Gelatine, 5 Die Aktiengesellschaft 150 (2005).Google Scholar

⁵² Bundesgerichtshof [BGH - Federal Court of Justice],Case No. II ZR 174/80, 25 Feb. 1982, BGHZ 83, 122, 131 [hereinafter Holzmüller]; Gelatine, supra note 35, at 40. The Gelatine II decision corresponds with the essential expositions of Gelatine I. 12 NZG 575 (2004); see 12 NZG 571 (2004).Google Scholar

⁵³ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 40.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See id. at 44.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See id. at 30–45.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 1613/94, 27 Apr. 1999, BVerfGE 100, 289, 301.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Holzmüller, supra note 52, at 139.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 42. See also Uwe Hüffer, Zur Holzmüller-Problematik: Reduktion des Vorstandsermessens oder Grundlagenkompetenz der Hauptversammlung?, in Festschrift für Peter Ulmer zum 70. Geburtstag am 2. Januar 2003, 279, 301–303 (Mathias Habersack & Uwe Hüffner eds., 2003).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See Macrotron, supra note 35, at 55.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 42 (arguing for the particular competence of the shareholders’ meeting should be viewed as a result of an open development of the law); The Constitutional Duty to Protect Fundamental Rights 2.2 para. 1, infra. Contra Holzmüller, supra note 52, at 131; Ernst Gessler, Einberufung und ungeschriebene Hauptversammlungszuständigkeiten, in Festschrift für Walter Stimpel zum 68. Geburtstag am 29. November 1985, 771, 780 (Marcus Lutter, Hans-Joachim Mertens & Peter Ulmer eds., 1985)Google Scholar

⁶¹ This is evident in Holzmüller, supra note 52, at 137–141, 55; Gelatine, supra note 33, at 40.Google Scholar

⁶² See supra Part III 1 & 2 (providing expositions for the scope of protection of Art. 14 para. 1 sentence 1 GG in reference to the share ownership under).Google Scholar

⁶³ See Klaus Stern, 3 Staatsrecht 1 (1988), § 67 para. 5 (dealing with the doctrine of the state's duty to protect fundamental rights); Sebastian Blasche, Die Grundrechtsbindung der Tarifparteien, 1 Verwaltungsrundschau (VR) 1, 2 (2002) (dealing with the doctrine of the state's duty to protect fundamental rights).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BVR 385/77, 20 Dec. 1979, BVerfGE 53, 30, 57.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 2/90 u. 4, 5/92, 28 May 1993, BVerfGE 88, 203, 254–258; see Christian Starck, Art. 1 (3), in 1 Grundgesetz n. 195 (Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein & Christian Starck, eds., 5th ed. 2005).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Sebastian Blasche, Die Grundrechtsbindung der Tarifparteien, 1 VR 1, 2 (2002).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Horst Dreier, Before Art. 1, in 1 Grundgesetz n.102 (Horst Dreier ed., 2d ed. 2004).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH - Federal Court of Justice], 14 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 992, 993 (2007); see Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 373 (6th ed., 1991).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 44.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Insofar, the expositions of Bundesgerichtshof [BGH - Federal Court of Justice], 12 NZG 571 (2004) are to be welcomed.Google Scholar

⁷¹ See Peter O. Mülbert, § 119, in GROßKOMMENTAR, Aktiengesetz n.21–24 (Klaus J. Hopt & Herbert Wiedemann eds., 4th ed. Supp. XIX 1999).Google Scholar

⁷² See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 42–45. It remains to be clarified whether the BGH does not expressly justify its jurisprudence with the doctrine of the state's duty to protect the fundamental rights, but rather refers to the missing legal provision and an open development of the law.Google Scholar

⁷³ See supra Part III 1. It was already set forth under Macrotron III 1, that insofar it cannot convince if the BGH, in addition to the monetary value equalization, demands a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ The idea of heteronomy stems from the judiciary of the Federal Constitutional Court. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 26/84, 7 Feb. 1990, BVerfGE 81, 242, 255.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 30, 44–45.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See supra Part III 1 and 2.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 45.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 44–46 (stating that the BGH should first of all expressly speak of economic significance for the company). Although at first sight the BGH does not expressly refer to the economic significance for the company, this understanding is evident when the BGH examines the concrete lawsuit. See id. at 48.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See supra Part III 2.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 40. In addition, the BGH already observed in Holzmüller an encroachment upon the shareholders’ membership rights and their assets embodied in the share ownership. See Holzmüller, supra note 52, at 181.Google Scholar

⁸¹ See supra Part II 5 (providing the result of interpretation).Google Scholar

⁸² Something else will apply if the scope of individual freedom provided by the tradability of the share ownership is severely affected. See supra Part III 1.Google Scholar

⁸³ The BGH would not be obstructed from wording lower barriers for an unwritten competence of the shareholders’ meeting, insofar as the prerequisites for a legal development were given; however, this does not alter the situation that the BGH is only obliged to act if a minimum of adequate protection of the fundamental rights is not granted.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See supra Part III 1.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See supra Part III 2.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See Gelatine, supra note 33, at 45.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See Holzmüller, supra note 52, at 132; Gelatine, supra note 33, at 40–41.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See § 179a I AktG supra note 27.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ See supra Parts III 2 & 3.Google Scholar