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113 The regime has been established by the following legislative acts: Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE); Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees; both available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm; The Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001 is accompanied by a German implementation law called: Gesetz zur Ausführung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2157/2001 des Rates vom 8. Oktober 2001 über das Statut der Europäischen Gesellschaft (SE) (SE-Ausführungsgesetz – SEAG) of 22 December 2004, BGBl. I, 3675; whereas the Directive 2001/86 EC has been transformed into German law by Gesetz über die Beteiligung der Arbeitnehmer in einer Europäischen Gesellschaft (SE-Beteiligungsgesetz – SEBG) of 22 December 2004, BGBl. I, 3675.Google Scholar

114 See Krause, Rüdiger, Die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in der Europäischen Gesellschaft, BetriebsBerater 1221 (2005), at 1222, who describes the negotiations before the conclusion of the covenenat as “bargaining in the shadows of law”.Google Scholar

115 See, supra, note 114, at 1226; also, supra, note 112, II. 2. e) bb).Google Scholar

116 Section 21 SE-Beteiligungsgesetz states that this covenant between the employer and a delegation of employees may determine how the supervisory board and the workers council are equipped.Google Scholar

117 Spiegel Online, 3 November 2007: Machtkampf: Porsche verschiebt VW-Aktienkauf [Power struggle: Porsche delays share acquisition of Volkswagen], available at: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,515200,00.html (last visited 7 November 2007)Google Scholar

118 Porsche worker would then have 30-times more influence as the vote of a Volkswagen worker, see Lange, Kai, Angriff aufs Gewerkschaftsparadies in: Spiegel-Online, 24 October 2007, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,513024,00.html; Ansgar Siemens, Wenn sie zanken Seit’ and Seit', Süddeutsche.de, 24 October 2007, available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/artikel/786/139495/.Google Scholar

119 Arbeitsgericht Stuttgart, decision of 24 October 2007, supra, note 112, at 10; see also the statement by IG-Metall (Germany's largest singular trade union) Peters, Jürgen, Angerichtetes Desaster, an interview by Janko Tietz in: Der Spiegel,29 October 2007, at 108.Google Scholar

120 Arbeitsgericht Stuttgart, Kammer Ludwigsburg, 12 BVGa 4/07 of 24 October 2007, available at: http://www.arbg-stuttgart.de/servlet/PB/show/1213597/12-BVGa-4-07.pdf, at 10Google Scholar

121 Supra, note 10.Google Scholar