¹ For a critical review of the term Vorverlagerung, cf. Arndt Sinn, Vorverlagerung der Strafbarkeit – Begriff, Ursachen und Regelungstechniken, in Grenzen der Vorverlagerung in einem Tatstrafrecht – Eine rechtsvergleichende Analyse am Beispiel des deutschen und ungarischen Strafrechts, 13 (Arndt Sinn, Walter Gropp & Ferenc Nagy eds., 2011).Google Scholar

² For a critical review of the term Feindstrafecht, cf. Manuel Cancio Meliá, Terrorism and Criminal Law: The Dream of Prevention, The Nightmare of the Rule of Law, 14 New Criminal Law Review (NCLR) 108, 110 (2011).Google Scholar

³ Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A), (5)(A). But, US Federal Law has at least 80 different definitions of terrorism and a number of different definitions of terroristic acts. See Alex Peter Schmid, Political Terrorism (1988); J.J. Lador-Lederer, Defining “Terrorism”—A Comment, in Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, 9 (Henry Hyunwook Han ed., 1993).Google Scholar

⁴ See e.g., Wis. Stat. § 973.017(3)(e)(1)(a)-(c) (use of guidelines, consideration of aggravating factors in the context of criminal sentencing).Google Scholar

⁵ Parallel discussions on the admissibility of undercover investigation evidence in order to prosecute crimes address borderlines of admissible investigation measures within rule-of-law states.Google Scholar

⁶ An example of a hierarchically structured group is the Red Faction Army (RAF), a terrorist group in Germany in the 1970s. More recent groups include Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. Current examples of groups of new non-hierarchically structured forms are the Sauerland Group (Stuttgart 2007) and the Taliban-Terror in Afghanistan lately resulting in killing former President Rabbani on September 20, 2011.Google Scholar

⁷ This explicitly means that terrorist groups tend to not work on base of clear forms and hierarchical structures but interweaving with different religious, economic or social groups within a loose decentralized network, like Al-Qaida. Discussing this see David Tucker, What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?, 13 Terrorism and Political Violence 1, 3 (2001). And see especially Mark Zöller, Terrorismusstrafrecht 91, 92 (2009).Google Scholar

⁸ Explicitly, human targets are not being chosen with the same specificity, they now include innocent and arbitrarily picked individuals. For an empirical discussion see James Piazza, Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?, 21 Terrorism and Political Violence 62 (2009) showing that religious groups especially tend to carry out mass-casualty attacks, most notably the Sept. 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in the United States.Google Scholar

⁹ One example of this may be the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey which has been fighting for an independent Kurdish statehood since 1984. The PKK is a terrorist group as defined in § 129a and 129b of the deutsches Strafgesetzbuch (German Substantive Criminal Code). See German Substantive Criminal Code [deutsches Strafgesetzbuch] [dStGB] in the version promulgated on 13 November 1998, Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] [BGBl.] I at 3322, as amended by Art. 1 of the law of 25 June 2012, BGBl. I at 1374 (Ger.), translated by Michael Bohlander (2010), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html (last accessed: 31 August 2012); referring to the example given see Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [BfV] [Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution], Verfassungsschutzbericht [Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution] 288 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Cf. Zöller, Mark, supra note 7, at 96; Ulrich Sieber, Legitimation und Grenzen von Gefährdungsdelikten im Vorfeld von terroristischer Gewalt, 29 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ) 353 (2009).Google Scholar

¹¹ Clearly Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 98.Google Scholar

¹² Constitutional law and order is built on the rights of freedom and liberty to achieve social safety for all; cf. with a detailed historical argument Helmut Goerlich, Zu Geschichte und Gegenwart der Konstitutionalisierung von Justizgrundrechten, in Beiträge zum deutschen und türkischen Strafrecht und Strafprozessrecht – Die Entwicklung von Rechtssystemen in ihrer gesellschaftlichen Verankerung 25 (Walter Gropp, Bahri Öztürk, Adem Sözüer & Liane Wörner eds., 2010).Google Scholar

¹³ See Verfassungsschutzbericht, supra note 9, at 3.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Verfassungsschutzbericht, supra note 9, at 3. Argumentation reads that the network character functions as the basis for radicalization. The terror attack at Frankfurt Airport in April 2011 is one example, where U.S. soldiers were killed by a single offender, who had been radicalized through such networks.Google Scholar

¹⁵ “Politically motivated criminality” (politisch motivierte Kriminalität) (PMK), introduced in 2001, is defined as “all kinds of criminality against the state, even if there is no proof of any political connection.” Cf. Verfassungsschutzbericht, supra note 9, at 33.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cf. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [BfV] [Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution], Verfassungsschutzberichte [Reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution] (2006-2010).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Cf. Bundesministerium des Innern [BMI] [Federal Ministry of the Interior] & Bundesministerium der Justiz [BMJ] [Federal Ministry of Justice], Second Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht: Langfassung [2^nd Periodical Security Report] 180 (2007).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. at 180. By comparison 79 preliminary investigations of sections 129, 129a, and 129b of the dStGB, allegations involving 100 suspects, were pending in 2006: see Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT Drs.] 16/4007 (question by the German parliament) and BT Drs. 16/5537 (answer by the German government).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Cf. 2^nd Periodical Security Report, supra note 17, at 185.Google Scholar

²⁰ Bohlander, supra note 9, at §§ 89a, 89b, 91. The provisions were introduced by the Gesetz zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren staatsgefährdenden Gewalttaten [Act to Prosecute Preparation of Serious Criminal Offenses], 30 July 2009, BGBl. I at 2437, effective 4 August 2009.Google Scholar

²¹ Through the introduction of sections 89a, 89b, and 91 of the dStGB.Google Scholar

²² As solely in the past, section 129a of the dStGB.Google Scholar

²³ Cf. Grenzenlose Vorverlagerung des Strafrechts? [Unlimited Predating of Criminal Law] (Roland Hefendehl ed., 2010); Grenzen der Vorverlagerung in einem Tatstrafrecht – Eine rechtsvergleichende Analyse am Beispiel des deutschen und ungarischen Strafrechts [Limits of Predating Crimes – A Comparison Between the German and the Hungarian Criminal Law] (Arndt Sinn, Walter Gropp & Ferenc Nagy eds., 2011).Google Scholar

²⁴ Cf. Sinn, supra note 1, at 14. See also Henning Radtke & Mark Steinsiek, Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus durch Kriminalisierung von Vorbereitungshandlungen? – Zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Verfolgung der Vorbereitung von schweren Gewalttaten, 3 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (ZIS) 383, 387 (2008), concluding that the introduction of section 89a in the dStGB by the Ministry draft of 21 April 2008 would still be constitutional and even though predating, it would not yet be “thought crime”. But this argumentation is confined to section 89a. Radtke and Steinsiek's argument has to be read against the background that the Ministry draft of 21 April 2008 did not yet include further predating elements including the preparation of the preparatory crime, now introduced in section 89b of the dStGB.Google Scholar

²⁵ Gesetz zur Umsetzung des Rahmenbeschlusses des Rates vom 13. Juni 2002 zur Terrorismusbekämpfung und zur Änderung anderer Gesetze [Act to implement the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism and to amend related Acts), 22 December, BGBl. I at 2386, art. 1(Ger.). It has been effective since 28 December 2003, in order to transform requirements of the European Council Framework Decision: see Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, 2002 O.J. (L164) 3, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:164:0003:0003:EN:PDF (last accessed: 31 August 2012). This framework decision has been seen as providing a legal EU-terrorism definition, see Eugenia Dumitriu, The E.U.'s Definition of Terrorism: The Council Frame-work Decision on Combating Terrorism, 5 Germ. L.J. 585, 590, 595, 602 (2004).Google Scholar

²⁶ See Boyne, Shawn, Law, Terrorism & Social Movements: How Politics has Shaped Germany's Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 12 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. J. 41 (2004) (for a American and comparative perspective); Karsten Felske, Kriminelle und terroristische Vereinigungen – §§ 129, 129a StGB: Reformdiskussion und Gesetzgebung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert [Criminal and Terrorist Groups—129, 129a of the Criminal Code: Reform Debate and Legislation since the 19^th Century] 349 (2002) (for an historical perspective).Google Scholar

²⁷ For a detailed discussion on the elements of the offense, cf. Bernhard Kretschmer, Criminal Involvement in Terrorist Associations – Classification and Fundamental Principles of the German Criminal Code Section 129a dStGB, 13 (9) Germ. L.J. 1016-1036 (2012); Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 510.Google Scholar

²⁸ As also argued by Lepsius, Oliver, Liberty, Security, and Terrorism: The Legal Position in Germany, 5 Germ. L.J. 435, 438, 439 (2004).Google Scholar

²⁹ Again, the Al-Qaida group may serve as a well known example.Google Scholar

³⁰ This does not mean that such laws are no longer necessary. Traditional groups still exist (even though they may internationalize) and their conduct still may be effectively addressed by older laws. Hereto section 129b of the dStGB allows investigation also in European and International terror cells, critically discussed by Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 331.Google Scholar

³¹ Section 89a of the dStGB punishes preparing a serious offense (against life or personal freedom) endangering the state. Preparatory action can be instructing another person or receiving instruction in the production or the use of firearms, etc.; producing, obtaining for himself or another, storing or supplying to another weapons, etc.; obtaining or storing objects or substances essential for the production of weapons, etc.; or collecting, accepting or providing not unsubstantial assets for the purpose of its commission.Google Scholar

Section 89b of the dStGB provides punishment even for establishing contacts for the purpose of committing a serious violent offense endangering the state. As such, section 89b serves as the preparatory crime to “forming a terroristic group” according to section 129a of the dStGB, which punishes any person who establishes or maintains contacts to an organization within the meaning of section 129a (i.e., if he/she acts with the intention of receiving instruction for the purpose of the commission of a serious violent offense endangering the government and/or democratic state under section 89a(2)(1) of the dStGB). Neither the elements of section 129a nor section 89a of the dStGB have to be fulfilled, if only the offender intends to commit a crime according to section 89a dStGB by establishing or maintaining contact to a terroristic group according to section 129a dStGB. Thereby criminal law is extended in predating and in expanding its subject matter. The aim is to catch the so called “sleeper terrorists.” Cf. in detail Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 581.Google Scholar

Section 91 of the dStGB establishes punishment for encouraging the commission of a serious violent offense endangering the state by displaying or supplying to another written material. For text of German provisions in English, cf. Bohlander, supra note 9.Google Scholar

³² Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism [CECPT] art. 5-10, 1 June 2007, C.E.T.S. No. 196. But Germany went beyond the demands of the convention; even the factual need for the new laws was ever issued; see Lepsius, supra note 28, at 435-437.Google Scholar

³³ CECPT, supra note 32, preamble. Google Scholar

³⁴ BT 16/12428.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Walter Gropp, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, para 3, at 90 (3rd ed. 2005) who argues that substantive criminal law defines, in which the circumstances in which legal norms are indispensible and require public disapprobation and that normally, this requires a certain action resulting in a certain violation of a legally protected interest or it requires a certain action as such. But Gropp also argues that today's criminal laws in majority provide for both. See also, Uta Baroke, Grenzenlose Vorverlagerung des Strafrechtsschutzes durch Gefährdungsdelikte, in Grenzen der Vorverlagerung in einem Tatstrafrecht 247 (Arndt Sinn, Walter Gropp & Ferenc Nagy eds., 2011) who argues that criminal law is predated, if only endangering the interest is sufficient.Google Scholar

³⁶ Cf. also Sinn, supra note 1, at 13,14.Google Scholar

³⁷ The term “safety” shall be especially stressed herein for discussion more and more is about feeling safe than socially secure.Google Scholar

³⁸ Cf. with a critical discussion of a criminal law of averting of dangers see Winfried Hassemer, Kennzeichen und Krisen des modernen Strafrechts, 25 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (ZRP) 378 (1992); Eric Hilgendorf, Strafrechtliche Produzentenhaftung in der Risikogesellschaft (1993); Verena Zöller, Liberty Dies by Inches: German Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights, 5 Germ. L.J. 469, 472, 473 (2004); Thomas Mertens, Criminal Justice after 9-11: ICC or Military Tribunals, 5 Germ. L.J. 545, 568 (2004); Cancio Meliá, supra note 2, at 108.Google Scholar

³⁹ Crimes of concrete or abstract endangerment are sometimes termed strict liability crimes (Gefährdungsdelikte). The terminology, however, is misleading and not used herein as in some criminal codes including those in the United States where “strict liability has a meaning that is significantly different in both criminal and civil contexts.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Cf. Zöller, Mark, supra note 7, at 502. For discussions on recent projects researching the predating of criminal responsibility (Vorverlagerung) by means of substantive criminal law see Unlimited Predating of Criminal Law (Hefendehl), supra note 23; Limits of Predating Crimes (Sinn), supra note 23.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Cf. Limits of Predating Crimes (Sinn), supra note 23.Google Scholar

⁴² Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 502.Google Scholar

⁴³ Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 502.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See also Manuel Cancio Meliá, Zum strafrechtlichen Begriff des Terrorismus,159 Goltdammer's Archiv für Strafrecht (GA) 1 at 5 (2012). Criminal law which includes some aspects of police law is problematic especially within the German legal system because Articles 70-74 of the German Basic Law (GG) allow both the German Federation and the German Länder (the states of Germany) to enact such laws, see: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany], May 23, 1949, in the revised version published in the Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt] [BGBl.] Part III, classification number 100-1, as last amended by the Act of 21 July 2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 944). Article 74(1)(1) of the GG gives exclusive jurisdiction to enact criminal law to the federal legislator, because substantive criminal law and criminal procedural law are been seen as an intrinsic task of the German Federation. In contrast, the Federal Länder are competent to enact police law, because preventing danger from the public is been seen as one major task of each of the Länder within their areas. New enactments of laws to prevent danger originating in police law but “dressed up” as substantive criminal law therefore interfere with the Länders' competence to legislate: cf. Susanne Beck, Rechtsstaatlichkeit – Bauernopfer im Krieg gegen den Terror?, in Festgabe für Rainer Paulus zum 70. Geburstag 15, 27 (Klaus Laubenthal ed., 2009).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For a discussion of structure and terms see especially Sinn, supra note 1, at 13, 15. Both are discussed as expansion (Ausdehnung) of criminal law. However, both need to be differentiated into an expansion of facts (sachliche Ausdehnung) and an expansion of time by predating criminal responsibility (Vorverlagerung). In fact, both will occur.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For a detailed discussion on crimes of endangerment and their lawfulness (Zulässigkeit) in German criminal law see Frank Zieschang, Die Gefährdungsdelikte, (1998); Wolfgang Wohlers, Deliktstypen des Präventionsstrafrechts: zur Dogmatik “moderner” Gefährdungsdelikte, (2000). In eliminating the element of concrete damage and replacing it with danger, criminal responsibility is also (already) predated to the point where the legally protected interest is endangered. The offender does not have to intend on damaging, but must endanger the interest: see Sinn supra note 1, at 13, 31, 32.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Baroke, supra note 35, at 247.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Karl Lackner, Das konkrete Gefährdungsdelikt im Verkehrsstrafrecht (1967).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Baroke, supra note 35, at 247.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Baroke, lately, supra note 35, at 247, 257, 275.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See e.g., Schünemann, Bernd, Kritische Anmerkungen zur geistigen Situation der deutschen Strafrechtswissenschaft, 142 GA 201, 213 (1995).Google Scholar

⁵² Hence, crimes of endangerment exist and continue to exist. Some interests are not to be protected else, like roadworthiness or public safety in special circumstances (e.g., protecting from terror attacks); see sources cited Baroke, supra note 35, at 247, 260.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Schünemann, supra note 51, at 142; Baroke, supra note 35, at 264.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Sieber, supra note 10, at 357; Schünemann, supra note 51, at 142. Already Schünemann's first and second criteria concede that the actual circumstances require protection of the legal interest (first criterion) while not interfering with entitled rights of the actor (second criterion). The academic discussion in Germany meanwhile discusses a so-called crime of qualified endangerment (Eignungsdelikt). The term seems to have come to the forefront in the discussion. The term well describes that not any endangerment is sufficient, but only such which qualifies to intervene with the legally protected interest; with further references Baroke, supra note 35, at 275 who explicitly argues for a conversion.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Also named abstrakt-konkretes Gefährdungsdelikt (crime of substantiated abstract endangerment). The term is to be criticized. Not only is translation almost impossible, the German terminology herein brings together, what is actually oppositional: Something is either concrete and substantiated or it is abstract, not both.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Sinn, supra note 1, at 13, 19.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Cf. Hefendehl, Roland, Über die Pönalsierung des Neutralen – zur Sicherheit, in Grenzenlose Vorverlagerung des Strafrechts? 89, 94 (Roland Hefendehl ed., 2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Jakobs, Günter, Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld einer Rechtsgutverletzung, 97 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW) 751 (1985) who critically pointed on the beginning of developments. For a provoked discussion see only Francisco Muñoz Conde, Über das “Feindstrafrecht” (2007); Michael Pawlik, Der Terrorist und sein Recht. Zur rechtstheoretischen Einordnung des modernen Terrorismus (2008); Arndt Sinn, Moderne Verbrechensverfolgung – Auf dem Weg zu einem Feindstrafrecht?, 1 ZIS 107 (2006); Manuel Cancio Meliá, Feind “strafrecht”?, 117 ZStW 267 (2005).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Sinn, supra note 1, at 13, 25.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Jakobs, supra note 58, at 756. See also Sinn, supra note 1, at 33; Jens Puschke, Grund und Grenzen des Gefährdungsstrafrechts am Beispiel der Vorbereitungsdelikte, in Grenzenlose Vorverlagerung des Strafrechts? 24 (Roland Hefendehl ed., 2010).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Likewise see Sieber, supra note 10, at 359 for a discussion on the forum internum. Google Scholar

⁶² See supra discussion Part E.II.1 Expanding Criminal Laws over a Bigger Base of Facts (sachliche Ausdehnung) together with Schünemann, supra note 51.Google Scholar

⁶³ Argued also by Sinn, supra note 1, at 13, 33.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ While such core area is basically acknowledged, the German Federal High Court of the Constitution (BVerfG) decides restrained. Unclear is, whether and to what extent such core area of the individual has to be respected in cases of criminalizing the planning and preparing of the commission of crimes, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 80, 367 (375), 14 Sept. 1989, 43 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 563, 1990 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Cf. also Verena Zöller, supra note 38, at 469, 474, 475.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ As also argued by Christoph Safferling, Can Criminal Prosecution be the Answer to massive Human Rights Violations? 5 Germ. L.J. 1469, 1488 (2004) on behalf of human rights violations and International criminal law.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Hassemer, Winfried, Kennzeichen und Krisen des modernen Strafrechts, 25 ZRP 378, 380 (1992). But see Bettina Weißer, “Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus” – Prävention durch Strafrecht?, 63 Juristenzeitung (JZ) 388, 393 (2008); Bettina Weißer, Über den Umgang des Strafrechts mit terroristischen Bedrohungslagen, 121 ZStW 131, 153 (2009).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Weißer, “Der Kampf gegen den Terrorismus” – Prävention durch Strafrecht?, supra note 67, at 393.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 503.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Cf. Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 503; Bernd Heinrich, Die Grenzen des Strafrechts bei der Gefahrprävention, Brauchen oder haben wir ein “Feindstrafrecht”?, 121 ZStW 94,116, 121 (2009).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Hereto and discussing the elements of section 129a of the dStGB: Kretschmer, supra note 27, at 1026- 1028. Cf. also Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 510.Google Scholar

⁷² Also Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 503; Weißer, Über den Umgang des Strafrechts mit terroristischen Bedrohungslagen, supra note 67, at 140.Google Scholar

⁷³ Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 503.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 504.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ For full discussion see Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 505.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ For cases of terrorism, see also Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 508; Weißer, Über den Umgang des Strafrechts mit terroristischen Bedrohungslagen, supra note 67, at 393, 395.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ According to German constitutional law, the right of “free assembly” is a personal right deriving from Art. 8 of the German Basic Law (GG): GG, supra note 44, at Art. 8.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 560, but also at 505.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 560, 561.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Intention was to punish the single offender: BT. 16/12428, 9. Cf. Kretschmer, supra note 27, at 1030 with further references.Google Scholar

⁸¹ See also Gierhake, Katrin, Zur geplanten Einführung neuer Straftatbestände wegen der Vorbereitung terroristischer Straftaten, 3 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (ZIS) 397, 402 (2008); Weißer, Über den Umgang des Strafrechts mit terroristischen Bedrohungslagen, supra note 67, at 149.Google Scholar

⁸² For the discussion of the law see supra Part D. Provisions: What is punishable according to the German Criminal Code?.Google Scholar

⁸³ Referring to section 89a of the dStGB: see supra note 31.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Supra note 31.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Cf. Bützler, Volker, Die Vorverlagerung der Strafbarkeit am Beispiel der Terrorismusverfolgung aus deutscher Perspektive, in Grenzen der Vorverlagerung in einem Tatstrafrecht 375, 394 (Arndt Sinn, Walter Gropp & Ferenc Nagy eds., 2011).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ This is also criticized by Gierhake, supra note 81, at 398; Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 586.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ The principle of clarity and definiteness (Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz) is incorporated within Art. 103(2) of the German GG: see supra note 44 at Art. 103(2). It is one of the main principles, especially within criminal law. Laws need to clearly define the grounds and the extent of the crime with all its elements and provide punishment. Also criminal law provisions that only function prospectively by averting danger to public need to contain specific material substance, at least in order to ring-fence developments. This specific material substance is derived from respecting constitutional principles, above all the principle of Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz, in defining the offense of abstract endangerment clearly and with certainty: see Schünemann, supra note 51, at 142 (This is Schünemann's third criterion).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See also Mark Zöller, supra note 7, at 586.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Jakobs, supra note 58, at 761.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See dStGB, supra note 9, at § 30; for a translation see Bohlander, supra note 9. According to section 30(2) of the dStGB, criminal responsibility also attaches to one who “declares his willingness or who accepts the offer of another or who agrees with another to commit or abet the commission of a felony”.Google Scholar

⁹¹ This is also seen as a necessary requirement by Michael Köhler, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil 22 (1997). For a critical summary of the discussion see Gierhake, supra note 81, at 400, 401; Sieber, supra note 10, at 362.Google Scholar

⁹² Title of the German offense as translated by Bohlander, supra note 9. See supra Part D. Provisions: What is punishable according to the German Criminal Code?; supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion on German 2009 laws of sections 89a, 89b, and 91 of the dStGB.Google Scholar

⁹³ The German wording does not require the “strong” establishment of relations to a terror group, but simply punishes for “contacting a terror group” under section 129a and section 129b of the dStGB or for “keeping contact to such a terror group” in order to be advised according to a crime under section 89a of the dStGB. A simple phone call would be sufficient.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Also rightly argued by Sieber, supra note 10, at 362.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Sieber, supra note 10, at 362.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See the arguments by Jakobs, supra note 58, at 756 on conspiracy—if close friends develop criminal plans. For a discussion which links conspiracy to the new German terrorist offenses see Gierhake, supra note 81, at 400; Detlev Sternberg-Lieben, § 89b, in Schönke/Schröder-Kommentar zum StGB (Albin Eser et al eds., 28. ed., 2010), margin number 1.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). This discussion is not farfetched, but part of the U.S. discussion on the U.S. Patriot Act: see only Viet D. Dinh, USA Patriot Act, 5 Germ. L.J. 461, 463 (2004).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Backes, Otto, Der Kampf des Strafrechts gegen nicht-organisierte Terroristen, 28 StrafVerteidiger (StV) 654, 660 (2008).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Sieber, supra note 10, at 353.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Because the “social phenomenon” terrorism changes its faces, one concrete and clear international definition is almost inconceivable. On the other hand, this failure to agree on a definition of terrorism is been seen as the major problem: see Verena Zöller, supra note 38, at 469, 476. For the social approach see also Saul Newman, Terror, Sovereignty and Law: On the Politics of Violence, 5 Germ. L.J. 569 (2004).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ For concrete suggestions on a legal definition see now Cancio Meliá, supra note 44, at 8.Google Scholar

¹⁰² This does not mean that constitutional borderlines are to be drawn differently for installing legal measures to prevent danger from the public and to ensure public security by police work, clearly: see Heinrich, supra note 70, at 129, 130. But, whether criminal law can be applied is yet to be seen different.Google Scholar