¹ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).Google Scholar

² Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 1 (1), 1975 (Ger.), translated in Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade—with Commentaries, 9 John Marshall J. of Prac. and Proc. 605 (1976) (translating the First Abortion Judgment).Google Scholar

³ In 1992, the Bundestag (Federal Parliament) adopted a reformed abortion law in order to harmonize the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Even though the law was similar to the one overturned in the First Abortion Judgment, the FCC held in the Second Abortion Judgment of 1993 that in principle it was constitutional. However, the Court affirmed that generally abortion must be regarded as illegal. 88 BVerfGE 203 (203). See also Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and Germany, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 274 (1995). According to the reformed abortion law of 1995, which is in effect today, abortion during the first three months is illegal, but a woman who aborts during this time period after she received counsel will not face legal sanctions.Google Scholar

⁴ Even though Roe v. Wade was limited in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld that the right of privacy encompasses the right to abortion and indicated that criminalization is forbidden until viability. For recent Supreme Court cases on abortion, see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).Google Scholar

⁵ On the pro-life movement, see National Right to Life Committee, http://www.nrlc.org (last visited 6 Nov. 2011).Google Scholar

⁶ See, e.g., Roe v. Wade and the Right to Choose, NARAL Pro Choice America Foundation (1 Jan. 2011), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/government-federal-courts-scotus-roe.pdf (last visited 6 Nov. 2011).Google Scholar

⁷ See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 160 (1973).Google Scholar

⁸ Only the 1970 abortion law of New York did not penalize abortion during the first 24 weeks, and thus corresponded to the standard set out in Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., Eva R. Rubin, Abortion, Politics and the Courts: Roe v. Wade and its Aftermath 24 (1987).Google Scholar

⁹ 39 BVerfGE 1 (49), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 648.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Id. at 68, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 663.Google Scholar

¹¹ E.g., Brugger, Winfried, Abtreibung—ein Grundrecht oder ein Verbrechen? Ein Vergleich der Urteile des United States Supreme Courts und des BVerfG, 39 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 896 (1986).Google Scholar

¹² See e.g., Kommers, Donald P., Abortion and the Constitution: The Cases of the United States and West Germany, 25 Am. J. Comp. L. 255 (1977). “That the highest tribunals of two robust constitutional democracies and secular political cultures should decide differently the question of the unborn child's right to life under the constitutions of their respective countries must excite curiosity, no matter one's stand or stake in the abortion controversy.” Id. (referring to similarities between the German and American political systems and political cultures).Google Scholar

¹³ There exists some literature that explains the discrepancy in the rulings. Kommers suggests that inter alia divergent “social philosophies” between an American individual liberty approach and a German communitarian approach shaped the contrasting decisions. Id. at 280. Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law. American Failures, European Challenges 38 (1987), points out that the FCC majority chose to stress community values, while Roe v. Wade focused on privacy and autonomy. Marc Chase McAllister asserts that the abortion cases reflect the difference between the German Constitution of dignity and the American Constitution of liberty. Marc Chase McAllister, Human Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and the United States as Examined through Each Country's Leading Abortion Cases, 11 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 491, 494 (2004). Douglas G. Morris argues that while the U.S. decision followed a model of individual liberalism, the German majority stood in a tradition of authoritarian liberalism. Douglas G. Morris, Abortion and Liberalism: A Comparison Between the Abortion Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Constitutional Court of West Germany, 11 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 159, 183 (1988); Hartmut Gerstein & David Lowry, Abortion, Abstract Norms and Social Control: The Decision of the West German Federal Constitutional Court, 25 Emory L.J. 849, 869 (1976) recognize a conservative and paternalistic philosophy in the German decision and put forward that the German Court resorted to an abstract analysis, while the Supreme Court undertook judicial balancing of conflicting rights and interests.Google Scholar

Even though the writings address many important issues (especially the influence of liberalism on Roe v. Wade), they underestimate the impact of the justices’ political provenience and the National Socialist past on the First Abortion Judgment. Google Scholar

¹⁴ See, for example, on the debate for the United States, Raymond Tatalovich, & Byron W. Daynes, The Politics of Abortion: A Study of Community Conflict in Public Policy Making 82 et seq. (1981); Lee Epstein & Joseph Kobylka, The Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty 137 et seq. (1992); for Germany, Dirk von Behren, Die Geschichte des § 218 StGB 409 et seq. (2004); Michael Gante, § 218 in der Diskussion. Meinungs- und Willensbildung 1945–1976 129 et seq. (1991).Google Scholar

¹⁵ For the United States, see, for example, Tatalovich, & Daynes, supra note 14, at 82 et seq. and Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 137 et seq. For Germany, see, for example, von Behren, supra note 14, at 409 et seq. and Gante, supra note 14, at 129 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For the pro-choice movement, see Suzanne Staggenborg, The Pro-Choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict 13 (1991); for the pro-life movement, see Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 126 (1984).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Tatalovich & Daynes, supra note 14, at 24.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Mississippi, Colorado, California, North Carolina, Georgia, Maryland, Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, for example, Tatalovich & Daynes, supra note 14, at 24.Google Scholar

¹⁹ New York, Washington State, Hawaii and Alaska. See, e.g., Tatalovich & Daynes, supra note 14, at 24; however, there existed no general trend to abortion reform; four states considered repeal laws in 1971, and the proposals were rejected. Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 151.Google Scholar

²⁰ Four different drafts were introduced to the Bundestag. One from SPD and FDP delegates together, one from a number of SPD parliamentarians and two from CDU/CSU delegates. The majority supported the most liberal SPD/FDP draft, see, for example, the detailed account in Gante, supra note 14, at 160.Google Scholar

²¹ See, for example, Rubin, supra note 8, at 31 or Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 162, who describe the “litigation avalanche.”Google Scholar

²² In the public debate, Roe v. Wade has become the abortion case, because Doe v. Bolton refers in large parts to the reasoning in Roe v. Wade. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973).Google Scholar

²³ According to GG Art. 93(1) S.2 (Ger.), the FCC had jurisdiction in the “abstract norm control” procedure to declare whether a particular law is in line with the constitution. The case can be brought by the federal government, a Länder government, or one fourth of the members of the Bundestag. Before the revision of GG Art. 93(1) S.2 (Ger.) on 1 December 2009, the federal government, a Länder government or one third of the members of the Bundestag could bring the case.Google Scholar

²⁴ See, for example, the powers of the strong U.S. President in the U.S. Const. art. II, and the much weaker German President. GG Art. 54–61 (Ger.).Google Scholar

²⁵ See, for example, the right to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. II.Google Scholar

²⁶ Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights maybe interfered with only pursuant to a law. GG Art. 2(2) (Ger.).Google Scholar

²⁷ “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV; cf. U.S. Const. amend. V.Google Scholar

²⁸ GG Art. 2(2) (Ger.).Google Scholar

²⁹ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).Google Scholar

³⁰ For the U.S. context, see, for example, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).Google Scholar

³¹ For the German jurisprudence, see, for example, 6 BVerfGE 32 (41) (Elfes-judgment).Google Scholar

³² E.g., Augstein, Rudolf, Unseres Herrgotts Kanzlei, Der Spiegel, 3 Feb. 1975.Google Scholar

³³ Id. Google Scholar

³⁴ 39 BVerfGE 1 (49), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 648.Google Scholar

³⁵ E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 498.Google Scholar

³⁶ The Evangelic Church did not have a unified position. However the Protestants who embraced the liberal reform law were in the minority. See, e.g., Simone Mantei, Nein und Ja zur Abtreibung: Die evangelische Kirche in der Reformdebatte um § 218 Stgb 345 (2004).Google Scholar

³⁷ 39 BVerfGE 1 (37, 648), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 638.Google Scholar

³⁸ See, e.g., Kommers, supra note 12, at 279.Google Scholar

³⁹ American Cardinals referred to the judgment as an “unspeakable tragedy for this nation” with “disastrous implications for our stability as a civilized society.” Lawrence van Gelder, Cardinals Shocked—Reaction Mixed; 2 Cardinals Denounce Decision; Other Leaders’ Reactions Mixed ‘Neutrality of State,’ N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 80. However, some churches generally supported a liberalization of the abortion laws; see, for example, Staggenborg, supra note 16, at 23.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Id. at 161.Google Scholar

⁴² Id. Google Scholar

⁴³ Gelder, Lawrence van, Cardinals Shocked-Reaction Mixed; 2 Cardinals Denounce Decision; Other Leaders’ Reactions Mixed ‘Neutrality of State,’ N.Y. Times 23 Jan. 1973.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ For instance, after Roe v. Wade, one of the reform advocates was quoted in the New York Times: “I am delighted to see that our position—that the women have the right to control their own bodies—has been vindicated.” Id.; see also for the women's movement, Rubin, supra note 8, at 89.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 496.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ E.g., Estelle Freedman, No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women 4 (2002).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ For the United States, see, for example, William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II 79 (2003); for Germany, see, for example, Kristina Schulz, Der lange Atem der Provokation: Die Frauenbewegungen in der Bundesrepublik und Frankreich 1968–1976, at 34 (2002).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ For the U.S., see Chafe, supra note 47, at 79; for Germany, see Schulz, supra note 47, at 34.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ E.g., Barbara Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement, Ideology and Activism 42 (1992).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ E.g., Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 145.Google Scholar

⁵¹ E.g., Rubin, supra note 8, at 26.Google Scholar

⁵² E.g., Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 151.Google Scholar

⁵³ E.g., Luker, supra note 16, at 99. Compare the quote of one of the radical women's movements’ supporters:Google Scholar

⁵⁴ E.g., Gerhard, Ute, Frauenbewegung, in Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945: Ein Handbuch 199 (Roland Roth & Dieter Rucht eds., 2008).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See, for example, the protest in the United States against the Miss America Election of 1968, which received wide public attention. Alice Echols, Nothing Distant About It: Women's Liberation and Sixties Radicalism, in The Sixties: From Memory to History 149 et seq. (David Farber ed., 2000). At first the German women's movement did not have a similar outreach.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Alice Schwarzer initiated the “Aktion 218,” according to a French exemplar, and won the support of famous personalities like Romy Schneider, Senta Berger, Sabine Sinjen and Veruschka von Lehndorff. von Behren, supra note 14, at 425.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 427; Edgar Wolfrum, Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart 318 (2006).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ 39 BVerfGE 1 (33), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 635. Horst Ehmke had been Federal Minister of Justice (1969), Chief of Staff at the Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery) (1969–72) as well as Federal Minister for Research, Technology, Post and Telecommunication (1972–74).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Among the most influential groups were the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL), the Association for the Study of Abortion (ASA) and Planned Parenthood. See Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 14, at 144.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ E.g., id. at 144.Google Scholar

⁶¹ E.g., Rubin, supra note 8, at 31.Google Scholar

⁶² Argument, Weddington's, Roe v. Wade, in Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 433 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1990).Google Scholar

⁶³ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 154 (1973).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Id. at 214. (Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas and Justice White formulated their concurring and dissenting opinions in Doe v. Bolton).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Id. Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 208.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164.Google Scholar

⁷² Id. at 153.Google Scholar

⁷³ Id. at 166.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ On the First Abortion Judgment in this direction, see Gerhard Biehler, Sozialliberale Reformgesetzgebung und das Bundesverfassungsgericht 197 (1990).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ The President of the Court Benda, Justice Brox, Justice Böhmer, Justice Ritterspach and Justice Faller all had been nominated following a proposal by the CDU/CSU. Only Justice Haager and the dissenting Justices Rupp-von Brünneck and Simon had been supported by the SPD, see, for example, Christian Stahl, Schwangerschaftsabbruch und Bundesverfassungsgericht: Der Einfluss der Weltanschauung von Bundesverfassungsrichtern auf die Rechtsprechung in weltanschaulichen Fragen 39 (2004). On the debate whether there might have been a third dissenting justice who did not make his dissent explicit, see, for example, id. at 46.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ E.g., Gante, supra note 14, at 160.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ For the minority opinion, see, for example, 39 BVerfGE 1 (68), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 663.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Id. at 44, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 641.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Id. at 55, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 653.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Id. at 56. translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 653.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Id. at 56. translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 653.Google Scholar

⁸² E.g., the critique of Robert Spaemann, Am Ende der Debatte um § 218 StGB, in Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 49 (1974).Google Scholar

⁸³ E.g., Wolfrum, supra note 57, at 152.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ One might question whether there was a unified party position on abortion in the United States. It was not until the 1980s that the national Republican Party took a position for restrictions on abortion; also, the Democratic Party did not formulate a binding position. N.E.H. Hull, William james Hoffer & Peter Charles Hoffer, The Abortion Rights Controversy in American History: A Legal Reader 336 (2001). Nonetheless, there arguably was a tendency of Republicans supporting restrictions while Democrats favored liberal abortion laws.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ E.g., The Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles 8 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ E.g., The Burger Court, supra note 85, at 18.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Justice White argued that the majority opinion meant that “[d]uring the period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 221. Because “nothing in the language or history of the Constitution” would support this interpretation, the laws, which criminalized abortion, were not unconstitutional. Id. Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Rubin, supra note 8, at 24.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).Google Scholar

⁹¹ For example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] 1975, Schwangerschaftsabbruch/Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Fristenlösung, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 74 (1975) (Austria); the German dissent also refers to this decision. 39 BVerfGE 1 (95).Google Scholar

⁹² 39 BVerfGE 1 (68), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 663.Google Scholar

⁹³ Id. at 73, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 667.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Id. at 73, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 667.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ For an extensive study of the different abortion laws, see Albin Eser & Michael Koch, Schwangerschaftsabbruch im internationalen Vergleich: Rechtliche Regelungen—soziale Rahmenbedingungen—empirische Grunddaten (1988).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Id. Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Id. at 483.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Id. at 486 .Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Id. at 163 .Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Roe, 410 U.S. at 169, (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 113, 213 (1973).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ E.g., Hans Vorländer, Politische Kultur, in Länderbericht USA 299 (Peter Lösche & Hans-Dietrich von Loeffelholz eds., 4th ed. 2004); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Liberal Thought Since the Revolution (1955).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ E.g., Hartz, supra note 106, at 5–6.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ E.g., Vorländer, supra note 106, at 299.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ E.g., James P. Young, Reconsidering American Liberalism: The Troubled Odyssey of the Liberal Idea 6 (1996); Hartz, supra note 106, at 3 et seq.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ E.g., Kommers, supra note 12, at 282, who argues that Roe v. Wade “seems perfectly consistent with Madisonian liberalism: the constitutional order is to serve the individual and his interest.”Google Scholar

¹¹¹ E.g., The Burger Court, supra note 85, at 18.Google Scholar

¹¹² The Law: A Stunning Approval for Abortion, Time Magazine, Feb. 5, 1973.Google Scholar

¹¹³ The second oral pleading was held because the first argument had taken place only before 7 justices (two justices had retired in 1971 for health reasons). The majority of the justices decided that there should be a reargument in front of a full bench with two newly appointed justices, see, for example, David Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade, 552 et seq. (1994).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Argument, Weddington's, Roe v. Wade, in Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 433 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1990).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ 39 BVerfGE 1 (43), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 643.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ The divergent resonance of the argument about state limitation in the United States and Germany in the abortion debate has been analyzed in Jürgen Gerhards & Dieter Rucht, Öffentlichkeit, Akteure und Deutungsmuster: Die Debatte über Abtreibungen, in Die Vermessung kultureller Unterschiede. die USA und Deutschland im Vergleich 165, 179 (Jürgen Gerhards ed., 2000).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Kommers, supra note 12, at 280.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ See Kommers, supra note 12, 278 for a different view: “The German decision mentioned two elements of contemporary experience, the widespread incidence of illegal abortion and the Nazi slaughter of defenseless and innocent persons; but in the end these considerations seemed not to loom very large in the reasoning of the Court, although the Court did note that the Founding Fathers had the Nazi experience in mind when they included a right to life in the Basic Law.”Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ 39 BVerfGE 1 (36), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 637.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Id. Google Scholar

¹²¹ Id. at 36, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 637 (quoting 18 BVerfGE 112 (117)).Google Scholar

¹²² Id. at 42, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 642.Google Scholar

¹²³ Id. at 43, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 643.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ E.g., Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] 1975, Schwangerschaftsabbruch/Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Fristenlösung, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 74 (1975) (Austria).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ See Eser & Koch, supra note 95.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Even in Catholic Italy a liberal law similar to the German proposal was not over turned by the Italian Supreme Court in 1978. E.g., Johanna Bosch & Anna Menges, Italien, in Schwangerschaftsabbruch im internationalen Vergleich: Rechtliche Regelungen—soziale Rahmenbedingungen—empirische Grunddaten 872 (Albin Eser & Michael Koch eds., 1988).Google Scholar

¹²⁷ 39 BVerfGE 1 (67), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 661:Google Scholar

¹²⁸ 39 BVerfGE 1 (36), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 637.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Id. at 67, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 662.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ E.g., Hans-Walter Schmuhl, Rassenhygiene, Nationalsozialismus, Euthanasie. von der Verhütung zur Vernichtung “lebensunwerten Lebens,” 1890–1945 364 (1992); Henry Friedländer, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final solution 11 (1995); critical of this view, Dieter Pohl, Verfolgung und Massenmord in der NS-Zeit 1933-1945 34 (2d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

¹³¹ E.g., Henry P. David, Jochen Fleischhacker & Hohn, Charlotte, Abortion and Eugenics in Nazi Germany, 14 Population and Dev. Rev. 81, 88 (1988).Google Scholar

¹³² E.g., David, Fleischhacker & Hohn, , supra note 131, at 88; Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 360.Google Scholar

¹³³ E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 362.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 211; see also on Cardinal von Galen, Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900–1945 176 (1994). However, Burleigh argues that T-4 was not stopped because of the protest but because “the team of practiced murderers were needed to carry out the infinitely vaster enormity in the East that the regime's leaders were actively considering.”Google Scholar

¹³⁵ E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 364.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ 39 BVerfGE 1 (67), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 662.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Id. at 67, translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 661.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ E.g., Schmuhl, supra note 130, at 161.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ E.g., David, Fleischhacker & Hohn, , supra note 131, at 91.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ For example, David, Fleischhacker & Hohn, , supra note 131, at 89, who also stress that during the Nazi era the criteria for obtaining legal abortions were interpreted more strictly and illegal abortionists were punished more severely; see also the dissenting opinion, 39 BVerfGE 1 (76).Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ For example, the dissenting opinion, which used the National Socialist past as support for the view that the state should be careful with criminalization of all kinds of behavior, 39 BVerfGE 1 (76).Google Scholar

¹⁴² 39 BVerfGE 1 (49), translated in Jonas & Gorby, supra note 2, at 648.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ In practice, the law opened the potential for abortion considerably since the social indication was interpreted rather broadly. Albin Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences, 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 369, 381 (1986).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ E.g., Staggenborg, supra note 16, at 58; Luker, supra note 16, at 137.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ E.g., Erich Geldbach, Protestantischer Fundamentalismus in den USA und Deutschland 95 (2001). Geldbach mentions Jerry Falwell, a well-known Southern Baptist pastor, as an example for an evangelist who was mobilized by Roe v. Wade. Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ E.g., Chafe, supra note 47, at 446.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ E.g., von Behren, supra note 14, at 496.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ E.g., id. at 498.Google Scholar