1 For insightful criticism and valuable comments, I am grateful to Anne van Aaken, Armin von Bogdandy, Günter Frankenberg, Alexandra Hilal Guhr, Rainer Grote, Ute Mager, László Sólyom, and Markus Wagner.Google Scholar

2 See Christoph Möllers, Staat als Argument 266 (2000) (discussing the time factor, that is, urgency).Google Scholar

3 This must be kept separate from an actual disruption of the constitution (Verfassungsstörung), which describes a situation where the upheaval stems from the state's internal sphere (for instance, the parliamentary legislature's self-dissolution in the last years of the Weimar Republic). See Johannes Heckel, Diktatur, Notverordnungsrecht, Staatsnotstand, 22 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 257, 310 (1932). This article analyzes only the state of emergency, excluding the constellation of constitutional disruption.Google Scholar

4 See Friedrich Koja, Allgemeine Staatslehre 397 (1993).Google Scholar

5 See Kirchhof, Paul, Die Zulässigkeit des Einsatzes staatlicher Gewalt in Ausnahmesituationen, in Die Zulässigkeit des Einsatzes staatlicher Gewalt in Ausnahmesituationen 84 (1976).Google Scholar

6 Hesse, Konrad, Staatsnotstand und Staatsnotrecht, in 5 Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft 202 (7th ed. 1989); Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 303 (20th ed. 1999).Google Scholar

7 “History is full of wars which everyone knew would never break out” (Hungarian proverb).Google Scholar

8 The emergency powers were invoked extremely often during the Weimar Republic, a fact that was both cause by and was a contributing factor to the instable nature of the Republic. In 1932 these emergency powers were used to dispense the autonomy of Prussia (a Land then led by Social Democrats as opposed to the right-wing nationalist central government), an important step towards the failure of the democratic Weimar Republic and resulting finally in the national-socialist takeover. The Reichstag was being dissolved at that time so it could not deal with the problem, and the vague and imprecise emergency provisions of the WRC did not allow (or did not force) the Staatsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) either to restore the power of the democratically elected Social Democratic Prussian cabinet. See Henning Grund, “Preußenschlag” und Staatsgerichtshof im Jahre 1932 (1976).Google Scholar

9 See Stern, Klaus, 2 Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1303 (1980).Google Scholar

10 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-A (1) [state of defense or external emergency] (“Any determination that the federal territory is under attack by armed force or imminently threatened with such an attack (state of defense) shall be made by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat. Such determination shall be made on application of the Federal Government and shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least a majority of the Members of the Bundestag.”). See also id. at art. 91 (1) [internal emergency] (“In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, a Land may call upon police forces of other Länder, or upon personnel and facilities of other administrative authorities and of the Federal Border Police.”); A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19 (3) (h) & (i) (“Within [its] sphere of authority, the Parliament shall … (h) declare a state of national crisis and establish the National Defense Council, in the case of war, or imminent danger of armed attack by a foreign power (danger of war); (i) declare a state of emergency, in the case of armed actions aimed at overturning constitutional order or at the acquisition of exclusive control of public power, in the case of acts of violence committed by force of arms or by armed groups which gravely endanger lives and property on a mass scale, and in the event of natural or industrial disaster; …”); Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Weimarer Reichsverfassung] [WRC – Weimar Republic Constitution] article 48 (“(1) If a Land does not fulfill the obligations laid upon it by the Reich constitution or the Reich laws, the Reich President may use armed force to cause it to oblige. (2) In case public safety is seriously threatened or disturbed, the Reich President may take the measures necessary to reestablish law and order, if necessary using armed force. In the pursuit of this aim he may suspend the civil rights described in articles 114 [freedom of person], 115 [privacy], 117 [secrecy of post and phone], 118 [freedom of expression], 123 [freedom of assembly], 124 [freedom of association] and 154 [right of succession], partially or entirely. (3) The Reich President has to inform Reichstag immediately about all measures undertaken which are based on paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. The measures have to be suspended immediately if Reichstag demands so. (4) If danger is imminent, the Land government may, for their specific territory, implement steps as described in paragraph 2. (5) These steps have to be suspended if so demanded by the Reich President or the Reichstag. Further details are provided by Reich law.”).Google Scholar

11 An accurate determination of the preconditions, in general, causes no small amount of difficulty, since it necessitates the prediction of situations that are by definition abnormal and therefore unpredictable and problematic to reduce to precise preconditions. See Stern, supra note 9, at 1326.Google Scholar

12 See Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Weimarer Reichsverfassung] [WRC – Weimar Republic Constitution] art. 48 (2). See Gerhard Anschütz, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches vom 11. August 1919, at Art. 48, margin note 7 (14th ed. 1933) (discussing the deformalizing of law for exceptional circumstances).Google Scholar

13 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 91.Google Scholar

14 See id. at art. 91 (1).Google Scholar

15 See id. at art. 115-A (1); id. at art. 80-A (1) (“If this Basic Law or a federal law respecting defense, including protection of the civilian population, provides that legal provisions may be applied only in accordance with this Article, their application, except when a state of defense has been declared, shall be permissible only after the Bundestag has determined that a state of tension exists or has specifically approved such application. The determination of a state of tension and specific approval in the cases mentioned in the first sentence of paragraph (5) and the second sentence of paragraph (6) of Article 12-A [need for compulsory military and alternative service] shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast.”). See also A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19 (3) (g), (h) & (i) (“Within [its] sphere of authority, the Parliament shall …(g) decide on the declaration of a state of war and on the conclusion of peace; …”); in conjunction with, id. at art. 19 (4) (“A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament shall be required for the decisions specified in points g), h) and i) of Paragraph 3.”).Google Scholar

16 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/A (1) (“Should the Parliament be obstructed in reaching such decisions, the President of the Republic shall have the right to declare a state of war, a state of national crisis and establish the National Defense Council, or to declare a state of emergency.”).Google Scholar

17 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-A (2) (“If the situation imperatively calls for immediate action, and if insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely convening of the Bundestag or the Bundestag cannot muster a quorum, the Joint Committee shall make this determination by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least a majority of its members.”).Google Scholar

18 See id. at art. 115-A (4) (“If the federal territory is under attack by armed force, and if the competent federal authorities are not in a position at once to make the determination provided for in the first sentence of paragraph (1) of this Article, the determination shall be deemed to have been made and promulgated at the time the attack began. The Federal President shall announce that time as soon as circumstances permit.”). See also A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/E (1) (“In the event that the territory of Hungary is subject to an unexpected attack by foreign armed units, immediate action shall, in accordance with the defense plan approved by the Government and the President of the Republic, be taken - with forces that are commensurate to the gravity of the attack and equipped for such a role - prior to the declaration of a state of emergency or a state of martial law in order to repel such attack, defend the territorial integrity of the country with the active air and air defense forces of the Hungarian and allied armed forces, ensure constitutional order and the security of lives and property, protect public order and safety.”).Google Scholar

19 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-L (2) (“The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time, by a decision to be promulgated by the Federal President, declare a state of defense terminated. The Bundesrat may demand that the Bundestag reach a decision on this question. A state of defense shall be declared terminated without delay if the conditions for determining it no longer exist.”).Google Scholar

20 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/A (4) (“At its first meeting following the end of the obstruction, the Parliament shall review the justification of the declaration of a state of war, state of national crisis or state of emergency, and shall rule on the legality of the measures taken. A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament is required for this decision.”).Google Scholar

21 See International Commission of Jurists, States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights 460 (1983).Google Scholar

22 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] arts. 80-A, 91 & 115-A; A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19 (3) (h) & (i). See also Wolfgang Daleki, Artikel 80-a des Grundgesetzes und die Maßnahmen zur Erhöhung der Verteidigungsbereitschaft (1985) (analyzing in detail the German legal situation in this respect).Google Scholar

23 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/C (2) (“The National Defense Council is chaired by the President of the Republic, and is composed of the following members: the Speaker of Parliament, the floor leaders of the political parties represented in Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Ministers, and the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces with the right of consultation.”).Google Scholar

24 Although the Joint Committee (article 115-E of the Basic Law) has practical functions only in a state of defense, it exists during the normal conditions as well.Google Scholar

25 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-H (1) & (3) (“(1) Any legislative terms of the Bundestag or of Land parliaments due to expire during a state of defense shall end six months after the termination of the state of defense. … (3) The Bundestag shall not be dissolved while a state of defense exists.”); A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 28/A (1) & (2) (“(1) During a state of national crisis or a state of emergency the Parliament may neither declare its dissolution nor be dissolved. (2) Should a term of Parliament expire during a state of national crisis or a state of emergency, its mandate shall be extended until the cessation of the state of national crisis or state of emergency.”).Google Scholar

26 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-G (“Neither the constitutional status nor the performance of the constitutional functions of the Federal Constitutional Court or its judges may be impaired. The law governing the Federal Constitutional Court may be amended by a law enacted by the Joint Committee only insofar as the Federal Constitutional Court agrees is necessary to ensure that it can continue to perform its functions. Pending the enactment of such a law, the Federal Constitutional Court may take such measures as are necessary to this end. Determinations by the Federal Constitutional Court pursuant to the second and third sentences of this Article shall be made by a majority of the judges present.”); id. at art. 115-H (1) (“…The term of office of a member of the Federal Constitutional Court due to expire during a state of defense shall end six months after the termination of the state of defense.”); A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/B (6) (“The operation of the Constitutional Court may not be restricted during a state of national crisis.”).Google Scholar

27 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-H (1) (“… A term of office of the Federal President due to expire during a state of defense, and the exercise of his functions by the President of the Bundesrat in case of the premature vacancy of his office, shall end nine months after the termination of the state of defense. …”).Google Scholar

28 See id. at art. 115-H (2) (“Should it be necessary for the Joint Committee to elect a new Federal Chancellor, it shall do so by the votes of a majority of its members; the Federal President shall propose a candidate to the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by a two-thirds majority of its members.”).Google Scholar

29 Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Weimarer Reichsverfassung] [WRC – Weimar Republic Constitution] art. 48 (2) (empowering the President of the Reich to take “necessary” measures); id. at art. 48 (3) (similar as to the governments of the constituent Länder). See Daniel Esklony, Das Recht des inneren Notstands. Verfassungsgeschichtliche Entwicklung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der tatbestandlichen Voraussetzungen von Notstandsmaßnahmen und ihrer parlamentarischer Kontrolle 88 (2000). For this reason, some spoke of the “dictatorial power of the President of the Reich.” See, e.g., Richard Grau, Die Diktaturgewalt des Reichspräsidenten, in 2 Handbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts 274 (Gerhard Anschütz & Richard Thoma eds., 1932) (with further references).Google Scholar

30 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-C (1) & (3) (“(1) The Federation shall have the right to legislate concurrently for a state of defense even with respect to matters within the legislative powers of the Länder. Such laws shall require the consent of the Bundesrat. … (3) To the extent necessary to repel an existing or imminently threatened attack, a federal law for a state of defense may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, regulate the administration and finances of the Federation and the Länder without regard to Titles VIII [Implementation of Federal Legislation, Federal Administration], VIIIa [Joint Responsibities] and X [Finance] of this Basic Law, provided that the viability of the Länder, municipalities, and associations of municipalities, especially with respect to financial matters, is assured.”).Google Scholar

31 See id. at art. 115-E (1) (“If, during a state of defense, the Joint Committee by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least a majority of its members, determines that insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely convening of the Bundestag or that the Bundestag cannot muster a quorum, the Joint Committee shall occupy the position of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and shall exercise their powers as a single body.”).Google Scholar

32 See id. at art. 91 (2) (“If the Land where such danger is imminent is not itself willing or able to combat the danger, the Federal Government may place the police in that Land and the police forces of other Länder under its own orders and deploy units of the Federal Border Police. Any such order shall be rescinded once the danger is removed, or at any time on the demand of the Bundesrat. If the danger extends beyond the territory of a single Land, the Federal Government, insofar as is necessary to combat such danger, may issue instructions to the Land governments; the first and second sentences of this paragraph shall not be affected by this provision.”); id. at art. 115-F (1) and (2) (“(1) During a state of defense the Federal Government, to the extent circumstances require, may: 1. employ the Federal Border Police throughout the federal territory; 2. issue instructions not only to federal administrative authorities but also to Land governments and, if it deems the matter urgent, to Land authorities, and may delegate this power to members of Land governments designated by it. (2) The Bundestag, the Bundesrat, and the Joint Committee shall be informed without delay of the measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article.”). See Peter Eichhorn, Besondere Formen der Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern im Katastrophenfall und zur Aufrechterhaltung der inneren Sicherheit 54 (1998).Google Scholar

33 See Grundgesetz, [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-B (“Upon the promulgation of a state of defense the power of command over the Armed Forces shall pass to the Federal Chancellor.”).Google Scholar

34 See id. at art. 87-A (3) and (4) (“During a state of defense or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defense mission. Moreover, during a state of defense or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may also be authorized to support police measures for the protection of civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities. (4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organized armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.”).Google Scholar

35 See id. at art. 115-I (1) (“If the competent federal bodies are incapable of taking the measures necessary to avert the danger, and if the situation imperatively calls for immediate independent action in particular areas of the federal territory, the Land governments or the authorities or representatives they designate shall be authorized, within their respective spheres of competence, to take the measures provided for in paragraph (1) of Article 115-F.”). See Hans-Joachim Rungweber, Kompetenzverschiebungen im Bereich der Exekutive im Rahmen der Notstandsverfassung 44 (1979) (dissertation, University of Bochum) (on file at the Max Planck Institute for International Law, Heidelberg).Google Scholar

36 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/B (3) (“The National Defense Council shall exercise (a) the powers transferred to it by the Parliament; (b) the powers of the President of the Republic; (c) the powers of the Government.”).Google Scholar

37 See id. at art. 19/B (1)(a) & (b).Google Scholar

38 See id. at 19/B (1)(a) (“During a state of martial law, the National Defense Council shall decide (a) on the use of the armed forces abroad and within the country, the participation of the armed forces in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian operations in foreign theaters, and the stationing of armed forces in a foreign country, (b) on the deployment of foreign armed forces in Hungary or in other countries from the territory of Hungary, and on the stationing of foreign armed forces in Hungary, …”).Google Scholar

39 See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-D (“(1) During a state of defense the federal legislative process shall be governed by the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article without regard to the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 76, the second sentence of paragraph (1) and paragraphs (2) to (4) of Article 77, Article 78, and paragraph (1) of Article 82 [details of legislative procedure with rather generous deadlines]. (2) Federal Government bills that the Government designates as urgent shall be forwarded to the Bundesrat at the same time as they are submitted to the Bundestag. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall debate such bills in joint session without delay. Insofar as the consent of the Bundesrat is necessary for any such bill to become law, a majority of its votes shall be required. Details shall be regulated by rules of procedure adopted by the Bundestag and requiring the consent of the Bundesrat…”).Google Scholar

40 See id. at art. 115-K (1) (“Laws enacted in accordance with Articles 115c, 115e, and 115g [emergency laws], as well as statutory instruments issued on the basis of such laws, shall suspend the operation of incompatible law so long as they are in effect. This provision shall not apply to earlier law enacted pursuant to Articles 115c, 115e or 115g.”). See also A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC -Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/B (4) (“The National Defense Council may pass decrees, which may suspend the application of certain laws or which may deviate from the provisions of certain laws. Furthermore, it may take other extraordinary measures, but may not, however, suspend the application of the Constitution.”).Google Scholar

41 See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-E (2) (“This Basic Law may neither be amended nor abrogated nor suspended in whole or in part by a law enacted by the Joint Committee. …”). See also A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/B (4).Google Scholar

42 See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-K (2) & (3) (“(2) Laws adopted by the Joint Committee, as well as statutory instruments issued on the basis of such laws, shall cease to have effect no later than six months after the termination of a state of defense. (3) Laws containing provisions that diverge from Articles 91a, 91b, 104a, 106, and 107 [provisions on joint responsibilities of the Federation and the Länder, and on fiscal powers] shall apply no longer than the end of the second fiscal year following the termination of a state of defense. After such termination they may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, be amended by a federal law so as to revert to the provisions of Titles VIIIa and X [titles on joint responsibilities of the Federation and the Länder, and on fiscal powers].”). See also A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] arts. 19/B (5) & 19/C (4).Google Scholar

43 See Schmitt, Carl, Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung, in 1 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 63 (1924); Erwin Jacobi, Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung, in 1 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 117 ff. (1924).Google Scholar

44 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 8 (4) (“During a state of national crisis, state of emergency or state of danger, the exercise of fundamental rights may be suspended or restricted, with the exception of the fundamental rights specified in Articles 54-56. [life and human dignity, right to freedom and personal security, capability to have rights], Paragraphs (2)-(4) of Article 57. [presumption of innocence, fair trial, nullum crimen], Article 60. [freedom of conscience and religion], Articles 66-69. [equality of men and women, children's rights, national minority rights, prohibition to expel Hungarian citizens] and Article 70/E [social security].”).Google Scholar

45 See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-C (2) (“To the extent required by circumstances during a state of defense, a federal law for a state of defense may: 1. make temporary provisions respecting compensation in the event of expropriation that deviate from the requirements of the second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 14; 2. establish a time limit for deprivations of freedom different from that specified in the third sentence of paragraph (2) [Only a judge may rule upon the permissibility or continuation of any deprivation of freedom.] and the first sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 104 [Any person provisionally detained on suspicion of having committed a criminal offense shall be brought before a judge no later than the day following his arrest; the judge shall inform him of the reasons for the arrest, examine him, and give him an opportunity to raise objections.], but not exceeding four days, for cases in which no judge has been able to act within the time limit that normally applies.”). See also Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Weimarer Reichsverfassung] [WRC – Weimar Republic Constitution] art. 48 (2).Google Scholar

46 See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 115-C (2).Google Scholar

47 See, e.g., id. at art. 11 (2) (“[Freedom of movement] may be restricted only by or pursuant to a law, and only in cases in which the absence of adequate means of support would result in a particular burden for the community, or in which such restriction is necessary to avert an imminent danger to the existence or the free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, to combat the danger of an epidemic, to respond to a grave accident or natural disaster, to protect young persons from serious neglect, or to prevent crime.”).Google Scholar

48 Herzog, R., Artikel 115c, in Das Grundgesetz ¶ 27 (Maunz et al. eds., 1969).Google Scholar

49 See Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs [Weimarer Reichsverfassung] [WRC – Weimar Republic Constitution] art. 48 (2).Google Scholar

50 See id. at art. 48(2).Google Scholar

51 See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law or Constitution] art. 87-A (4) (“… Any … employment of the Armed Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands”); id. at art. 91 (2) (“Any … order [placing the police of a Land and the police forces of other Länder under federal leading] shall be rescinded … any time on the demand of the Bundesrat.”); id. at art. 115-F (2) (“The Bundestag, the Bundesrat, and the Joint Committee shall be informed without delay of the measures taken in [state of defense].”); id. at art. 115-L (1) (“The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time repeal laws enacted by the Joint Committee. The Bundesrat may demand that the Bundestag reach a decision on this question. Any measures taken by the Joint Committee or by the Federal Government to avert a danger shall be rescinded if the Bundestag and the Bundesrat so decide.”). See also A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [HC - Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19/C (3) (“The President of the Republic shall immediately inform the Speaker of Parliament of any emergency measures that have been introduced. The Parliament or, should the Parliament be obstructed, the Parliamentary Defense Committee shall remain in session during a state of emergency. The Parliament, or the Parliamentary Defense Committee, shall have the right to suspend emergency measures introduced by the President of the Republic.”).Google Scholar

52 See Friedrich Koja, Der Staatsnotstand als Rechtsbegriff 15 (1979) (noting that it is logical that, wherever the traditions of democracy and the rule of law are not strong, precise regulation is especially important).Google Scholar

53 In December 1981, General Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland so as to quash the democratic oppositional movement. See International Commission of Jurists, supra note 21, at 86.Google Scholar

54 See 1958 Const. art. 16 (“(1) Where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the measures required by these circumstances, after formally consulting the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the assemblies and the Constitutional Council. (2) He shall inform the Nation of these measures in a message. (3) The measures must stem from the desire to provide the constitutional public authorities, in the shortest possible time, with the means to carry out their duties. The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures. Parliament shall convene as of right. (4) The National Assembly shall not be dissolved during the exercise of the emergency powers.”).Google Scholar

55 See Stern, , supra note 9, at 1290.Google Scholar

56 See Koja, , supra note 52, at 65. See also Robert Alexy, Zur Struktur der Rechtsprinzipien, in Regeln, Prinzipien und Elemente im System des Rechts 35 (Bernd Schilcher, et al. eds., 2000) (discussing in general the connection between proportionality and balancing).Google Scholar

57 See Hesse, , Staatsnotstand, supra note 6, at 202.Google Scholar

58 See Koja, , supra note 52, at 65.Google Scholar

59 Accordingly, the original version of the Hungarian Constitution (1949), for example, did not contain the institution of state of emergency. A Stalinist constitution did not necessarily require a state of emergency: the state was in any case in a permanent, informal state of emergency. See Stern, supra note 9, at 1297 (discussing pre-constitutional times in a similar vein).Google Scholar

60 Jakab, András, Die Verfassungscharta von “Serbien und Montenegro”, 63 Heidelberg J. Int'l L. 811 (2003).Google Scholar

61 The advantage of a non-German author in this sensitive, theoretical area is that he or she can make stronger, more pointed assertions without offending, since he or she, as outsider, obviously does not mean to take part in an argument internal to Germany. In this sense, the attempt will be made to depict the theoretical situation with honesty and in contradistinction.Google Scholar

62 Friedrich Koja would trace these concepts back to the Hegelian idea of the state as preeminent institution. See Koja, supra note 52, at 12. Koja is partially correct, although one must also bear in mind that these ideas predate even Hegel. See Ernst Rudolf Huber, 1 Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte 654 (1960).Google Scholar

63 See Stern, , supra note 9, at 1337.Google Scholar

64 See Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur: Von den Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf, at IX (1921). See Stern, supra note 9, at 1337 (rejecting Schmitt in formulation, but not in essence). See also Meinhard Schröder, Staatsrecht an den Grenzen des Rechtsstaates, 103 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 121, 134 (1978); Georg Flor, Staatsnotstand und rechtliche Bindung, 73 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 149 (1958); Kirchhof, supra note 5, at 98, 100; Ulrich Scheuner, Der Verfassungsschutz im Bonner Grundgesetz, in Um Recht und Gerechtigkeit: Festgabe für Erich Kaufmann 318 (1950); Hans Nawiasky, 2 Allgemeine Staatslehre, pt. 2, at 108 (1955); Elsbeth Siegers, Staatsnotrecht: Geschichte, Inhalt und Begründung 125 (1974); Hans-Ernst Folz, Staatsnotstand und Notstandsrecht 187 (1962); Hanns Kurz, Volkssouveränität und Volksrepräsentation 317 (1965); Rudolf Zihlmann, Legitimität und Legalität des Notrechts 72 (1950).Google Scholar

65 See Herbert Krüger, Allgemeine Staatslehre 31 (2d ed. 1966); Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie 19 (2d ed. 1934). This is also recognized by the moderated state-centered theories, discussed infra. See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Der verdrängte Ausnahmezustand, 31 Neue juristische Wochenschrift 1881, 1884 (1978) (stating that, when the presumed normality falls away, the reference point for a norm's normativity falls with it); Hermann Heller, Staatslehre 255 (1934).Google Scholar

66 Schmitt, Carl, Legalität und Legitimität, in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924– 1954, at 321 (1958) (author's translation).Google Scholar

67 The state is viewed as a pre-legal institution, whose power is originally unlimited, and only tamed by the law. Even moderate state-centered theorists display this Schmittian viewpoint. See, e.g, Böckenförde, supra note 65, at 1885; Kirchhof, supra note 5, at 117.Google Scholar

68 See Carl Friedrich Wilhelm von Gerber, Grundzüge des deutschen Staatsrechts 42 margin note 2 (3d ed. 1880) (“The recognition of emergency powers contains the idea of the state's right of existence beyond its usual constitutional life, a right that appears in abnormal emergency circumstances”) (author's translation); Erich Kaufmann, Zur Problematik des Volkswillens 14 (1931) (“For the extreme case, an ultimate right of necessity exists, alongside standardized and formalized exceptional rights, in the unwritten, natural-law content of every body of constitutional law”) (author's translation). See also Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht 330 (8th ed. 1923) (“As the individual human being, so too the state has a right of necessity when its existence is threatened”) (author's translation). Or from antiquity, see Cicero, De Legibus III, at 3 (“Salus rei publicae suprema lex esto”).Google Scholar

69 See Schröder, , supra note 64, at 132 (detailing the history of the term jus eminens and citing further references).Google Scholar

70 See Krüger, , supra note 65, at 31 (“Emergency law, by its very concept, implies recourse to natural law as against positive law”) (my translation). See also Stern, supra note 9, at 1336 (reasoning identically).Google Scholar

71 See, e.g., Georg Meyer & Gerhard Anschütz, Lehrbuch des deutschen Staatsrechts 906 (7th ed. 1919) (“Only one thing is sure: the constitution does not intend, cannot intend … for the life of the state to stand still…. Here, constitutional law ceases, and the inquiry … is no longer a legal inquiry”) (my translation). See also Schmitt, supra note 65, at 11 (describing the supremacy of this right to existence over positive law: “Sovereign is whoever decides in the exceptional state”). Schmitt claims that positive law cannot bind this sovereign decision-making and this state of emergency. See Schmitt, supra note 64, at IX.Google Scholar

72 Nawiasky, Hans, 2 Allgemeine Staatslehre, pt. 2, at 108 (1955)Google Scholar

73 See Krüger, , supra note 65, at 31.Google Scholar

74 The restraints are meant to show that unwritten emergency law does not imply an “open general empowerment.” See Stern, supra note 9, at 1337. For a similar opinion see Böckenförde, supra note 65, at 1883.Google Scholar

75 See Stern, , supra note 9, at 1337.Google Scholar

76 Id.Google Scholar

77 Id. at 1334, 1337.Google Scholar

78 Id. at 1337.Google Scholar

79 See Theodor Maunz & Reinhold Zippelius, Deutsches Staatsrecht 415 (30th ed. 1998) (referring only to the theoretical situation where regulation is lacking); Karl Doehring, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 270 (3d ed. 1984); Karl Doehring, Allgemeine Staatslehre 202 (2d ed. 2000); Markus Trotter, Der Ausnahmezustand im historischen und europäischen Rechtsvergleich 99 (1997) (dissertation, University of Heidelberg) (on file at the Max Planck Institute for International Law, Heidelberg); Günter Dürig, Artikel 87a, in Das Grundgesetz ¶ 128, margin note 5 (Maunz, et al. eds., 1971).Google Scholar

80 See Böckenförde, supra note 65, at 1883.Google Scholar

81 For his de lege ferenda constitutional regulatory text, see Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Ausnahmerecht und demokratischer Rechtsstaat, in Die Freiheit des Anderen: Festschrift für Martin Hirsch 259, 264 (Hans-Jochen Vogel ed., 1981).Google Scholar

82 See supra note 79.Google Scholar

83 Thus, the objective of emergency legislation in 1968 was precisely to make recourse to unwritten constitutional principles unnecessary by way of explicit regulation. See Schriftlicher Bericht des Rechtsauschusses, BTDrucks 5/2873 (quoting Stern, supra note 9, at 1329).Google Scholar

84 See Thoma, Richard, Der Vorbehalt der Legislative und das Prinzip der Gesetzmäßigkeit von Verwaltung und Rechtsprechung, in Handbuch, supra note 29, at 221, 232 (“In a structured, republican constitutional state, there can be no state's right of necessity beyond what is constitutionally foreseen”) (author's translation); Andreas Hamann, Zur Frage des Ausnahme- oder Staatsnotrechts, 73 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 405 (1958); Reiner Speidel, Der Begriff der Staatsnotstandslagen und die Möglichkeiten ihrer Abwehr in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 94 (1964); Alfred Voigt, Ungeschriebenes Verfassungsrecht, 10 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 44 (1952); Adolf Arndt, Der Rechtsstaat und sein polizeilicher Verfassungsschutz, 14 Neue juristische Wochenschrift 900 (1961); Hans M. Parche, Der Einsatz von Streitkräften im inneren Notstand: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom rechtsstaatlichen Handeln der Exekutive und seiner Kontrolle 3, 179 (1974) (dissertation, University of Münster) (on file at the Max Planck Institute for International Law, Heidleberg); Christoph Möllers, Staat als Argument 267 (2000); Heinrich Oberreuter, Notstand und Demokratie 89 ff., esp. 113, 120 f. (1978); Werner Kägi, Die Verfassung als rechtliche Grundordnung des Staates 118 (1945); Michael Krenzler, An den Grenzen der Notstandsverfassung. Ausnahmezustand und Staatsnotrecht im Verfassungssystem des Grundgesetzes 74 (1974); Frank-Bodo von Wehrs, Zur Anwendbarkeit des Notstandsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 116 (1971) (dissertation, University of Mainz) (on file at the Max Planck Institute for International Law, Heidelberg). Surprisingly, the approach taken by Konrad Hesse is similar to the Kelsenian approach. See Konrad Hesse, Die normative Kraft der Verfassung 24 (1959); Hesse, supra note 6, at 300. According to Hesse, one cannot call upon supra-positive emergency law, but one should keep in mind that state institutions will indeed do so, where regulation on state of emergency is lacking.Google Scholar

85 Aside from this, the natural-law viewpoint as such is criticized as unscholarly in the Kelsenian tradition. See, e.g., Koja, supra note 4, at 398; Koja, supra note 52, at 10.Google Scholar

86 Arndt, Adolf, Demokratie: Wertsystem des Rechts, in Notstandsgesetz – aber wie? 13 (1962) (author's translation). See also Joseph Barthélemy & Paul Duez, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel 242 (1933) (stating that supra-positive emergency law is no legal principle but only “une théorie politique que le gouvernement pourra invoquer devant le parlement pour expliquer son illégalité et la rendre politiquement excusable”); Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 359 (3d ed. 1929) (stating that the category of state's emergency rights was developed and applied in order to gloss over blatant violations of the legal order, which is just a reformulation of the saying: power prevails law); Adolf Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht 166 (1927) (stating that supra-positive emergency law is the last refuge of those who advocate freedom of the executive from the law, to some degree).Google Scholar

87 Koja, , supra note 4, at 399. See also Koja, supra note 52, at 14 (“State emergency, understood thus, becomes—and this is important—a constitutional state, and not a state of constitutionlessness”) (author's translation).Google Scholar

88 See Arndt, Adolf, Der Rechtsstaat und sein polizeilicher Verfassungsschutz, 14 Neue juristische Wochenschrift 899 (1961) (“A constitutional state has no other raison than its constitution.”) (author's translation); Konrad Hesse, Ausnahmezustand und Grundgesetz, 8 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 741 (1955).Google Scholar

89 Kelsen, Hans, Allgemeine Staatslehre 157 (1925) (author's translation).Google Scholar

90 See Koja, , supra note 52, at 17.Google Scholar

91 Klein, Eckart, Der innere Notstand, in 7 Handbuch des Staatsrechts 412 (1992). This is similar to the doctrine of implied powers. See Karl Doehring, Das Staatsnotrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, in Das Staatsnotrecht in Belgien, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Italien, den Niederlanden, der Schweiz und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 212 (1955).Google Scholar

92 See supra note 83.Google Scholar

93 Those who do not concretely address the current legal situation of the Federal Republic of Germany are in parentheses. Those who do, in italics.Google Scholar

94 See supra, at 1. The Classical Version.Google Scholar

95 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law 100, 109 (2d ed. 1994).Google Scholar

96 Id. at 204.Google Scholar

97 This conceptualization, however, does not mean that a given majority opinion is unassailable. That is, if the implicit, previously unknown ramifications of majority opinion A contradict majority opinion B, then one may legally challenge a majority opinion (namely, whichever majority opinion is the more important, according to majority opinion C).Google Scholar

98 See, e.g., Zsolt Balogh et al., Az Alkotmány magyarázata [Constitutional Commentary] 309 (2003) (supporting the observation implicitly); A. Újfalvi, “Szükség törvényt bont” avagy a rendkívüli jogrend szabályozása a Negyedik Köztársaságban [“Necessity Knows No Law,” or Regulation of the Emergency Legal Order in the Fourth (Hungarian) Republic], 40 Magyar Közigazgatás 614 (1990); András Jakab, A jogszabálytan főbb kérdéseiről [Central Questions for a Theory of Normative Legal Acts] 152 (2003).Google Scholar

99 On the textually bound nature of Hungarian legal reasoning in general, see A. Jakab & M. Hollán, Die rechtsdogmatische Hinterlassenschaft des Sozialismus im heutigen Recht: Das Beispiel Ungarn [The Legal Conceptual Legacy of the Socialism today: The Example of Hungary], 46 Jahrbuch für Ostrecht 11 (2005).Google Scholar