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19 “Emerging markets,” which is sometimes used in place of “emerging economies” refers to market and business activities in developing or industrializing regions of the world. It is used in this paper to denote developing regions of the world.Google Scholar

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22 Subject to the global use of alternative forms of energy and the discovery of new fields and mines outside the emerging markets.Google Scholar

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