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21. Unlike the president and the liberal candidate, the social-democrats, due to the obvious communicational disadvantages of their candidate wanted to avoid a direct confrontation. For this reason, they chose first not to participate in the Cluj debate, which opposed Basescu to Anonescu, and then to dilute the final meeting by inviting as many candidates as possible. This latter strategy failed, and the discussion took place, two days before the polls opened, only between Basescu, Geoana and Antonescu.
22. Antonescu officially announced his candidature only after winning the presidency of his party at the National Congress held in March. However, the pollsters asked the people in their sample about the ‘liberal candidate’ since January, mentioning both Calin Popescu Tariceanu (the former Prime-Minister and party president at the moment) and Crin Antonescu.
23. The actual results for the first round were: Basescu: 32.44%, Geoana 31.15%, Antonescu 20.02%.
24. In the avalanche of election polls, one could hardly distinguish these differences. By comparing the 50 collected polls, we can conclude that the four institutes that conducted exit polls during election days predicted the results quite accurately.
25. The turnout during elections was similar to the one reported during the polls prior to 22 November.
26.Hallin, D.C. and Mancini, P. (2004) Comparing Media Systems. Three Models of Media and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
27. The only sanction was a fine from the National Audio-visual Council. Antena 3 did the same in the second round, presenting the exit polls on the ‘Sinteza Zilei’ show, before the closure of the voting stations.