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¹⁶³ See generally Michael zürn & Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik: Umkämpfte internationale Institutionen (2011); Pieter de Wilde & Michael Zürn, Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?, 50 J. Common Mkt Stud. 6 (2011); Michael Zürn, The Politicization of World Politics and its Effects: Eight Propositions, 6 Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev. 47 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ Hall, supra note 16.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ According to G&;sta Esping-Andersen, the development of institutions predominantly preoccupied with the production and distribution of social well-being led to the rise of the welfare state, with variations of welfare state institutions and policies in capitalist democracies. Esping-Andersen distinguishes the liberal, conservative, and social democratic model of welfare state regulation. See G&;sta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism [XX] (1990); Schmidt, Manfred G. et al., Der Wohlfahrtsstaat. Eine Einführung in den historischen und internationalen Vergleich (Schmidt, Manfred G. et al. eds., 2007).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ Paul Pierson, Three Worlds of Welfare State Research, 33 Comp. Pol. Stud. 798 (2000).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ See Schulz, Martin, Interview, Daumenschrauben angezogen, 36 Der Spiegel (2012) http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-87997155.html.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ See Wolfgang Schäuble, Interview, Keine Rettung um jeden Preis, 33 Der Spiegel (2011), http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-79973965.html.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Habermas, supra note 73, at 83–84 (translated version).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ For an inspired proposal for institutional changes in the European Union, see de Witte & Daweson, supra note 154, at 214–17.Google Scholar

¹⁷² For a proposal as to how the design of an international financial architecture could draw on the institutional setting of the ILO, see Tsotroudi, Katerina, International Labour Standards as a Model for the Future: The Case of Financial Regulation, in Les normes internationales du travail: un patrimoine pour l'avenir. Mélanges en l'honneur de Nicolas Valticos 615 (George Politakis ed., 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁷³ See other organizations, for example, Consejo Presidencial Andino, Consejo Consultivo Empresaral, and Consejo Consultivo Laboral. Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ In the case of MERCOSUR, workers' and employers' representatives can also vote on instruments and policies to be adopted by the organization in the area of social and labor affairs.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ For the ECJ, see Jan Komárek, National Constitutional Courts in the European Constitutional Democracy, 12 Int'l J. Const. L. (2014).Google Scholar