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Just Hitting the Nail or Also the Thumb? The Court’s Deference to Member States

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JanZglinski, Europe’s Passive Virtues: Deference to National Authorities in EU Free Movement Law (Oxford University Press2020) pp. 256.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2021

Susanne K. Schmidt*
Affiliation:
Institute of Political Science, University of Bremen; email: skschmidt@uni-bremen.de.

Abstract

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Type
Book Review Essay
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Constitutional Law Review

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Footnotes

I am grateful to Nik de Boer and the editors for extremely helpful comments. The research assistance of Theresa Nußbaum is gratefully acknowledged.

References

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13 F.W. Scharpf, ‘Forced Structural Convergence in the Eurozone’, in A. Hassel and B. Palier (eds.), Growth and Welfare in Advanced Capitalist Economies How Have Growth Regimes Evolved? (Oxford University Press 2021) Table 5.3.

14 G. Davies, ‘Brexit and the Free Movement of Workers: A Plea for National Legal Assertiveness’, 41 European Law Review (2016) p. 925 at p. 926.

15 D. Finke, ‘A Guardian in Need of Support: the Enforcement of EU State Aid Rules’, Journal of European Public Policy (2021) at p. 15, ⟨https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/13501763.2021.1873403?needAccess=true⟩, visited 21 June 2021.

16 N. Lindstrom, ‘Aiding the State: Administrative Capacity And Creative Compliance With European State Aid Rules in New Member States’, Journal of European Public Policy (2020), ⟨https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epub/10.1080/13501763.2020.1791935?needAccess=true⟩, visited 21 June 2021.

17 G.N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change? American Politics and Political Economy (University of Chicago Press 1993).

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22 T. Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union as an Institutional Actor (Cambridge University Press 2018) p. 14.

23 G. Silverstein, Law’s Allure: How Law Shapes, Constrains, Saves, and Kills Politics (Cambridge University Press 2009) p. 268.

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26 The mayor of Mannheim, at the committee of the regions, criticised the fact that all land development plans seemed to need notification: ⟨http://www.mrn-news.de/2019/06/28/mannheim-ob-dr-kurz-spricht-in-bruessel-zur-drohenden-notifizierungspflicht-fuer-kommunale-bebauungsplaene-393743/⟩, visited 21 June 2021.

27 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press 2007) p. 44.