¹ BGH, Judgment 24 June 2005 – 5 StR 306/03, 25 NStZ 35 (2005) = 57 NJW 3051 (2004).Google Scholar

² The facts of the case are reprinted in BGH, 57 NJW 3051, 3051-52 (2004).Google Scholar

³ BGH, 57 NJW 3051, 3053 (2004).Google Scholar

⁴ §§ 25 (II), 27 (I) and (II), 49 StGB (Strafgesetzbuch – Criminal Code); an English translation is available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm.Google Scholar

⁵ See 37 BGHSt 289, 291 and Herbert Tröndle& Thomas Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch, § 25 MN 5a (52nd ed. 2004).Google Scholar

⁶ BGH 57 NJW 3051, 3053-54 (2004).Google Scholar

⁷ As for the meaning of this principle see Christoph Safferling, Towards an Intenational Criminal Law, 260 (2003).Google Scholar

⁸ Instead of all: BGH 18 StV 540 (1998); “Revision” is purely a review of the legal issues of a case. The facts have to be accepted as the Landgericht found them. In case the BGH is not content with the evidence and the facts, he will order a re-trial; see Lutz Meyer-Gossner, Strafprozessordnung, vor § 333 MN 1 (47th ed., 2004).Google Scholar

⁹ See BGH, 57 NJW 3051, 3054 (2004).Google Scholar

¹⁰ The sections read as follows:Google Scholar

Section 211 MurderGoogle Scholar

(1)The murderer shall be punished with imprisonment for life.Google Scholar

(2)A murderer is, whoever kills a human being out of murderous lust, to satisfy his sexual desires, from greed or otherwise base motives, treacherously or cruelly or with means dangerous to the public or in order to make another crime possible or cover it up.Google Scholar

Section 212 ManslaughterGoogle Scholar

(1)Whoever kills a human being without being a murderer, shall be punished for manslaughter with imprisonment for not less than five years.Google Scholar

(2)In especially serious cases imprisonment for life shall be imposed.Google Scholar

Section 216 Homicide upon RequestGoogle Scholar

(1)If someone is induced to homicide by the express and earnest request of the person killed, then imprisonment from six months to five years shall be imposed.Google Scholar

(2)An attempt shall be punishable.Google Scholar

¹¹ One could view in this requirement a parallelism to the English “malice aforethought”-requirement in murder; C.f. R. v. Mooney [1985] 1 All ER 1025.Google Scholar

¹² See Jähnke in Leipziger Kommentar, vor § 211 MN 35 et subs (11th ed., Hans-Heinrich Jescheck et. al, eds., 1993).Google Scholar

¹³ See Maurach in Strafrecht Besonderer Teil Teilband 1, § 2 I MN 3 (9th ed. Maurach et al. eds. 2003).Google Scholar

¹⁴ “Strafrechtlicher Rundumschutz”, see Hartmut Schneider in Münchener Kommentar StGB, vor §§ 211 MN 2 (Wolfgang Joecks & Klaus Miebach eds., 2004).Google Scholar

¹⁵ The relevant section reads as follows:Google Scholar

Section 13 Commission by OmissionGoogle Scholar

(1) Whoever fails to avert a result, which is an element of a penal norm, shall only be punishable under this law, if he is legally responsible for the fact that the result does not occur, and if the omission is equivalent to the realization of the statutory elements of the crime through action.Google Scholar

(2) The punishment may be mitigated pursuant to Section 49 subsection (1).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See, e.g., Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil I, § 12 MN 21-31 (3rd ed., 1997).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Wessels & Hettinger, Strafrecht Besonderer Teil 1, MN 82 (28^th ed. 2004); see also BGH, 21 NStZ 475, 476 (2001); and Stefan Mühlbauer, Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs zur Tötungshemmschwelle, 10-12 (1999).Google Scholar

¹⁸ The BGH on the other hand, see § 211 and 212 StGB as two autonomous norms. The only relevant difference towards the above mentioned opinion occurs in case of § 28 StGB, but is too complex to be discussed in this paper and above all irrelevant for the issue at hand; see the analysis of Schneider (note 14) vor §§ 211 MN 132-36.Google Scholar

¹⁹ C.f. 34 BGHSt 59.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Lackner & Kühl, Strafgesetzbuch, § 211 MN 4 (25^th ed. 2004).Google Scholar

²¹ See 10 BGHSt 399; 29 BGHSt 317.Google Scholar

²² “Generalklausel,” see Schneider, supra note 14, at § 211 MN 69.Google Scholar

²³ See 2 BGHSt 63, and 3 BGHSt 132, 133; 35 BGHSt 116, 126.Google Scholar

²⁴ See 35 BGHSt 116, 127.Google Scholar

²⁵ See BGH, 14 NStZ 34 (1994).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Wolfgang Joecks, Strafgesetzbuch, § 211 MN 16 (5^th ed. 2004).Google Scholar

²⁷ Jealousy: 3 BGHSt 180; Selfishness: BGH 5 NStZ 454 (1985); Anger: BGH 13 NStZ 182 (1993).Google Scholar

²⁸ This is the common definition of the BGH: 2 BGHSt 251, 254; 9 BGHSt 385, 389; and 39 BGHSt 353, 368.Google Scholar

²⁹ See 7 BGHSt 218, 221; 32 BGHSt 382, 384.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Schneider, supra note 14, at § 211 MN 138.Google Scholar

³¹ See e.g., Winfried Hassemer, Die Mordmerkmale, insbesondere “heimtückisch” und “niedrige Beweggründe – BGHSt 23, 19, 11 JuS 626, 630 (1971) and Eberhard Schmidhäuser, Gesinnungsmerkmale im Strafrecht, 232-38 (1958); Albin Eser in Schönke & Schröder, § 211 MN 26 (26th ed., Adolf Schönke et. al eds., 2002) speaks of a prevailing view in legal writing.Google Scholar

³² Overview in Lackner, supra note 20, at § 211 MN 6.Google Scholar

³³ See Wessels, supra note 17, at MN 108 et subs, Günter Spendel, “Heimtücke“ und gesetzliche Strafe bei Mord 269-72 (1983).Google Scholar

³⁴ See 20 BGHSt 301 and the recent case BGH 23 NStZ 425 (2003).Google Scholar

³⁵ See 23 BGHSt 119; and the recent house-tyrant case in 48 BGHSt 255, 256.Google Scholar

³⁶ From the jurisprudence of the BGH, see 8 BGHSt 216, 218.Google Scholar

³⁷ See 3 BGHSt 264.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Wessels, supra note 17, at MN 101Google Scholar

³⁹ See 34 BGHSt 13, 14; 38 BGHSt 353, 354: A pistol is therefore not a means dangerous to the public even if the accused could not control the weapon and accidentally shot an uninvolved bystander, see also Maurach, supra note 13, at § 211 MN 19.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ 1 OGHSt 86, Tröndle & Fischer, supra note 5, at § 211 MN 24.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See 15 BGHSt 291.Google Scholar

⁴² 9 BGHSt 180, Tröndle & Fischer, supra note 5, at § 211 MN 26.Google Scholar

⁴³ See 45 BVerfGE 187.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The relevant section reads as follows:Google Scholar

Section 57a Suspension of the Remainder of a Punishment of Imprisonment for LifeGoogle Scholar

(1) The court shall suspend execution of the remainder of a punishment of imprisonment for life and grant probation, if:Google Scholar

1 fifteen years of the punishment have been served;Google Scholar

2 the particular gravity of the convicted person's guilt does not require its continued execution; andGoogle Scholar

3 the requirements of Section 57 subsection (1), sent. 1, nos. 1 and 3 are present.Google Scholar

Section 57 subsection (1), sent. 2 and subsection (5) shall apply accordingly.Google Scholar

(2) Any deprivation of liberty undergone by the convicted person as a result of the act shall qualify as punishment served within the meaning of subsection (1), sentence 1, no. 1.Google Scholar

(3) The term of probation shall be five years. Sections 56a subsection (2), sent. 1, 56b to 56g and 57 subsection (3), sent. 2, shall apply accordingly.Google Scholar

(4) The court may fix terms not exceeding two years, before the expiration of which an application by the convicted person to suspend the remainder of the punishment and grant probation shall be inadmissible.”Google Scholar

⁴⁵ This was decided by the Federal Constitutional Court in 86 BVerfGE 288. This decision is still debated, but has been accepted by the general practice; for an overview, see Tröndle & Fischer, supra note 5, at § 57a MN 7-18; and Franz Streng, Strafrechtliche Sanktionen, MN 229 (2^nd ed. 2002). The question is to be determined by a general evaluation of the offence and the personality of the offender; see 40 BGHSt 360.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The same is true for genocide, see § 78 (II) StGB; the former statutory limitation for murder and genocide has first been delayed (1969) and then been lifted entirely (1979); nevertheless the statutory limitation has led to quite some extraordinary decisions like in the Caiazzo case 48 NJW 1297 (1995) where a former Wehrmachtsoffizier was charged with the killing of civilians.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ § 78 (III) StGBGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ See Maurach, supra note 13, at § 211 MN 24Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Eser, supra note 31, at § 211 MN 10, see also the recent case before the BGH in 48 BGHSt 255. The battered wife in this case killed her husband when he was asleep. The Court stated that this was a treacherous act but ordered a re-trial for diminished responsibility.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The relevant section reads as follows:Google Scholar

Section 213 Less Serious Case of ManslaughterGoogle Scholar

If the person committing manslaughter was provoked to rage by maltreatment inflicted on him or a relative or a serious insult by the person killed and was thereby immediately torn to commit the act, or in the event of an otherwise less serious case, the punishment shall be imprisonment from one year to ten years.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Maurach, supra note 13, at § 2 III A 3; Peter Riess, Zur Abgrenzung von Mord und Totschlag, in 21 NJW 628, 630 (1968)Google Scholar

⁵² The relevant section reads as follows:Google Scholar

Section 49 Special Statutory Mitigating CircumstancesGoogle Scholar

(1) If mitigation is prescribed or permitted under this provision, then the following shall apply to such mitigation:Google Scholar

1 Imprisonment for not less than three years shall take the place of imprisonment for life;Google Scholar

2 In cases of imprisonment for a fixed term, at most three-fourths of the maximum term provided may be imposed. In case of a fine the same shall apply to the maximum number of daily rates;Google Scholar

3 An increased minimum term of imprisonment shall be reduced:Google Scholar

in the case of a minimum term of ten or five years, to two years;Google Scholar

in case of a minimum term of three or two years, to six months;Google Scholar

in case of a minimum term of one year, to three months;Google Scholar

in other cases to the statutory minimum.Google Scholar

(2) If the court may in its discretion mitigate the punishment pursuant to a norm which refers to this provision, then it may reduce the punishment to the statutory minimum or impose a fine instead of imprisonment.Google Scholar

⁵³ BGHSt 30, 105Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See BGH 57 NJW 3051,3054 (2004).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Id.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See the judgement of the LG Berlin reported in BGH 57 NJW 3051, 3056-57 (2004).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Id. at I. 3. a.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See BGH 57 NJW 3051, 3054 (2004).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See also BGH 57 NJW 1466 (2004).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ §§ 353 (I), 354 (II) StPO; an English translation is available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm.Google Scholar

⁶¹ 41 BGHSt 222, BGHR StPO § 353 I Teilaufhebung 1.Google Scholar

⁶² See Section 353 (I) and (II) stop.Google Scholar

⁶³ These are sometimes called “hate crimes,” see e.g., Hans-Jörg Schneider, Kriminologie der Gewalt 43 (1994).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Schneider, supra note 14, at § 211 MN 83 and Jähnke, supra note 12, at § 211 MN 28.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Maurach, supra note 13, at § 211 MN 38.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Lars Brocker, Die Tötung des politischen Gegners und § 211 Abs. 2 StGB, JR 13 (1992).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ BGH 57 NJW 3051, 3054 (2004).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See Selle, Dirk v., Zur Strafbarkeit des politisch motivierten Tötungsverbrechens, 53 Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 992, 996 (2000) and Michael Walzer, Just an unjust war. A moral argument with historical illustrations 197 (2nd ed., 1992).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Walzer, supra note 68, at 200.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Brocker, Overview in, supra note 66, and Oliver Zielke, Politische Motivation als niedriger Beweggrund im Sinne des § 211 Abs. 2 StGB, JR 136 (1991).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Instead of all: Jähnke, supra note 12, at § 211 MN 29, and Brocker, supra note 66, at 13.Google Scholar

⁷² Art. 20 (4) Grundgesetz reads as: “All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.”Google Scholar

⁷³ Dreher, & Tröndle, , supra note 5, at §211 MN 13, Maurach, supra note 13, at MN 38, Eser, supra note 31, at § 211 MN 20Google Scholar

⁷⁴ “Allgemeine Interessen”; this requirement is treated very restrictive in the literature and jurisdiction of the BGH, see e.g., BGH 3 NJW 434 (1950).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Eser, supra note 31, at § 211 MN 20.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ As would be privileged according to Art. 20 IV Grundgesetz – see supra note 72.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Schneider, supra note 14, at § 211 MN 84.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ From the case law see BGH 48 NJW 602 (1995), BGH 16 StV 208 (1996), BGH 57 NJW 1466 (2004).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ The vendetta is still a vital element of the common law practiced for example in the rural areas of Northern Albania and parts of Afghanistan, see VG Oldenburg 12 A 1019/98. Although on the other hand the Turkish legislator recently explicitly outlawed the vendetta it is today nonetheless still practiced in some few Turkish families. For a very recent vendetta among in Germany living Turks, see: Sueddeutsche Zeitung, SZ 21 February 2004, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Schneider, supra note 14, at § 211 MN 92, Jähnke, supra note 12, at § 211 MN 39, BGH in 17 StV 565 (1997) and 16 StV 208 (1996).Google Scholar

⁸¹ This was the 4^th Senate of the BGH in the case reported in 17 StV 565 (1997) and Lackner, supra note 20, at § 211 MN 5.Google Scholar

⁸² See the comment of Michael Köhler in 35 JZ 238 at 240 (1980) of the decision of the BGH reprinted in 35 JZ 238 (1980).Google Scholar

⁸³ The second senate followed this ruling: 16 StV 209,209 (1996), 22 NStZ 369,370 (2002).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Schneider, supra note 14, at § 211 MN 94.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ BGH 48 NJW 602, 603 (1995).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ BGH 16 StV 208 (1996) and 22 NStZ 369 (2002).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ BGH 57 NJW 3051, 3055 (2004).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See the El Motassadeq case concerning the 9/11 attack in BGH 57 NJW 1259 (2004) reviewed by Safferling in 5 German L.J. 515 (2004).Google Scholar