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2. This being said, preparing for EU membership has had a major impact on post-communist law: ‘European directives have had a clearly disruptive effect on national legal orders, resulting in the questioning of old values of legal science and the call for novel answers to new problems.’ Hesselink, referred to in Kühn, Z. (2008) Development of comparative law in Central and Eastern Europe, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 215–236.Google Scholar

3. For a thorough account of definitions, see Reference 1.Google Scholar

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5. The project was funded by the Research Council of Norway (grant no. 156856/V10) and carried out jointly by NIBR, the Centre for Social and Economic Strategies, Charles University, Prague/GfK-Prague (Czech Republic), Faculty of Criminal Justice, University of Maribor (Slovenia), Vitosha Research (Bulgaria) and the Romanian Academic Society/Gallup (Romania).Google Scholar

6. (1) Elected representatives; (2) political party representatives; (3) prosecutors and judges; (4) representatives of local businesses; (5) representatives of international businesses; (6) public procurement officials; (7) media representatives; and (8) NGO representatives. As regards the judges, we were interested in the views and experiences of judges as such, the sample included judges from different types of courts rather than one specific type of court.Google Scholar

7. NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units) II is the main analytical level used in EU regional policy analysis.Google Scholar

8. G. Lengyel (n.d.) Notes of the ‘quality of elites’. In: Elites in Central-Eastern Europe (Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Foundation), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/04578.pdf On page 8 Lengyel notes that ‘the attitudes and opinions of the elite differ in many ways from the rest of the population's. They are more meritocratic, individualistic, use more elaborate codes, and form more consistent opinions than the rest of the society, including professionals themselves. They are less tolerant towards norm breaching behaviour and they are more pro-European than the rest.’ Following from this, elites in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania should be more negative to corruption and more favourable to EU membership than the general population. Consequently, they may be more sensitive to EU criticism of corruption in their countries and possibly more likely to decline to be interviewed, or to provide a certain type of answers. Different types of elites, however, may differ in their perceptions of corruption as well as the EU. Ruling elites may be more sensitive to such phenomena than non-ruling elites and views may also differ by sub-groups of elites within both categories. For a more general discussion of elites in post-communist states, see Gel'man, V. and Steen, A. (2003) Elites and Democratic Development in Russia. An Introduction (London/New York: Routledge). The average refusal rate (all categories of respondents merged) in the Czech Republic was 59%, in Romania it was 55%, in Slovenia 71% and in Bulgaria 17%. A corruption scandal involving the then Czech Prime Minister, Stanislav Gross, broke in April 2005, i.e. shortly before our quantitative survey was carried out, and Romania was under considerable pressure by the EU to introduce more effective measures against corruption and also to introduce reform the judiciary at the time. This may partly explain the reluctance of elites to take part in our survey. In comparison, corruption has been less prominent in the Slovenian public debate. Still, refusal rates were higher there than in any of the other countries. The most plausible explanation is that interview locations in Slovenia are fairly small compared with those of other countries. Consequently, the pool of potential respondents is smaller and members of the elite more likely to be well known in the local community. Despite reassurances both on the part of the pollsters and NIBR (grant-holding institution) that data would be treated confidentially, prospective respondents may therefore have thought it would be possible to identify them all the same, should they agree to take part in the survey.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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10. Findings presented in this article have not been weighted by category of elites – i.e. by the potential number of respondents for each elite category – as (a) it is not possible to construct accurate weights for all of them, (b) quota samples are fairly small and (c) not all respondents answered the most sensitive questions on contacts and informal networks. However, we have compared weighted and non-weighted findings for those categories of elites for which we were able to create approximate weights. Weights were calculated based on the discrepancy between the probability of selection and the actual number of respondents for each category. Such data were available for six categories in Bulgaria, five in Slovenia and four in Romania. We did not have access to such data for the Czech Republic. Differences between weighted and non-weighted results were checked for those categories of respondents whose actual or estimated weights differed from 1. At the aggregate level (cross-country comparison) results differed only by a few percentages (0–2). Weighted and non-weighted findings were not compared at the more disaggregated level, as the number of respondents was small and, consequently, differences in weights would have a big impact on results.Google Scholar

11. For a detailed account of how the qualitative data were analysed, see Note 1.Google Scholar

12. However, in some cases we have referred to smaller differences between countries in the text, for instance in cases where it has been important to show the distribution continuum of the four countries.Google Scholar

13. For a discussion on the concept of the rule of law, see MacFarlane, N. (2003) Politics and the rule of law in the Commonwealth of Independent States. In: D.J. Galligan and M. Kurkchiyan, eds., Law and Informal Practices. The Post-Communist Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 61–66.Google Scholar

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17. Almost 4% of the respondents opted for responses that were not read to them (a mix of these – 2.8%, depends – 0.3%, do not know – 0.4%). Data weighted by country, N=2359.Google Scholar

18. Lb-1-Cz indicates that the respondent represents local business, is respondent number 1 within this category and based in the Czech Republic. Similarly, public procurement officials are referred to as Pr, representatives of local businesses as Lb, representatives of foreign businesses as Fb, elected representatives as El-r, political party representatives as PP, prosecutors and judges as Le, media representatives as Me, NGO representatives as NGO, EU representatives as EU, Council of Europe representatives as CoE and government officials working in the field of anti-corruption as Go. Cz indicates that the interview was conducted in the Czech Republic, Sl that it was conducted in Slovenia and Bu that it was conducted in Bulgaria.Google Scholar

19. Respondents were asked the following question: on a scale from one to seven where one is more law-abiding and seven is less law-abiding, would you say that people in (COUNTRY) are generally more law-abiding or less law-abiding now than they were during communism? We coded one and two as ‘more law abiding now’, six and seven as ‘less law-abiding now’ and three, four and five as ‘neutral’. The ‘do not know’ answer category, accounting for 3% of the answers, has been excluded. N=2384.Google Scholar

20.Trandafir, G. (2006) Romania prepares a recipe for fighting corruption. Southeast European Times, 31 July; Economist (2007) The new kids on the block, 4 January; Euroobserver.com (2007) Romania to slow anti-corruption fight, minister warns, 9 January.Google Scholar

21. Respondents were asked the following question: on a scale from one to seven where one is more law-abiding and seven is less law-abiding, would you say that people in (COUNTRY) are generally more law-abiding or less law-abiding now than they were five years ago? We coded one and two as ‘more law-abiding now’, six and seven as ‘less law-abiding now’ and three, four and five as ‘neutral.’ The ‘do not know’ answer category, accounting for 2% of the answers, has been excluded. N=2404.Google Scholar

22. A study of attitudes towards the rule of law in Russia, found that such attitudes remained stable over time. Gibson, J.L. (2003) Russian attitudes towards the rule of law. In: D.J. Galligan and M. Kurkchiyan, eds., Law and Informal Practices. The Post-Communist Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 87–88.Google Scholar

23. The proportion of respondents holding the view that EU membership would make people less law-abiding, varied between 1% (Bulgaria) and 9% (Czech Republic). The Czech Republic and Slovenia joined the EU in May 2004 whereas Bulgaria and Romania joined in January 2007. Interviewing for the quantitative survey in the Czech Republic and Slovenia started in April 2005 and these countries officially joined EU on 1 May 2004. Given the short time-gap, however, this is not likely to have affected respondents’ view on EU-related questions.Google Scholar

24. There is, of course, no guarantee that increased exposure to countries in which law-abidingness is higher, will make people from post-communist countries more law-abiding as such. Western business-people tend to adjust and if necessary give bribes in countries where this is a pre-condition for obtaining lucrative contracts, even though in their own country they may never consider such an approach.Google Scholar

25.See for instance Charlemagne (2008) Europe's Marxist dilemma. It is easier to influence a Country before than after it joins the Club. The Economist, 24 April.Google Scholar

26. Respondents were asked the following question: please show me on this seven-point scale, where one represents no trust and seven great trust, how great your personal trust is in the courts. We coded one and two as ‘low trust’, six and seven as ‘great trust’ and three, four and five as ‘medium trust’. N=2416.Google Scholar

27. Six and seven were coded as ‘high trust’, one and two were coded as ‘low trust’ and three, four and five were coded as ‘medium trust’.Google Scholar

28. Our findings are somewhat more positive than that of public opinion polls conducted in these countries in recent years. See (1).Google Scholar

29.Miller, W.L., Grødeland, Å.B. and Koshechkina, T.Y. (2001) A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Postcommunist Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press).Google Scholar

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31.For an overview of flaws in the Romanian court system, see World Bank (2005, 2007) in Notes 1 and 30. It should be mentioned, however, that inefficient legal systems are not only a problem in the East, but also in the West. However, in the East it is reinforced by widespread culture of informal practice in the past. Attitudes to the law and law abidingness are also different in the West.Google Scholar

32. Respondents were asked four questions derived from BEEPS surveys, about five different types of institutions/persons: ‘Would you say that (public procurement, courts, elected political bodies, business, political party representatives) are (i) fair and impartial?; (ii) honest and uncorrupted?; (iii) easy to access, and (iv) easy to influence? There were six answer categories (always, mostly, frequently, sometimes, seldom and never). In the analysis always and mostly are grouped together as positive, frequently and sometimes – as neutral, and the latter two answer categories as negative.Google Scholar

33.Not only backlogs, but also drawn-out court proceedings and poor quality judgements are causing problems for those seeking justice in Romanian courts. World Bank (2005) Project Information Document – PID – Appraisal Stage, Report no. AB1923, available at www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/113/2005/10/31/000104615_20051101104829/original/PID010A.Google Scholar

34. Although not asked about this outright, some respondents suggested this when answering other questions. Our conclusions on this issue above, are based on an analysis of our respondents’ statements on this issue.Google Scholar

35. Respondents were asked the following questions: would you say that courts are (1) fair and impartial?; (2) honest and uncorrupted?; (3) easy to access?; and (4) easy to influence? They were told to choose between the following answer categories: ‘always’, ‘mostly’, ‘frequently’, ‘sometimes’, ‘seldom’ and ‘never’. Figure 4 shows the percentages of those who answered these questions with ‘always’ or ‘mostly’. ‘Don't know’ and ‘No reply’ are not included in the analysis. N varies from 2325 (easy to access) to 2382 (fair and impartial).Google Scholar

36. Between 2000 and 2004, Romania launched several initiatives and also passed three laws aimed at de-politicising the judiciary and freeing it from state control. Although this may not have reduced attempts at influencing court staff as such, it should at least have reduced the scope for political influence in the judiciary (see Reference 33).Google Scholar

37. We instructed the pollsters to conduct one third of the interviews with prosecutors and two thirds of the interviews with judges – though bearing in mind that this might be difficult, given the need to in some instances obtain official permission to interview both. In the end, the share of the interviews conducted with prosecutors constituted 23% in the Czech Republic, 31% in Slovenia, 35% in Bulgaria and 32% in Romania.Google Scholar

38.A former Slovenian public prosecutor general, A. Drobnic, complains that the old communist elite largely controls the Slovenian courts and states that ‘after half a century of lies, the abnormal subservience of the Slovenian judiciary to politics is still considered quite normal.’ A. Drobnic (1998) Rule of law and Slovenian jurisprudence, available at www.prah.net/slovenia/justice/drobnic.htm visited 30 March 2006.Google Scholar

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43. In contrast, 16% of the respondents from the other categories of elites said the same.Google Scholar

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46. The formal qualifications and training of the person interpreting the law also to some extent affect the outcome. In post-communist states poor qualifications amongst judges and prosecutors is quite a problem, as is the relative inexperience of younger staff.Google Scholar

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48. It is also worth noting that the percentage who answered that they had no discretionary powers was much larger in Romania (24%) than in the other three countries where from 2 to 7% of the respondents expressed the same view.Google Scholar

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53. Respondents were asked ‘how often are you approached with various requests by…?’ and were given five different answer categories: ‘very often’, ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ and ‘never’. Figure 5 shows the percentages of those who opted for ‘very often’ and ‘often’. The ‘do not know’ answer category, accounting for 1 to 2% of the answers for each type of request, has been excluded. N=297.Google Scholar

54. Eleven percent of the Czech respondents had been asked to facilitate contact to colleagues or superiors, compared with 3% of the Slovenian, 7% of the Bulgarian and 5% of the Romanian respondents. Similarly, 11% of the Czech respondents had been asked to facilitate access to people in other institutions, compared with none of the respondents in Slovenia and Bulgaria, and 7% of the Romanian respondents. Finally, 12% of the Czech respondents had been asked to provide a job for someone, compared with 1% of the Slovenian, 5% of the Bulgarian and 1% of the Romanian respondents.Google Scholar

55. Whereas only 35% of the Slovenian respondents had experienced attempts at influencing them through friendly behaviour, corresponding figures for the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania were 66%, 69% and 57% accordingly. Similarly, only 24% of the Slovenian respondents said they had experienced persistence, compared with 54% of the Czech, 55% of the Bulgarian and 50% of the Romanian respondents. Finally, 25% of the Slovenian respondents said attempts had been made at influencing them through appealing to their good nature – in contrast to 38% of the Czech, 54% of the Bulgarian and 53% of the Romanian respondents.Google Scholar

56. Argument was most common in the Czech Republic (48%) and Bulgaria (40%), and less widespread in Slovenia (11%) and Romania (13%). Surprisingly many of the Czech respondents (32%) had been offered some sort of reciprocity, compared with 12% of the Slovenian, 21% of the Bulgarian and 20% of the Romanian respondents. Whereas a total of 28% of the Czech respondents had been offered a small present, only 5% of the Slovenian, 15% of the Bulgarian and 10% of the Romanian respondents reported the same. Respondents in the Czech Republic were slightly more often offered money (13%) and expensive presents (12%) compared with respondents elsewhere (1% of the Slovenian, 6% of the Bulgarian and 4% of the Romanian respondents had been offered a small present; whereas between 3 and 4% had been offered an expensive present).Google Scholar

57. Respondents were asked the following question: ‘have people requesting favours from you ever tried to influence you by…’ and were asked to answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Figure 6 shows the percentages of those who answered ‘yes’. Answers coded as ‘do not know’ (between 6 and 8% of the respondents depending on type of attempt, are excluded from the figure. N=283.Google Scholar

58. Some 66% of those who provide favours the least say they have high trust in the courts, compared with only 33% of the most active providers of favours.Google Scholar

59. Of those respondents who are the least responsive, 83% thought courts are always or mostly fair and impartial, 87% thought they are always or mostly honest and uncorrupted and 65% held the view that courts are always or mostly easy to access.Google Scholar