¹ From Greek phainómenon, “that which appears.”Google Scholar

² The phenomenological method examines and demonstrates the perception of given circumstances and considers acts of consciousness as the inducement for ethical decisions.Google Scholar

³ Brentano, Franz, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte (Thomas Binder & Arkadiusz Chrudzimski eds., 2008).Google Scholar

⁴ Christine Tappolet, Émotions et Valeurs (2000).Google Scholar

⁵ Solomon, Robert C., True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us (2007).Google Scholar

⁶ See Scheler, Max, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung Eines Ethischen Personalismus 266 (Manfred Frings ed., 2000); Robert C. Solomon, Emotionen, Gedanken und Gefühle: Emotionen als Beteiligung an der Welt, in Philosophie der Gefühle 150 (Sabine A. Dörig ed., 2009).Google Scholar

⁷ Hubmann, Heinrich, Naturrecht und Rechtsgefühl 320, in 153 Archiv Für die Civilistische Praxis (AcP) 297 (1954).Google Scholar

⁸ Good, Paul, Max Scheler im Gegenwartsgeschehen Der Philosophie 21 (1998).Google Scholar

⁹ See infra Part C.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft 47 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 1956).Google Scholar

¹¹ Analogue categories are time and causality. See id. at 86, 103, 231, 289.Google Scholar

¹² So as to be able to represent an object in space, the idea of space must be—a priori—inherent to the faculty of cognition. See Id. at 48.Google Scholar

¹³ Id. at XIII, 23.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Id. at XVI, 25.Google Scholar

¹⁵ It has to be pointed out that Kant himself—also against a general prejudice—attributes an essential significance to emotion: The feeling of respect (Gefühl der Achtung) before the moral law is described as morality itself. See Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft 196 (Wilhelm Weischedel ed., 1956). Kant further states that respect is “das Gefühl der Unangemessenheit unseres Vermögens zur Erreichung einer Idee, die für uns Gesetz ist“ (respect is defined as “the feeling of inadequacy of our capability to achieve an idea, which will be our principle”). See Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der Urteilskraft 344. For a representative overview on the whole emotional aspects of the Kantian ethics, see Lege, Joachim, Abscheu, Schaudern und Empörung. Die Emotionale Seite von Recht und Sittlichkeit bei Kant, in 14 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 447 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Scheler, Maria & Scheler, Max, Zur Ethik und Erkenntnistheorie 433 (Max Scheler & Manfred Frings eds., 3rd ed. 1986).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Pohlmann, Rosemarie, Autonomie, in 1 Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 707 (Joachim Ritter ed., 1971).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Scheler, supra note 6, at 266. See also Hartmann, Nicolai, Ethik 117 (1962).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See also supra Part B.I.Google Scholar

²⁰ A primary emotional disclosure of the world and its proceedings has also been suggested by empirical research. See Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds. How Nature Designed our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong 163 (2007); Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotional Memory Systems in the Brain, in 58 Behavioural Brain Research 69 (1993); see also Daniel Goleman, Emotional intelligence 19, 35 (1995); infra note 44.Google Scholar

²¹ The intentional access to the world and its proceedings through its own sentient position is described as “emotionally engaging with the world” as a primary mode of cognitive involvement with the world. See Solomon, supra note 5, at 150, 168; see also Vetter, Helmuth, Emotion, in Wörterbuch der Phänomenologischen Begriffe 138 (Helmuth Vetter ed., 2004).Google Scholar

²² See Scheler, Max, Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass (1913).Google Scholar

²³ Eley, Lothar, Rechtsgefühl und materiale Wertethik, in Das sogenannte Rechtsgefühl, 10 Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie 136, 156 (Ernst-Joachim Lampe ed., 1985).Google Scholar

²⁴ See supra Part B.II.Google Scholar

²⁵ See Hartmann, supra note 18, at 116; Johannes Hessen, 2 Lehrbuch der Philosophie 210 (1948); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions (2005); Scheler, supra note 6, at 85, 88.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 400/51, 15 Jan. 1958, 7 BVerfGE 198 [hereinafter Lüth] (Ger.); Ulrich Matz, Rechtsgefühl und objektive Werte 124 (1966).Google Scholar

²⁷ Scheler, supra note 6, at 216; Eley, supra note 23, at 136, 155.Google Scholar

²⁸ At this point the distinction between positive law and morality appears.Google Scholar

²⁹ The translation is by the author. Bundesgericht [Bger - Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 9, 1991 117 BGE 257 (Switz.) (“Gleiches nach Massgabe seiner Gleichheit gleich, und Ungleiches nach Massgabe seiner Ungleichheit ungleich behandelt wird.“) See, e.g., Bundesgericht [BGer - Federal Supreme Court] May 23, 1962, 88 BGE 149 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer – Federal Supreme Court] 18 Mar. 1964, 90 BGE 159 (Switz.); Bundesgericht [BGer - Federal Supreme Court] 11 Dec. 1996, 123 BGE 9 (Switz.) (concerning the taxation of individuals); Bundesgericht [BGer – Federal Supreme Court] 10 June 2010, 136 BGE 231 (Switz.) (concerning social welfare benefits).Google Scholar

³⁰ See Gächter, Thomas, Rechtsmissbrauch im öffentlichen Recht 380 (2005).Google Scholar

³¹ Id. at 400.Google Scholar

³² See Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 5 para. 2 (Switz.); Bundesverfassung [BV] 18 Apr. 1999, SR 101, art. 5 para. 3 (stating the axiom of good faith).Google Scholar

³³ According to Venzlaff, the majority of legal terms are undefined and require interpretation. See Venzlaff, Friedrich, Über die Schlüsselrolle des Rechtsgefühls bei der Gesetzesanwendung 32 (1973).Google Scholar

³⁴ A text cannot explain itself, only further factors as the practicing use of language can help to evaluate and determine its meaning; “[t]he meaning of a word is its use in the language.” See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Werkausgabe in 8 Bänden (1989); Ludwig Wittgenstein, 40 Philosophical Grammar 60; cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1 Philosophical Investigations § 43 (1953). For Wittgenstein's thought applied to juridical contexts, see Depenheuer, Otto, Der Wortlaut als Grenze (1988); Manfred Herbert, Rechtstheorie als Sprachkritik: Zum Einfluss Wittgensteins auf die Rechtstheorie (1995); Eduardo Silva-Romero, Wittgenstein et la philosophie du droit (2002); Andreas Kley, Wittgenstein und die Moderne Juristische Methodik, in 14 Recht: Zeitschrift für Juristische Weiterbildung und Praxis 189 (1996); see also Marc Amstutz & Marcel A. Niggli, Recht und Wittgenstein I. Wittgensteins Philosophie als Bedrohung der rechtswissenschaftlichen Methode, in Gauchs Welt: Festschrift für Peter Gauch zum 65. Geburtstag 3 (Pierre Tercier et al. eds., 2004); Julia Hänni, Ludwig Wittgenstein und die Juristische Hermeneutik: Zur Korrelation von Welt, Sprache und Ethik, in Rechtswissenschaft und Hermeneutik. Kongress der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, 16. und 17. Mai 2008, Universität Zürich, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 209 (Marcel Senn & Barbara Fritschi eds., 2009).Google Scholar

³⁵ See, e.g., Alexy, Robert, Theorie der Grundrechte 23 (2001).Google Scholar

³⁶ Meier, Christoph, Zur Diskussion über das Rechtsgefühl 57 (1986).Google Scholar

³⁷ Bihler, Michael, Rechtsgefühl, System und Wertung 19 (1979); Reinhold Zippelius, Das Wesen des Rechts 72 (1978).Google Scholar

³⁸ See Eley, supra note 23, at 136, 146. According to Hubmann, the sense of justice takes mainly effect in the weighing of interests. See Hubmann, supra note 7, at 323.Google Scholar

³⁹ Bundesgericht [BGer – Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 1, 2004, [BGE] 1P. 624/2003 (Switz.) (concerning public defenders).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ References to the intellectual sources of previous knowledge in Greek Philosophy can be found in Eley, supra note 23, at 136, 150.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Clausdieter Schott, Rechtsgrundsatze und Gesetzeskorrektur: Ein Beitr. Z. Geschichte Gesetzl. Rechtsfindungsregeln (1975); Gächter, supra note 30, at 392.Google Scholar

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⁴³ This has been proved by empirical psychology. From a developmental psychology point of view, see, for example, Martin Dornes, Der kompetente Säugling: Die Präverbale Entwicklung des Menschen 124 (1998); Goleman, supra note 20, at 19; see also the research work of Hauser, supra note 20.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Scheler, Max, Schriften aus dem Nachlass 356, 348 (Maria Scheler ed., 1957); see also Scheler, Max, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft 109 (Maria Scheler ed., 1960).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Good, supra note 8, at 27.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Sometimes already when seizing the state of records we refer to our evaluating emotional competences to sort the juridically relevant elements.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Hartmann, supra note 18, at 116.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Gächter, supra note 30, at 394; Meier, supra note 36, at 133.Google Scholar

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⁵⁰ Gächter, supra note 30, at 400; Kaufmann, supra note 49, at 367, 372; Meier, supra note 36, at 133.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Gächter, supra note 30, at 398.Google Scholar

⁵² See Weimar, Rechtsgefühl und Ordnungsbedürfnis, supra note 42, at 164; Meier, supra note 36, at 57.Google Scholar

⁵³ The experience of the sense of value is therefore not suitable to justify juridical decisions. To do so, rational reasons are necessary. See Hubmann, supra note 7, at 328.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Gächter, supra note 30, at 400.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Venzlaff, supra note 33, at 59. The duty to justify juridical decision is not questioned by this in any way; it is indisputable that juridical decisions and decision making must be accessible, comprehensible and reasonable.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ A subjective factor which is called upon when evaluating what is to be considered just and right. According to Venzlaff, the methods of interpretation can only be used in an appropriate manner, when the practitioner is aware of the fact that his or her personal approach or attitude will play an essential part in the decision-making process. See Venzlaff, supra note 33, at 59; see also Hans Wiprächtiger, recht 1995, 143, 145 (1995).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Gächter, supra note 30, at 397. See also the examples above.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Venzlaff, supra note 33, at 59.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Zippelius, Reinhold, Rechtsgefühl und Rechtsgewissen, in Das sogenannte Rechtsgefühl, 10 Jahrbuch für Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie 12 (Ernst-Joachim Lampe ed., 1985).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See id. at 74; Meier, supra note 36, at 58. Structural and organizational factors of courts form a barrier hereto such as the stages of appeal and the system of the election of judges as well as the authorities of administration. See Riemer, Hans Michael, Die Einleitungsartikel des schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches 107 (2003); Wiprächtiger, supra note 56, at 143, 150.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Scheler describes that one component of conscience based on the intentional feeling is learned and bound to culture and tradition in the conscious mind of the human. See Scheler, supra note 6, at 324. The conscious mind is defined differently by Hartmann. For him, it is a primary sense of evaluation that naturally inherits every human being. See Hartmann, supra note 18, at 134.Google Scholar

⁶² Gächter, supra note 30, at 399.Google Scholar

⁶³ Meier, supra note 36, at 62. We must distinguish between normative justification and normative enforcement. See also Eley, supra note 23, at 136, 142. See also Wiprächtiger, supra note 56, at 143, 148.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Platon, Politeia 433; Platon, Sämtliche Werke in zehn Bänden (Karlheinz Hülser ed., 1991); Annius Ulpianus (Ulpian), Digesta 1.1.10.Google Scholar

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⁶⁶ See supra Part C.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Rational and emotional elements often collaborate in juridical decisions. This partly corresponds with the postmodern philosophical understanding of an unalterable component of emotion within cognition resp. reason. See Scheer, Brigitte, Gefühl, in 2 Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Historisches Wörterbuch 628 (Karlheinz Barck et al. eds., 2003).Google Scholar