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The EU as a Promoter of Values and the European Global Project

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019


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The international arena is increasingly important in EU legal discourse. Using the word “global” is highly fashionable at present, but what does it mean to refer to this concept? It is not an exaggeration to claim that if “constitutionalism” is added to the picture you have a new catchphrase for understanding the EU legal architecture beyond the nation state and its interrelationship with the external sphere: “Global constitutionalism.” Much of the discussion on the normative dimension of EU powers is centered on the function of the EU as a promoter of values abroad. This is also what the Lisbon Treaty promises as set out in Article 3(5) and Article 21 in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) by guaranteeing, inter alia, that the EU shall uphold its values in the relationship with the wider world and contribute to the protection of its citizens. As witnessed in the recent judgment on the validity of the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS), the EU's values may sometimes spill over to the global level. In the ETS case, the Court of Justice set out to make a powerful statement on the importance of environmental protection, even when such concerns extend beyond the borders of Europe. Therefore, the question of global constitutionalism in the EU seems inextricably linked to the normative question of what values the EU should promote or conversely “borrow” from the outside world.

Special Issue: EU Law qua Global Governance Law
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 


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